From Globalization to Fragmentation: US-China Tech Rivalry and the Rise of Neo Techno-Nationalism

  Focus - Allegati
  21 maggio 2026
  20 minuti, 49 secondi

Author: Ilaria Catalano (Junior Researcher Mondo Internazionale GEO - Economia)

Introduction

While trade relations between US and China deepened over the past few decades, particularly since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, economic tensions have now reached a critical crossroads. The sanctions first imposed by the Trump administration in 2018 marked a definitive rupture in relations between the world’s two largest economies, catalyzing an escalation that has since evolved into a full-fledged trade war. However, this conflict carries deeper systemic weight than a mere dispute over trade deficits. Rather, it signals a broader crisis in the post-Cold War global order and raises fundamental questions about the future of US technological and geopolitical primacy. Initially targeting commodities such as steel and soybeans, the trade war has progressively shifted toward what can be considered the engine of 21st-century power: technology. The latter has effectively become the operating system of national power, and consequently, the struggle for technological leadership has emerged as the core feature of US-China trade relations. This shift has created a new paradigm: New Techno-nationalism (NTN), which views competition as a zero-sum game and significantly departs from the liberal underpinnings of traditional techno-nationalism. This analysis therefore examines how NTN reshapes international trade through the securitization of supply chains and assesses the extent to which these practices undermine global innovation and economic efficiency.

From trade war to tech war: the case of Huawei

While the US-China conflict started off as a tariff tit-for-tat, with the Trump administration imposing 25% tariffs on roughly $350 billion worth of Chinese imports under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, it soon revealed deeper tensions shaping relations between the world’s two largest economies. In 2018, the United States justified these measures by citing concerns over unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft and forced technology transfer. China did not take long to respond, accusing the Trump administration of using protectionist measures to hinder its economic rise. Chinese retaliatory measures were framed as a defense of international trade and targeted politically sensitive American exports, particularly agricultural and automotive products. Although both countries repeatedly made attempts at defusing this trade war through negotiations, the conflict has become the defining economic confrontation of the 21st century. By 2025, tariffs had reached a record high of 145% on Chinese goods entering the United States, and of 125% tariff on US imports to China, before being challenged by the US Supreme Court in early 2026.

However, this seemingly conventional tariff war soon escalated into a technological rivalry and strategic competition. Indeed, while China’s efforts to strengthen its indigenous technological capabilities were not anomalous per se, as increasing productivity and innovation are widely recognized as drivers of long-term economic growth, concerns quickly spread across the United States. The latter feared the scale and strategic breadth of China’s industrial upgrading strategy envisioned in the Made in China 2025 initiative of 2015. This policy aimed at establishing China as a global leader in advanced manufacturing and strategic sectors including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, robotics, electric vehicles, biotechnology and telecommunications. Particularly significant was the initiative’s goal of achieving 70% domestic self-sufficiency in critical technological inputs by 2025, signaling an explicit intention to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers. The breadth of sectors targeted, combined with ambitions to relocate critical segments of the production chain within China, sparked concern among foreign governments and firms, who gradually began to view China as a “strategic competitor” in high-value sectors. Reflecting this shift in perception, senior Trump trade advisor Peter Navarro (2018) argued that the central issue was no longer the bilateral trade deficit alone, but rather China’s “state-directed investments” and industrial policy that was allowing “Chinese companies to move rapidly up the innovation curve at much lower cost than their foreign competitors”. As a result, the trade war gradually shifted away from conventional sectors such as steel, aluminum and agriculture, toward strategic industries at the core of their technological competition.

The placement of Huawei on the Entity List (1) in 2019 was a turning point in transforming the economic conflict into a technological race to supremacy. The company had become a global leader in telecommunications infrastructure, 5G and smartphone manufacturing, signaling China’s ability to compete at the technological frontier. Its growing international presence, particularly in telecommunications networks across Europe, Asia and Africa, began to question US technological dependence and potential national security vulnerabilities. Increasingly, US authorities and policymakers started accusing Huawei of being an instrument of Chinese state influence, capable of threatening critical infrastructure, national security and broader geopolitical interests, rather than a standard private technology provider. Despite the lack of evidence demonstrating direct espionage activities linked with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the perception that Huawei could serve strategic objectives of the Chinese state was sufficient to dominate the political discourse. As a result, economic considerations and market efficiency became progressively subordinated to national security concerns. This phenomenon, namely the securitization of Huawei, eventually marked a definitive transformation in US-China relations: from then, technological interdependence itself was perceived as a strategic liability rather than a source of mutual economic benefit.

This paradigm shift persisted under the Biden administration. Its measures demonstrate how state perceptions of technological interdependence changed as a function of advanced technologies themselves, which went from being associated with globalization and market efficiency, to mere instruments of security and cyber warfare. Specifically, beyond retaining roughly $360 billion worth of tariffs on Chinese goods from the previous administration, Washington expanded export controls on advanced semiconductors by adding hundreds of companies to the Entity List, restricted investment in sensitive Chinese technologies and increased tariffs on strategically competitive sectors such as electric vehicles and semiconductors. In this new era of US-China competition, technology emerged as the central arena of interstate competition that could no longer be left solely to market forces but instead required active state intervention and strategic control.

Looking at these measures, export control policies such as the Entity List have been effective at constraining China’s technological advancement. Rather than targeting finished products through tariffs, they leverage American structural dominance and network centrality to directly restrict access to critical inputs. The measure prohibited US firms from supplying listed companies with semiconductors and other sensitive technologies without government authorization. This included restrictions on access to Google Mobile Services, significantly weakening Huawei’s global smartphone business by undermining the usability of its devices outside the Chinese market.

The strategic scope of these restrictions expanded even further through the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) of 2020. This legal mechanism extended US export controls extraterritorially by prohibiting foreign firms using US-origin software or manufacturing equipment from supplying Huawei and its affiliates without authorization. In practice, this allowed Washington to exert control far beyond its own jurisdiction: companies such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which relied on US chip design software, were forced to halt production for Huawei. These measures embody what scholars have defined as the strategy of “weaponized interdependence”, with Washington leveraging its position in the global semiconductor supply chains to systematically exclude competitors from its infrastructure and maintain its structural advantage. More broadly, these measures also reflect a growing tendency to justify technological restrictions through the language of national security and strategic rivalry. What had initially emerged as a dispute over tariffs and trade practices increasingly evolved into a broader contest over technological supremacy, laying the foundations for Neo Techno-Nationalism as the analytical framework through which this analysis examines the inefficiencies and innovation costs emerging within the global technology ecosystem.

The economic costs of this securitized approach are also clearly illustrated by the Rip-and-Replace program of 2020, through which the US government allocated billions of dollars to remove and replace Huawei and other enemy telecommunications equipment from domestic rural networks. From an economic perspective, this policy highlights the inefficiencies generated by techno-nationalist measures. Functional telecommunications infrastructure was deliberately dismantled and replaced not because of technological obsolescence or poor performance, but due to national security concerns. In effect, capital that could have supported productivity-enhancing investments was diverted toward politically mandated infrastructure replacement, generating a clear form of deadweight loss. More importantly, the Huawei case established a broader precedent: governments and firms increasingly had to account for the possibility that technological supply chains themselves could become instruments of geopolitical coercion.

Ultimately, the Huawei case serves as a prime example of how contemporary US-China competition is driven by efforts to control access to the critical technological infrastructures upon which modern economic and geopolitical power depends. In this context, technological exchange is increasingly framed through the lens of national security, while the logic of market efficiency becomes subordinated to strategic concerns regarding resilience and control. The result is a growing securitization of global technology networks that is reshaping the governance of international trade and accelerating trends toward selective technological decoupling.

The theoretical framework behind new US-China competition

The escalation of the US-China competition into a technological confrontation can be better understood through the frameworks of New Techno-Nationalism (NTN) and Weaponized Interdependence. Together, these theories explain both the ideological logic underpinning the current technological rivalry and the mechanisms through which states exploit global technological interdependence for strategic purposes. More importantly, they also provide the analytical foundations for assessing the broader economic and innovation-related consequences of techno-nationalist policies.

Neo Techno-Nationalism, as conceptualized by Luo (2022), refers to “an emerging strain of geopolitical thinking and actions that link technological capabilities directly to a country’s national security and geopolitical benefits.” Unlike traditional techno-nationalism of the 1980s, which emerged in the United States largely in response to fears of Japanese economic competition, contemporary NTN differs both in scope and logic. Earlier forms of techno-nationalism primarily sought to strengthen domestic competitiveness and technological innovation while remaining open to the global economy. In contrast, contemporary NTN is explicitly focused on restricting technological exchange and limiting the innovative capacity of strategic rivals. This new techno-nationalism is therefore no longer simply about competitiveness and economic growth, but about technological exchange itself being perceived as a direct threat to national security, which must be contained by restricting the cross-border flow of technology, capital and knowledge.

This logic flows from a fundamentally zero-sum understanding of technological competition that characterizes NTN. In many ways, NTN is indeed underpinned by a realist understanding of international relations, according to which the international system is inherently anarchic and conflictual. Within this framework, states only care about their own security and national interests in a struggle for power, while technological leadership becomes a means to this end. Specifically, technological leadership becomes a prerequisite for geopolitical power, military superiority and control over strategic infrastructures, which rivals must be prevented from achieving. US efforts to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors and chip-design software are a testament to this intention, further demonstrating how NTN is both highly critical of technological openness and constantly trying to operate beyond territorial borders.

Control over technological standards has also become an important dimension of great-power competition. The attempt by the United States and several European governments, as well as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), to restrict Huawei’s role in 5G infrastructure reflects broader concerns that China could shape the future architecture and governance of critical digital networks. Ideological differences regarding surveillance, cybersecurity, privacy, censorship and state control over technology reinforce the new perception that technological dependence on strategic rivals constitutes an unacceptable security risk. In the Huawei case, many restrictions were justified not through objective evidence of espionage, but through the mere assumption that Chinese technological firms could potentially serve the strategic interests of the CCP. The result is a process of securitization in which technological exchange itself becomes politically suspect.

However, Luo also warns against the contradictions and misperceptions underlying techno-nationalist thinking. According to the author, the zero-sum logic fails to acknowledge how the global open economy has historically functioned as a positive-sum system. In fact, measures designed to weaken foreign competitors frequently expose domestic firms to greater “institutional, regulatory, and legal uncertainties and restrictions” while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of retaliation and technological fragmentation. In the Huawei case, restrictions imposed on Chinese firms also generated losses for American companies such as Qualcomm and Intel, both of which had long depended on business relations with Huawei and its affiliates. More broadly, multinational corporations deeply integrated into Chinese markets and supply chains face greater exposure to political risk, regulatory uncertainty and technological bifurcation due to this rivalry.

While NTN explains why states increasingly seek to control technological flows, the theory of Weaponized Interdependence developed by Farrell and Newman (2019) explains how states are able to operationalize this control. The theory argues that globalization has produced highly centralized global networks in sectors such as finance, information and advanced technology that can be leveraged by States occupying dominant positions within those networks. Moreover, they can transform interdependence into a tool of coercion by exploiting their control over critical nodes and infrastructural chokepoints.

The United States occupies precisely such a position within the global semiconductor ecosystem. Although chip manufacturing is geographically dispersed across countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and some European countries, key components of the supply chain remain heavily dependent on US technologies, particularly in Electronic Design Automation (EDA) software and advanced chip architecture. This hub-and-spoke structure allows Washington to control and restrict technological access, and even go as far as controlling it beyond its territorial jurisdiction, as exemplified by the Foreign Direct Product Rule. Through this measure, the US prohibits foreign firms using US-origin software or equipment from supplying listed companies without authorization, thereby leveraging its central position within global technological networks extraterritorially.

Farrell and Newman describe this capacity as a “chokepoint effect,” whereby states controlling critical nodes within global networks can disrupt economic flows and constrain the strategic options of other actors. In the context of the US-China technological rivalry, this mechanism enables the United States not only to compete economically with China, but to directly slow China’s technological upgrading by restricting access to foundational technologies essential for the entire semiconductor value chain.

Taken together, NTN and Weaponized Interdependence are useful for understanding the contemporary technological confrontation between the United States and China, explaining both the ideological shift and the structural mechanisms underlying it. Most importantly, they also facilitate the identification and assessment of effects caused by the techno-nationalist rivalry between the US and China.

The macroeconomic effects

In today’s interconnected economy and supply chains, many collateral damages and effects arise from NTN policies. The fragmentation of innovation is probably the most consequential result of these. As sanctions and incompatible regulatory regimes proliferate, the world is drifting toward fragmented technological spheres. The development of parallel and incompatible systems, like Chinese 5G networks versus Western alternatives, or distinct data governance models, to name just two examples, signals the erosion of shared platforms. This lack of interoperability not only increases economic inefficiencies but also disincentivizes global companies and researchers from building universally scalable technologies. Instead, firms are pressured to align with one ecosystem and redesign products for others, slowing progress, raising costs and duplicating efforts.

The result is investment in redundancy rather than in frontier technologies. Huawei itself, once a leader in 5G infrastructure and a key supplier for underserved rural markets, has been forced to redirect resources toward replacing lost access to chip technologies, operating systems, and supplier networks. Simultaneously, American tech giants such as Qualcomm and Intel have seen multi-billion-dollar losses due to broken commercial ties with Huawei, exposing the reciprocal damage inflicted by decoupling. The economic logic is clear: when technological exchange is weaponized, innovation becomes collateral damage.

As Nobel laureate Robert Solow demonstrated, long-term economic growth is driven not by capital accumulation alone, but by technological progress. Without it, economies eventually stagnate. The Huawei case, as part of a broader pattern of technological decoupling, threatens to derail the very engine of global productivity. In order to thrive, innovation relies on distributed knowledge networks, global talent flows and collaborations: conditions that are actively being threatened under the NTN order.

The situation is particularly precarious for MNEs, which have historically thrived on global value chains and cross-border R&D networks. MNEs that are heavily reliant on either a specific market (like China) or specific technological inputs (like US-origin semiconductors), now face heightened volatility, constrained strategic options and diminishing incentives to engage in international joint ventures. Collaborative global innovation networks that have long been a hallmark of international business, are now under existential threat.

This broader fragmentation of technological interdependence also generates substantial macroeconomic inefficiencies beyond the innovation sector itself. Increasingly influenced by geopolitical considerations, firms now face supply chain disruptions, tariff-driven cost escalation, regulatory uncertainty and logistical frictions that undermine the predictability needed for globally integrated production systems. Altogether, effects including customs compliance requirements, export controls and geopolitical volatility, have destabilized for Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing models. Many firms have thus abandoned lean inventory systems in favor of greater redundancy and strategic reserves, thereby sacrificing many of the efficiency gains historically generated by integrated global value chains.

Another major consequence of this technological war is the emergence of a growing security premium across the global technology ecosystem. In practice, firms and governments tend to rely on politically aligned suppliers rather than the most efficient or cost-competitive providers. The exclusion of Huawei from Western telecommunications infrastructure is a perfect example of this dynamic. Although Huawei had become one of the world’s leading and often cheapest suppliers of 5G equipment, national security concerns led many governments to ban or replace its infrastructure, imposing significant additional costs on telecommunications providers and consumers. Similar dynamics are emerging in other strategic sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and cloud infrastructure, where trade barriers limit technological exchange and raise the overall costs of digital development.

At the same time, the progressive bifurcation of the global technology ecosystem risks creating what many analysts describe as a “digital Iron Curtain.” Rather than operating within a single integrated technological system, firms are forced to adapt to incompatible technological, regulatory and political environments centered around the United States and China. This fragmentation reduces economies of scale and weakens the global diffusion of innovation and knowledge.

Ultimately, the long-term macroeconomic consequences of techno-nationalist fragmentation may extend far beyond the US and China themselves, and across various sectors. As technological progress slows and global production networks become more politicized, the world economy risks entering a period characterized by higher structural costs and declining innovation efficiency.

Policy recommendations

As the overview of effects shows, the current trajectory of techno-nationalist competition risks creating long-term economic fragmentation, slower innovation and heightened geopolitical tensions. While States must address national security and technological dependence concerns, they should also foster a sustainable global technology order capable of balancing strategic competition with continued economic cooperation. In this context, the objective should not be the complete elimination of technological rivalry, but rather the prevention of an uncontrolled fragmentation of the global innovation ecosystem.

To this regard, existing initiatives such as the WTO Information Technology Agreement make a good case that international coordination on technology governance is possible, even between strategic competitors. Thus, policy responses could envision the creation of a multilateral global technology framework aimed at regulating fair technological competition, digital security standards and supply chain transparency. Such a framework could partially reduce the unilateral use of sanctions and export controls by replacing politically driven restrictions with more institutionalized and fact-based assessment mechanisms. Moreover, a broader framework focused on technological interoperability and transparency could also help reduce regulatory fragmentation and preserve the efficiency gains generated by global innovation networks.

At the same time, governments could benefit from prioritizing policies that encourage technological interoperability rather than technological bifurcation. In this regard, initiatives supporting Open RAN represent a particularly relevant example. By allowing telecommunications operators to combine equipment from different vendors within the same network architecture, Open RAN reduces dependence on single suppliers while simultaneously preserving market competition and innovation. Rather than relying solely on exclusionary policies targeting foreign firms, governments could instead support the development of competitive alternatives through public investment, research incentives and international partnerships aimed at strengthening open and interoperable technological ecosystems.

More broadly, policymakers should avoid approaches rooted exclusively in zero-sum techno-nationalist logic. Excessive securitization risks undermining precisely the innovation networks upon which long-term economic growth depends. Technological progress has historically emerged from open collaboration and globally integrated research ecosystems. Preserving at least partial forms of technological cooperation between major powers therefore remains essential not only for economic efficiency, but also for the long-term stability of the global economy itself.

In conclusion, the US-China trade war demonstrates how technological competition has become one of the defining dimensions of contemporary geopolitical rivalry. What initially emerged as a dispute over tariffs and trade imbalances, progressively evolved into a broader struggle over technological leadership and control over critical infrastructures. Both powers have respectively relied on export control policies, effectively transforming technological interdependence into a tool of strategic competition and geopolitical coercion.

The frameworks of New Techno-Nationalism and Weaponized Interdependence help explain both the ideological logic and the structural mechanisms underlying this transformation. However, while these policies may strengthen resilience and reduce certain strategic vulnerabilities, they also generate substantial economic costs. If this trajectory continues unchecked, the world risks entering a more fragmented and less innovative global economic order characterized by higher structural costs, selective technological decoupling and declining innovation efficiency.

(1) The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List is a US trade restriction list managed by the Department of Commerce under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), identifying foreign individuals, companies and organizations that pose a significant risk to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

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