From the 1970s oil shocks to today: understanding electricity price volatility

  Focus - Allegati
  16 aprile 2026
  18 minuti, 27 secondi

Author: Beatrice Sala (Senior Researcher Mondo Internazionale GEO - Economia)

Abstract

This article explores the evolution of electricity price volatility, by comparing the 1970s oil shocks with the contemporary energy crisis following the February 2026 attacks on Iran. Central to this analysis is the merit order mechanism, a model where the marginal cost of the most expensive generating unit required to meet demand determines the wholesale price of electricity. This creates a structural paradox: even with high renewable penetration, expensive fossil fuels at the margin continue to drive electricity costs.

The study revisits the 1970s, a period defined by state monopolies and heavy dependence on OPEC oil. Supply disruptions during this era led to stagflation, prompting the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the establishment of strategic oil reserves.

In contrast, the modern energy landscape features liberalized markets, a broader array of suppliers, and diversified energy sources. While this diversification provides a stronger macroeconomic backdrop, the European Central Bank scenarios highlight that electricity prices remain sensitive to supply shocks. While today’s economy is more resilient, decoupling prices from fossil fuel volatility requires deeper investment in flexibility of renewable energy.

Introduction

The energy landscape of the 1970s, marked by significant oil crises, can offer a valuable reference against which today's evolving market dynamics can be studied. In 1973 and 1979, geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East led to drastic price spikes, fundamentally altering economies heavily reliant on oil, like the US and the European Union. These events triggered widespread inflation and economic stagnation. However, the current context differs markedly. As we navigate the recent escalation in the Strait of Hormuz following U.S. and Israeli attacks against Iran, the implications for energy pricing and economic stability demand a careful analysis. At this stage, the only certainty is that the supply disruption, caused by the blocking of the Strait and by a decrease in crude production, has already affected the price of oil, and consequently the electricity price.

Figure 1: Energy Commodity Prices. Source: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/projections/html/ecb.projections202603_ecbstaff~ebe291cd3d.en.html

Today’s energy sector is less oil-intensive, featuring diverse suppliers, supply chains and a broader array of energy sources, including renewable ones. This complexity means that the impact of fossil fuel shocks will be more complex, and it will depend on the severity, persistence and policy response chosen to face the crisis.

This article will explore the lessons of the 1970s oil crisis, examining the electricity pricing mechanism, macroeconomic consequences of supply disruptions, and effective policy responses. The comparison between the current situation and previous oil disruptions highlights similarities, like geopolitical premises, and differences, in market structure, and resilience. The liberalisation of the European electricity sector and diversification of energy sources have altered the way economies react to electricity price volatility, but today’s situation has shown that electricity markets are still sensitive to supply shocks, and how important energy security is to advanced economies.

The Merit Order Effect: how prices are determined in the electricity market

In order to fully understand the magnitude of the fossil fuel shock resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, following the attacks on Iran in February 2026, it is paramount to understand how wholesale electricity markets function. A shock in the supply of energy sources is often reflected in, and has a strong impact on, final consumers through electricity prices. The way electricity prices are determined, and thus the structure of the wholesale electricity market, is strictly related to the marginal cost of fuel.

In particular, the sale of electricity is ruled by the merit order mechanism. Following the liberalisation of gas and electricity markets in the EU, with the first energy package being adopted in 1998, pricing for electricity has functioned in this way: as clearly explained by the EU Joint Research Centre (Gasparella et al., 2023), electricity is traded every day on day-ahead spot markets, which match supply and demand on an hourly basis. According to the merit order mechanism, supply bids are ranked in ascending order based on their variable generation cost. This cost is the sum of three components, namely fuel (determined by the price of the commodity), carbon emissions (which in the EU are priced according to the ETS mechanism), and variable operating costs (which include daily running costs of operating a plant). The extent to which the price of electricity depends on the price of the commodity depends on the relative weight of the commodity cost within total production costs. For instance, nuclear power generation is less affected by changes in the price of uranium, since the costs for processing, fabrication and safe disposal are higher than those of uranium itself, while power plants using oil, coal or gas will be more vulnerable to price fluctuations.

What determines the price of electricity is the market-clearing price, set by the last bid, i.e. the marginal bid. Lower-cost technology bids are ‘cleared’ from the market first, such as renewable sources, while “the price of electricity in any given period is determined by the short-run marginal cost of the most expensive generating unit required to meet demand” (Poudineh, 2026).

Figure 2: The Structural Paradox of Electricity Markets. Source: Poudineh, R. (2026, March). Fossil fuel shocks and European electricity prices since the 1970s: what can we learn? The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

The structural paradox is that it is not the energy source that is most prevalent, with the highest share of consumption, that sets the price, but rather the one that sits at the margin, namely the most expensive unit needed to meet demand. Even though this mechanism is well known, and although future contracts allow traders to minimize their risks, there is another aspect that contributes to electricity price volatility: geopolitical dynamics. Disruptions in the supply of energy sources driven by political decisions are inherently unpredictable. Nonetheless, even if price fluctuations cannot always be predicted and political decisions can strongly influence energy markets, countries can develop best practices and increase their preparedness to manage potential disruptions.

The 1970s Oil Shocks

In 1973, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to reduce oil production and impose an embargo on the United States and any country that would support Israel in the Yom Kippur War. The immediate outcome of the oil shock was a quadrupling of oil prices, from three dollars per barrel to twelve dollars per barrel in 1974 (Poudineh, 2026). The 1970s were marked by another major supply disruption. With the Iranian revolution (1979) and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war (1980), Iran, one of the largest oil exporters at the time, drastically decreased production. Although other producers were able to offset part of the loss, the net supply reduction amounted to around 4–5% of global oil production. This once again spiked prices up, from thirteen dollars per barrel in 1979 to thirty-four dollars per barrel a year later (Gross, 2019). Both shocks drove prices for oil up, which at the time represented almost 25% of total electricity generation (Poudineh, 2026).

When the first oil crisis hit, Western countries were heavily dependent on oil produced by Arab countries. The shift from the Seven Sisters Cartel to OPEC dominance of the market coincided with an increase in oil demand, driven by growing needs of the transportation sector, petrochemical industries, and heating and electric power generation. The energy sector of the 1970s was particularly oil-intensive, and even after the first oil crisis, when nuclear power and coal regained importance in electricity generation, the rise in oil prices also pushed up the price of alternative fuels, such as coal. Furthermore, due to oil indexation — linking the price of natural gas to that of oil — the price of natural gas also increased (Poudineh, 2026). Higher dependence on imported petroleum went hand in hand with geopolitical shifts in the region, and the fall of the pro-Western rule of the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, highlighted the vulnerabilities of this system.

In the US, the consequences of the embargo and the shock to oil production, translated into long queues at gas stations, higher heating bills, and a halt to the American automotive industry, as domestic cars were highly fuel-intensive and demand dropped sharply when gasoline became scarce and expensive (Greenspan, 2026). European countries, like the UK, France and Italy, which heavily relied on oil for electricity generation, as well as the Netherlands and Portugal, which supported Israel and were therefore also subject to the embargo, were hit with the crisis.

It is interesting to note that in most European countries at the time, there was no wholesale market for electricity but rather state-owned monopolies, such as ENEL in Italy, which set prices through cost-of-service regulation. This meant that prices included operating costs, a return on investment based on the rate of return on invested capital, and the recovery of depreciation expenses. Price increases required tariff adjustment, which depended on a political agreement, and were therefore not immediate.

As expected, a rise in the price of an essential commodity, like oil, had widespread negative effects across the economy. Cost-push inflation increased, leading firms to cut production, due to higher input costs, consumers to consume less, and unemployment to rise. The combination of high inflation with a recession led to stagflation. However, according to Professor Philipp Braun, the oil crisis was not the ultimate cause of stagflation, but rather a contributing factor, while the actual culprit was the policy response of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Indeed, the FED decided to lower interest rates significantly, to respond to the recession building up, and only made inflation rise (Braun, 2026).

As pointed out by European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, in her speech at “The ECB and Its Watchers” conference organised in Frankfurt, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the duration of the supply shock and the extent to which inflation deviates from target. This is crucial to avoid responses that arrive too late, are counterproductive, or are insufficiently forceful (Lagarde, 2026).

In the aftermath of the first oil crisis, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was established to provide a collective response to future oil shocks, and to recommend energy policies that strengthen sustainability, reliability and affordability. One of the criteria for membership in the IEA is maintaining a strategic reserve in crude oil and/or product reserves, that is equivalent to the previous year’s net imports covering 90 days. Strategic reserves have since become an important buffer, managed both by the state and private entities. In the European Union, regulations have been introduced to improve coordination and risk-preparedness in the electricity sector, as well as to strengthen electricity interconnection across member states. In addition, a directive requires EU member states to maintain minimum oil stocks equivalent to 90 days of average daily net imports, or 61 days of average daily inland consumption (European Parliament, 2026).

From the 1970s Oil Shock to Today: What Has Changed?

The current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has drawn comparisons with the oil shock of 1973. The underlying causes once again lie in geopolitical tensions. Surprise attacks on Iran on 28 February, led by Israel and the US, have so far resulted in the assassination of Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranian retaliation against neighbouring US allies, and the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, blocking 20% of the world’s oil supply.

The magnitude of the crisis cannot be fully understood after only a month. Whether the conflict will continue despite US attempts to negotiate a peace treaty with Iran remains uncertain, but what is clear is that even a disruption of a couple of days in the Strait will create significant increases in energy costs that may persist beyond the end of the crisis.

However, the current situation is different from the oil shock of the 1970s. Taking the European Union into account, as shown in Figure 2, the demand for coal and oil has diminished drastically as a share of total energy demand, leaving more space for nuclear energy and renewables. This diversification strategy, which involves diversifying across energy sources, suppliers, and supply routes, has changed the energy market structure. Moreover, in the European Union, 2025 ended with positive growth, with private consumption growing, inflation stable at 1.9% in February of this year , and investment expanding in areas such as defence and digitalisation (Lagarde, 2026).

The macroeconomic environment today differs from that of the 1970s, in part due to the liberalisation of electricity markets. This shift has altered both the impact of shocks and the available mitigation strategies, enabling risk management through instruments such as futures contracts, as well as fostering greater efficiency and deeper economic integration. Under the previous cost-of-service regulation, price shocks were partially absorbed through a lag in transmission, supported by government subsidies that ultimately resulted in higher taxation. In contrast, in today’s spot electricity markets, shocks to energy commodity prices can be passed on to consumers more immediately, but through hedging and futures contracts traders can attempt to mitigate price volatility (Poudineh, 2026). Nonetheless, the merit order mechanism that governs electricity markets still allows shocks to global energy supplies to impact global trade.

Figure 3: Change in energy demand in selected regions, 2023 - 2024. Source: International Energy Agency

According to the latest report from the International Energy Agency, benchmark crude oil prices have already increased from 20 dollars per barrel to 92 dollars per barrel, following the attack on Iran. With fewer ships able to travel, and crude production decreasing (in the Gulf countries, the inability to export through the Strait, coupled with Iran attacks on critical infrastructure, have translated into lower production) the IEA members have released 400 million barrels of oil from their emergency reserves (International Energy Agency, 2026). Furthermore, according to their estimates, higher oil prices are expected to translate into higher retail prices and to hamper global economic growth. In Europe, the Gulf region is the largest source of European jet fuel imports, and this has already led to flight disruptions, while flights will also require more fuel as they must avoid routes affected by the war.

Assuming a relatively contained shock, the ECB assumes that the increase in energy prices will have a negative impact on consumption, through losses in purchasing power and lower employment, and on investments, given higher uncertainty and lower business confidence. However, growth will not be as negatively impacted given the current resilience of the labour market and fiscal stimulus, related to defence and infrastructure spending. Domestic demand will recover over time, bringing annual real GDP growth to 1.4% in 2028 (European Central Bank, 2026).

However, the ECB has taken into consideration alternative scenarios: an adverse scenario, which implies a disruption of 40% of oil and LNG flows from the Strait of Hormuz in the second quarter of 2026, with a return to normal supply flows in the third quarter of 2026; and a severe scenario that assumes a larger energy shock, with 60% of trade flows disrupted, and a delayed normalisation of oil and LNG supplies to the first quarter of 2027.

The severity and duration of the shock will affect energy commodity prices differently, with highest prices projected in the more severe scenario. It will also impact uncertainty and therefore financial market volatility in different ways,with more severe scenarios leading to more persistent global uncertainty.

The policy response in Europe will need to be adapted, taking into consideration the persistence and severity of the crisis. A shock to commodity prices that passes through to the broader economy risks generating higher inflation through indirect and second-round effects. These effects may be non-linear, making it essential to assess all possible scenarios. If shocks are short-lived and limited, they can be largely overlooked, as inflationary pressures tend to remain confined to the energy sector and monetary policy responses may come too late. However, when shocks are larger and more persistent, policy action becomes necessary.

Our macroeconomic conditions will also influence how the crisis will affect us. As Lagarde points out, the shock to the natural gas prices following the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which deprived Europe of one of its biggest suppliers (45% of natural gas imports came from Russia) and drove oil and gas prices up, hit a very different Europe. In 2022, Europe saw a surge in demand after the economy reopened from the pandemic, while supply chains were still disrupted. At the same time, there were major labour shortages, and inflation was already above 5%. These factors together pushed inflation higher. Today, inflation has been close to target for almost a year, and although unemployment is still low, labour shortages are no longer severe. Economic policy has also changed. In 2022, monetary policy was very supportive, with interest rates at -0.5% and the ECB still buying assets, while governments were spending more. Today, interest rates are around neutral levels, and fiscal policy is no longer providing extra support. What will help manage the crisis, according to Lagarde, is agility, which means no pre-commitment to a single rate path, and a particular attention to risks, by considering worse-than-expected scenarios, and continuously monitoring early warning signs.

Conclusions

Electricity prices are determined by the merit order mechanism, and despite continous changes in the share of energy sources used in total electricity generation, economies will continue to be vulnerable to supply shocks of the most expensive and marginal generation unit required to meet demand, such as oil and gas. Gas and oil prices will continue to play a crucial role in the formation of electricity prices even in advanced economies that increasingly invest in renewable energy. Building on this understanding, while diversification, market integration, and financial hedging have strengthened resilience, energy remains exposed to external shocks.

This specific system’s functioning makes it unlikely for shocks to disappear, and the electricity sector will remain inherently exposed to global commodity prices and geopolitical tensions. In this context, policy must prioritise preparedness and agility, as emphasised by Lagarde, with flexible responses tailored to the size and persistence of shocks to prevent second-round inflation effects. Europe is today more resilient than fifty years ago, and diversification, strong labour market and fiscal policies help the economy absorb supply shocks, however we are not immune.

An important implication for future research concerns the relationship between renewable energy and price volatility. While greater renewable penetration lowers average electricity prices, since wind and solar run on lower costs, it does not necessarily reduce price volatility. As renewable energy production expands, gas plants are used less frequently, according to the merit order mechanism, but become more critical in periods of low renewable output or high demand, where they set the price. This leads to a system with many hours of low prices, where renewables are abundant, but occasional and more extreme price spikes when gas is needed. In the EU, renewable energy alone cannot meet all demand and hourly residual load is met by gas power plants. This does not mean that the shift towards renewable energy should be halted, rather that investment in renewable sources has to be accompanied by investment in flexibility, namely in long-duration storage, nuclear power, and carbon capture to break the persistent link between fossil fuel markets and electricity price volatility (Gasparella et al., 2023; Poudineh, 2026).

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