A New Era? Developments in European Defence Policy After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

  Focus - Allegati
  28 giugno 2022
  21 minuti, 35 secondi

Abstract

The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the consequently changed international scenario have brought the issue of security back to the centre of the European debate. Despite the strength and unity shown by NATO, the European Great Powers have shown a renewed interest in their military devices. Germany, Italy and France have undertaken, in accordance with their traditions, important initiatives in the field of defence, autonomously but, perhaps, with a common destiny.

Authors:

Michele Gioculano - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics

Matteo Bulzomì - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics

Chiara Malaponti - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics

Nicola Zanini - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics



Introduction

The Russian aggression of Ukraine marked a watershed in European defence policy. Even though the country had previously used its military power in other theatres, and in Ukraine itself, the events that unfolded after February 24 represented an unprecedented change in its foreign policy. By invading Ukraine, Russia showed, in fact, its willingness to pursue its strategic goals regardless of whether this represented a blatant violation of international law. As a consequence, Western countries, and European ones more in particular, realised that such an unprecedented move required an adequate response.

Ever since the beginning of the war, a huge debate started within European Union members about how to tackle present and future threats effectively. The debate had a twofold development. On the one hand, the European parliament's debate on modifying their traditional approach toward military expenditures. On the other hand, a parallel discussion regarded the national position towards both NATO and the possibility of establishing a common European Defense device. The memory of the past military experiences played a key role in influencing the course of the debate. Indeed, the former Axis and Axis-allied countries have been showing remarkable reluctancy in strengthening their armed forces over the decades. Despite some recent changes, their commitments to defence issues have been focusing on peacekeeping missions. Conversely, the countries that belonged to the Allies bloc have often shown a more interventionist attitude.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of the recent events on the security policies of three countries - Germany, Italy and France. These countries represent the largest economies in the EU, as well as its three most influential political actors. Furthermore, the debates that took place within these contexts give a proper perspective on the main dilemmas that affect the responses of European countries to the invasion of Ukraine. The first chapter explores the German approach to the new policy challenges. In particular, it focuses on Germany’s traditional reluctance toward military interventions since the end of World War II as well as on the shifts that the Merkel and Sholz administration promoted. The second chapter deals with Italy’s debate between its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and its prudent interventionist policy. Finally, the last chapter delves into France’s posture vis a vis interventionism and its balance between fostering its national interests and its role within common defence institutions.

1. Germany

On February 27th, a few days after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz held a historic speech during a plenary session of the Bundestag. This moment represented a watershed in German defence and security policy, as Scholz announced a massive injection of funds (100 billion euros) into the national military apparatus. Moreover, besides this “down payment” to the Bundeswehr, Chancellor Scholz pledged to allocate 2% of GDP every year to the defence budget (Giegerich, 2022). Considering a historical turning point by many, this event reopened the debate on the role that Berlin ought to play in Europe. While some underline the difference with Berlin’s more pacifist attitude, others try to single out factors indicating that Germany was already “preparing for war” (Eberle, 2022). Nevertheless, it is yet to be seen how effectively this money will be spent and if Germany’s change of heart will be sustained in time. Only then, indeed, it could be able to affect Europe’s defence architecture, based largely on NATO and a possible upcoming role for the European Union.

It is commonly accepted that Germany has long been Europe’s economic leader, while being somewhat absent in the security realm. Many attribute Berlin’s reluctance in stepping into this role to Germany’s difficult relationship with Nazi militarism and the horrors it brought about in the first half of the XX century. For this reason, it has been long considered a pacifist power. Nevertheless, Eberle (2022) argues that Germany’s foreign and security policy has been rather determined by a series of liberal beliefs: the importance of economic interdependence (the Wandel durch Handel approach), the systematic use of diplomatic tools and an “ordoliberal obsession” with the State budget, that made it difficult to invest in the Bundeswehr. “It is not pacifism but rather the liberal assumptions about the ineffectiveness of military force and the virtues of diplomacy, trade, and fiscal discipline that Germany is now questioning” (Eberle, 2022).

Even Scholz’s predecessor, Chancellor Angela Merkel, was not a pacifist. Under her leadership, Germany renewed its commitments to NATO and backed the European defence project (Puglierin, 2021). Indeed, it has been argued that “embracing the Bundeswehr and NATO - two things German pacifists have traditionally struggled to do - is a key precondition for being considered a serious political partner in the country” (Eberle, 2022). Still, she exhibited a so-called “culture of restraint” and showed little faith in military interventions. The so-called “Merkel doctrine”, which focuses on logistic and training support to regional partners in global hotspots, kept Germany away from the frontlines, not without criticism (Puglierin, 2021).

In Europe, Germany seemed to support a more integrated security architecture only symbolically, as a way to strengthen European integration as a whole. “Germany’s negotiating positions in the recent debates on the best way toward a European Defence Union have arguably been shaped most decisively by its desire to preserve its identity as a ‘good European’ who defends the European integration process as such” (Bunde, 2021). Indeed, Germany’s military posture in the past decades has been characterised by a lack of strategic thinking. Angela Merkel never steered the German security policy in a particular direction. This focus on a short-term oriented crisis management approach also entailed a difficulty in determining which had to be Berlin’s priorities, were the European Union to play a more decisive role geopolitically (Puglierin, 2021). In short, “Germany has mostly pushed for symbolic proposals and integration efforts without real teeth on the EU level”. NATO always remained the best option: Germany was not willing to put it in jeopardy (Bunde, 2021).

To conclude, Scholz’s Zeitenwende raises two important questions regarding the future of German foreign and security policy. For one, it leads to wonder whether money will be enough to close Berlin’s military gap. Indeed, a study by Ifo, a German think-tank, shows that “defence spending adjusted for inflation fell 34 per cent between 1990 and 2014” (Chazan, 2022). The same source then reports that Germany’s military spending rose from 32.4 billion euros to 45.6 billion euros in the years 2014-2020, triggered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. However, “that is still $10bn less than what it was at the end of the Cold War” (ibid.). From this point of view, an injection of cash into the armed forces is needed in order to modernise the Bundeswehr and make it combat ready. Nevertheless, “more money does not automatically translate into military capability: it is an enabler only. Germany needs to tie increased military-related spending to geopolitics, strategy, people, and its defence industry” (Giegerich, 2022). To sum up, Berlin is confronted with the same old issue: it needs to back up plans of military renovation with some sort of long-term strategic thinking, in order to boost their efficacy and consistency. In this light, Baebock’s initiative to jumpstart the drafting of the first national security strategy seems a first good step (Auswärtiges Amt, 2022).

Last but not least, one could not help but wonder whether these efforts will be short-lived - as extraordinary times require extraordinary measures - or signal the beginning of a long-term cultural shift in Germany’s strategic culture. This question becomes even more pressing in light of the EU’s newly developed Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept.

2. Italy

The Italian approach towards their armed forces has been complicated since the end of the Second World War. After their defeat and the destruction caused by the conflict, in fact, a strong anti-militarist sentiment emerged and characterised the entirety of the political landscape, all throughout the Cold War. There was, in those years, a strong reluctance in using the military device in international missions abroad, preferring to focus it on the internal problems and renouncing to follow a policy of defensive self-sufficiency. This reluctance was highlighted in the constitutional chart, with Article 11, that highlights how Italy “rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes”. In this optics, some decisions about the national defence, and therefore the European defence, were delegated to the United States, which, starting from the 1950s, began signing a series of treaties with the Italian governments establishing American military bases all throughout the Italian territory. In this optics, therefore, a great disinterest began forming, in the political class, as well as in the public opinion, towards the problems connected to the external safety. During the years of the Cold War, Italian armed forces have been implemented together with the policing forces, in order to contrast the organized criminality and terrorism. This allowed them to develop a series of know-hows in regards to urban contexts and missions in close contact with the population, which have helped them to shine in the international scenarios that would rise in the final part of the twentieth century.

The 1980s, in fact, marked the start of a new paradigm for the Italian armed forces. In the period between 1982 and 1984, two operations in Lebanon, together with the allied France and United States, were set out, in order to maintain peace and the respect of the rule of law in the area. These interventions were seen as the only way to respect the Constitution, whilst gaining a role in the international community. Gradually, during the 1990s and the following decades, these missions in support of peace increased in numbers and became a legitimate instrument for Rome’s ambition to become a crescent global power. In 2021, more than sixteen thousand military personnel were engaged in forty-three operations, half of them being initiatives for international safety and stability, making Italy one of the greatest contributors of the NATO and EU missions and the first of western countries in the UN missions.

Prime Minister Draghi’s Government has put great emphasis on cooperation for international safety, focusing on a strong Atlantic perspective, whilst also considering the European defence strategy. Rome considers NATO as its main military reference organisation able to assure to the Alliance strong collective defence and deterrence, and seeing in this, as well as in the European Union and the United Nations the historical anchorages that brought security and international prestige to Italy (Draghi, 2021). For Italy, the main priority inside the Alliance should be to expand NATO’s overview to the East, as well as to the South, and stabilising the areas of crisis and partnership between the international and regional organisations, such as the African Union, the United Nations and the European Union itself. This attitude of keeping the middle ground between the Atlantic Alliance and a European common force of defence can be seen also in the intentions of the Italian Government to continue its support to the EU Global Strategy through the Strategic Compass and the development of a Common Plan of Safety and Defence as well as the European Defence Action Plan. By strengthening the role that Italy plays in these European frameworks, Draghi intends to strengthen the cooperation with Paris and Berlin. The prime minister, moreover, showed the great importance that he gives to the partnership with the United States, effectively trying to gain a more central position in the international checkerboard.

In this last optics, and after the developments of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, Rome set itself on a more clear path to meet the 2% of the GDP in military expenditures, that was asked to each Member State in the 2014 NATO summit in Wales. Whilst the suggested deadline for meeting this target was set in 2024, Defense Minister Lorenzo Guerini has declared that the 2% threshold will be met by Italy, only in 2028. The progressive rearmament is seen as fundamental, by the Ministry of Defense and Italian Government, to better the efficiency of the armed forces and pursue Italian strategic interests, in order to highlight and maintain the national and international prestige of the Italian military. In Italy however, due to the above mentioned historical precedents, this increase is not well seen by a great part of both the population and the political class. In a recent survey, in fact, only 21% of Italians are in favour of the increase in public expenditure, a number that rises to 40% if these would entitle greater funds for public research (Euromedia research, 2022). Inside the Government and the political majority, moreover, there is a fringe that is against meeting the 2% target, considering it an unnecessary investment that would only damage the national history and go against the constitutional dictate. Nonetheless, in recent years there has already been an increase in the magnitude of spending that reached all branches of the military, from better equipment and vehicles, to greater investments in military bases and infrastructures. The strategic and research aspect is also seen as a key sector in which to broaden the horizons and focus more, as well as a precise strategy that has well defined objectives in order to adjourn the 2015 White Book for International Security and Defence.

3. France

France boasts a historical and essential link with its armed forces and with their role at the service of the Nation. The military device represents a fundamental element of French politics and, unlike other European Powers, it is not affected by any stigma of cultural nature. The very birth of the Fifth Republic is owed to a soldier who intervened in a period of political crisis, General De Gaulle. Symbol of prestige and power, the armed forces have allowed Paris to maintain its status as a Great Power and to project its policies globally. Traditionally, France sees the military option as a simple political tool, like diplomacy or trade. In fact, the Armée française conducted many activities outside the national borders, after the Second World War. Whether it was targeted interventions to depose uncomfortable leaders, or more sophisticated peace operations, Paris has resorted to its military device twenty-six times since 1956. This policy has, in recent years, from Libya to Mali, suffered from numerous failures, facing a setback. It is therefore possible that, in Europe, Paris could once again assert its military weight, in order to protect its strategic interests and achieve its geopolitical objectives.

The search for an international role in the field of defence is typical of a France that is never completely at ease within NATO. Although it is one of the original signatories of the Atlantic Charter, tensions between Paris and the Alliance have continued since 1958, when De Gaulle hoped for the creation of a directory with London and Washington. In 1966, France boycotted war integration, unilaterally withdrawing from NATO's Integrated Military Command and continuing to participate only in the political component of the organisation. Only in 1995, on the initiative of President Chirac, did Paris begin its re-entry into the Alliance, a process completed in 2009, with the total reintegration of its armed forces by President Sarkozy. Nonetheless, even today, France is the only NATO Great Power not to host foreign bases or soldiers on its territory, as if to underline its complete strategic autonomy. Currently, France is the leading European military power, having the largest armed forces, with the best equipment and the greatest experience in the field. This posture, combined with its historical military tradition and its status as a Nuclear Power, make Paris suitable to assume a leading role in the field of European defence.

The creation of common European armed forces represents an ancient aspiration of France. President De Gaulle, with his "third pillar" policy, already aimed at the establishment of a political and military continental axis, alternative to both the United States and the Soviet Union. This “third pillar” would become a strong and independent European bloc, able to escape the rigid logic of the Cold War and to act autonomously in the exclusive interest of its members. The constitution of such an organisation would have ensured France a preeminent role in the management of the alliance and, more generally, over Europe. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the French project of European defence has evolved, abandoning the dynamics of bipolarity and focusing on the nascent European Union. The establishment of a common defensive apparatus would have strengthened the integration between the various members and given Paris a position of prestige. However, the absence of a common foreign policy, Washington's opposition and the unwillingness of some members to put their defence entirely in the hands of a supranational organisation, represented too great obstacles to overcome. Indeed, despite NATO's reinvigoration, the distrust of the United States and the absence of a common line in rearmament plans still represent critical issues for European security, as well as being a source of mutual discontent and tension. This framework offers France the opportunity to propose a coordinated plan and to take the lead, translating its defence projects into concrete policies, to be projected on the continental level.

President Macron, after defining NATO as “brain dead”, aimed to fill the political and military void left by the United States in Europe, reserving the leadership role for his Country. Biden's arrival at the White House and, moreover, the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, have rekindled Washington's interest in the Old Continent, frustrating, at least for the moment, French efforts. Therefore, the rapid recovery of the Atlantic Alliance, combined with the powerful rearmament program launched by the German government, which would make Berlin the third largest military power in the world by amount of expenditure, represent the greatest obstacles to France's military hegemony projects. It is therefore likely that, in the coming months, the Elysée will relaunch the idea of ​​the European armed forces with ever greater emphasis and exploiting the fears aroused by the ongoing conflict. In this way, it would harness the military expansion of the other Powers, creating, at the same time, a rift within the Atlantic Pact, which has always been hostile to the liberation of European partners. Once again, in accordance with the French tradition, defence and the armed forces would translate into an effective foreign policy tool, capable of placing Paris at the centre of the continental scene and making it the promoter of a far-reaching initiative. With the departure of Angela Merkel and the consequent downsizing of Berlin, France would have the opportunity to assume the leadership of the European Union, ousting the German friend/rival and proposing its agenda, of which the defence represents an important chapter.

Conclusions

The crisis in Ukraine triggered a set of political decisions that will have a dramatic impact in the future debate on European defence. This process is far from being over and its eventual track is difficult to foresee. On the one hand, it is impossible to predict the course of the events in Ukraine, and therefore their impact on future debates. On the other hand, EU policymakers will have to deal with many crucial challenges.

Firstly, the outlook of any hypothetical EU common defence institution is quite unclear. Even though there is some sort of agreement on the necessity to work more in this direction, there is no consensus on the prerogatives of such an institution. Shall Europe use military force as a usual foreign policy means like France does? Shall it limit itself in carrying out peacekeeping tasks like they do in Italy? Or shall it avoid military intervention as much as possible like in the German case? The answer will likely depend on the perception of the events in Ukraine as well as on the ability of EU institutions to reach a consensus out of different visions of foreign policy.

Secondly, how will the conflict change the balance of power in NATO? Although no one claims that there isn't compatibility between the Alliance and a common EU defence institution, it is clear that a more assertive and better equipped Europe will challenge the traditional balance of power within NATO. The answer to this question is not clear as well and will likely depend on the capacity of EU countries to push for a more effective military integration. This means that they will have to pursue their rearmament policy in a coordinated way rather than separately.

Lastly, the European Defence Union cannot be established without persuading the national public opinions. Whereas in some countries any discussion concerning defence would be treated like any other foreign policy debate, the public opinion of countries like Italy and Germany may be more reluctant to deal with the matter. Consequently, persuading the most diffident public opinions in the Union is a crucial step toward any project of common defence policy.

Despite the challenges that it will bring about, the war in Ukraine may be a turning point in the future of European integration. Indeed, debates and taboos that in normal times would have been discussed for decades have been dealt with in just a few weeks. Even though the main dilemmas remain unsolved, the very fact that EU policymakers are now carrying out rounds of negotiations on a common defence policy is already a remarkable step forward. Furthermore, the crisis seems to have resurrected NATO from its “brain death” status. The Alliance has come back to the European decision tables, and there will likely remain in the next future. The outcome of all the discussions that have been presented here will depend on the historical awareness of the European decisionmakers. Regardless of whether Ukraine will actually join the Union, what is going on in its bloody battlefields will be of crucial importance for the future outlook of the European Union.




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