Energy and the European Union: a Political and Economic Perspective

  Focus - Allegati
  17 marzo 2022
  23 minuti, 9 secondi

written by Margherita Camurri (Junior Researcher G.E.O. Politics) and Marco Zecchillo (Senior Researcher G.E.O. Economics)


Abstract

Historically, the manipulation of energy resources has been one of the most widespread and effective foreign policy tools used by big producers of energy. Notably, Russia is currently the world’s largest net exporter of oil and natural gas combined, with Europe representing its main source of revenues (BP, 2021). Relying heavily on Russian energy supply, European states run the risk of becoming victims of the Kremlin’s strategic manipulation of the energy market to further its interests. For this reason, it is important to investigate the European energetic ties with Russia both from a political and an economic point of view.

This paper thus provides an extensive economic analysis of the EU energy sector, assessing the entity of the dependence that the continent has towards the Russian Federation, with the aim of discussing Russia’s resulting possibility to make use of its energy sector as a geopolitical tool of foreign policy. Lastly, the analysis discusses whether the shift towards renewable energy could represent an effective exit strategy for the EU to Russian dependence.

Statistics on EU Energy Position Between Autonomous Production and Imports

The European Union’s economic activities set themselves in a relation of dependence from external energy sources to remain operational. Nevertheless, each state of the union displays contextual elements that increase peculiarities. In this respect, this analysis will be centred on a EU level of analysis, gathering data from trustworthy sources to evaluate which industries and which sectors are most vulnerable from fluctuation of energy imports. The data hereby provided and interpreted, seem to suggest a trend of higher reliance from external factors, confirmed all across the considered timeframe (1990-2019).

Firstly, the European Union’s endogenous energetic production discloses contrasting patterns. On the one hand, the output quantity of “traditional” energetic sources, as solid fossil fuels and natural gas, has witnessed a downward trend in the reference period (1990-2019), with the most sensitive decrease being detected in the fossil fuel domain (Eurostat, 2021). On the other hand, the output of renewables and biofuels has risen, with the curve assuming a higher slope at the turn of the century.

Despite these trends, the internal output cannot meet the demand, requiring EU economies to import energy from a variety of sources. The same period of reference (1990-2009) underlines a relative enhancement in imports of oil and petroleum products and natural gas, in line with the gradual decrease of EU autonomous production (Eurostat, 2022). It is estimated that more than half of the union’s energy demand is currently covered by imports. By refining the analysis, data need to be included in a more diachronic perspective to evaluate empirically whether the rate of dependence is growing year by year. In this context, the Energy Dependency Rate indicator can be useful in grasping the degree of reliance European nations accord to any foreign exporter.

This indicator shows the share of energy that an economy needs to import to sustain its own operations, expressed via the following formula:

EDR (Energy Dependence Rate) = (Net Energy Imports / Gross Available Energy)

A further explanatory tool can be utilised, in conjunction to previous data on the EDR, to interpret whether higher EDR are in simultaneous presence of high Gross Inland Energy Consumption per capita. The latter indicator, always reported by the Eurostat database, allows us to evaluate the degree of energy utilisation (in tonnes of oil per capita) of an economy, also as a proxy for energetic efficiency. The associated presence of high values of these two variables might suggest higher vulnerability to likely supply shocks in the immediate future, as those due to the worsening of the Russo-Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, a low internal output of energy tied to a high utilisation of the latter could, as an empirical lens, be useful to estimate the magnitude of the impact due to the materialisation of supply risk.

For what the Energy Dependency Rate is concerned, we evaluate the presence of different trends amongst nations. EU27 displays an ascendant trend of the indicator (Eurostat, 2022). EU27 shows increasing observed values of the latter figure in the timespan between 1990 and 2019, with the former year showing the lowest datum and the latter year the highest (Eurostat, 2022). 2019 has been chosen because it is expected that 2020 observations are based on the implications of the pandemic that has lowered energy demand due to lockdowns. Nevertheless, the Euro Area nations underscore greater dependence with respect to the EU 27 average (60.5%), signalling a spread of around 4.7 percentage points (65.2%).

Fig.1: Contrasting Trends in Energy Dependence. Source: Eurostat, 2022. Graph: Mondo Internazionale, 2022.

Provided these differences, which require software-led multiple regressive analysis to evaluate significance, it would be reasonable to argue that some nations show different degrees of dependence on external imports and that the EU situation is highly diversified and difficult to sum up organically.

The Top 4 EU Economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) similarly see conflicting and diverse results. While France (47.6%) sits substantially below the EU27 and Euro Area average in 2019, Germany, Spain and Italy display values that are marginally higher than average, with the latter being the most dependent on external endowments (77.5%). In spite of the data, it is worth noting that the share of imports over total energy demand in these four countries has not undergone particularly important changes since the early 2000s, unlike the overall EU27 or EU19 trends. In some nations, as in the case of Italy, the dependence rate has been reduced as Figure 1 explains.

In terms of sources of imports, it is necessary to critically assess the entity of the dependence that the European Union has in relation to the Russian Federation. According to Trading Economics, Russia is EU’s 4th largest trading partner overall (5.8% of the book value of EU imports, valued at 100 billion dollars in 2020), after China, USA and Switzerland (respectively covering 26%, 14% and 7.3% of EU total imports as of 2020). In the pie chart of Russian exports to the EU, Mineral Fuels and Oils cover a noticeable part but, as foreseen, in a declining trend. As Eurostat found, natural gas imports from Russia to the EU underwent a decrease across the last months of 2021. As data are elaborated, this figure is expected to be even lower, in the context of the Ukrainian crisis outbreak in January-February 2022. Also in this instance, data point towards a two-tiered Europe with respect to dependence links with the Russian Federation. To exemplify this, it is estimated that 89% of Finland gas imports rely on Russia (European Union Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators, 2020), while lower shares are highlighted in France (overall less dependence, as additionally motivated by the low EDR values previously defined), The Netherlands and Ireland (respectively, at 24%, 11% and 0%).

From a macroeconomic standpoint, the reduced quantity may have played its role in augmenting the price, possibly supplemented by an additional cost segment linked to disruption risk of the supply chain. Financially, future contracts on natural gas are on the rise, as a symptom of market expectations of a higher spot price for the months to come.

Structural Sources of Dependence in EU Economy

As the previously discussed figures understate, the European economy appears to be suffering from an excessively high degree of diversity in the sector of energy production and import. While some states, such as France, appear not to be problematically reliant on external provision of resources, other countries, mostly located in Southern Europe, position themselves in a strict framework of interaction with foreign gas. Italy and Spain, respectively the third and fourth economies of the EU in terms of total GDP, heavily depend on imports of these factors to sustain their economies. In a vicious cycle, lower investment in innovative internal energy production, causes European economies to be more dependent on the exterior and to miss economic growth opportunities derived from a lower supply of energy or a higher price of the latter.

In this instance, lower R&D investment in some parts of the region with respect to other areas of the world, such as the USA, have caused the EU to lag behind in Average Productivity of Labour. The decoupling with the rate of growth in Average Hourly Productivity of the US (Marinello et alia, 2015), for example, can be partially explained by a relatively low level of investment in Research and Development experienced across some EU member states. A lower pace of technological innovation has had as one of its major consequences that of making Total Factor Productivity relatively lower in comparison to the largest economy of the world in nominal terms, that of the United States. Italy, for instance, devotes 1.4 percent of its GDP to R&D, against a world average of 2.2 and a EU average of 2.19%.

The relation between Average Hourly Productivity (Output per Hour worked) and Total Factor Productivity is exemplified by the following identity, which maintains the former to be, amongst others, a function of the latter variable.

Output / Hours Worked = F (A,k,j)

Briefly, A refers to Total Factor Productivity (proxied by indicators related to the pace of innovation), lower case k to capital per worker and lower case j to human capital per worker.

For the sake of this case study, it can be argued that differentials in investment into more efficient energy production processes could have had the effect of making Europe more dependent on external risk of supply and to be still anchored to more traditional ways of producing energy when the area is called to reduce its dependence. The latter scenario appears to be what is coming to realisation in the period during which this analysis is elaborated, driven forth by the worsening of the Ukrainian crisis, coupled by rising demand for fuel and energy as the Covid-19 pandemic appears to be substantially less socially threatening in the Union.

We delineate, therefore, some problematic issues that can be explanatory of the reasons why the situation is ultimately worrying for Europe’s internal affairs and economic growth, in a phase in which ex-ante expectations estimated a “v-shape” rebound of the economy from 2020. The rate of post-pandemic growth, therefore, risks to be lower than expectations. After a 6% decrease in 2020, the economy grew back 5.3 points in 2021. However, the European Commission estimates a flattening rate of growth to 4% in 2022 and to 2.7% in 2023 (European Commission, 2022), with symptoms of declining momentum being already present (Q1 2022 growth is expected to be 0.4%, down from 2.2% of Q4 2021).

These forces underline the difficulty Europe may encounter in developing a common energetic policy to mitigate the effects of the current problems arising in Russia and that a one-fits-all-policy could be misplaced provided the high degree of diversity across members. The EU currently imports 61% of its energetic demand (ISPI, 2022), with Russia being the largest supplier sitting at 41% of total natural gas imports. Problems arise on the horizon for Europe, in this context. Its energy demand depends on sources that are not diversified, raising the probability of going into distress and the related expected cost.

Under these circumstances, higher investment in renewable energy could present the continent with an exit strategy to Russian dependence, but the projects and the reconversion to greener activities would require long-term investments that are hardly projected to meet demand in the short term, also provided the context of rising request of energy, tied to higher prices (Financial Times, 2022).

A political perspective: energy resources as geopolitical tools

Historically, states resorted to numerous non-military means to increase their economic and political spheres of influence. As far as economic methods are concerned, over time the manipulation of energy resources became one of the most widespread and effective foreign policy tools used by states (Ghaleb, 2011). As a matter of fact, even though the good functioning of an economy does not solely depend on natural resources, severing access to them can significantly impact a country’s economic, social, political and national security. Indeed, at present time, the international community has come to acknowledge energy security, understood as the continuous and uninterrupted availability of energy, as an integral part of any state’s national security (Ozawa & Iftimie, 2020).

One of the main issues related to the exploitation of world energy resources is their natural scarcity, caused by their current rate of consumption, which is way more elevated if compared to their rate of formation. Energy resources are also limited in geographical terms since they tend to be concentrated in few regions of the world. Given the importance of energy for the functioning of countries’ economies, their natural scarcity creates strong dependency relationships between the producers of resources such as oil, coal and natural gas, their consumers and, possibly, also transit states (Korteweg, 2018). In turn, this provides big producers of energy with a powerful tool that can be exploited to exert an influence on other states and to further their own foreign policy and security agendas.

The case of Russia

According to the 2021 BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy, Russia is currently the world’s largest net exporter of oil and natural gas combined, with Europe as its main source of revenues (BP, 2021). Being an energy superpower, historically Russia has managed to make use of its energy production and reserves as a geopolitical tool by exploiting the strong dependence of other states on its exports of oil and natural gas. President Putin himself clearly envisages the idea of Russian energy wealth as a strategic source of both economic and political power. Indeed, already in his graduate studies dissertation, Putin emphasised the importance of the strategic management of Russian natural resources in order to “solve any problem associated with national objectives abroad” (Ozawa & Iftimie, 2020). More recently, he also reasserted that “Russia enjoys vast energy and mineral resources which serve as a basis to develop its economy; as an instrument to implement domestic and foreign policy. The role of the country on international energy markets determines, in many ways, its geopolitical influence” (Kupchinsky, 2009).

The importance of the energy sector is also acknowledged in Russia’s 2030 Energy Security Strategy, which highlights how energy security is deemed to be closely correlated to the country’s national and economic security (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010). For this reason, over the past decades, the Kremlin has consolidated its power over the energy sector in several ways, including carrying out a process of nationalisation of Russian big monopolistic energy companies (such as Gazprom for natural gas and Transneft for oil). This allowed Moscow to strengthen its capacity to employ Russian energy resources as a tool to maintain domestic political stability and to further its interests in foreign relations (Ozawa & Iftimie, 2020). European countries, especially former Soviet states, are particularly affected by this strategy since they are highly dependent on Russia for their energy consumption.


Russia’s geopolitical use of energy

The current literature shows that, over the decades, Russia has resorted to energy as a geopolitical tool in several ways, including through the manipulation of energy supplies’ prices; the control of energy assets (such as pipelines and gas operators); the disruption of gas supplies; the conclusion of restrictive supply contracts; and the development of alternative supply routes of gas (Korteweg, 2018).

Given the choice to focus this research on the European context, for the purposes of this analysis, only the most relevant strategies implemented towards European states and former Soviet states will be discussed.

Since after the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has worked to preserve its influence on its neighbours by maintaining close economic ties with them. Notably, the dependence of former Soviet states on Russian exports of oil and natural gas allows the Kremlin to manipulate and adjust prices of the energy sector in order to pursue both its economic and political interests. In the last decades, the strategy has thus been to grant benefits in the form of cheap energy and to raise the prices whenever a country was pursuing undesirable political paths (Korteweg, 2018). For instance, in Ukraine, after a prolonged period of low prices, in response to the 2005 election of the pro-Western President Viktor Yuschenko (who favoured the establishment of closer ties with the EU and NATO), Gazprom raised the prices of gas for Ukraine. After Kiev’s refusal to accept such a measure, Moscow cut gas supplies to Ukraine for three days. Ultimately, a deal was reached but, in the following years, the two countries engaged in other significant energy disputes (Parfitt, 2006).

As it happened in Ukraine, there were multiple other occasions in which European and former Soviet states were affected by Russian energy supply cuts, most likely carried out as a means to exert political influence. For instance, in 2008, Russia’s oil supply towards the Czech Republic fell after Prague accepted to host a US anti-missile radar system within its border. Moscow justified this event as being provoked by technical issues, but some analysts interpreted it as a retaliation move against Prague (Korteweg, 2018). More recently, in 2014, following the Russian invasion of Crimea, while the EU was discussing the implementation of tougher restrictive sanctions against Moscow, Germany and Poland reported a decrease in the gas flow from the Yamal-Europe pipeline (Krajewski & Szary, 2014). Even though Moscow never openly provided explanations behind this gas cut, many scholars see it as a strategic move to warn European states about the potential consequences of imposing stricter sanctions.

Another way through which Russia managed to acquire a strategic control over the European energy sector is through the management of critical supply pipelines. Notably, its actions have aimed at preventing European states to receive energy from alternative pipelines over which Moscow has no control and at constructing new pipelines covering pivotal routes, especially aspiring to cease its dependency on transit states (Sait Sonmez & Cobanoglu, 2016). For instance, the two twin projects for the construction of the controversial Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines were seen by many as a direct attempt by the Kremlin to divert Russian energy flows around several central and eastern European states, making them arrive directly in Germany (Korteweg, 2018).

Europe’s response

Over the past decade, the EU has attempted to diversify its energy supply sources and to decrease its dependence on Russia’s natural gas. Broadly speaking, the European efforts have aimed at reforming the energy market promoting liberalisation and integration through different strategies (Korteweg, 2018).

Firstly, the EU has worked to unbundle the energy transportation system, meaning to separate the suppliers, the transporters and the marketers of energy sources, so that no actor is able to obtain a monopolist position (European Commission, 2009). Envisaged in the 2009 Third Energy Package, the concept of “unbundling” was key to cope with the Russian gas monopolistic company Gazprom and to decrease its ability to exploit its economic power as a geopolitical tool.

Secondly, the EU has engaged in several initiatives aiming at diversifying its energy sources and at strengthening its energy security. An important step was represented by the creation of the EU Energy Union, which gave the European Commission the power to check ex ante the compliance with EU law of all energy agreements between EU member states and third countries (European Commission, 2016). Moreover, the EU has agreed on several projects to promote the integration in the gas and the electricity markets, including the construction of several pipelines that bring energy resources to states that are currently dependent on a single supplier (Korteweg, 2018). In the last years, the EU has also invested in its energy diplomacy, especially aiming at facilitating dialogues with transit and supplier states and reinforcing a common EU vision and strategy towards the energy market (Council of the European Union, 2015).

Lastly, the EU has also indirectly attempted to reduce its dependence on third states’ energy supply through the promotion of alternative “green” energy resources (Ozawa, & Iftimie, 2020). Indeed, an increase in the use of renewable sources of energy would inevitably diminish the consumption of hydrocarbons. However, this process has shown different results across member states. Moreover, since natural gas is currently considered to be the cleanest energy source (due to its lower CO2 production levels), in the future it is likely that the demand for gas will fall less rapidly with respect to other hydrocarbons (Korteweg, 2018).

Conclusion

Despite the multiple strategies that the EU has implemented to diversify its supply of energy, the European energy market continues to rely on Russian supply of hydrocarbons for its good functioning. This has serious geopolitical and economic consequences, especially in times of crisis. The European Union’s energetic position thus remains in a state of volatility, as exemplified by the indicators analysed in the first section. Furthermore, as broadly treated within the second section of the paper, political consequences are to be faced by EU members when they interact with the complex geopolitics of energy, particularly when dealing with countries in whose respect the EU is strongly dependent, such as Russia. Therefore, further efforts are needed to stabilise and liberalise the European energy market.

Broadly speaking, to address the geopolitical challenges posed by big producers of energy, the EU shall continue to reinforce its energy security by working for the establishment of a more integrated and liberalised energy market. An integrated approach, based on projects of common interests, would indeed allow the EU to develop resilience to the manipulation of energy supply, decreasing third countries’ ability to exert political pressure on its member states. In this respect, the search for multiple energy supply sources is pivotal to prevent European states from being victims of energy coercion (Korteweg, 2018).

Nevertheless, overcoming structural dependence on external energy shall require considerable investment (European Commission, 2020) in making the European Union an area ahead of its time in the production of green resources. In this context, investment in a greener shift of the economy of Europe, may offer a long-term solution for the rate of dependence of the Union. As noted by the European Commission, the member states have been, on average, faster than the pre-established target of consumption of renewable resources out of total gross energy. In this respect, each country had a wide margin of manoeuvre according to its contextual factors. This is to confirm that a one-fits-all policy at the EU level could be detrimental for those member states in the Southern area of the union or in CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries), which are lagging behind with respect to northern countries (EC, 2020).

However, already high prices for natural gas may disrupt long-term visions for greener investments, given their additionally higher cost and the difficulty to produce positive net values in the short run (Campbell, 2022). A win-win game for Europe and the whole world could derive from the widespread adoption of clean energy as a response to the current situation with Russia and as a transnational answer to the climate emergency. From this position, a considerable revival of coal could present an immediate easing from temporary problems, but it would dismay the efforts undertaken by member states to increase the share of renewables since 2004. In the 16-year time span, the utilisation of renewables reached 22.1% overall from 9.6% in 2004. (European Commission, 2020).

In this respect, the EU has undertaken a comprehensive approach to climate, with a long-term vision ranging up to 2050. Nevertheless, natural gas remains fundamental to provide heating and for industrial utilisations (Bloomberg, 2022) for the foreseeable future, making an immediate substantial shift to renewables quasi unfeasible. The most updated data estimate that renewables are currently covering 23% of the energy destined for heating and cooling. But, considerable disparities and variabilities of observations remain, ranging from 78% of Austria down to Malta’s 9.5% (Eurostat, 2020). Intermediate steps would be, therefore, required, an aspect that makes the European Union still vulnerable to outside leverage in the energetic domain, at least in the short to medium term.

Bibliography


Information Content

1

Confirmed

Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic

2

Presumably true

Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic

3

Maybe true

Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic

4

Uncertain

Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic

5

Improbable

Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic

6

Not able to be evaluated

No basis to evaluate the validity of the information



Trustworthiness of the source

A

Trustworthy

No doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence; has a history of total trustworthiness

B

Normally trustworthy

Small doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence, nevertheless has a history of valid information in a majority of cases

C

Sufficiently trustworthy

Doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence; however, has supplied valid information in the past

D

Normally not trustworthy

Significant doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence, however has supplied valid information in the past

E

Not trustworthy

Lack of authenticity, reliability or competence; history of invalid information

F

Not able to be evaluated

No basis to evaluate the validity of the information



BP, (2021). “Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 – Russia”. Retrieved from: https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/country-and-regional-insights/russia.html ; (B-1)

Council of the European Union (2015). “Council Conclusion on Energy Diplomacy”. Retrieved from: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10995-2015-INIT/en/pdf ; (A-1)

European Commission (2016). “Decision 994/2012/EU establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy”, EU Monitor. Retrieved from: https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vj4c6rnjdrzq ; (A-1)

European Commission, 2022. “Energy Production and Imports”, Eurostat, online data available from: ​​https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Energy_production_and_imports (A-1)

European Commission, 2022. “Energy Statistics: Overview”, Eurostat, online data download link:Energy statistics - an overview: tables and figures (xlsx format file) (A-1)

European Commission (2009). “Third Energy Package”. Retrieved from: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/market-legislation/third-energy-package_en ; (A-1)

European Commission, 2022. “Winter 2022 Economic Forecast”, Brussels: European Commission Press Corner, available from: ec.Europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22:926

European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, 2020. Which Country Depend on Russian Gas?, Statista. Available from: https://www.statista.com/chart/26768/dependence-on-russian-gas-by-european-country/

Ghaleb A. (2011). “Natural gas as an instrument of Russian state power”, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Retrieved from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/134230/pub1088.pdf ; (B-1)

Gili A., 2022. “The Great European Energy Crisis: What Lies Ahead?”, Istituto Studi di Politica Internazionale. Available from: https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/great-european-energy-crisis-what-lies-ahead-32815. (B-1)

Leonard M. et alia, 2022. “The Geopolitics of the European Green Deal”, European Council on Foreign Relations. Available from: https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/The-geopolitics-of-the-European-Green-Deal.pdf (B-1)

McBride J., 2022. “Russia’s Energy Role in Europe”, CFR (Council on Foreign Relations). Available from: https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/russias-energy-role-europe-whats-stake-ukraine-crisis (B-1)

Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, (2010) “Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period Up to 2030”, Institute of Energy Strategy. Retrieved from: http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf ; (A-1)

Korteweg R. (2018) “Energy as a tool of foreign policy of authoritarian states, in particular Russia”, European Parliament’s Committee of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603868/EXPO_STU(2018)603868_EN.pdf ; (A-1)

Krajewski A., Szary W., (2014). “German and Polish operators report lower supply from Russia”, Reuters, Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-gas-poland-idUSKBN0H51OP20140910 ; (C-2)

Kuhan A., 2021. “Energy Prices in Europe: A Costly Winter is Coming”. Euler Hermes. Available from: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1z_SG4DjzhpqS2QDk-CG5NO51YdafBim3jgNG03Vmsyg/edit (B-1)

Kupchinsky R. (2009), “LNG -Russia’s New Energy Blackmail Tool,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 77. (C-2)

Ozawa, M., & Iftimie, I. A. (2020). “Russia’s energy policy: Dependence, networks and special relationships”, NATO Defense College. Retrieved from: https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1498 ; (A-1)

Parfitt T. (2006). “Russia turns off supplies to Ukraine in payment row, and EU feels the chill”, The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/02/russia.ukraine ; (B-2)

Sait Sonmez A., Cobanoglu S. (2016). “The Use of Energy Resources as Foreign Policy Tools: The Russian Case”, European Scientific Journal. Retrieved from: https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/7249 ; (C-2)

Statista Research Department, 2021. “Energy Dependency Rate in The EU, 2009-2018”, Statista. Available from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/267588/dependency-on-energy-imports-in-the-eu/ (B-1)

Trading Economics, 2022. “EU Natural Gas”, Trading Economics. Dataset available from: https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/eu-natural-gas (A-1)

Wallace J. et alia, 2022. “Energy Dependence Ties Europe’s Hands”, The Wall Street Journal. Available from: https://www.wsj.com/articles/energy-dependence-ties-europes-hands-in-u-s-russia-crisis-11642069805 (B-1)



Condividi il post