Abstract
This analysis has the main objective of giving a comprehensive overview of the Belt and Road Initiative, with a particular focus on how it evolved and is expected to continue in the territory of EU member states. As it will be described, the BRI is a medium to long-term project with consequences that involve several areas of a country policies, not only the economic one, and that would see the Chinese influence increased not only in Asia but in Europe as well. The implications for the security of the European Union as a whole are pivotal to understanding the possible consequences and evolutions of the relationship between the EU member states and China in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Authored by Francesca Bodini, Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Difesa&Sicurezza
Introduction
Relations between the European Union and China have been growing since 2013 when both actors adopted a new general framework for their relationship, the EU-China Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. This document called for a broader and deeper cooperation in many areas, from international security and politics, economic affairs, socio-economic development to people-to-people exchanges. One of the most ambitious projects is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ‘a China-oriented undertaking’ that has the objective of boosting the connectivity between China and many regions, including Europe, by ‘building a comprehensive infrastructural, logistical, economic, political and cultural network for the following decades.’ (Von Hauff, 2019) The Initiative was announced for the first time in 2012 by Chinese President Xi Jinping and it represents a great economic opportunity for the countries partnering with China. In turn, BRI gives China the opportunity to use its economic power to increase its relations and political influence over BRI partner countries. In this context, how can the European Union balance its economic interests and the defence of the values it takes pride on, such as those of democracy and defence of human rights, while collaborating with a country that has a strong grip on its population as it is the case of China? This analysis has the main objective of giving a comprehensive overview of the Belt and Road Initiative, with a particular focus on how it evolved and is expected to continue in the territory of EU member states. As it will be described, the BRI is a medium to long-term project with consequences that involve several areas of a country policies, not only the economic one, and that would see the Chinese influence increased not only in Asia but in Europe as well. The implications for the security of the European Union as a whole are pivotal to understanding the possible consequences and evolutions of the relationship between the EU member states and China in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Overview of the Belt and Road Initiative, particularly related to the EU
According to numerous observers, by increasing the relationship with the European Union, China is attempting to become an ever more prominent global actor, marginalising the United States, that are already experiencing a decline of their global importance. Starting in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping created the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Belt and Road Initiative, a strategy attempting to increase Chinese outreach and influence, which includes EU nations as well. In this sense, BRI seems to be part of an alternative model of governance that could rival the one proposed by the United States up until now; this new model could not only refer to the economic arena, but has multiple implications, that could even be extended to considering it as a driver for a new world order. The Chinese government has denied every possible geopolitical implication of the BRI, affirming in numerous occasions how the project only relates to the economic arena. Indeed, the Initiative is presented by the Chinese government as a way to enhance mutual cooperation in a new multi-polar international order.
Since it has been initially introduced, BRI has been compared to the Marshall Plan adopted by the United States at the end of WWII to use the American economic power to influence the European countries in the framework of the Cold War. In the same way, China is expected to invest up to $1.3 trillion by 2027. Particularly, there are five main similarities between the Marshall Plan and BRI: they are boosting exports, exporting currency, countering a rival, fostering strategic divisions, and siphoning away diplomatic support. (Shen; Chan, 2018) Looking more in detail to the relations between China and the European Union in the BRI framework, we can say that the first entry point of China into the European territory was through the Visegrad Four countries. These are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, all countries from Central Europe and former Soviet satellite nations now part of the EU. By the end of 2020, 34 BRIs were present in Europe and Central Asia, with 18 being in the EU; moreover, at the global level 125 nations and 29 international organisations have signed up as BRI partners. Europe is a major recipient of Chinese investments in key sectors like energy, telecommunications, and real estate; with these investments comes Chinese political influence, with potential side effects on EU internal cohesion. Indeed, from a security and economic perspective BRI is impacting the EU along three broad categories: the effects on EU unity, the impacts on European security, and the competition for trade, investments, and market access both in Asia and the EU. Not only most EU countries are also members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a Chinese-led bank founded in 2014, but European involvement in BRI materialized through the engagement of European and other international financial institutions with European membership, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Both institutions have already been involved in BRI projects at an early stage and are expected to enlarge their shares in financing infrastructure projects part of the BRI. An example is the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2019 between EBRD and People’s Bank of China, which refers to the strengthening of cooperation in third party markets within the BRI framework. But already in 2016, several European commercial banks, especially in the UK and Germany, had started collaborating with BRI projects. Despite the general reluctance on the part of EU institutions and several EU member states to engage with BRI, the proactive approach of European financial institutions and commercial banks has been constant since BRI’s commencement. In practice, these investments are used to build corridors through infrastructures that reach Western Europe markets – from Rotterdam in the Netherlands to Valencia in Spain and many other countries, making it much easier and cheaper for Chinese goods to arrive at the intended markets. This engagement obviously poses some challenges, but the emphasis seems to be rightly placed on the inherent opportunities to introduce European and internationally recognised standards to ensure maximum benefit for the parties and countries involved in BRI. An interesting point is that the engagement of these financial institutions and multilateral development banks can generate development dividends while serving as an accelerator for achieving the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals in BRI countries.
Position of the EU with respect to the BRI
In 2018, twenty-seven out of twenty-eight EU ambassadors signed a document ‘denouncing the lack of reciprocity in infrastructure projects linked to the far-reaching Chinese development strategy Belt and Road Initiative’. (Rosenberg, 2020) Looking at the data, we can see that in 2018 the EU-28 exported 210 billion Euros worth of goods and services to China, against the 395 billion worth of imports coming from China that same year. This already puts the net trade deficit of the EU with China at 195 billion Euros and this figure is expected to drastically increase along further implementation of the BRI. For European companies, the competition with BRI projects represents a though challenge, since state-owned companies such as the Chinese ones can provide large loans and state backing. This type of assurances causes an effectively distortion of the markets, especially in large infrastructure project like high-speed railway, port construction and logistics where European companies used to lead. Moreover, the introduction of Chinese technical and manufacturing standards in new markets is further closing out space for European companies. In this context, the BRI is described as a tool used by China to attempt to shape globalisation, in contrast with the EU agenda for liberalising trade. Western-led bilateral and plurilateral infrastructure and connectivity initiatives designed as alternatives have remained fragmented and have been dwarfed in scope and scale by a rapidly expanding BRI. The only opposition to the aforementioned position within the EU was presented by Hungary, that refused to sign the document denouncing an increasing lack of reciprocity in the economic relations between EU and China. In 2014 China created a Foreign Domestic Investment in Hungary, that amounted to almost 33% of total Chinese investments in central and eastern European countries. These investments can imply a sort of obligation for Hungary not to criticise China and it is a perfect example of how a strong Chinese hold on the European economy could have repercussions on several areas of the political landscape, with the possibility of influencing them. BRI seems to be undermining the European Union internal cohesion, with a potential future impact on European security, and the creation of a stiff competition for European companies on trade, investments and market access both in Asia and the EU. Countries with higher unemployment rates and slower economic growth are more prone to welcoming Chinese investments, as can be observed especially in Southern, Central and Eastern member states. For example, Italy is a partner with BRI since 2019, and the development of infrastructures at its ports along the Mediterranean Sea with interconnectivity between land and sea within the framework of BRI could represent a shift in alliances for the country, bringing it closer to China in comparison with the historic alliance across the Atlantic. Chinese investments come with strings attached, as in the Hungarian case, leading to increased Chinese influence both at the EU and member state level.
Alternatives for the EU with respect to the BRI
For years now, Western European states and Brussels are viewing the Chinese ‘divide and rule’ tactic with great alarm and have been pushing for a ‘One Europe’ approach towards China to avoid finding themselves divided. In 2018, led by calls from Germany, France and Italy, the Commission started a process of developing a screening mechanism for foreign investments in sensitive sectors – critical infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, high-end tech-companies, and defence technologies. Indeed, the impact the BRI could have on the power balance and stability, and all the consequences these could entail for the EU, is becoming clearer. Asian markets are important export destinations for Europe, and a majority of its sea-borne trade transit through the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, Central Asia now plays a pivotal role in the implementation of China’s connectivity objectives because of its geostrategic position and the possibility of this area becoming a hub for international connectivity, linking East and West and being centre of the Belt and Road Initiative. To contextualise, more than 35 percent of EU exports go to Asia, and four of its top 10 trading partners are in the region. For these reasons, the EU wants to partner with key players in Asia on shaping the rules around connectivity and provide a comprehensive response to the BRI challenge. Particularly, European interests converge considerably with countries like India, Japan, Australia and the United States, who have responded to Chinese assertiveness along the Belt and Road by revitalising the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – originally created in 2004 to respond to a tsunami, abandoned in 2007 and revived in 2007. Brussels is not in the position for being alone in playing the role of security actor in the Indo-Pacific area. Nonetheless, it can be a pivotal partner when it comes to shaping rules concerning connectivity, and possibly in offering an alternative to BRI. Indeed, Europe’s response to BRI is two-fold: if, on one side, the EU is interested in engaging with and participating to BRI, hoping to shape the initiative from within, on the other hand European policymakers are realising that BRI poses threats to the EU. The European Union has already conducted a mapping exercise in consultation with member states which describes existing policies, instruments and projects. The EU-China Connectivity Platform is the European response to the Chinese endeavour and aims at coordinating those parts of BRI projects that are of relevance to Brussels – in and outside Europe, established in 2015 between the European Commission and the National Reform and Development Commission (NDRC) of China. The main objective is to facilitate and broaden information exchange, transport and cooperation between China and the EU for what concerns policies and related project, in order to create opportunities for companies from both sides. The new strategy will focus on crucial sectors – transport, digital, energy and people-to-people connectivity. From a normative point of view, the EU’s approach to connectivity will promote labour rights, social and environmental standards, sustainability, transparency, market principles, open procurement rules, a level playing field, equal treatment and equal access – several of these principles are missing in most of BRI projects. The EU highlighted issues brought up by BRI, mostly related to lending practices that have left several countries with a debt crisis contributing to state fragility in the Euro-Asian region. On the contrary, the European alternative would be to strengthen regional order and focus on multilateral approaches to connectivity. The strategy should also include a better availability and sustainability of finance, which is absolutely essential to make any alternatives to BRI work in practice – most likely through European Investment Bank (EIB), European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and investments coming from the member states. During the 2021 G7 Summit, however, leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US agreed on a global 'values-driven, high-standard and transparent infrastructure partnership', known as the Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership, backed by US President Joe Biden. This Partnership represents a collective attempt of the major democracies to meet the infrastructure needs of medium- and low-income countries through a sustainable and targeted alternative to the BRI, while simultaneously tackle the challenges that BRI poses regarding the rules-based international order. As stated by the White House, the B3W’s objective is to fill the infrastructural gap of an estimated at US$40+ trillion, using public development finance to mobilise untapped private-sector funds, but challenges are to be expected. In the Resolution on connectivity and EU-Asia relations (2021), the European Parliament underlines the need for a global connectivity strategy at the EU level, which should broaden the 2018 Europe-Asia connectivity strategy. The goal should be strengthening the EU's role as a single geopolitical and geo-economic actor and broadening partnerships with democracies across the world that share the EU's fundamental values. In 2018, an EU connectivity strategy for Asia – referred to as ‘Connecting Europe and Asia—Building Blocks for an EU Strategy’ – was unveiled by the EEAS and the European Commission, five years after China’s launch of BRI. The document was presented as a European way to enhance connectivity and outlined, in a general manner, the EU’s objectives in different areas related to connectivity, such as ‘air, sea, and land transportation, as well as in the areas of digital and energy connectivity’. The document can be seen as a way of challenging the ongoing infrastructure development by Beijing through the BRI, even if this is not explicitly mentioned. For this reason, the strategy has been criticised for not being clear in how the EU should engage in and with BRI.
Conclusions
When it comes to arranging economic opportunities and values like democracy, free trade and competition, the European Union is still trying to find the best way to balance everything. This is clear when it comes to big economies that do not share the same basic values that are of great pride for the EU, like China. When looking at the European approach to BRI, we can see some ambivalences: if, on one side, the Initiative represents great opportunities for European companies and countries, it poses also challenges that go from the arena of security to the one of market competition. Since 2012, when BRI was presented by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the EU and its member states have been trying to find a way to participate to it – many member states today are BRI partners – without compromising their interests by giving Beijing too much power. Indeed, the BRI ‘has been the most highly debated, heavily criticised and poorly understood policy framework of the 21st century’ by the West. (Di Donato, 2020) While different options and initiatives have been proposed to contrast the Chinese one, the situation and the relations between Brussels and Beijing are still in progress. Both at the national and the European level, many treaties have been signed within the BRI framework, but at the same time the member states are aware of the existing imbalance in the economic relations with China, as exemplified by the net trade deficit with the Asian partner. Moreover, BRI could severely change the balance in another important market for European exports, the one of Asia. This is an issue that has been talked about for years, yet the EU seems not to have found a definitive solution and position.
Contenuto dell’Informazione | ||
1 | Confermata | Confermato da altre fonti indipendenti; logico in sé; coerente con altre informazioni sull’argomento |
2 | Presumibilmente Vera | Non confermato; logico in sé; consistente con altre informazioni sull’argomento. |
3 | Forse Vera | Non confermato; ragionevolmente logico in sé; concorda con alcune altre informazioni sull’argomento |
4 | Incerta | Non confermato; possibile ma non logico in sé; non ci sono altre informazioni sull’argomento |
5 | Improbabile | Non confermato; non logico in sé; contraddetto da altre informazioni sul soggetto. |
6 | Non giudicabile | Non esiste alcuna base per valutare la validità dell’informazione. |
Affidabilità della fonte | ||
A | Affidabile | Nessun dubbio di autenticità, affidabilità o competenza; ha una storia di completa affidabilità. |
B | Normalmente Affidabile | Piccoli dubbi di autenticità, affidabilità, o competenza, tuttavia ha una storia di informazioni valide nella maggior parte dei casi. |
C | Abbastanza Affidabile | Dubbio di autenticità, affidabilità o competenza; tuttavia, in passato ha fornito informazioni valide. |
D | Normalmente non Affidabile | Dubbio significativo sull'autenticità, affidabilità o competenza, tuttavia in passato ha fornito informazioni valide. |
E | Inaffidabile | Mancanza di autenticità, affidabilità e competenza; storia di informazioni non valide. |
F | Non giudicabile | Non esiste alcuna base per valutare l’affidabilità della fonte. |
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