Author: Chiara Bianco - Senior Researcher
Abstract
The Caucasus region, situated between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, holds strategic importance due to its geographic location as a natural bridge between Europe and Asia. Recent events, particularly the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, have further complicated the security dynamics in the South Caucasus, comprising Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and parts of Russia. This paper provides an analysis of the ongoing conflicts in the Caucasus, considering the roles of key international actors such as Russia, Turkey, Iran, and, partly, China. It examines the historical background and current status of conflicts, including the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and Georgia's complex relationship with Russia and the West. The paper also explores potential scenarios and future outlooks for the region, highlighting the need for increased EU involvement in promoting peace and stability. Despite challenges posed by geopolitical rivalries and historical tensions, fostering reconciliation and dialogue among stakeholders remains essential for achieving long-term peace and prosperity in the Caucasus.
Introduction
Situated between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus region encompasses Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and parts of Russia. Due to the invasion of Ukraine, the security situation in the South Caucasus has significantly deteriorated and will foreseeable continue to do so.
The Caucasus is a zone of interest due to its strategic location, it serves as a natural bridge between Europe and Asia and it is at the center of the issues of energy security among major players such as Russia, the US, the European Union, Iran and Turkey, with recent involvement of China, too. The Caucasus boasts an extraordinary ethnic and cultural diversity with over fifty distinct ethnic groups speaking more than twenty-eight languages. This diversity has shaped the region's history – marked by invasions from various peoples, internal conflicts, and significant involvement by Russia since the 16th century –, adding complexity to its socio-political dynamics.
A broader look
Europe is becoming more interested in using the South Caucasus as a Middle corridor to reach Asia, avoiding Russia, while the latter is starting to place more importance on the North-South corridor that connects it to the Middle East via Iran and the South Caucasus transit routes that connect it to Turkey. For the EU and its strategy towards the larger Eastern neighborhood, in addition to the desire to supplant Russia as the principal land trade route between Asia and Europe, there is growing interest in acquiring oil and gas from Central Asia and the Caspian region.
China has emerged as a significant trade, investment, and development partner for the South Caucasus governments thanks to its strategic integration into global markets. Beijin’s interest in the Caucasus is driven by its strategic location as a transit territory for accessing markets in Europe and the Middle East. China's direct investment stocks expanded fivefold from 0.16 to 0.82 billion USD between 2010 and 2020, and 1 billion USD of Chinese government financing was utilized for development projects in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The overall amount of regional commerce with China nearly quadrupled from 1.33 to 3.7 billion USD during this time. However, China's engagement in the South Caucasus has been focusing on economic aspects rather than significant geopolitical influence.
In the Caucasus, the boundaries of Iran, Turkey, and Russia converge. Russia considered the South Caucasus a part of its post-Soviet territory for a long time. It took a consistent stance toward the area, utilizing military, economic, and other instruments of dominance. Since the invasion of Ukraine, its foreign policy in the Caucasus has shifted and became reactive. This was particularly visible by its lack of response during or after Baku's military assault on Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. The main interest is now to eliminate or avoid any Western presence in the region, to have guaranteed its prominent role in the post-Ukraine war.
Not only does Iran share a border with these regions, but events in the Caucasus also have the potential to impact Iran's internal political landscape and the stability of the current government. This is due to the connections that Iranian ethnic groups have with neighboring ethnic regions, primarily Azerbaijan. As a result, Iran's primary objectives in its regional policy are defensive, meaning they want to keep regional developments from having a detrimental impact on their country's internal politics and national security. Tehran thus aspires to limit Turkish and Russian military presence in the Caucasus and their control over major transportation infrastructure, particularly roads and rail that are close to Iran's border or that Iran frequently uses, like the road to Armenia, in addition to maintaining influence over the strategic architecture of the region. Nevertheless, Iran has no desire for hostilities with Russia since likewise, it aspires to reduce US and Israeli influence and presence in the area.
The war in Ukraine and the instability of the area, have given Turkey numerous chances to increase its influence throughout the South Caucasus. As its strongest ally, Turkey-backed Azerbaijan's occupation of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. Ankara has sought to expand its influence in Central Asia, a region of primarily Turkic-speaking nations, since the fall of the Soviet Union. The South Caucasus serves as a bridge between Turkey and this region. In addition, Turkey wants to become a regional energy hub and is attempting to do this by gaining access to the energy-rich Caspian Sea region.
South Caucasus: not only a rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan
There are occasions when rivalry between the regional powers affects their internal spheres. Iran has been providing more support in recent years to the Kurdish group that regularly carries out terrorist operations in Turkey and along the Turkish-Iranian border. As a result, Turkey has become more outspoken in its defense of the rights of Iran's Azerbaijani Turks, who make up nearly a third of the country's population. The geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Iran is also playing out in the South Caucasus at the same time, and Turkey is currently perceived as having the upper hand in this regard due to Azerbaijan's 2020 victory in the Second Karabakh War and its subsequent takeover of the entirety of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. However, Turkey has never established diplomatic ties with Armenia, primarily as a result of Turkey's denial of the Ottoman Armenians' mass executions during World War I. Despite attempts to restore relations have been made on several occasions, especially following the 2020 conflict, the border remains closed and efforts to maintain its openness to third-country nationals (i.e., non-Armenians and non-Turks) at the very least have not succeeded.
One cannot rule out the possibility of another escalation in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. There are good reasons why Armenians are afraid that Azerbaijan may invade their land at this time. Azerbaijan took control of strategically important heights on Armenian soil. In addition, there is disagreement about a train link between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan, which would pass through the southern Syunik area of Armenia, which is a requirement of the 2020 ceasefire accord. Although Azerbaijan and Russia believe that the connection must be extraterritorial, Armenians demand authority over such a route. Previously, Baku has threatened to use force if Yerevan refuses to comply with this demand. Ankara would not benefit from additional military escalation in the South Caucasus since its ultimate goal is to establish a stable South Caucasus region that serves as a vital link to Central Asia. Following the 2020 ceasefire, the EU acted as a mediator between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Brussels' diplomatic leverage is weak, as demonstrated by the military offensive in September. Neither can it guarantee security to Yerevan, where Moscow continues to be the dominant military force, nor does it have enough clout over Baku to insist on diplomatic rather than military solutions.
Turkey's endeavors to cultivate more profound diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with Central Asia will ultimately benefit Europe too by advancing regional collaboration and diversifying alliances. In the image below, it is shown Turkey’s role as a trans-Eurasian energy connector. Since Ankara and Brussels have no interest in further combat, which may escalate into a larger regional conflict, the EU might interact with Turkey to use its backdoor connections with Azerbaijan to act as a force for long-term conflict resolution in the area and stop future military escalation.
Source: Jam News
Georgia: a difficult stance between Russia and the West
Georgia shares borders with Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. It continues to be a gateway for the transit of oil and gas pipelines that originate in Azerbaijan. It also serves as a hub for the transportation of products by road from Iran via Armenia to the European Union, from Armenia to Russia, and from Turkey to both Russia and Azerbaijan. Since Georgia is not regarded as a strong enough conflict mediator, it has avoided getting involved in the dispute thus far and has even attempted to act as a mediator in the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but to no avail.
Georgia has a complex relationship with the Kremlin; on the one hand, Russia has strong economic ties with Georgia; on the other hand, since the war waged by Putin in 2008 a portion of Georgia is still under Russian occupation. These events changed Georgians' perceptions of Russia, and a large number of the country's youth now adamantly support a pro-Western path that includes EU membership. This is mainly because Georgia has no partners or allies who would defend it in the event of a military conflict with Russia, something that became even more relevant with the invasion of Ukraine. Despite this, the Georgian administration maintains cordial ties with the Kremlin and assists in getting under Russian sanctions. This stance during the Ukrainian War not only contributes to miscommunication with the West but also fuels instability within the country. Nevertheless, Georgia at last achieved the status of an EU candidate, with the latter presumably compelled to accept it to keep relations with Georgia intact and to stop Georgia from getting even closer to Russia.
To maintain its security and stability because of its geographic proximity to Russia's sphere of influence, economic interdependence with Turkey has seen a positive trend. The foundation of the two countries' collaboration is the trade of commodities and services, which promotes mutual development and prosperity. But the two countries' relationship goes well beyond just business. Acknowledging the strategic benefit of working with a NATO member and major regional player such as Turkey, Georgia hopes to strengthen its security stance via this alliance. Turkey is an important ally for Georgia in thwarting possible threats because of its active participation in NATO, which highlights its role as a guarantee of regional security. Furthermore, the significance of their bilateral relations is further enhanced by Türkiye's unwavering support for Georgia's ambitions to join NATO.
On Georgia's admission to the North Atlantic Alliance, however, the Western nations are divided. Poland, Romania, the US, and the Baltic republics are adamant about accelerating the procedure. France and Germany are also concurrently against it; at least until the disagreements are resolved and the outstanding issues between Tbilisi and Moscow are settled. In the meantime, Russia finds Tbilisi's Alliance membership to be completely unacceptable. Moscow views this as the creation of a highly adverse strategic environment.
Potential Scenarios and Future Outlook
The Russian invasion of Ukraine poses security dangers to the region, which is already burdened by the security environment that followed the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The Armenian government and public opinion could be swayed by Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, so serving Russian aims. It is reasonable to anticipate that Russia will be less tolerant of Azerbaijan's geostrategic role in energy policy and policies, as it does with Turkey. Russia may exert pressure or influence over Azerbaijani decision-making by adjusting the degree of its leeway in the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. The situation in Georgia's breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia may get worse, and Russian attempts to project influence through this conflict are a possibility.
Several events could result in an exacerbation of conflicts and a military buildup. For instance, it's feasible that South Ossetia – and less probably Abkhazia, according to Sergey Markedonov in “Russia and the conflicts in the South Caucasus: main approaches, problems, and prospects” – will be annexed to Russia similar to what happened to Crimea in the event of Georgia's accelerated NATO entrance. The increasing number of events in Nagorno-Karabakh is dangerous because it could lead to the use of force by Russia, Turkey, Iran, and, in some cases, the United States and its European allies in the conflict.
As explained in “The Geopolitical Impact of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine” by Mustafa Aydın and Siri Neset, in the worst case, the South Caucasus countries may become further divided in an attempt to maintain their alliance with Russia, thwart Russian aggression, and maximize their level of autonomy as a result of the Russian war on Ukraine. In the best-case scenario, the war's aftereffects might promote unity against a shared foe.
All parties engaged in the Caucasian processes acknowledge, however, that Moscow's involvement is necessary for the resolution of conflicts in the area at the moment. But the way Russia's leadership sees the situation and what is expected of it differs greatly. The "de-occupation" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as demanded by Tbilisi and the U, is probably not something the Kremlin is prepared for. Furthermore, the West will not accept Russian control being established in the South Caucasus. However, not only has Western inaction before and during the Nagorno-Karabakh war damaged confidence in democracy and the EU throughout the region, but it has also caused the government, parliament, and civil society organizations that advocated for a democratic and European Armenia to lose credibility.
In this context, the EU should work to become a relevant geopolitical player. It must take a more active role in multilateral discussions to achieve and maintain long-lasting peace in the South Caucasus, in addition to its significant role as a major contributor and advocate for dialogue. It must put more money into the many forums for negotiations, like as the OSCE, and be more prepared to send out peacekeepers to protect ceasefires. However, the responsibility is on Armenian and Azerbaijani political elites and civic society to initiate a sincere process of reconciliation and put a stop to the divisive and hateful discourse. There has been very little interaction between the citizens of the two nations since the end of the 1980s. More acceptance for the negotiation of a durable peace accord might result from improved circumstances for measures aimed at fostering discussion and confidence-building.
While a greater involvement of the EU in the peace-building process is advisable, Russia will try to oppose it. By including Iran and Turkey in the region, Russia is attempting to retain its political hegemony. At first, Moscow rejected Ankara and Tehran's attempts to start talks during the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2022. Later, Turkey's official presence on the ground was established through the joint Russian-Turkish Monitoring Center as a result of its direct involvement in the fighting on behalf of Azerbaijan. Iran did not participate in the process until 2023 when this all changed. Russia is now in favor of the "3+3" format, which is a platform for conflict negotiation between the three Caucasian nations (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) and the three regional powers (Russia, Iran, and Turkey). This opens the door for Tehran and Ankara to directly influence the future of the region, while the role of the EU recedes further.
Conclusion
The Caucasus region stands at a critical juncture, with complex geopolitical dynamics and ongoing conflicts threatening regional stability. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has further exacerbated tensions, in the South Caucasus because of Russia's focus on Ukraine and a diminishing role in the Nagorno-Karabkh conflict, and in Georgia because fear of another invasion, regions occupied, and population pushing for closer ties with the West, intertwines with economic and political ties that are still strong with the Kremlin. Russia's historical dominance in the region has faced challenges, particularly with Turkey's increasing influence, as seen in its support for Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, Russia continues to assert its presence and influence, albeit in a more reactive manner following the Ukraine war, aiming to eliminate Western presence and secure its role in the post-Ukraine war era.
The conflicts in the South Caucasus are not only a source of rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan but also reflect broader geopolitical tensions between regional powers. Iran's defensive regional policy aims to safeguard its internal stability and limit the influence of Turkey and Russia in the Caucasus, while also minimizing US and Israeli presence. Turkey, on the other hand, seeks to expand its influence in the region, leveraging its strong ties with Azerbaijan and positioning itself as a key player in regional energy politics.
Looking ahead, potential scenarios for the Caucasus region range from further division and conflict to greater unity against shared threats. The EU must play a more active role in promoting peace and stability in the region, engaging in multilateral discussions and supporting dialogue and confidence-building measures. However, Russia's opposition to increased EU involvement, coupled with the influence of Iran and Turkey, presents challenges to such efforts. Balancing the interests of all stakeholders will be essential for navigating the complex geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus and ensuring long-term stability and prosperity.
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