Can the EU-Mercosur Deal Reconcile Trade and Sustainable Development?

  Focus - Allegati
  12 febbraio 2026
  16 minuti, 1 secondo

Autore: Cecilia Di Fulvio (Senior Researcher Mondo Internazionale GEO - Economia)

Abstract

The EU-Mercosur agreement is one of the most ambitious attempts to reconcile free trade with sustainable development objectives in EU economic diplomacy. This article examines whether the deal’s innovative legal architecture can effectively balance market access, ESG compliance, and fair competition. Particular attention is devoted to the Trade and Sustainable Development chapter, which integrates international, regional, and national labour and environmental commitments through a dialogue-based compliance mechanism as an alternative to sanctions-based enforcement. The analysis then assesses the agreement’s expected economic effects. On the EU side, the deal is projected to modestly but positively increase its GDP, driven by increased exports of industrial goods and by improved long-term access to critical raw materials. While the quantitative impact on sensitive agricultural sectors appears limited, political resistance persists, reflecting concerns over the enforcement of EU standards and consumer protection. For Mercosur countries, the agreement improves access to the EU market and regulatory predictability, while potentially attracting FDI in strategic sectors, although these benefits depend on domestic institutional capacity and infrastructure development. The EU–Mercosur deal is neither a definitive solution to Europe’s supply chain vulnerabilities nor a guarantee of sustainable development in South America. At the moment, its relevance lies in its institutional contribution: reaffirming the viability of interregional free trade and testing the EU’s capacity to project its regulatory standards through cooperation rather than coercion.

Introduction

On January 17th 2026, the European Union and the Mercosur bloc (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia) finally signed a comprehensive free trade agreement, after 25 years of negotiations. While this deal was formally finalized in December 2024, a small but vocal group of opposing Member States have hindered its conclusion until recently. As a matter of fact, the unusual alignment of agricultural and environmental interests has prompted negative reactions from farmers in France, Ireland, Poland and Austria, as well as transnational climate advocacy against the deal. The agriculture sector’s concerns were partially addressed by the Commission’s market safeguards, and the Trade and Sustainable Development chapter ensured compliance with EU environmental standards. However, opposition mounted again in the European Parliament, and the two international agreements composing the EU-Mercosur deal were referred, by 334 to 324 votes, to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a binding legal opinion on its conformity with the Treaties. This step, which may take up to two years, puts the deal’s implementation in jeopardy: although the Commission could legally implement the agreement provisionally, this move would invite criticism regarding the EU’s democracy deficit. Nonetheless, if successful, this agreement represents an innovative legal framework for combining free trade with sustainable development. After analyzing it, this work assesses the EU-Mercosur deal’s implications for interregional trade in consumer goods and commodities.

1. Legal framework

The EU-Mercosur deal is composed of two distinct legal instruments: the EU-Mercosur partnership agreement (EMPA) and the interim trade agreement (iTA), to apply provisionally until the EMPA enters into force. In fact, the EMPA is an association agreement covering policy areas which fall under the Member States’ competence (i.e, it is a “mixed agreement”). Therefore, its entry into force requires ratification by all parties. More specifically, this instrument comprises three pillars: political dialogue, cooperation, and trade. The first pillar promotes intergovernmental consultations regarding democracy and rule of law, human rights, as well as foreign and security policy coordination. Moreover, it establishes an Association Council and a Joint Committee with monitoring functions, reflecting the typical structure of EU association agreements. The second pillar advances cooperation in “shared EU competences” such as sustainable development, energy and transport, science and technology, as well as in education, culture, and public administration capacity-building, which are national prerogatives (“supporting competencies” in EU law). The third pillar - Trade - is the most extensive, as it establishes a free trade area in goods while defining intellectual property and environmental standards. Given that the ratification process is projected to be lengthy on both sides of the Atlantic, the European Commission concluded an interim trade agreement with Mercosur for advancing the implementation of the trade pillar, which mostly falls under the exclusive EU competence in the Common Commercial Policy according to art. 207 TFEU.

The interim trade agreement itself is a complex yet innovative legal instrument, combining the institution of the world’s largest free trade area with specific provisions protecting the agri-food sector and sustainability standards, which are monitored through a dialogue-based compliance framework.

The agreement’s “Trade and Sustainable Development” section introduces several key principles for safeguarding ESG standards. Firstly, it integrates national environmental and labour laws into the free trade regime: art.18 clearly states that they cannot constitute “disguised restriction or arbitrary discrimination” to trade and investment. Consequently, the parties should not weaken or derogate from existing legislation in these areas with the goal of encouraging trade or investment. Moreover, the improvement of protection levels in these fields is encouraged. In both domains, the treaty shall be applied in connection to international legal regimes. The implementation of the International Labour Organization standards, as defined in the relevant conventions, is ensured by a binding provision. Additionally, the parties are obliged to comply with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement by contributing to low emissions and climate-resilient development, as well as adaptation, through trade. Regarding biodiversity, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITIES), and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture apply. This results, for instance, in the parties’ commitment to reduce illegal trade in wildlife and encourage trade in products obtained through the sustainable use of natural resources. While in soft-law form, art.18 provides for the integration of ESG criteria in value chains by supporting the adoption of responsible supply chains and best practices exchange on this aspect.

Secondly, the agreement introduces a specific dialogue-based compliance mechanism for sustainable development issues, separate from the more typical dispute settlement system instituted for the other sectors. This procedure is composed of six steps: in case of disagreements, after a first dialogue effort, a party can request formal consultations to be carried out within 30 days. If further discussion is needed, a party can convene the Trade and Sustainable Development subcommittee (composed of EU and MERCOSUR states), which must consider the views from domestic advisory groups, as well as expert advice, and publish any resolution reached. After 120 days from the consultation request, a panel composed of 3 independent experts in the subject at hand can be requested, which produces a public report with recommendations. At this stage, parties discuss appropriate measures, and the subcommittee monitors their progress. If one of the parties determines that another one has violated essential obligations, the trade agreement can still be partially or totally suspended.

This approach to sustainability is innovative, on the EU side, insofar as it integrates internal environmental criteria (the Green Deal goals are mostly based on the Paris Agreement targets) in its external action, and it promotes ESG in a developing region through diplomacy instead of legal enforcement. In parallel, the inclusion of sustainability standards could help contain the concerns of European farmers and climate advocates. However, the deal indirectly restricts future EU regulatory power through the “rebalancing mechanism”, which allows parties to challenge other parties' new regulations that nullify or substantially impair benefits expected from the agreement. This measure could come at the expense of the EU Deforestation Regulation, which prohibits selling or exporting commodities and derived products in the EU when produced on land deforestated or degraded after 2020. These provisions will start applying to large enterprises at the end of 2026, and to SMEs from June 30, 2027. Given that Brazil holds 60% of the Amazon forest, increasing agrifood exports due to the Mercosur deal may imply further deforestation. Therefore, in case it enters into force before that date, the deal will likely affect the regulation’s implementation.

2. Trade in goods

Currently, the EU is Mercosur’s second largest trade in goods partner, and it accounted for almost 17% of the Latin American bloc’s total trade in 2023. However, high import duties, complex procedures and different regulatory standards limit European companies’ operations in the region. By removing import duties on over 90% of exports to Mercosur, the agreement is set to increase the EU’s GDP by 0.1%, by 2040. Moreover, 80% of EU-Mercosur trade regards industrial goods, including machinery and chemicals, which are expected to see among the largest increases in EU export from the deal's implementation. In effect, the four most positively impacted categories of EU goods will be motor vehicles (+200%), chemicals (+50%), agricultural products (+49%), and machinery (+35%).

The traditionally strong European automotive industry, with especially large exports from Germany, Spain, Italy, and Sweden, has registered negative trends in the past five years, facing global competition (especially from China), supply chain and technological challenges in EV production, as well as high production costs - according to the 2024 Draghi Report, vehicle production is 30% more costly than in China. The 15% tariff on autos and their components, imposed by the US in August 2025, is projected to cause an export loss between €1.5-7.5bn. Given that the automotive sector accounts for over 10% of the manufacturing workforce in Germany and Eastern Europe, the Mercosur deal represents a positive development for this sector. Current tariffs of up to 18% on auto parts and up to 35% on cars severely constrain EU exports to Mercosur, whose market is growing. As a matter of fact, EU countries already exported €1bn of cars to Brazil in 2024 (with 70% from Germany) and €5bn, including auto parts, to the whole bloc. While European brands have not yet faced significant Chinese competition in the region (Fiat has a 21% market share in Brazil, and Volkswagen holds 17%), the situation is rapidly evolving: BYD currently holds 4% of the Brazilian market (0% in 2020) and is increasing local production.

Another topical sector in EU debate is agrifood, as agricultural interest representatives have actively opposed the conclusion of this agreement. While agrifood products represent 43% of EU imports from Mercosur, the deal’s impact on the trade balance differs between subsectors, with the strongest export surges in dairy (+102%), beverages (+53%), fruit and vegetables (+36%), and vegetable oils (+21%), due to the removal of high tariffs (18-55%). Furthermore, the deal provides better market access for trademark European products, such as Southern European olive oil and high-quality wine, French cheese, and Irish spirits. Simultaneously, it protects them from unfair competition through 344 geographical indications (GIs), prospecting higher profits for European farmers. In addition, meat processors, confectionery companies, and soft drink producers could benefit from lower input costs, possibly expanding their customer base.

However, European beef, poultry, and sugar beet farmers are exposed to Latin American competition, perceived as unfair despite the integration of EU sustainability standards in the agreement. Interest representatives sustain that South America exports the best meat cuts to the European continent, making it uneconomic for local farmers to continue breeding. Others affirm that it is the export of the cheaper parts - which is facilitated by the deal - that subsidizes the expensive ones. In any case, the tariff-free quotas established in the agreement account for 1.6% of EU annual beef consumption by volume, 1.4% and 1.2% respectively for poultry and sugar. Therefore, the quantitative impact on these sectors is projected to be small. The EU Commission attempted to address farmers’ concerns by introducing market safeguards. Firstly, preferential tariffs can be suspended if a surge in imports leads to a fall in EU prices of sensitive products. Secondly, the next EU budget will include a €6.3bn crisis fund for agriculture. Lastly, €45bn from a flexible reserve will be redirected towards agriculture and rural development.

Further concerns were raised regarding food quality and health standards control in terms of consumer protection. While the deal implementation will plausibly increase imports, Latin American agrifood products already enter European markets, and border controls include the verification of EU consumer standards.

However, concerns from European breeders persist and the dialogue-based compliance mechanism for ESG standards present a certain degree of risk, despite the overall positive effect on the EU trade balance.

3. Access to commodities

EU demand for lithium batteries, essential for the electric vehicle industry and energy storage, is set to increase by 1100% by 2030, and demand for rare earth elements, utilized in EVs and wind turbines, is set to rise by 550% in the same period. Given the current instability of supply chains due to geopolitical uncertainty, the European Union started developing a strategy for securing critical raw materials. The Critical Raw Materials Act, adopted in March 2024, set ambitious targets for diversification: by 2030, no more than 65% of each strategic raw material can be imported from a single extra-EU country. Currently, the EU depends on Turkey at 99% for the extraction of boron, while it depends completely on China for processing magnesium, gallium and rare earth elements. The EU-Mercosur deal may enhance European supply chain security, as Mercosur countries are rich in critical raw materials, including lithium, niobium, tantalum, and natural graphite. Specifically, Brazil processes 88% of global niobium production and meets 82% of European demand. The EU also imports 16% of its tantalum, 12% of its bauxite, 13% of its natural graphite, 9% of its metallurgical-grade silicon, 8% of its manganese, and 7% of its vanadium from Brazil. Argentina, which processes 11% of global lithium, supplies 6% of the EU’s demand. However, Mercosur currently applies tariffs ranging from 8% to 18% on these commodities, which the agreement would curb. Additionally, the EU-Mercosur deal presents a framework for facilitating EU investment in local processing while supporting its clean energy transition, as highlighted by president Lula and von der Leyen in their recent joint statement. Nonetheless, this scenario is only realistic from a long-term perspective. The critical mineral sector in Latin America is currently constrained by regulatory uncertainty, infrastructure bottlenecks, and a lack of downstream processing, which results in heavy dependence on China. Considering Europe’s scarce refining capacity, the deal is unlikely to concretely increase European or South American strategic autonomy in this segment. Severe underinvestment undermines extraction as well. For instance, only three lithium plants are operational in Brazil, with one operator facing cash flow shortages and another one’s waste management practice currently undergoing a labour ministry review. While 25 additional projects are in progress, they will probably begin commercial production only in 2028 (BatteryTech, 2026). Moreover, the 2026 presidential election and legal reviews of the operators’ environmental licences could impact the sector’s development. Provided its successful implementation, the deal could catalyze mining investment by fostering regulatory predictability and the advancement of ESG standards. The opposite is unlikely to happen, given European investors’ reluctance to finance risky sectors. Despite its inability to immediately enhance supply chain security, the EU-Mercosur deal represents, at least symbolically, a brake to Chinese and American geoeconomic ambitions towards the region’s energy resources.

Conclusion

The current geoeconomic competition between China and the US translates into restrictions to free trade, such as tariffs and import quotas, therefore into supply chain insecurity for Europe and Latin America. In this context, the EU-Mercosur deal acquires strategic value by advancing free trade.

From an EU perspective, the agreement offers concrete advantages in industrial goods exports and access to critical raw materials in the long-term, while promoting sustainability standards in trade. Although the quantitative impact on sensitive agricultural sectors is limited, political resistance remains. The deal’s innovative sustainability architecture, centred on dialogue rather than coercion, reflects a pragmatic compromise but also raises legitimate concerns about its ability to preserve fair competition, particularly in light of the EU’s regulatory agenda.

For Mercosur countries, the agreement promises greater access to the world’s largest single market, incentives for regulatory predictability, and potential foreign direct investment in strategic sectors. However, these advantages depend on domestic commitments to transparency and infrastructure development. Ultimately, the EU-Mercosur deal per-se is neither a solution to Europe’s supply chain vulnerabilities nor a guarantee of sustainable development in South America. At the moment, its significance lies in its institutional contribution: reaffirming the viability of interregional free trade and positioning the EU as an international actor capable of combining economic cooperation with its internal sustainability standards.

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