Emirati and Turkish Economic Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa

  Focus - Allegati
  07 maggio 2026
  13 minuti, 47 secondi

Author: Cecilia Di Fulvio (Senior Researcher - GEO Economia)

Introduction

The Horn of Africa is a subregion of East Africa comprising Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia. While the large-scale civil war in Sudan (2023-ongoing) represents the most evident development in the last five years, this area has also emerged as a hub for middle power competition due to its strategic relevance, natural resources, and economic growth potential. Indeed, the Horn has become a focal point for Middle Eastern economic diplomacy, with the Gulf monarchies and Turkey increasingly projecting political competition in the region while investing in development. Despite Saudi Arabia being the first sponsor of road transport infrastructure and Qatar recently scaling up on brownfield investments, the most relevant actors in this context are currently Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These two countries present different yet complementary strategies for expanding their economic influence in the Horn, with Turkey relying on long-standing political partnerships with Somalia and Ethiopia, and the UAE acting as a venture capital investor with a Chinese-like transactional logic. While the ongoing conflict in the Middle East is significantly impacting the UAE’s economic outlook, the country’s decision to exit OPEC is likely to boost diversification efforts in the medium term and generate positive repercussions on investment in the Horn.

  1. The Horn’s Economic Trends

The Horn of Africa presents a dynamic environment for investment, though challenging due to geopolitical instability. On average, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea have registered between 5% and 9% GDP yearly growth in the last ten years, while the Somali economy is recovering momentum (around 3% GDP growth rate) after decades of severe internal security challenges. Conversely, civil conflict has led to the Sudanese and South Sudanese economy shrinking in the last five years. Most of the countries in this region are classified as low-income (with GDP per capita not surpassing 1,145 USD/year), except for Djibouti, which is a lower middle-income country (about 3,600 USD/year). However, this pace of economic growth is not always sufficient for development, given the rapid demographic expansion.The region is experiencing 2.6% population growth per year, exceeding the continent’s average. While this trend requires sustained economic growth, it also indicates the presence of a very young population, with a potentially positive impact on fiscal sustainability and human capital development. Moreover, these economies are undergoing a significant degree of transformation, with expanding services sectors (accounting for about half of the region's GDP) and growing urbanization rates, mainly fueled by economic opportunities or displacement as the area remains strongly rural and 15% of the population relies on agro-pastoralism. As a consequence, the demand for utility services and infrastructure is consistently rising.

Energy-wise, the Horn of Africa is particularly suitable for the deployment of hydropower and solar energy infrastructure. However, the access to electricity rate ranges between 10% in South Sudan and 55% in Ethiopia, while on average 85% of the population lives without access to clean cooking technologies. Given that energy demand has almost doubled in the last ten years and is projected to increase more by 2030, investment in infrastructure is especially important in this phase. As a matter of fact, the Horn ranks low in infrastructure development compared to other African regions, with particularly weak transmission and distribution networks. Considering that most of these countries present complex bureaucratic procedures and regulatory uncertainty, projects in these segments are particularly risky. To date, foreign investment in resources has mostly focused on the extractive sector, especially in gold, silver, and zinc extraction, as Sudan produces 15% of Africa’s gold and Eritrea accounts for 20% and 10% of the continent’s silver and zinc respectively.

In addition, the region’s location is a strategic asset per se, as it is a key point for trade routes from the Middle East to Africa through the Red Sea. Therefore, external powers such as the US, China, Russia, and the UAE, aim to control the Horn’s main seaways through Port Sudan, Kismayo in Somalia, and the port of Djibouti, which provides sea access to landlocked Ethiopia. The latter was the object of a legal dispute between Djibouti and the UAE, when the East African state decided to nationalize the Emirati’s share and later sold a 23.5% stake to the state-owned China Merchants.

To sum up, the Horn of Africa is a strategically relevant region which presents significant development and security challenges. Therefore, East African governments are increasingly leveraging their assets to attract growth-oriented investments, and the external actors involved tend to adopt the opposite strategy.

  1. Emirati Economic Diplomacy in the Horn: a Risk-Taking Approach

The United Arab Emirates has emerged as the main regional actor to invest in venture capital or other risky projects in this area. Most famously, the UAE is involved in the Sudanese civil war due to their alleged financial and military support to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which are accused of committing multiple war crimes by the United Nations, especially in the Darfur region. In this context, the UAE has not interrupted its support due to the RSF’s control on gold mines in Sudan. As a matter of fact, the Dubai emirate is a global hub for refining and it controls about 15% of the global gold supply, while the UAE has been the main buyer of Sudan's gold since the early 2010s, often importing it via unofficial routes through a company (Al Gunade) owned by the RSF chief’s family. With gold trade being a fundamental resource for financing military operations, these dynamics indicate significant influence by the UAE on the warring parties. However, the Emirates prefer to maintain a business-oriented approach rather than to apply diplomatic pressure, profiting from their economic leverage on both the army and the RSF.

Secondly, the Emirates are deepening their economic partnership with Ethiopia, which is the fastest-growing economy in the region, by prioritizing strategic investment over traditional aid. The UAE had previously acted as a financial guarantor for Ethiopia in 2018, most famously providing a 3 billion USD concessional loan and investment package to stabilize the economy, making the relationship evolve into an asymmetrical trend. However, recent figures show that bilateral trade exceeded 6 billion USD in 2023, while more than 113 UAE-backed projects (valued at approximately 2.9 billion USD) are currently active in the country. To further insulate the Ethiopian market from macroeconomic shocks, the two nations signed a currency swap agreement in 2024 to ease foreign exchange pressures, demonstrating the UAE's readiness to deploy flexible financial instruments to secure its regional interests. This relationship remains strongly asymmetrical, as the UAE holds a majority share of the Berbera Port in Somaliland, creating a vital trade corridor that serves as an alternative to Djibouti for Ethiopian exports. Furthermore, the UAE recently unveiled the “Green Corridor”, a fast-track customs and logistics channel to Ethiopia designed to accelerate cargo clearance and ensure that strategic commodities reach the country more smoothly. By integrating alternative maritime gateways, like Fujairah, with land and rail transport, the UAE is effectively filling the space in regional infrastructure before other global competitors can consolidate their influence. Moreover, the Emirati energy company Masdar signed an agreement for a 2,000 MW solar project, coherently with the country’s attempt at Global South climate leadership displayed at the COP28.

As anticipated, the UAE’s primary interest is the control of logistic hubs and maritime trade routes, consistently with its economic diversification efforts. By leveraging state-owned enterprises such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports for foreign policy action, the UAE has secured a series of critical assets along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, enhancing its control on the flow of trade through the Bab el-Mandeb strait. After the 2018 loss of the Doraleh terminal in Djibouti port to Chinese competition, Abu Dhabi invested 442 million USD to secure a 51% stake in Somaliland’s Berbera port and established a military base in Bosaso (Somalia). By integrating alternative maritime control points with roadways such as the Green Corridor, the Emirates are building a flexible trade architecture that guarantees the uninterrupted flow of commodities. These dynamics indicate a shift toward a dual-use infrastructure model where port management functions as both a revenue stream and a diplomatic lever.

  1. Turkish influence between economic leverage and humanitarian aid

In stark contrast with the UAE’s approach, Turkey has re-emerged as a political and economic actor in the Horn of Africa by conducting initiative- and humanitarian-oriented diplomatic action that bridges its imperial past with its current pragmatism. As a matter of fact, Ankara leverages its historical influence in the Horn, which dates back to Ottoman settlements in Somalia and Sudan, to project an image of a “motherland” to the regional Muslim community. This vision is integrated in the “Ankara Consensus”, a model that blendsstate capitalism with religious solidarity, offering a third way to development that (partially) avoids the colonial baggage of Western powers or the transactional approach of regional rivals. Moreover, President Erdoğan has personalized this outreach through more official visits to the continent than any other non-African leader, institutionalizing Turkish influence via a vast diplomatic network that now ranks fifth globally. In this context, Turkey’s political framework synthesizes soft power, such as humanitarian aid and education projects, with hard power assets like the TURKSOM military base and defense exports.

This approach is most visible in Somalia, where Turkey has established itself through a multi-actor and multi-track engagement, effectively bridging humanitarian aid with large-scale economic integration projects. Firstly, Ankara has secured long-term control over the country's main trade routes, with the Albayrak Group managing the Port of Mogadishu and Favori LLC renovating Aden Adde International Airport under extended concession agreements. In this context, the presence of Turkish Airlines as the first international company to fly to Mogadishu since 1991, has helped consolidate bilateral relations, facilitating a trade volume that exceeded 400 million USD by 2024. Moreover, the opening of a Ziraat Bank branch in 2021 as the first international bank in Somalia in five decades demonstrates Turkey’s commitment to providing the financial infrastructure necessary for a viable business environment. Moreover, the two countries deepened their economic integration through the 2024 Maritime Security Agreement, which grants Turkey authority over Somali territorial waters and a 30% share in local resource exploitation. Simultaneously, Turkish humanitarian diplomacy prioritizes institutional consolidation and social policy initiatives. For instance, Ankara has invested over 1 billion USD in social projects, including the construction of the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital, and it cancelled a portion of Somali foreign debt with the IMF in 2020. This approach has proved to be instrumental for advancing the Turkish national interest. After the 2016 failed coup d’etat in Turkey, the Maarif Foundation and the Diyanet have replaced the Gulen movement in Turkish language education in the African continent, and Somali officials have increasingly described Turkish as the nation's “second language”.

While Somalia represents the main endeavor for Turkish cultural projection in the Horn, Ankara has also become the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia after China. With total investments reaching nearly 3 billion USD, Turkish firms provide employment for over 30,000 Ethiopians. In addition, they have outpaced competitors in securing infrastructure projects such as the 400-km Awash-Kombolcha-Weldia railway, supported by a 1.4 billion USD funding package from Turkey’s Eximbank. In this context, the 2021 Military Framework Agreement constitutes a significant hard power component, as Turkish defense exports (most notably Bayraktar TB2 drones) proved instrumental in stabilizing the federal government positions during the Tigray conflict (2020-2022). Simultaneously, Ankara reinforces its influence through its humanitarian and cultural diplomacy apparatus led by TIKA, which established its first Sub-Saharan program office in Addis Ababa in 2005 to manage official development assistance. As seen above, the Maarif Foundation has further institutionalized this soft power by operating seven schools across Ethiopia, including a recently inaugurated facility in Tigray for bridging educational gaps in war-torn areas. This deep cultural reach, exemplified by Turkish TV shows broadcasting on national TV, creates a shared social reality that facilitates economic integration. Despite a sharp decline in trade volume to 224 million USD in 2024 due to the civil war, both nations remain committed to a 1 billion USD trade target. These dynamics indicate that Ankara prioritizes long-term institutional presence, utilizing its aid and security strategy to maintain its status as a regional economic power.

Conclusion

While the Horn of Africa remains a strategic region for both regional and global powers, Middle Eastern actors have a special interest in controlling the main trade routes connecting Asia to Africa, where favorable demographic trends indicate the emergence of large markets. With the current blockage of the Hormuz strait, the Red Sea is increasingly vital for Gulf exports. Moreover, the UAE’s commitment to diversify its oil-based revenue sources place it on the front line of venture capital investment and innovation, with a potentially positive impact on East African efforts towards universal energy access. However, the business-oriented approach adopted by the UAE presents challenges for low-income countries, where infrastructure projects tend to take more time to generate profit. In order to maintain its reliability, the UAE should combine its risk-prone approach with long-term economic engagements. On the contrary, Turkey’s economic diplomacy strategy reflects a more traditional view of relations with the Horn, prioritizing development, humanitarian aid, and a strong cultural component, which emphasizes its long-standing influence in the region. With increasing Chinese interest in the Red Sea, growing Saudi and Qatari ambitions in the African continent, and complementary commitments in Ethiopia and Somalia by the UAE and Turkey, Eastern African countries are in a favorable position to benefit from power competition. Whether these opportunities will result in growth and development depends both on local institutions’ ability to provide viable business environments and on regional powers’ priorities in the medium to long term.

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