Fine Lines: Taking a closer look at the Venezuelan-Colombian border in the context of the Venezuelan migration crisis

  Focus - Allegati
  03 luglio 2025
  40 minuti, 14 secondi

Fine Lines: Taking a closer look at the Venezuelan-Colombian border in the context of the Venezuelan migration crisis

Marco Rizzi - Head Researcher Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Cultura & Società

Rosa Santa Serravalle - Senior Researcher Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Cultura & Società

Sofia Spanó - Junior Researcher Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. G.E.O. Cultura & Società

Abstract

The Venezuelan migration crisis, now the largest displacement phenomenon in Latin American history, has profoundly reshaped the geopolitical and humanitarian landscape across the continent. This article takes a deep dive into the complex realities of the Venezuelan-Colombian border, exploring how displacement intersects with economic collapse, political authoritarianism, organised crime, and systemic underfunding. Through an on-the-ground perspective rooted in first-hand fieldwork, we analyse how the flow of caminantes (Venezuelans forced to migrate largely on foot) unfolds along fragile border regions marked by violence, exploitation, and impunity. Colombia has emerged as both a destination and a corridor for onward migration, grappling with the dual pressures of hosting over 2.8 million migrants and navigating a shifting policy environment under President Petro. The article further dissects the gendered dimensions of the crisis, with Venezuelan women and girls facing disproportionate risks of sexual violence and trafficking. In parallel, the role of armed groups, the perils of the Darién Gap, and the deterioration of border governance reflect broader regional instability. Finally, we scrutinise the role of the United States, highlighting both the potential and pitfalls of its hybrid approach to sanctions, aid, and migration policy. The result is a humanised portrait of a crisis whose future trajectory remains precarious.

Venezuelan migration crisis: on-the-ground realities

Venezuela is facing one of the largest displacement crises in the world. Driven by economic collapse, political instability and social disorders, nearly 8 million people have fled the country since 2014, making Venezuelan migration the biggest humanitarian crisis in Latin America (USA for UNHCR, 2024). The scale of this displacement underlines the catastrophic impact of the situation in Venezuela, forcing millions to abandon their homes and lives in search of safety elsewhere and presenting a significant challenge to international humanitarian efforts.

Among neighboring countries, Colombia has emerged as the main destination for Venezuelans seeking refuge. According to the International Organization for Migration, Colombia is currently hosting over 2.8 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees (IOM, 2024), largely owing to its geographic proximity which in most cases makes Colombia the first point of arrival for refugees. This large influx of people has created significant pressure on Colombian public services and aid infrastructure, impacting the country’s capacity to accommodate the vulnerable refugees (International Republican Institute, 2019). In response to this humanitarian challenge, the country introduced a Temporary Protection Status (TPS) in February 2021 for Venezuelan refugees, offering ten-year protected status including access to identification documents, healthcare, education and other essential services.

Despite the initial pressure, the TPS set up by the Colombian government has yielded considerable benefits, fostering socio-economic inclusion for both Venezuelans and the Colombian communities hosting them. (USA for UNHCR, 2024). Research suggests that regularisation of immigrants has the potential to transform a vulnerable population into economically active contributors. Specifically, regularisation prevents the risk of workplace exploitation, it reduces informal labour and the dependency on humanitarian aid, it preserves family unity and it significantly improves access to social services and higher education (Bansak & Pearlman, 2021).

However, the current Colombian President Gustavo Petro - elected in 2022 - has shown a reluctance to continue or expand wide-reaching programmes to assist the refugees. This shift created a climate of uncertainty, affecting government and non-government agencies and their effort to help and integrate Venezuelan people into the Colombian economy and society (Guerrero, 2023).

On the ground, the situation at the Colombian-Venezuelan border is a critical humanitarian emergency. The migrants – referred to as caminantes – undertake arduous journeys predominantly on foot. This mode of travel is not a choice but a necessity for the overwhelming majority, who cannot afford public transportation. The journey exposes them to dangers such as extortion, exploitation, physical and sexual violence and lack of access to essential support systems. Without legal status, they cannot access formal employment or basic services, which significantly increases their exposure to exploitative working conditions, often under duress imposed by armed groups. The fear of detention or deportation frequently prevents them from reporting abuses, thereby perpetuating a cycle of impunity and further entrenching their precarious situation (ACAPS, 2021).

The desperate need to cross the border forces people to utilise dangerous unofficial crossings, commonly known as “trochas”, particularly near entry points as the Simon Bolivar International Bridge. These unofficial routes are often controlled by armed groups and plagued by drug and human trafficking and extortions. Caminantes choose this path for various reasons, including the absence of identification documents or due to criminal records that preclude legal entry. Furthermore, during periods of heightened political tension, such as election periods in Venezuela when borders have been arbitrarily closed by the Maduro regime, these trochas become the only viable option for those attempting to re-enter Venezuela to vote.

Once in Colombia, the journey of forced migration often continues. While some Venezuelan migrants settle in the border city of Cúcuta, others seek opportunities in major Colombian cities such as Bogotá, Medellín and Cali (Guerrero, 2023). However, a significant portion of migrants also aim to reach Peru, Brazil, Chile and Ecuador, or even attempt to travel northward towards the United States (R4V, 2024). A particularly challenging route for those heading north is the Darién Gap, a dense and dangerous jungle connecting Colombia and Panama. This diverse and constantly evolving pattern of movement outlines the dynamic and adaptive nature of Venezuelan migration.

Along the principal migration routes within Colombia, a vital network of shelters operates, managed by dedicated Colombian citizens and Venezuelan migrants who found employment and stability themselves. These shelters offer critical assistance to caminantes such as temporary accommodation, food, medical aid, and mobile support to those who are walking. Furthermore, they provide crucial information about safe routes, available aid points and potential dangers ahead for the arduous journey. From my personal observation while working within the shelters, these shelters are more than just aid points, functioning as fundamental spaces of hope and safety in a situation defined by immense hardship and uncertainty. During their daily operations, I witnessed a rare and powerful sense of community and solidarity, offering migrants a respite from the constant physical and psychological pressures of their journey.

Grassroots humanitarian help that emerged in response to the crisis, often underfunded and operating with limited resources, stands as a powerful testament to human resilience and solidarity in response to the crisis. While the government’s TPI was a significant step, the practical implementation and ongoing support for these frontline services remain a challenge. Consequently, a clear disparity exists between the scale of humanitarian need and the funding provided. Grassroots efforts are often stretched beyond their capacity, yet remain indispensable.

As a humanitarian aid worker witnessing the daily life of these caminantes on the ground, the profound struggle for basic human needs is evident. Access to fundamental resources such as food and water is limited, public transportation is often unaffordable forcing them to walk, frequently with inadequate clothing. It is not uncommon to see individuals walking barefoot, leading to severe foot injuries. Furthermore, their inability to afford accommodation often forces them to sleep outdoors, exposing them to harsh weather conditions, including dangerously cold temperatures, and significant safety risks. Beyond the physical hardships, the mental health and psychological distress from forced migration are equally profound, though often less visible. The trauma of displacement, separation from family and distressing experiences witnessed or endured during their journey leave deep psychological scars. Migrants’ socio-economic vulnerability is evident in their reliance on humanitarian aid for basic necessities, highlighting the systemic challenges they face in meeting fundamental human needs.

Moreover, local low-resource communities are addressing the needs of children collaborating with local schools and grassroots organizations. Art classes, English classes, and play-based activities aim to provide a sense of normality and support the emotional well-being of children who have experienced significant disruption and trauma. These activities offer a safe space for creative expression and learning for children, helping them to cope with the psychological impact of displacement. Such community-led initiatives underscore the vital role that local engagement plays in addressing the social and emotional needs of migrant children, fostering a sense of belonging and mitigating the negative effects of displacement.

The reality of the hardships endured by Venezuelan migrants underscores an urgent and critical need for humanitarian aid. Yet, despite its enormous scope, this crisis is severely underfunded, hampering humanitarian organizations' capacity to deliver essential services and implement sustainable, long-term solutions. In 2023, donors met only 16 percent of the overall needs for the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) coordinated Venezuelan response (Guerrero, 2023). This significant reduction in support, manifesting as major budget cut-outs for humanitarian organizations in Colombia, weighs on the ability to provide crucial support to migrants. This situation indicates a failure to establish safe and accessible pathways for displacement, worsening the vulnerability of millions of migrants and refugees. The inability to meet fundamental needs, from basic food and shelter to healthcare and protection from violence, represents a critical gap in international responsibility and a collective failure to uphold the most basic principles of humanitarian support.

Gender-Based Violence and Exploitation Among Venezuelan Migrant Women in Colombia

Females migrants are a significant number of the displaced population in Colombia, representing 51,81% of the total Venezuelan migrant population in the country (Migración Colombia, 2024). This demographic reality underscores a critical vulnerability, as Venezuelan migrant women and girls face an elevated risk of gender-based violence (GBV) and various forms of exploitation throughout their migratory journey and upon arrival in host communities.

The journey exposes women to critical dangers, particularly along the Colombian-Venezuelan border. Here, the pervasive presence of both legal and illegal armed actors makes these border regions highly unsafe for women, who risk becoming victims of violence and sexual exploitation. Human trafficking, sexual violence, forced disappearances and the coercion to engage in "sex for survival" are a reality for many (Ramírez Bolívar, 2025). The International Organization for Migration has identified physical, verbal, psychological and sexual violence as the most frequent types of abuse faced by women during this perilous journey (IOM, 2021). These acts of violence are not isolated incidents but rather systemic threats embedded within irregular migration routes, intended to prey on the desperation of those fleeing.

Once arriving in Colombian host communities, Venezuelan migrant women continue to be exposed to violence, sexual exploitation, harassment, and stigmatization (Ramírez Bolívar, 2025). Gender-based violence against Venezuelan refugees in Colombia saw a 71% increase between 2018 and 2020. This violence is multi-faceted, occurring within familial settings where economic, patrimonial, physical, and sexual violence, predominantly from partners or former partners, is prevalent. In the informal and precarious workplace, women face various forms of exploitation, including being coerced into forced labor specifically for the purpose of sexual exploitation (Amnesty International, 2022).

A critical factor increasing their vulnerability is the profound socio-economic precarity faced by many migrant women. Some migrants and refugees lack legal status and insufficient awareness of their rights. Irregular migratory status precludes them from accessing formal employment and essential services, such as adequate healthcare or education, deepening their precarious situation. The difficulty in obtaining formal employment in Colombia translates into an elevated risk of becoming victims of human trafficking and sexual exploitation. Criminal groups actively target women and minors, deceptively offering what appear to be legitimate job opportunities in hotels and restaurants, only to force them into sexual exploitation and confiscate their passports. Compliance is often brutally enforced through threats of violence against the victims or their children. In 2023, 51% of Venezuelan households were living in poverty, making them desperate for any offer of survival, however illicit or dangerous (Castano, 2024).

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that in 2022, the most common forms of exploitation in the region were forced labor (55%) and sexual exploitation (40%), with women and girls being the primary victims subjected to trafficking for sexual exploitation (UNODC, 2024). Since the massive influx of migration, there has been a sharp and deeply concerning increase in the sexual exploitation of minors and the trafficking of Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Border towns along migration routes into Colombia are especially high-risk areas for trafficking and exploitation (Castano, 2024). Areas such as La Parada, near the Simón Bolívar bridge, became a notorious hub where Venezuelan women are often forced into sex work upon arrival, frequently ending up in clandestine brothels where they face sistematic exploitation and abuse (International Crisis Group, 2022; Castano, 2024). Some are forced into rural areas to serve armed groups, while others, including minors, are compelled through force or deception to engage in commercial sex in urban tourist hubs like Medellín, often working 24-hour shifts with their identity documents withheld (International Crisis Group, 2022).

The psychological consequences of such violence and exploitation cannot be overstated. Survivors commonly experience severe trauma, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, depression, and chronic stress. The persistent threat of violence, family separation and the profound uncertainty about their future contribute to these mental health struggles. These psychological burdens are often compounded by the lack of accessible and culturally sensitive mental health services within host communities, leaving many survivors to endure their suffering in isolation. The shame, stigma and fear associated with GBV also serve as significant barriers to seeking help, perpetuating a cycle of silent distress (Caroppo et al., 2025).

Challenges in seeking justice for victims of gender-based violence and exploitation are significant. Many cases go unreported or are misclassified. For example, being labeled as "inducement to prostitution" rather than human trafficking, which denies victims of the specialised protection and assistance they are legally entitled to. Despite Colombia's robus legal frameworks to combat human trafficking, including its ratification of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its anti-trafficking protocol, impunity persists. Between 2011 and 2016, only 52 of 908 reported trafficking cases resulted in convictions (Castano, 2024). Furthermore, since 2019, there has been a worrying reduction in convictions for trafficking across the region (UNODC, 2024). Although sex work is legally regulated in Colombia, Venezuelan women engaged in prostitution, frequently face discrimination from authorities, who often don’t recognise them as potential victims of exploitation. In some cases, state and law enforcement officials have been complicit in the sexual exploitation of trafficking victims (International Crisis Group, 2022).

A landmark October 2021 ruling by Colombia’s Constitutional Court mandated the state to strengthen protections for trafficking victims, emphasizing the unsafe position of migrant women and the need for special safeguarding measures. However, the consistent lack of convictions and institutional capacity to effectively protect vulnerable women and girls reveals a significant gap between legal intent and practical enforcement, leaving countless victims without justice (International Crisis Group, 2022).

The human cost of migration across Latin America: the Darién Gap and the Central Role of Armed Groups

Today, the Venezuelan exodus is considered one of the largest forced displacement crises in the world. Colombia has become the main destination for displaced Venezuelans, with nearly 3 million having arrived by October 2022.
Distinguishing clearly between voluntary and involuntary migration is often challenging. For both the individuals involved and the broader societal context, the perception and definition of coercion and life-threatening circumstances must be understood as part of a complex, negotiated reality. These factors affect not only the migrants themselves but also the policies and responses of the societies they move through or settle in.

Qualitative research on the migration corridor from Central America through Mexico to the United States and Canada highlights the critical role of violence and insecurity in shaping migration experiences, particularly within Mexico. Migrants frequently face dangers linked to the drug wars and human trafficking operations conducted by powerful cartels, making their journey not just difficult, but often life-threatening.

One of the most dangerous parts of this journey is crossing the Darién Gap, where migrants, especially women, face high risks of sexual abuse, robbery, and food theft. Criminal groups, in particular on the Colombian side, have taken control of the area, profiting from migrant flows by opening new jungle routes and exploiting travellers. According to CNN (Walsh et al., 2023), the duration and difficulty of the crossing depend on weather conditions, river levels, and the prices paid to guides. Residents, working with cartels, have also set up makeshift shops along the route, selling essentials like food, drinks, and shoes. While several studies have focused on smuggling networks in Central America and at the US-Mexico border, the specific dynamics of the Darién Gap remain under-researched despite its growing importance as a major migration corridor. Nowadays, social media plays a distinct role during migration, serving as a tool for migrants to familiarize themselves with cultural norms and destination countries virtually. As highlighted by Ihejirika & Krtalic (2021), this digital exposure helps reduce uncertainty and anxiety throughout the journey.

The Darién Gap is a 60-mile expanse along the border between Colombia and Panama. Long deemed "impassable" and "uninhabitable," this region is characterized by both natural and human-made threats. As the only land bridge between South and Central America, it remains a critical, and often unavoidable, crossing point for migrants, particularly as the United States continues to externalize its borders in efforts to deter migration.

The journey through the Darién Gap typically takes 10 days or more and exposes migrants to extreme risks. The natural environment itself poses immense challenges: the region is among the wettest on Earth, with deep, thick mud covering most of the path. Heavy rains frequently trigger landslides in the mountainous terrain, and the vast, disorienting jungle makes it easy to lose one’s way.

Although the harsh natural environment poses serious risks, the greatest dangers migrants face in the region come from gangs, cartels, and smugglers. Armed groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Gulf Clan, a powerful paramilitary drug cartel, are known to extort, rob, and sexually assault migrants. Those who pay guides or “coyotes” often fall victim to human traffickers exploiting their vulnerability (Doctors of the World). Rape, often used by cartels as a weapon to intimidate and dominate, is widespread, though exact figures are difficult to obtain due to underreporting and lack of oversight.

Colombia’s borderlands are exposed to armed conflict for decades. The areas that adjoin the 2200-km-long border line that both separates and unites Colombia and Venezuela have been one of the country’s most conflict-affected regions. Within the borderlands, however, there are inter-regional differences. For example, the department of Arauca in the south faced a brutal war between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC guerrilla groups in the 2000s. Arauca is utilized as a corridor for migrants and refugees to get to bigger cities, whereas there is no control. It is quite an easy corridor to smuggle weapons, goods or people. If they are minors, children, you can take out whatever you like (Zulver et al. 2020).

The guerrilla war ended in 2010, but armed activities against the state, and especially the oil industry, continue; in 2020 it remains a major ELN stronghold. Farther north, in Norte de Santander, multiple groups including the FARC, ELN, Popular liberation Army (EPL) and paramilitary groups both cooperate in and fight for control of strategic corridors used in the cocaine business. Since long before the crisis (which intensified in Venezuela after the death of former president Chávez in 2014), family and commercial links have extended across the border, and armed groups have operated across the borderline as well.

The situation along the Colombia–Venezuela border has grown increasingly complex. Colombian refugees in Venezuela (retornados) are returning home, while many Venezuelans continue to flee in search of better opportunities. Armed groups have expanded their influence on both sides of the border, exploiting the instability. A major driver of the growing insecurity is the lack of cooperation between law enforcement agencies and the weak presence of state institutions, which together fuel a climate of impunity.

At the same time, coordination between the Colombian government and humanitarian organizations has deteriorated. According to reports from Refugees International (2023), the government has halted information sharing and closed channels of communication. Venezuelan-led organizations have been particularly sidelined, with officials refusing to engage.

A major obstacle to resolving the crisis is the international community’s inconsistent and fragmented approach. While humanitarian assistance is essential, it is not enough. A political solution must remain a central objective. This requires rejecting extreme measures, such as military intervention, while actively supporting the restoration of democratic institutions in Venezuela, which have been significantly undermined in recent years.

Root causes and consequences of Venezuela’s humanitarian emergency: The interconnection between political collapse and socio-economic crisis

Today, Venezuela, and Latin America more broadly, are experiencing a humanitarian crisis that is met with growing indifference from the Western world.

Venezuela’s deepening economic crisis has been followed by an equally severe political collapse. In recent years, the country has experienced the violent repression of anti-government protests, the imprisonment of President Nicolás Maduro’s political opponents, and the near-total dismantling of its democratic institutions.
During electoral campaigns, armed groups, and criminal organizations, known as “colectivos”, have intimidated opposition candidates and voters, particularly in border and mining regions. As Maduro’s popularity has declined, his regime has increasingly relied on illegal and repressive means to stay in power. He has built a hybrid system of criminal governance, forging alliances with criminal actors and using illicit revenue to consolidate power and ensure the loyalty of key political and military leaders.
These armed groups are not merely enforcers. They represent vested interest in Maduro’s continued rule. Their access to impunity, privilege, and illicit profits depends on their alliance with the state, and they are prepared to defend it. For example, the Peace Defenders Corps (Cuadrillas Defensoras de la Paz – Cupaz), created in 2019, aim to reassert state control during national protests. Active in ten of Venezuela’s twenty-three states, Cupaz factions not only enforce political and social control but are also involved in extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and drug micro-trafficking.

Other armed actors, including Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN), the Patriotic Forces of National Liberation (FPLN), and post-FARC dissident groups, operate in border regions. These groups violently impose their own forms of control, regulating everyday life with brutality.

In 2021, Colombia launched a large-scale regularization initiative through the Estatuto Temporal de Protección de Migrantes Venezolanos (ETPV) (Guerrero, 2023), granting legal status and work permits to Venezuelans. However, this progress is now under threat. Since taking office, President Gustavo Petro has shifted the government's approach to the Venezuelan displacement crisis. Many of the frameworks and policies that previously guided Colombia’s response are dismantled, replaced by what is called a “policy of silence.” This approach downplays the presence and specific needs of Venezuelans in the country.

Although the Petro administration has continued the regularization program, it has not introduced new measures to support the economic inclusion of Venezuelans. As a result, the progress made so far is at risk, and the future of Venezuelans’ integration into Colombia’s economy remains uncertain.

Since 2014, nearly eight million Venezuelans have left their homes, fleeing an economic crisis and authoritarian repression under President Nicolás Maduro. Of all Venezuelan migrants surveyed in a 2022 poll by Centro de Investigaciones Populares, 72% said economic problems, including hyperinflation, poverty, and food insecurity, pushed them to migrate. Violence and abuse by security forces have also forced Venezuelans to flee. The country remains one of the most violent in the region, despite the homicide rate dropping last year (Freeman et al., 2024).

In the first four months of 2024, tens of thousands of Venezuelans left the country, accounting for 64% of all migrants who have so far crossed Panama’s Darién Gap. The exodus of Venezuelans will accelerate if Maduro secures another six-term year in elections scheduled for the last July 28, which certainly will not be free or fair (Freeman et al. 2024).

The crisis is multi-dimensional encompassing economic, social, political, and institutional aspects. In March 2013, a few days after the death of Hugo Chávez, Moises Naím (2016) described what were already the evident distortions of the Venezuelan economy: “Venezuela has one of the largest fiscal deficits in the world, the highest rate of inflation, the worst adjustment of the exchange rate, the fastest increase in debt and one of the biggest drops in productive capacity, even in the critical oil sector. In addition, during the Chávez era, the country fell to the bottom of the lists that measure international competitiveness, ease to do business and attractiveness for foreign investors, and rose to the top among the most corrupt countries in the world.” Despite these warnings, the Venezuelan government did not implement a serious economic plan to resolve the crisis. Rather, the Maduro administration continued exchange controls, control of prices and interest rates, and increased public expenditure. International organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, as well as various ratings agencies, estimate that the country has the highest inflation rate in the world (Briceño-Ruiz, Lehmann 2020).

Over 20 million Venezuelans, out of a population of 28.8 million, live in multidimensional poverty due to economic precarity and poor public services, having irreversibly lost their means of support and subsistence, and 14.2 million face severe humanitarian needs, according to the independent platform of civil society organizations HumVenezuela (2023).

A mix of factors causes Venezuelans to flee, including harsh economic conditions and persecution. Movement restrictions in other countries such as visa requirements, promoted by the US, as well as limited access to asylum and regularization, poor integration programs and discrimination and xenophobia in neighbouring countries drive many refugees into dangerous routes such as the already cited Darién Gap (Human Rights Watch, 2025).

An estimated 7.1 million Venezuelans have migrated abroad as the country has economically and politically devolved into a protracted humanitarian crisis. Inflation increased tenfold between 2014 and 2016, reaching more than 600% (Weitzman, Huss 2024). By 2019, 9.3 million Venezuelans within the country suffered from food insecurity (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Venezuela has had among the highest homicide rates worldwide since the early 2000s, and its homicide rate continued to increase through the 2010s (World Bank 2023a).

It has now been over eight years since the crisis in Venezuela began to unfold, forcing millions to seek protection abroad, especially in the neighbouring countries, such as Colombia and Peru.

Humanitarian organizations in Colombia are experiencing significant budget cuts, which are severely impacting their ability to deliver essential support programs for Venezuelan migrants. At the same time, President Petro’s government has shifted its narrative, from recognizing the Venezuelan presence in Colombia to minimizing it.

This change in discourse aligns with a broader shift in foreign policy toward Nicolás Maduro’s regime. The "de-Venezuelanization" of Colombia’s migration response may be a strategic move to foster better diplomatic relations with Maduro, who has consistently denied the existence of a humanitarian crisis in Venezuela (Weitzman & Huss, 2024).

Over the past year, the Colombian government has dismantled the Gerencia de Fronteras, the key coordinating body responsible for the Venezuelan response. The Gerencia had proven to be an effective mechanism: it had high-level political support, direct oversight from the presidency, and the authority to coordinate across government ministries and ensure the implementation of policies nationwide. Its dissolution has undermined the continuity of crucial programs—especially those focused on the economic integration of Venezuelans—leaving a significant gap in the national response to the ongoing displacement crisis.

As explained above, the Darien Gap shared by Colombia and Panama has become an important transit route for migrants from various places, particularly Venezuelans. As of May 2024, statistics provided by the National Migration Service of Panama (2024) indicate that 170,014 migrants have crossed, and 109,895 are from Venezuela. Today, migrants from Venezuela in Colombia represent 5 percent of the total population, with 2.81 million people as of April 2024 (R4V,2024). Colombia also serves as a transit country for migrants and refugees moving toward Central and North America, to other countries in South America, as well as for those engaging in return movements to Venezuela. The Colombia-Venezuela border maintains a pendular movement dynamic, with people entering the country seeking medical services and medicines, education, livelihoods, and access to goods and services. Regarding the regularization process (granting a Temporary Protection Status; TPS), as of April 2024, 2.2 million Venezuelans were enrolled and had successfully registered in the Registry of Venezuelan Nationals (RUMV), of whom 1.9 million held the Temporary Protection Permit (TPP) (Migración Colombia, 2024). However, as of April 2024, approximately 462,000 Venezuelans in Colombia were in an irregular situation, which impacts their access to rights and essential services, including to health, education, and to regular employment (R4V, 2024).

Finding employment in Colombia is extremely difficult for Venezuelan migrants, primarily due to administrative barriers. One of the main challenges is the inability to obtain or renew essential documents such as passports or visas required to legally enter neighbouring countries like Colombia and Peru.

As a result of the severe humanitarian, economic, and political crisis in Venezuela, many inhabitants are forced to leave their homeland, often undertaking the dangerous journey through the Darién Gap. Entering these countries irregularly means they are often deprived of basic human rights,from the right to life, food, and healthcare, to the right to work. Without legal status, access to formal employment becomes impossible.

Overall, the crisis in Venezuela is deeply rooted in the interconnection between economic collapse and political instability. While humanitarian organizations strive to provide assistance and shelter to as many people as possible, recent cuts in international funding,particularly from the United States, have weakened the already fragile humanitarian response systems in Latin American countries.

U.S. as a player in action

Venezuela’s collapse has produced a full-blown humanitarian emergency. Years of economic mismanagement, oil shocks and sanctions have driven GDP down 80% (2014–2021) and left roughly 85% of Venezuelans in poverty. Hyperinflation (over 200% in 2022–23) and a crash in public services have caused food and medicine shortages, a collapsing health system and a severe water crisis. For example, the minimum wage has remained only about $3.60 per month while a family’s basic food basket costs some $500. Infrastructure failures (90% of the country suffers unreliable water delivery) and the COVID-19 pandemic have worsened the situation, leading to outbreaks of malaria, measles and other preventable diseases. The result is an exodus of desperate people: more than 7.7 million Venezuelans have fled since 2014, making it the largest displacement crisis in Latin America (Center for Disaster Philanthropy, 2022). One refugee to Brazil summed up the plight: “We left everything in Venezuela…have nothing to eat” (UNHCR, 2023). In short, widespread hunger, disease and insecurity now compel millions to seek aid and safety abroad.

Geopolitically, U.S. policy toward Venezuela has swung notably from the Trump to the Biden administration. Under Trump, the United States pursued a “maximum pressure” campaign: it recognized the opposition as Venezuela’s legitimate government, imposed extensive oil and financial sanctions and even added Venezuela to a travel‐ban list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” Critics argue these measures worsened the humanitarian crisis by choking off revenue and imports. For example, U.S. sanctions on PDVSA were tightened repeatedly, contributing to Venezuela’s economic freefall (Center for Disaster Philantropy, 2022). Trump also used pandemic-era Title 42 orders to expel Venezuelans (along with other nationalities) from the border, and his “Remain in Mexico” policy forced many to wait for asylum across the southern border.

Under Biden, the approach shifted to a mix of targeted relief and conditional pressure. Politically, the administration pressed for free elections (with only limited success) and offered temporary sanction relief in late 2023, authorizing foreign purchases of Venezuelan oil in hopes of improving the climate for opposition participation, before re-imposing oil sanctions when concessions proved illusory (Washington Post, 2024). In practice, sanctions remain in force but are selectively waived for humanitarian needs. Diplomatically, the U.S. continues to refuse to recognize Maduro’s legitimacy, but has engaged regional partners more constructively than under Trump.

On migration and asylum, Biden combined legal pathways with strict border controls. In October 2022 he announced a new humanitarian parole program (CHNV) for Venezuelans (later expanded to include Haitians, Cubans and Nicaraguans). Under this scheme, 24,000 Venezuelans per month who have approved U.S. sponsors and pass background checks can enter for two years of legal stay. This “carrot” was coupled with a “stick”: Mexico agreed to accept up to 24,000 Venezuelans deported from the U.S. each month, and the administration sharply curtailed asylum access at the U.S.-Mexico border. In effect, most irregular arrivals from Venezuela are now quickly expelled under Title 42 or returned to Mexico, while only a limited number can enter via parole or established legal status (American Immigration Council, 2023). Notably, Biden also created Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Venezuelans: by 2023 roughly 348,000 Venezuelans in the U.S. were registered for TPS (carrying work authorization). This status (like that of Haitians and others) was later rescinded by the courts in 2025.

In summary, U.S. asylum policy under Biden opened official channels for some Venezuelans but kept strict controls on the rest (Reuters, 2025). Observers note this “carrot-and-stick” approach has had mixed effects: it offered lawful entry to many in principle, but in practice only a fraction of asylum-seekers can access these routes, while others still embark on dangerous irregular journeys north.

The U.S. government has committed substantial aid to alleviate the Venezuelan refugee crisis, both inside Venezuela and in host countries. Between 2017 and 2020 the U.S. provided roughly $611 million in humanitarian assistance to regional partners (governments and NGOs) to help Venezuelan refugees. In September 2020 Secretary Pompeo announced an additional $348 million for Venezuelan migrants and the countries hosting them, bringing the total to over $1.2 billion since 2017. These funds have been used for food distribution, temporary shelter, medical supplies and other life-saving aid in Colombia, Peru, Panama and beyond (Wolfe, 2025). For example, U.S. support has helped vaccination campaigns, mobile health clinics and nutrition programmes for migrants in Colombia and Ecuador. U.S. refugee programmes have also facilitated registration: in Colombia U.S. assistance helped register millions of Venezuelans for the country’s Temporary Protected Status system (PEP) so they could obtain work permits.

Under Biden, the pace of aid announcements accelerated (though with uneven disbursement). At the 2022 Summit of the Americas President Biden pledged up to $314 million more for the “Venezuela regional crisis,” much of it via USAID and State Department accounts. In late 2023 the administration declared an even larger package (nearly $485 million in new humanitarian aid for FY2023) of which about $451 million was earmarked for the Venezuela crisis. (This included roughly $174 million through USAID and $310 million through State’s Migration and Refugee Assistance.) These funds were to provide food assistance, healthcare, water/sanitation and legal protection services for Venezuelans inside the country and for refugees and host communities in the hemisphere (Mirage News, 2023).

Despite these large headline figures, analysts critique the adequacy and follow-through of U.S. programmes. A 2023 report noted that at best donors (including the U.S.) have funded only a fraction of the assessed needs: in 2022 the joint UN/IOM Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) was just 36% funded, and by late 2023 only about 16% of that year’s needs were met. The U.S., while a major donor, still underwrites far less than what would be required to fully address the crisis. For instance, Colombia’s appeal was only 21% funded by late 2023, even though it hosts over 1.8 million Venezuelans. In practice, underfunding means many U.S.-backed projects operate at a reduced scale. Humanitarian organisations report having to cut back cash-assistance, schooling and shelter programmes due to funding shortfalls (Refugees International, 2023).

Critics also point out that U.S. aid has tended to emphasize short-term relief; some argue more should be invested in long-term integration and economic development in host countries. Others note that U.S. aid announcements do not always materialize quickly, leaving refugees and authorities uncertain. As one policy analyst put it, by tightening legal pathways (TPS/parole) while failing to fully back UN response plans, the U.S. risks effectively “turning its back” on many Venezuelans (Dib & Bare, 2025).

The consequences of inconsistent or insufficient aid are severe for Venezuelan refugees. With UN and donor funding well below targets, many migrants cannot access basic services. For example, UNHCR reports that half of Venezuelan refugees in Latin America lack enough money for three meals a day and adequate housing. Unable to secure food or shelter, many resort to desperate coping mechanisms: survival sex work, begging or predatory loans are tragically common (UNHCR, 2023). Lack of funding also means protection gaps. Migrants without legal status, who form the majority, struggle to get documentation or work permits. With tight U.S. border policies and overwhelmed asylum systems, some families spend years in limbo in Colombia, Panama or Mexico. Host-country services (health clinics, schools, psychosocial support) are overstretched and often require international funding to continue; funding shortfalls have forced cuts in medical aid and food rations.

In sum, underfunding the UNRMRP/UNHRP and IOM plans has left many refugees without full protection or assistance. Aid agencies warn that donor fatigue could provoke more hardship: without sustained contributions, more migrants may be forced to return to Venezuela or attempt dangerous onward journeys.

In human terms, the aid shortfall erodes safety nets just as needs grow. A recent UN analysis noted that Venezuela’s 7.7 million people in need of aid are poorly served by the current funding levels (Center for Disaster Philantropy, 2022) . One protection officer said the funding gap means the difference between having a shelter versus sleeping on the street. Another noted children being kept out of school when cash-for-education programs run out. In this context, the role of U.S. aid is double-edged: while U.S. programmes have saved lives, their uneven delivery has sometimes added uncertainty. For example, Americans have repeatedly announced new assistance, but migrants sometimes wait months to see tangible benefits. Such delays can exacerbate distrust among refugees and fuel perceptions that international support is unreliable (Dib & Bare, 2025).

Overall, analysts agree that stable, sufficient U.S. funding and consistent policies are crucial. Expanded legal pathways (like TPS and parole) have provided hope to some, but abrupt rollbacks have sown fear. In February 2025, WOLA reported that terminating Venezuelan TPS and parole “abandons” hundreds of thousands of migrants to Maduro’s regime. Likewise, cuts to planned aid have forced NGOs to scale back, leaving acute needs unmet. In short, the Venezuelan crisis has created a humanitarian emergency that exceeds current response capacity. Without greater U.S. engagement – both in diplomacy and sustained financing – the region’s countries of asylum will struggle to cope, and many vulnerable migrants will remain without protection or basic services (Refugees International, 2023).

5. Conclusions

As Venezuela’s displacement crisis deepens, the line between humanitarian response and political inertia grows ever thinner. Our findings point to a critical reality: unless comprehensive and coordinated action is urgently scaled up, the region risks normalising a humanitarian catastrophe that is anything but normal. In the coming months and years, several predictions and imperatives emerge:

  • Without tangible reforms to dismantle authoritarian governance and stabilise the economy, Venezuelans will continue to flee, often risking their lives through jungles, trochas, and traffickers. A fair electoral process in the July 2025 elections is unlikely. Migration flows, therefore, may spike further, particularly if hopes for democratic renewal are once again dashed.
  • With the dismantling of border coordination bodies and muted political discourse on Venezuelan integration, the Petro administration is increasingly favouring diplomatic rapprochement with the Maduro regime over robust migration support. This “policy of silence” risks undermining hard-won gains in social cohesion and legal protection.
  • In the face of institutional fatigue and international donor retreat, local shelters, citizen networks, and migrant-led initiatives will continue to fill the gaps. Yet without systemic support, their ability to offer more than temporary relief is fragile. These humanised safety nets must be reinforced.
  • Women and girls are at the epicentre of a shadow economy of exploitation. The weaponisation of their bodies, from forced prostitution in brothels to survival sex along migration routes, will worsen unless GBV prevention and survivor-centred services are expanded, especially in high-risk zones.
  • Sanctions alone will not shift the dynamics in Caracas; they must be paired with sustained, well-funded humanitarian commitments and realistic migration pathways. Parole and TPS programmes offer a model, but not if they are subject to political whim and judicial rollback. Strategic clarity is needed to avoid cycles of hope and abandonment.
  • As it becomes the principal passage to North America for Venezuelans, the Darien Gap will draw growing attention from criminal actors, humanitarian responders, and governments alike. If left unchecked, it risks becoming a permanent theatre of exploitation and death.

  • The future of Venezuelan displacement hinges on a regional pact. Shared responsibility in asylum systems, funding, and long-term inclusion is essential. Otherwise, the burden will fall disproportionately on frontline countries like Colombia, already strained to their limits.

Ultimately, the Venezuelan migration crisis is not just a story of movement. It is a story of survival, system failure, and human rights. And while borders may be lines on a map, for millions of Venezuelans they are also fine lines between hope and despair. Whether those lines become pathways to safety or barriers to humanity depends entirely on what the region and the world chooses to do next.





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