EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans: Going Forward

  Focus - Allegati
  02 novembre 2022
  12 minuti, 49 secondi

EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans: Going Forward



Chiara Malaponti - Junior Researcher G.E.O. Politics



Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the current status of the EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans, taking into account its merits and its flaws, especially after the ground-breaking candidacies of Moldova and Ukraine. It concludes that enlargement should be reformed as a process of gradual or staged integration, which is able to retain technocratic and geopolitical instances.

Introduction

On June 23th, 2022 Ukraine and Moldova entered the ranks of the candidate countries to join the European Union. The decision of the Council to accept their applications was the result of a political calculus that was sparked by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For some, the war itself put into question the power of attraction of the European Union, as Kiev’s will to integrate within EU structures is considered one of the reasons behind Moscow's choice to invade. “Putin decided to invade a neighboring country in order to prevent it from integrating, slowly but steadily, into the union’s institutions and market” (Bechev, 2022).

However, the decision to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova re-opened a bigger debate on the functioning of the enlargement process and on its boundaries. In particular, Brussels seems to have abandoned the “consolidation” criterion - namely, “restricting any promises of future accession to the six countries of the Western Balkans plus Turkey” (Lippert, 2022). While Kiev’s and Chisinau’s candidacy represents a step forward in the definition of a “geopolitical Europe”, it has been argued that this development led to the waning of the Union’s credibility in the Western Balkans, which have been stuck in the waiting room for years. “The summit reiterated a general failing: EU member states did not honor the key principle that candidates will advance on their EU path once they fulfill set conditions” (Töglhofer, 2022). This case has been made for Kosovo, that, despite having met the standards required by the EU, was once again denied to enter a regime of visa liberalization.

On the other hand, the war itself underlined the importance of the Western Balkans for Europe’s stability and security. A hint was first given away when “the foreign ministers of Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic [have] asked Josep Borrell for a debate in the Council because "there is an urgent need to give impetus to the integration of the Balkans" ” (Mirel, 2022). The fear, of course, is that Russia might use its soft power to further escalate tensions in the region, following a strategy which has been in the Kremlin’s playbook for some years now. It mainly relies on the weaponization of military intelligence and of disinformation campaigns to raise discontent (Stronski, 2022). The fact that Serbia has not joined EU sanctions against Russia further adds a worrying element to the picture (Euronews, 2022).

A few questions, then, remained to be answered: what has gone wrong in the Western Balkans? Is the current process of enlargement functional? Are there alternative avenues to anchor Balkan countries to the EU?

Painfully slow: the Balkans’ difficult path towards European integration

As of October 2022, the following Balkan countries figure among the list of candidates for EU membership: Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are considered potential candidates (European Union, 2022).

The situation, however, is more problematic than it seems. For one, Albania and North Macedonia, that are to be assessed jointly, have started their accession negotiations just in July 2022, despite having received candidate status in 2014 and 2005 respectively (European Commission, 2022). This development was only rendered possible by Skopje’s decision to “compromise on a long-standing dispute with neighboring Bulgaria” (Gijs, 2022), that was until then using its veto against North Macedonia.

On the other hand, Serbia has opened 22 chapters out of 35 and provisionally closed just 2, while Montenegro has opened 33 chapters and provisionally closed 3. To give some context, Belgrade started the accession negotiations in 2014 and Podgorica in 2012 (European Commission, 2022).

There are a few reasons behind this painfully slow integration process. To an extent, inputs both from the EU and the Western Balkans originate a vicious circle. Consider, for example, the fact that in Balkan countries EU enlargement is led by politicians that are, more than often, looking after short-term gains and therefore anchored to the status-quo. This happens while the European Union suffers from a lack of political will, whereby “the EU’s internal consolidation trumps its foreign policy ambitions, unless there is a direct link between the two. Arguably, with the Western Balkans, there is no such link: the region does not generate sufficient levels of instability to disrupt or threaten the EU” (Bechev, 2022).

On the other hand, Bruxelles is torn between bilateral disputes (see the case of Bulgaria’s veto on North Macedonia) and the democratic backsliding of a few EU Member States, such as Hungary and Poland, which puts into question the Union’s absorption capacity. In the meantime, the Balkans themselves suffer from democratic stagnation and widespread corruption. Ethnic cleavages and the distribution of power they determine at the institutional level further exacerbate the situation, by allowing dysfunctional policies that make it painful to bridge the gap with the Western bloc (ibid.).

Thus, in the Western Balkans the process of EU enlargement has largely failed its original goals, such as the promotion of democracy and of the rule of law and the fostering of economic prosperity. Besides each of the candidates’ national peculiarities, for what concerns the EU it has been argued that this is a direct consequence of how this process is designed.

Rethinking enlargement

The current process of accession to the EU does not seem to be completely fit for purpose. The most appalling data involves the disparity in the magnitude of pre-accession and post-accession financing. For example, “Bulgaria, which is similar in size to Serbia, received almost six times more than the IPA [Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, ndr] allocated to the latter in the period 2014-2020” (Mirel, 2022). This is problematic for three reasons at least: it makes it hard to bridge the gap between MS and candidates; it sometimes is not enough to finance costly policies to join the Union; it does not give adequate incentives to make sufficient and long-lasting improvements in order to move forward into accession. The case for overcoming this duality has been made by proposing a system that rewards progress with access to increased funds, step by step (ibid.).

On the political side, it is necessary to re-design rule of law assessment measures that are also able to allow for reversibility - meaning that the absence of progress or even a regression can be sanctioned during accession. When talking about the Western Balkans, this becomes even more relevant as “the EU’s failure to suspend negotiations or funds when candidates systematically violate the rule of law merely signals complacency to the authoritarian strongmen of the region. It cements the very illiberal tendencies the EU does not want to import by taking in new member states” (Töglhofer, 2022).

In conclusion, much debate has been revolving around the concept of “gradual integration”. In the words of the president of the Council, Charles Michel, “We urgently need to turn a corner, and create new impetus to encourage reforms and further European integration. I think we must make the process faster, gradual and reversible. We must offer tangible socio-economic benefits to our partners during the accession negotiations, instead of waiting until the very end. The solution would lie in gradual, phased integration, even while the accession process is ongoing. More for more” (Council of the European Union, 2022). His point embraces the line of thought of step-by-step integration that was presented in the previous paragraphs.

Moreover, it was proposed that a staged accession procedure should also comprehend a “consolidation phase”. The existence of such a phase would serve two purposes: “to verify that the acquis adopted is effectively implemented, that the country does not start to renege on the values to which it has subscribed and the principles it has accepted, and that it is not already opposed to new common policies” and “to allow the European Union to finalise a new governance, including the number of Commissioners” (Mirel, 2022).



Light and shadow of the European Political Community

During his speech on May 9th, French President Emmanuel Macron launched a new project, the European Political Community (EPC), which is intended as “a place where members of the European family can discuss issues of common interest” (Moyer, 2022). The initiative to construct a broader European framework was motivated exactly by Macron’s reckoning that European integration takes time. However, when it comes to the Western Balkans, the EPC might become a double-edged sword.

On a more positive note, the EPC comes in handy for a few reasons. For example, with Ukraine and Moldova’s candidacies, it has become clear that EU enlargement has been weaponized as an instrument of geopolitics, “one that the EU can use to counter third actors’ destabilising influence in its neighbourhood” (Dumoulin, 2022). However, the impression that Ukraine and Moldova got a “geopolitical discount” from the European Union due to their peculiar situation might result in fewer incentives and lowered expectations for the Western Balkans, as well as in palpable frustration and their exposure to other international actors, such as Russia and China. In this sense, the EPC might prove to be useful: “by binding candidate countries to the union, such a community would create a stronger incentive for them to enact reforms. In turn, these reforms would improve the cohesion of an EU with more than 30 member states – and help them resist external pressure” (ibid.). To sum up, the EPC would be in theory in the position to bridge the gap between a purely technocratic and a purely geopolitical approach to enlargement.

However, in practice, this might not be the case. By joining the EPC, the Western Balkans “could orbit the EU center of gravity but without crossing the line from nonmembership to membership. As a result, the incentive to conform with Europe’s conditions—whether in the area of democracy, economic governance, or foreign policy—would diminish” (Bechev, 2022). And after its first meeting in Prague on October, 6th, the EPC has been defined by critics as “more of a talking shop than anything else” - even though they recognized that “with war on the Continent, another diplomatic outlet is not inherently a bad thing. It’s yet another avenue to find areas of cooperation on a number of conflicts” (Lynch, Caulcutt, 2022).

Indeed, discussing areas for coordination is a smart move, even if it is complicated by a variety of national interests. However, such a framework may eventually upset the Western Balkans, if the enlargement process is not reformed. The potential risk is making them feel stuck in what has been defined a “second-tier Europe” and losing them to external influence. Moreover, the EPC seems to be born out of the current circumstances, but it is unsure whether it will continue to survive in the future (ibid.)



Conclusion

By fully integrating the Balkan region, the European Union might secure its periphery and build on its geopolitical role in the continent. On the other hand, the Western Balkans would be able to enjoy better economic prospects and institutional resilience.

Designing a better enlargement process requires incentivizing long-term thinking in Balkan elites, so that institutional reforms do not fall prey to short-term political gains. This could be done, for example, by implementing a system of gradual/staged integration, thus by linking economic and institutional progress to financial assistance. On the other hand, the capacity of absorption of the European Union must be continuously assessed, so that integration does not lead to disruptive outcomes.

Finally, it is plausible that current circumstances might push the EU to redesign the nature of the enlargement process in a way that is able to merge technocratic and geopolitical insights. However, even when it comes to the geopolitics of it, one must promise only what can be delivered. Successful integration continues to be a long-run process that needs specific avenues able to convey sufficient incentives in order to prevent frustration.







Sources


Information Content

1

Confirmed

Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic

2

Presumably true

Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic

3

Maybe true

Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic

4

Uncertain

Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic

5

Improbable

Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic

6

Not able to be evaluated

No basis to evaluate the validity of the information



Trustworthiness of the source

A

Trustworthy

No doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence; has a history of total trustworthiness

B

Normally trustworthy

Small doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence, nevertheless has a history of valid information in a majority of cases

C

Sufficiently trustworthy

Doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence; however, has supplied valid information in the past

D

Normally not trustworthy

Significant doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence, however has supplied valid information in the past

E

Not trustworthy

Lack of authenticity, reliability or competence; history of invalid information

F

Not able to be evaluated

No basis to evaluate the validity of the information




Albania, Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission. [1-A] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/albania_en

Bechev, D., What Has Stopped EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans?, Carnegie Europe, 20 June 2022. [2-B] https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/06/20/what-has-stopped-eu-enlargement-in-western-balkans-pub-87348

Dumoulin, M., Wilder Europe: Enlargement and a European political community, European Council On Foreign Relations, 11 July 2022. [2-B]

https://ecfr.eu/article/wilder-europe-enlargement-and-a-european-political-community/

Gijs, C., EU launches accession talks with North Macedonia, Albania, POLITICO, 19 July 2022. [2-C]

https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-launch-accession-talks-north-macedonia-albania/

Joining the EU, European Union. [1-A]

https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/joining-eu_en

Lippert, B., The EU’s Next Eastward Enlargement Will Be Complicated and Expensive, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 12 August 2022. [2-B]

https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-eus-next-eastward-enlargement-will-be-complicated-and-expensive

Lynch, S., Caulcutt, C., Macron’s new political community opens Pandora’s box, POLITICO, 6 October 2022. [2-C]

https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-new-european-political-community-open-pandora-box/

Meeting of the European Political Community, Council of the European Union, 6 October 2022. [1-A]

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2022/10/06/

Mirel, P., In support of a new approach with the Western Balkans: Staged accession with a consolidation phase, European issues n°633, Robert Schuman Foundation, 24 May 2022. [2-B]

Montenegro, Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission. [1-A] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/montenegro_en

Moyer, J. C., Macron’s ‘European Political Community’ Risks Two-Tiered European Union, Wilson Center, 3 October 2022. [1-A]

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/macrons-european-political-community-risks-two-tiered-european-union




North Macedonia, Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission. [1-A] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/north-macedonia_en

Serbia, Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission. [1-A] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/serbia_en

Serbia's reluctance over Russia sanctions could hinder EU ambitions — EU Commissioner, Euronews, 7 October 2022. [2-B] https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/07/serbias-reluctance-over-russia-sanctions-could-hinder-eu-ambitions-eu-commissioner

Speech by President Charles Michel at the plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, Council of the European Union, 18 May 2022. [1-A]

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/18/discours-du-president-charles-michel-lors-de-la-session-pleniere-du-comite-economique-et-social-europeen/

Töglhofer, T., EU Enlargement – A Will But Not (Yet) a Way, German Council on Foreign Relations, 30 June 2022. [2-B]

https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/eu-enlargement-will-not-yet-way






Condividi il post