Are Democracies More Effective at Implementing Environmental Agreements Than Autocratic Regimes?

Abstract:

Throughout the emergence of climate change international organizations, the use of climate agreements have been in full effect to mitigate the changes of the environment and its degradation. Agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol and The Paris Agreement have been pivotal in signifying the collective action of nations to address the climate crisis. Throughout time, democratic nations have slowly integrated climate policy in domestic politics, but nations such as Iran and Malaysia have signed agreement, but have yet to adapt policies or ratifications in which can genuinely reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Countries in which democracy is not an effective form of government seem to not be as stable when it comes to implementing climate mitigation policies as much as democratic governments do.

Climate change and environmental degradation is a borderless, immediate threat to global politics. There is a policy gap in between countries that differ in government types. Through economic funds, education of citizens, and availability of renewable resources that set democracies apart from autocracies on domestic policy building. These policies include the procurement of environmental mitigation which can directly reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide gasses. Countries with higher levels of gross domestic product have established environmental policies, but are still emitting excessive carbon dioxide levels in relation to other countries in a similar gross domestic product bracket. Is this because of their government type? Further research must be conducted in order to fulfill and analyze the research question at hand. Climate change is a collective action problem and countries must work in unison to overcome or mitigate the ever-changing climate. Without the cooperation of countries which are defined as autocracies, the solution to such a threatening issue will become more difficult to cross and can lead institutions into disarray.

Author: Valentina Horlander

Theory Building:

It is without suggestion that certain voids will not be addressed in congruence with the research question acknowledging autocracies and democracies building environmental policy. The state of institutions and infrastructure in developing nations compared to developed countries have not been addressed in the literature presented thereafter. The gap between the need for economic development in order to fund the building of new institutions which have the availability to support climate mitigation practices is ever present in today’s international system. Pierson addressed this in his 2000 literature addressing increasing returns in the application of resources towards institutions. He explicitly regards how new institutions often need high start up costs or fixed costs and require learning curves as well as adaptive expectations. In regards to climate policy, it is a massive debilitation for already struggling countries to develop institutions to address the issue when the costs to implement such policies outweigh the costs for basic governmental needs.

The particular incongruence with the relationship between institution building and climate policy integration was as well addressed by Huntington’s 1968 print addressing political order and its development alongside societal changes. He argues that rapid social change alongside the slow development of new political institutions leads to the rise of instability. “As social forces became more variegates, political institutions had to become more complex and authoritative. It is precisely this development, however, which failed to occur in many modernizing societies in the twentieth century. Social forces were strong, political institutions weak.” (Huntington 1968). The research question at hand emphasizes the distinction between autocratic and democratic regimes, but it is relevant to acknowledge the issue of countries not having the capability to address the new era in climate change issues due to their inability to structure certain institutions to deal with it.

Addressing the theoretical question: Are democracies more effective at implementing climate change or environmental agreements than autocratic regimes? the main argument and hypothesis posed in the support of the theory is yes, democracies are indeed more effective at implementing climate policies than autocratic regimes. This is due to the alluding fact that countries with certain forms of government do not have the budgetary flexibility to pursue climate change agendas and are unable to make it a priority. Literature has discussed the grievances of economic development of democracies verses autocratic regimes. Economic flexibility gives developed nations the ability to implement more institutions that can better their ability to follow through in international promises legitimized by agreements.

In the 1959 literature published by Lipset, he puts forth the main argument in which once a democracy is established, the more well to do a nation, the more well to do its survivability. This is intertwined with the status of a countries economic development. Average wealth and degree of industrialization is much higher in democratically established countries. The argument he poses, influenced by factual data, leads to the creation of the hypothesis this comparative case study leads to answer. A democracy in which holds more legitimacy and economic wealth is theoretically more likely to have established institutions or the ability to create institutions in a timely manner to address the threat of climate change as opposed to an autocracy. Democracies are more likely to survive in countries with higher levels of economic development and therefore have institutional structures that can address constraints in international agreements.

Due to the fact that there is a sort of relationship between democracy and economic development, it is legitimized to conclude in agreement that democracies do indeed have an advantage when it comes to developing domestic climate policies. In autocratic regimes, political elites are non-constrained and are more involved with concessions to remaining in power than redistributing income for the betterment of their citizens. Acemoglu and Robinson address this fact in their publication of 2006 concerning the different paths to democratic development. “… democracy arises from conflict between elites and disenfranchised majorities who are prepared to accept democracy rather than something more radical because it gives them more political power than a non-democracy.” (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006). Elites are more-so concerned with the controlling of the majority instead of procuring legislation that would enhance their institutions.

Redistribution is a key factor in the development of a large-scale market economy through the development of innovation through educational practices. Democracies are integrated into a redistribution system which provides social services contrasting from a autocratic regime that hinders their redistribution policies. Polanyi discusses the implications of a society in which distribution is not a commonality from the elites in government. “All large-scale economies in kind were run with the help of the principle of redistribution. The kingdom of Hammurabi in Babylonia and, in particular, the New Kingdom of Egypt were centralized despotisms of a bureaucratic type founded on such an economy.” (Polanyi 2001). A state which redistribution is not as prevalent, exemplified by an authoritarian regime, there will be struggles in the application of certain institutions such as educational government institutions. These affect the exposure citizens have on such international issues of climate change and the threat of biodiversity change. The lack of knowledge on such threats would halt any development in advocating for domestic policy changes and therefore not engage the effectiveness of public mobilization.

Modernization in a democracy is influenced by the relationship between economic development and survivability of the regime in developed and underdeveloped countries. Further developing the argument that countries with lower economic development do not prioritize the current threat of climate change, Przeworski and Limongi address how democracies are more likely to emerge as countries develop economically or may be established independently of economic development but is more likely to survive in developed countries. Democracies are more likely to be prolonged in states which have higher levels of industrialization and per capita income. This would directly correlate their ability to sustain new institutions and allow the funds to develop policy implementation that can influence the mitigation of climate change.

Conclusion:

The theoretical study presented can aid scholars into finding why certain forms of government do not have the ability to effectively implement climate change in comparison to the ones that do. The extension of such research can aid intergovernmental organizations that specify in the environmental agreement foundations to ideally discover new ways to effectively influence and motivate countries that are struggling with prioritizing climate policies. Aiding economic development or influencing an implication of regime change can benefit the regulation and mitigation of climate change through new areas of policy building. The research can legitimize the need for foreign aid from economically advanced democracies to aid disadvantaged countries with the infrastructure needed to further their domestic policies in environmental preservation.

Differences in autocratic and democratic regimes are evident not only through their levels of representation but also implementation on their climate policies. This incongruence in policies can be attributed to their form of government which as well influences their economic development that can hinder their motivation in accessing the infrastructure needed to mitigate climate change. Further research is needed to explore this topic, for climate change is a newly existential issue that has grown rapidly in the twenty-first century, coupling it with a borderless threat, it is truly the coming of age’s collective action problem.

Acknowledgements:

1. Samuel P. Huntington. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale UP. 1-71. (1b)
2. Paul Pierson. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” American Political Science Review. 82: 1203-30. (1b)
3. Seymour Martin Lipset. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review. 53: 69-105. (1b)
4. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge UP, pp. 1-87. (1b)
5. Karl Polanyi. 2001. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 44-58, 231-68. (1b)
6. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” World Politics 49: 155-183. (1b)