Abstract
The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) represents a landmark intervention at the intersection of climate policy and international trade. Today CBAM represents a global focus as, at the beginning of February 2026 it entered its final phase. This paper situates CBAM within the broader theoretical debate on climate governance and international commerce, demonstrating that the mechanism constitutes both a regulatory innovation and a geopolitical instrument capable of reshaping global trade dynamics.
Matilde Bonomi (Junior Researcher - GEO Environment)
The theoretical context of climate and international commerce
Despite decades of international climate efforts, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have continued to rise throughout the 21st century. Since 2005, a cornerstone of the European Union’s climate policy has been the Emission Trading System (ETS), a market-based mechanism that has proven effective in reducing emissions. While the ETS covers the EU as well as Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein through the European Economic Area agreement, its scope remains geographically limited. Within this context, carbon-leakage, the incentive for firms to relocate production to jurisdictions with laxer climate rules, threatens the integrity of European climate efforts and exposes the fragility of the multilateral trade order. In response, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) represents a novel institutional device that extends the Union’s domestic carbon price to imported goods, thereby “level-playing-field-ing” the cost of emissions without altering tariff schedules. Beyond its environmental rationale, CBAM reconfigures the WTO-environment nexus: it challenges the principles of non-discrimination and national treatment. This way it revives a longstanding tension between the WTO’s trade-liberalisation agenda and the need for robust environmental regulation. Economists such as Nordhaus argue that unilateral instruments like CBAM can seed “climate clubs”, offering a collective-action alternative to the stalled Paris-regime by rewarding members with preferential market access while penalising free-riders. The mechanism also exemplifies the EU’s “regulatory power”. Its internal standards generate spill-over effects that coax third-country exporters to adopt domestic carbon-pricing or align with EU-level standards, to mitigate CBAM charges. Thus, CBAM is not merely a climate policy; it signals a paradigm shift in global commerce. Using environmental regulation as a geopolitical lever reshapes trade flows and confronts the systemic failure of binding international climate cooperation.
CBAM in practice
The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) represents a significant shift in global climate governance and international trade relations.
CBAM was introduced by Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 as part of the EU’s “Fit for 55” legislative package of the Green Deal. On the 31st of December 2025 it completed its transitional phase, started on October 1st, 2023. This phase included the obligation to send quarterly declarations relating to emissions incorporated in imported products, specifically on iron, steel, cement, electricity, aluminium, hydrogen and fertilisers.
The final phase began on 1 January 2026. Emission data verification requirements entered into force, requiring importers to rely on verified emissions data, typically assessed by accredited third-party verifiers. Failure to comply with CBAM reporting and surrender obligations now results in monetary penalties, with fines linked to the weekly average carbon price in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). This linkage is designed to ensure equivalence between the carbon costs faced by EU producers and foreign exporters, reinforcing the environmental integrity of the EU’s climate policy framework.
From 1 February 2026, imported goods covered by the mechanism became subject to the payment of CBAM certificates, the price of which is aligned with EU ETS allowances. In this way, CBAM progressively replaces the system of free allocation of emission allowances under the EU ETS, which is being phased out between 2026 and 2034. The European Commission affirms that this parallel phase-out is what is maintaining CBAM compatible with the WTO (World Trade Organization) and to avoid double protection for EU industries.
By 2030, CBAM’s scope is expected to extend to all product groups covered by the EU ETS and to additional products deemed to be at high risk of carbon leakage, including crude petroleum and petroleum products, inorganic basic chemicals, industrial gases, synthetic rubber and non-ferrous metals. Moreover, the EU plans to cover 100 per cent of embedded emissions of CBAM goods by 2034, marking the full integration of imported products into the EU’s carbon pricing architecture.
The EU aims to achieve a 55% net reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to 1990 levels by 2030 and become climate-neutral by 2050. However, as the EU continues to implement measures to reach these goals, many non-EU countries have less onerous environmental policies in place. Therefore, from a legislative point of view, CBAM aims to ensure that the European Union’s internal greenhouse gas emission-reduction efforts are not undermined by an increase in emissions outside its borders, the so-called “carbon leakage” phenomenon. Several studies highlight that CBAM may act as a catalyst for the diffusion of carbon pricing globally, particularly if major trading partners choose regulatory convergence over trade friction. However, the European policy received strong criticism especially from those countries that export carbon-intense goods.
CBAM as an instrument of extension of EU regulations
CBAM functions as an extraterritorial extension of EU regulation that reshapes global trade relations as much as it does carbon markets. By imposing a levy on the embedded emissions of imports, the mechanism internalises the EU carbon price for foreign producers, thereby altering the economics of value-added chains that span Asia, Africa and Latin America. In doing so, CBAM effectively redefines market access to the European Union by conditioning it on compliance with EU-defined climate standards, transforming carbon intensity into a de facto trade criterion.
Quantitative trade-model estimates show that CBAM shifts a sizable share of imports toward domestically produced, lower-carbon goods, rising 0.10 per cent. This is because, while the CBAM raises unit production costs for all producers by increasing the price index, clean producers are less exposed to this shock due to their lower input carbon intensity, increasing their relative competitiveness. The system also significantly reduces embodied emissions in EU-bound trade by roughly 5 per cent. However, this number falls to a still quite relevant 3 per cent once the emissions embodied in importers’ supply chains are accounted, due to the “reallocation effect" where importers switch to alternative, non-targeted, yet still carbon-intensive materials or suppliers.
At the core of CBAM is the prospect that a carbon-adjusted price frontier incentivises exporting countries to adopt domestic carbon pricing mechanisms or to align their regulatory standards with the EU ETS. This dynamic of regulatory convergence is described in the literature as a “spillover” effect, whereby unilateral EU climate policies induce policy change beyond EU borders. Empirical evidence suggests that, rather than provoking uniform retaliation, CBAM has prompted a differentiated set of responses ranging from partial emulation to cooperative climate policy reforms.
CBAM demonstrates the EU capacity to steer climate legislation in non-EU jurisdictions, reinforcing the credibility of the EU’s climate commitments. Access to the world’s largest single market becomes a vehicle for exporting norms and standards in the absence of binding multilateral agreements and growing fragmentation of global trade governance. CBAM operates as a geopolitical lever: it leverages climate ambition to reshape supply-chain incentives, and promote a diffusion of carbon pricing regimes worldwide.
At the same time, this unilateral approach raises unresolved questions about legitimacy, distributive justice and the future of multilateral climate-trade cooperation.
WTO concerns
The mechanism raises concerns regarding compliance with the GATT principle of non-discrimination, in particular Articles I (Most-Favoured-Nation) and III (National Treatment). Under these provisions, “like products” must be treated equally regardless of their country of origin and must not be subject to internal charges that afford protection to domestic production. CBAM potentially challenges this framework insofar as it differentiates between otherwise identical goods on the basis of their embedded emissions and the climate policies of the exporting country, rather than on their physical characteristics. Such differentiation may result in imported products facing higher effective charges than domestically produced goods or imports from jurisdictions with comparable carbon pricing, thereby constituting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.
The European Union has sought to justify CBAM under Article XX of the GATT, invoking the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. However, the chapeau of Article XX requires that such measures not be applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, nor constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. The European Union openly criticized the WTO calling for a comprehensive reform, as the GATT rules date back to 1947 a time where the context of the climate crisis wasn’t as pressing as it is today. Support to this argument can be found in other multilateral agreements such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement. The legal debate, however, remains open. Some scholars argue that the limited recognition of credits from third-country climate policies may disregard historical differences in levels of development and the flexibilities granted to less-developed countries under WTO law (such as the Generalised System of Preferences and the Enabling Clause). Others, instead, contend that differentiation based on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) could, in theory, fall within the scope of GATT exceptions, although its acceptance remains uncertain.
Equity challenges of CBAM
CBAM raises broader systemic concerns regarding the cohesion of the global trading system. Reactions from major trading partners, including China, India and Brazil, have already framed the mechanism as protectionist, intensifying diplomatic tensions that could spill over into wider trade disputes. Such opposition reflects fears that CBAM may set a precedent for the unilateral use of environmental measures as de facto trade barriers, eroding trust in multilateral trade governance.
These dynamic risks accelerate trends toward regionalisation. Countries that are more closely integrated with the European Union may choose to align their domestic carbon-pricing systems with EU standards in order to preserve market access, while others may resist or pursue alternative regulatory models. The result could be the emergence of “climate blocs” characterised by divergent carbon-pricing regimes and regulatory frameworks. Rather than fostering global convergence, CBAM may thus contribute to a patchwork of regional arrangements with limited interoperability.
In such a scenario, the multilateral trading system faces further fragmentation. The role of the World Trade Organization as a central forum for resolving trade disputes and coordinating rules risks being weakened, as climate–trade governance loses its scope against regional agreements or informal climate clubs. While such arrangements may facilitate coordination among like-minded actors, they also risk excluding less-developed economies and deepening divisions between regulatory insiders and outsiders.
These systemic concerns from non-EU countries are often used to mask the deeper economic anxieties of these economies. Indeed, at the core of these critiques lies the embedded cost structure of CBAM. Empirical evidence shows that the mechanism’s reporting, measurement and verification obligations generate significant administrative and compliance costs.
While CBAM aims to level the playing field between domestic and foreign producers, its distributive effects are uneven and raise particular concerns for developing and emerging economies. As the free allocation of EU ETS allowances is progressively phased out, European producers benefit from a partial restoration of competitiveness. By contrast, energy- and carbon-intensive segments located outside the EU bear a disproportionate share of the adjustment costs. Quantitative assessments indicate immediate competitiveness losses for export-oriented sectors in China, India and other middle- and low-income economies, with ad valorem equivalents reaching up to 1.2 per cent for iron, steel and aluminium.
These impacts are amplified in countries whose production structures rely heavily on coal-based energy systems and carbon-intensive technologies. Limited access to low-carbon alternatives, emissions-monitoring infrastructure and accredited verification bodies further constrains firms’ ability to adapt. Moreover, technological asymmetries exacerbate this imbalance, as many developing countries lack reliable emissions data-tracking systems and standardised accounting methodologies. In this context, CBAM may function less as a neutral climate instrument and more as a selective market-access filter, favouring producers already integrated into advanced regulatory and technological ecosystems. As a result, CBAM risks reinforcing existing asymmetries in the global trading system by disproportionately burdening economies with fewer financial, technological and institutional resources to respond to stringent climate-related trade requirements.
The European Union acknowledged the concerns raised by non-EU partners but argued that CBAM is fundamentally not a protectionist barrier. The mechanism explicitly limits discrimination by granting partial credit for carbon-pricing schemes that meet EU-defined equivalence criteria. This flexibility has already attracted the support of several “large friends” such as Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and “small friends” including South-Korea, Japan and Mexico, whose governments have signalled willingness to align their domestic carbon-pricing systems with EU standards in exchange for continued market access.
Moreover, the European Climate-Finance Initiative earmarks billions of euros for joint R&D, low-carbon infrastructure and emissions-monitoring capacity in partner economies. By linking these resources to the gradual phasing-out of free EU ETS allowances, the EU aims to offset the short-term competitiveness losses documented for exporters from China, India and Brazil, while providing a predictable regulatory horizon that encourages private investment in clean-technology upgrades.
Whether CBAM ultimately fosters global decarbonisation or accelerates the emergence of climate-based trade blocs will depend on how the European Union manages the tension between regulatory ambition and global inclusiveness. If accompanied by meaningful financial transfers, targeted technical assistance, and capacity-building initiatives aimed at developing economies, CBAM could function as a catalyst for broader regulatory convergence and cooperative climate action. In this scenario, the mechanism would move beyond its role as a defensive trade measure and evolve into a platform for integrating climate objectives into the global trading system in a more equitable and multilateral manner.
Conclusion
The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism marks a decisive turning point and, arguably, the first large‑scale global experiment in aligning trade rules with climate objectives. By internalising the carbon price of imported goods, CBAM demonstrates that environmental ambition can be embedded directly into the architecture of international commerce. Its long‑term success, however, hinges on three inter‑dependent conditions. First, robust international cooperation is essential; without reciprocal climate policies or recognized carbon‑pricing schemes, the mechanism risks being perceived as a unilateral barrier rather than a catalyst for collective decarbonisation. Second, concrete support for the most vulnerable economies, through technology transfer, capacity‑building, and financial assistance for compliance, must accompany the levy to mitigate adverse distributional impacts and to honour the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Third, coordinated multilateral governance, ideally anchored in WTO‑compatible rules or a dedicated climate‑trade framework, is needed to prevent fragmentation, manage disputes, and ensure that climate clubs evolve into inclusive, rule‑based institutions rather than exclusive blocs. If these pillars are established, CBAM could evolve from a contested policy into a replicable model that reshapes global value chains, accelerates emission reductions, and paves the way for a new era of climate-aligned trade.
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