Abstract
This article analyzes the identity dimension of Turkey's foreign policy and its relationship with the West. It aims to provide an explanation of such a complex issue looking at it through historical lenses, and by mainly analyzing the impact of the country's Westernisation, which led to an essentialization of its foreign policy. Such a concept will be explained through the investigation of the relationship of two exclusive categories towards the West, namely the supposedly unconditional pro-Westernism of the Kemalists and the supposed anti-Westernism of the Islamists. From the Ottoman Empire’s decline and the emergence of a defensive culture of national security, to Turkish attitude after the Second World War, passing through the Kemalist period that governed the country in the Twenties and Thirties, the article will make reference to the pivotal historical events which concurred in the creation of the Turkish identity as we know it nowadays.
Author:
Marco Rizzi - Junior Researcher Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Environment Culture & Society
1. Introduction
Concepts like “geostrategic importance", "reorientation of foreign policy", and "break with the West" are constantly mentioned when analysing Turkish foreign policy. They reflect an ideological dimension that is a consequence of Turkish modernisation and occupy an important place in its policy.
Turkish foreign policy and its relations with the rest of the world are very complex and the product of events occurred in the past decades. From this perspective, Turkey's international relations have been deeply affected by the country's geostrategic position, which played an essential role for centuries. For instance, it determined the Ottoman Empire's relations with the European powers and Russia, especially since the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji of 1774. Territorial losses to Russia and other European powers, increasingly led to an Ottoman awareness of decline, which the modernising and westernising reforms, the Tanzimat reforms, attempted to halt.
These reforms aimed to address two major challenges: firstly, to modernise the state and the army in order to respond to the Western military superiority that threatened the very survival of the Ottoman state, and secondly, to forge an Ottoman identity in response to the inter-communal violence that endangered its society. At the same time, the 'Ottomanism' sought, with the adoption of the principle of equality of Christian and Muslim subjects, to create a new Ottoman citizenship. The culmination of this ideology is witnessed in the 1876 Constitution. However, following the Ottoman defeat by Russia in 1878, the Sultan Abdülhamid II suspended the Constitution and pursued the “Pan-Islamism” ideology, the aim of which was to avoid the disintegration of the Empire by strengthening the solidarity of its Muslim elements (Aksakal, 2011). Such a policy further aggravated intercommunal violence and radicalised the Young Turk opposition that came to power after the 1908 revolution. The new government maintained the objective of modernisation, but quickly shifted towards Turkish nationalism and sought in the ‘Pan-Turkism’ the solution to re-found the Empire by including all Turks on an ethnic basis. After unsuccessfully seeking a military alliance with the Western Allies, Turkey allied with Germany, which dragged the Empire into the First World War and brought about its downfall (Aksakal, 2010).
The Tanzimat did not end the territorial losses but did result in the emergence of an ideology that saw the future of society and the state in the European model of the secularised nation-state. This “Westernisation” resulted in an odd relationship with the West and in an identity and ideological burden in the Ottoman and then Turkish foreign policy. After the victory in the War of Independence against the West (1919-1922), the founders of republican Turkey took up the project of Westernisation and the creation of a secularised nation-state (Findley, 2010). But in doing so, they established, through their relationship with the Islamic world, a paradoxical relationship with their society: Islam became both the foundation of the nation and its enemy because, on the one hand, belonging to Islam was needed to be part of the new Turkish nation but, on the other hand, it was perceived as a threat to secularism, another fundamental component of the new-born Turkish Republic (Hanioğlu, 2010).
The question of Westernisation and alignment with the West has an ideological and identity-related dimension and leads to exclusive categories that offer the image of a country and a society torn apart. Thus, in his article announcing a "clash of civilisations", Samuel Huntington (2011) describes Turkey as the "ideal type of country torn apart" on the question of whether its society belongs to one civilisation or another: in the late 20th century, leaders of Turkey followed the Atatürk tradition in defining Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nation state. In fact, Turkey allied with the West in NATO and in the Gulf War and they applied for membership in the European Union. At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern and Muslim Society.
For decades, Turkey was deeply divided between the Kemalists, who were resolute supporters of an unconditional alignment with the West, and the Islamists, hostile to the West and in favour of a return to the Muslim world. Both in the West and in Turkey, this gave rise to the fear of a possible ‘Islamisation’ of Turkish society, challenging the Kemalist modernization and process of Westernization. These fears have been reinforced especially when the AK, the Justice and Development Party, came to power: this because, after a brief period of euphoria where this party embodied moderation and democratisation (2002-2009), it has revealed itself as a very conservative and Islamic side (Cizre-Sakallioglu et al. 2003; Çarkoğlu, 2002; Çarkoğlu, 2012). This policy was interpreted in the West as a break with the Kemalist tradition, the end of Turkey's alignment with the West and its return to the Middle East, as the AKP's "Neo-Ottomanism" was accompanied by policies promoting conservative values, authoritarian drifts and ambiguous relations with Russia and certain Middle Eastern actors (Ylmaz, 2020).
To better understand what the relationship between the definition of national identity and Turkey’s international orientation is, through a chronological approach, this short analysis will provide a summary of the most important historical events. These will be read through critical lenses and will allow for a simplified understanding of the country's complex relationship with the Western and the Eastern world.
2. The Ottoman Empire’s Decline, the Emergence of a Defensive Culture of National Security and its Impact on Relations with the West
After its establishment in 1299, the Ottoman Empire underwent rapid territorial expansion and posed a threat to Christian Europe until the failure of the Second siege of Vienna in 1683. The 1699 Treaty of Karlowitzof marked the beginning of the Ottoman retreat. From then on, Ottoman Realpolitik’s objective was no longer to manage the Westward expansion but to slow down the Eastward retreat (Kaya, 2014). From this date onwards, its military and diplomatic isolation forced the Empire to negotiate its territories between the great powers (Karaosmanoǧlu, 2000).
The Russian victories and the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca confirmed the Ottoman retreat. However, because of the Russian threat, the Ottoman Empire's geostrategic position became an asset for its diplomacy: Russian attempts to expand its territories and to conquer the Straits led France and Great Britain, concerned about the security of their route towards India, to defend the Ottoman Empire (Elezovic, 2017). In order to avoid a power vacuum, or even a Russian hegemony that would result from the rapid collapse of the Empire, the other great European powers thus favoured its defensive diplomacy. This allowed it to survive, despite its weakness, for more than a century. However, this did not stop the territorial losses or the increasingly frequent interventions of the European powers in its territory.
Born in such a context, the Young Turk movement developed a “spirit of siege” according to which the Ottoman state, on the verge of being destroyed, would be engaged in a struggle for survival (Kaya, 2014). The rise of a German threat in the Middle East at the outbreak of the First World War shattered the balance of power that had allowed the Ottoman Empire to survive in the 19th century. Such a threat led Great Britain to stop prioritising the defence of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire (Erickson, 2001). However, the Russian withdrawal from the Great War allowed France and Great Britain to share the Ottoman territories alone, a sharing confirmed by the Treaty of Sèvres of August 1920 (Ibid.). This Treaty became a new determining element in Turkey's relationship with the West, as well as in its relations with the rest of the world. The "Sèvres syndrome", defined as the fear of betrayal and territorial losses, was indeed a common trait of Kemalists and Islamists (Guida, 2008). Moreover, the Treaty encouraged the continuation of the defensive diplomacy of alignment with the West, which was essential for the new Turkish state.
3. The Kemalist Period Marked by a Defensive Policy and a "Spirit of Siege", and the Deep Westernisation of Turkey Beyond Contradictions and Ambiguities
The disintegration of the Ottoman state led to the emergence of a nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal, better known as Atatürk ("the father of the Turks"). He came to power in the midst of a profound social and economic crisis, a product of the debacle of the Ottoman Empire, which had begun its decline after the First World War. He resulted victorious in the so-called War of Independence, rendered the Treaty of Sevres null and void, and replaced it with the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923. The Westernisation policies that followed aimed to create a stronger state and a homogeneous nation. The Kemalist project moderated the feeling of Pan-Turkism, by renouncing to the irredentist project of reuniting the Turkish peoples, but it was driven by the objective of creating a national community and of modernising the new state on the Western model in order to strengthen it against the Western threat (Zurcher, 2014; Morris, 2019).
The founders of republican Turkey came mainly from the Ottoman army and the ranks of the Young Turk movement. Thus, for political reasons, the Ottoman army tried to create a state and society in its own image by practising a policy of Westernisation. However, it did not limit itself to modernising the state by building a strong army, an administration, and by establishing the rule of law. It was above all a matter of westernising society and also to model a new Turkish population with this new culture and identity (ibid). Authoritarian modernisation consisted of reforms imposed with an iron fist from the establishment of the party-state regime in 1925 (Ozsoy, 2009). Ethnic and religious groups were forced to assimilate into the identity promoted by the new state and subscribe to the values of the new regime (Fernee, 2014). Although the War of Independence was fought against “the West”, the Kemalist project is often seen as synonymous with radical and unconditional Westernisation. In fact, Westernisation and especially secularisation reforms led to a Western-style essentialisation of the regime. This reality nevertheless obscured the complexity of the ties that Mustafa Kemal had with the West: one of the ambiguities of Kemalism was the tension between the ideology of Westernisation and the relations with the Western powers: Mustafa Kemal came from the ranks of the army and the Young Turk movement, which were vectors of the ideology of Westernisation. Marked by the role played by the Western powers in the decline and disappearance of the Empire, he shared the defensive culture of national security and the spirit of siege of his contemporaries. The West is for him a model, an ideal to be achieved, but at the same time a threat. The survival of the Turkish state and the feeling of this threat are decisive drivers for his reforms and his politics. Westernisation is therefore also a policy of defence against the West (Ates, 2003; Fernee, 2014).
The ambiguities of Kemalist Westernisation also extended to religion: During the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal used Muslim identity and religious symbols to mobilise the popular masses. But ideologically, he was influenced by the ideas of "Westernists" definition of the nation. Mustafa Kemal, as early as 1923, played an important role in introducing the Turkish language in Friday sermons, prayers and ritual acts. In 1924, the abolition of the caliphate and the reform of national education aimed at deleting the social and political influence of Islam and to bring it under political control. This context led to the publication of a Turkish translation of the Qur'an in 1924 (Fernee, 2014, Ozsoy, 2009). The objective of creating a modern homogeneous nation was supposed to avoid division and disintegration. However, in concrete terms, the homogenisation of Anatolia was achieved through its Islamisation. In the first instance, the founders of the new state made adhesion to Islam the main condition for joining the new nation. In fact, Islam became both an ideology of national liberation as well as a criterion for adherence to the new national identity. But the objective of creating a modern state through Westernisation policies meant to control religion and to erase its influence through the suppression of its institutions and to make room for other symbols and new values (Brockelmann et al. 1960). However, unlike the military, the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy, the rural masses and the traditional Muslim community were not affected by the authoritarian social reengineering that Kemalism promoted. And by appealing to one Turkey, one culture and one civilization, Kemalism deliberately nullified the country's cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. This was especially true in the case of ethnic minorities such as the Kurds, Sunni Muslims, or the Armenians, who are Christians, who have accused Kemalism of a policy of denial of their existence, and, as said, of systematic conversion by force (Zeydanlıoğlu, 2008; Tombus et al. 2017; Kieser, 2003).
However, Kemalist modernisation was limited to an internal Westernisation of society. To avoid the fate of the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalist elites avoided engaging their country in international tensions and developed a policy of neutrality regarding the country's involvement in a war, still remaining very active when it came to exploiting rivalries to ensure the survival of the state (Ozsoy, 2009). In the context of the Second World War, Turkey, coherent to its doctrine, favoured national independence and sovereignty. But, because of the country's geographical position, its diplomacy was also able to exploit international tensions and rivalries: Through the friendship Treaties of 1921 and 1925, it maintained the status quo with the Soviet Union. In 1932, it joined the League of Nations. In 1934, in order to stabilise its Western borders, it joined the Balkan Entente alongside Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia. From 1935, international tensions linked to Mussolini's and Hitler's ambitions enabled it to obtain a revision of the status of the Straits. In the same year, Turkey renewed the status quo with the USSR by renewing the friendship Treaties between the two countries for ten years. In 1936, it obtained the signature of the Montreux Convention, which allowed it to establish full sovereignty over the Straits (Deringil, 2004; Macfie, 1989). The Saadabad Pact of 1937 with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan strengthened the security of its Eastern borders and its cooperation with Iran and Iraq against the Kurdish rebels. In 1939, the threat of war in Europe allowed Turkey to sign cooperation and non-aggression agreements with France and Great Britain, to receive their financial aid and to integrate the Sanjak of Alexandretta into its national territory. After the French defeat in 1940, it signed non-belligerency agreements with Italy and, in 1941, a treaty of friendship with Germany with which it maintained its economic relations while refusing to enter the war on its side. But, after the Stalingrad Battle, and the change in the balance of power between Germany and the USSR, Turkey assumed a more neutral and Russophile posture (Macfie, 1989). It was not until after the Yalta conference, which was a conditional meeting for the participation in the United Nations Organisation, that Turkey officially declared war on Germany on the 23rd of February 1945 (Seydi, 2004).
All in all, the Turkish Revolution was a genuine national liberation movement that ushered in a process of cultural reform and social reconstruction unprecedented in an Islamic country. At that time, an authoritarian secular order was imposed, which did not become completely hegemonic. Once his revolution was over, Atatürk carried out a series of structural reforms to modernize the state under a democratic system and adopted the French republican model as the basis of the country's legal structure. But it was the introduction of the secular state, totally separated from the religion of Islam, that gave Turkey its decisive character. The heritage of this republican vision of the state advocated for administrative secularism. However, strong traditional and historical ties with Islam, which for 600 years was the basis of the Ottoman Empire, remained present in the country. In fact, tensions between Kemalists and Islamists were mainly over Westernisation reforms and the imposition of a European way of life. The survival of the state, the desire to make the most of the country's assets, notably its geographical position, and the desire to exploit international rivalries constituted the foundations of Turkish foreign policy. The following Cold War led to a policy of international Westernisation that also showed the complexity of Turkey's relationship of Kemalist and conservatives vis à vis the West.
4. Turkey After the End of the Second World War: Shifting from Alliances Towards Autonomy
From the beginning of the Second World War, the Turkish Straits became a subject of tension with the USSR, which accused Turkey of letting German military ships through. In March 1945, the USSR abrogated the 1925 Friendship Treaty and proposed a new status allowing it to create a joint military base with Turkey to ensure the security of the Straits. In order to achieve this objective, the USSR also demanded the return of certain Turkish territories (Forestier-Peyrat, 2021; Weinland, 1972). Due to the new context of the great wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, the Allies remained open on the question of territories and on the revision of the Montreux agreement but refused to recognise the right of the USSR to ensure the security of the Straits together with Turkey (Weinland, 1972).
To counter Soviet pressure, Turkey aligned itself with the Western bloc. From 1947, it benefited from the military and financial aid stemming from the Truman Doctrine, and joined economic, cultural, and military organisations created by the Western alliance. Given the new international orientation and its entry into the so-called free world, Turkey had to put an end to its one-party system and established a multiparty political system in 1946. The first free elections in 1950 gave victory to the Democratic Party (DP), a conservative party opposed to Kemalist Westernisation (McGhee, 2016; Satterthwaite, 1972). Because of its challenge of Westernisation and some firm conservative points concerning religion, the DP is often presented as an Islamist party and its victory defined as the "beginning of Turkish Islamism" (Ozkan, 2017).
But while the DP government challenged Westernisation domestically, it reinforced Turkey's integration into the Western bloc: its participation in the Korean War allowed it to join NATO in 1952. This membership can be seen as the end of a long period characterised by military and diplomatic isolation and defensive diplomacy, determined by the fear of disintegration and territorial abandonment which began with the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699 (Karaosmanoǧlu, 2000). Such a membership was perceived as a great success: on the one hand, membership was seen as a guarantee of protection against the USSR and for the modernisation of the country thanks to American financial and military assistance. On the other hand, it is seen as recognition of Turkey as a Western country. This alignment opened a unique period of identification with the West in all economic, social, political, and cultural fields. Also, membership in NATO and other Western international organisations was seen by the Turks as proof of their status as full members of Western civilisation, towards which they have been striving for decades (McGhee, 2016). Integration into the institutions of the Western bloc allowed intellectuals, bureaucrats and experts close to the decision-making circles to participate in the construction of the Western identity of their country, opposed to the Eastern bloc countries’ model. This ideological and symbolic aspect played an important role in Turkey's entry into NATO and the Western bloc, despite internal criticism. In this context, Turkey worked hard to strengthen the Western bloc in the region. It played an important role in the establishment of the 1953 Balkan Pact with Greece and Yugoslavia and the 1955 Baghdad Pact with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Great Britain (CENTO). During the Suez crisis in 1956, it aligned itself with the American position and, in 1957, it adhered to the Eisenhower Doctrine. It thus appeared "more Westernist than the Westerners” (Ozavci, 2015). In this phase of alignment with the West, those circles that could be described as Islamist were not opposed to the West or opposed to Turkey's new orientation either. However, even in this period when Turkey appeared to be very much aligned with the West, but the relationship with this world was not free of contradictions: for instance, when the United States, Turkish main financial supporter, showed reluctance to accept new requests for economic aid, Adnan Menderes, the DP Prime Minister, turned to the USSR, not hesitating to exploit international rivalries. Thus, from 1958, a rapprochement with the Eastern bloc and the USSR began to take shape, which led to the signing of a trade agreement between Turkey and Poland in March 1960 (Yanik, 2007).
In the same period, criticism of the West, especially of the US, came from both Kemalist and Islamic sides. The former believed that the country's independence was compromised by American economic aid and military bases. The privileges granted to the United States and its military and administrative personnel in Turkey and their abuses were also violently criticised in Kemalist circles. The latter's attacks were focused on the Muslims’ conditions in Western colonies. In conservative circles, American cultural and social influence, especially alcohol consumption and gender relations, also raised moral criticism (Guney, 2008). All these criticisms became even more bitter after the Cuban crisis: more tensions arose when a letter from US President Johnson informed the Turkish government that protection by NATO against the USSR was not automatic. This ended Turkey's unconditional alignment with the West and led to a "multidimensional approach” to its foreign policy, with an empowerment autonomy from the US, and an increasing anti-Americanism in Turkey (Yegin et al. 2013; Ozkan, 2019). Turkish distrust was reinforced during the Cyprus crisis which led to a Turkish intervention in the island in 1974 (Ozkan, 2019).
Turkey's relations with Israel and the Arab countries also show that the identity issue does not determine its foreign policy. After voting against the 1947 partition plan, Turkey recognized Israel de facto in 1949 and de jure in 1950. Between 1950 and 1953, Turkey and Israel signed numerous agreements on trade and cultural and scientific cooperation. After the Suez Crisis, Turkey reduced the rank of its diplomatic representation in Israel and the peak of the distension of the relations occurred when two years later, in August 1958, the two countries signed a secret strategic alliance with Iran, named the Phantom Pact (Volk, 2013). The determining factor in this rapprochement with Israel was Turkey's perception of the threats coming from its regional environment. The fears linked to Nasser's Pan-Arabism, reinforced by the creation of the United Arab Republic and the rapprochement between Egypt and the USSR, determined the strategic relationship with Israel (ibid.).
In the wake of the multidimensional approach to economic, energetic, and diplomatic issues, Turkey tried to seek a better balance in its relations with Arab countries and Israel. It was only with the Islamic revolution in Iran that relations with Israel were given new impetus. This rapprochement with the Arab countries stemmed from the desire to obtain their support in the Cyprus issue as well as the energy needs of Turkey in a context of economic difficulties (Jung, 2005; Altunisik, 2000). The multidimensional approach also had an influence on relations with Europe and the Muslim world: in 1963, Turkey signed the Agreement Creating An Association Between The Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community (Ankara Agreement), and in 1969, it joined the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (Katselli, 2006). Such a multidimensional policy was taken up by Turgut Ozal, Prime Minister between 1983 and 1989 and President of the Republic between 1991 and 1993. Through this multi-pronged policy, described as "Ozalism" or "Neo-Ottomanism", he sought to address the economic challenges of the 1980s and the geopolitical changes following the end of the Cold War (Pronina, 2021). He worked for Turkey's integration into the European Economic Community (EEC), now EU, and submitted the first formal application for membership in 1987. At the same time, he improved relations with Arab countries and tried to make Turkey a regional leader. To underline the strategic importance of Turkey to its Western allies, he also was actively engaged in the international coalition that put an end to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (ibid.)
5. Conclusion
During the Cold War, Turkey's membership in the West and its Western identity was not questioned. However, as soon as the Cold War ended, the West began to redefine itself more along cultural criteria and deep-seated values, linked to a desire to promote democracy, individual freedoms, social rights, and the rule of law, and not only by anti-communism. Thus, feeling rejected, Turkey sought to emerge from its position on the margins. When it came to power in November 2002, the AKP took up Ozal's multidimensional approach and his Neo-Ottomanism. He succeeded in transforming Turkey into a central pivot between Europe, Russia, Africa, Asia, and the Arab world (ibid.). However, because of certain internal policies and his strong engagement with Arab countries, he has been accused of breaking with Westernisation and the West. Such an approach pursued by the Kemalists broke with the country's past and Muslim values, and therefore with the Ottoman civilisation. Judged to be incompatible with this civilisation, the Kemalist project was also seen as something generating mistrust and conflicts with the regional environment. Thus, in the last decades, the AKP proposed a return to Ottoman values perceived as synonymous with peace and cooperation (Tepe, 2005).
A careful analysis shows that, despite the intensification of relations with some Arab countries and the use of Ottoman and Muslim symbols, the AKP's policy remained characterised by a continuity with the multidimensional approach that aimed to empower Turkey. The same applies to the tendency to exploit rivalries between the different sides around the country in order to assert its own interests. Indeed, Turkey's rapprochement with Russia, at least before the Ukrainian invasion, does not mean a break with the West but a desire to strengthen its position in its relations with the West without giving up any of its autonomy (Tepe, 2005; Altunisik et al. 2011). In fact, Turkey today is a core country of the Black Sea region, and a very important player in the balance of power between the East and the West world. Turkey is at a crossroads: on the one hand, its conservative and Muslim past and, on the other, it seeks to show itself to the world as a modern state, conciliatory and respectful of rights and freedoms, while struggling with currents that threaten the delicate balance in which it has lived for the last decades.
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