How does Consolidation fit in the current European Defence Industrial Landscape?

  Focus - Allegati
  04 giugno 2024
  21 minuti, 46 secondi

Francesco Baronio - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Difesa&Sicurezza

1. Introduction

As EU elections are approaching, the defence industry is one of the most hotly-debated topics in Europe. It is not a coincidence that the European Commission has recently released its European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS). In this document, fragmentation and hurdles in delivering the capabilities required are highlighted as major issues that are currently affecting the industry (European Commission, 2024). In parallel, a further consolidation of the European defence industry through Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) is often envisioned and advocated (Briancon, 2024; Financial Times, 2024). The aim of this paper is to discuss how a potential future consolidation of the industry could impact the crucial challenges of reducing fragmentation and ramping up production. This effort constitutes a follow-up to a paper that provided a historical account of consolidation processes in the European defence industry in the post-Cold War (Baronio, 2024).

Accordingly, the analysis is guided by the following research question: how does consolidation fit in the current European defence industrial landscape? Addressing this question requires discussing the current challenges that the industry is facing, which are outlined in the next section. The third and fourth sections tackle benefits and risks of consolidation for European political stakeholders. In the fifth section, then, the analysis focuses on how these benefits and risks might impact current challenges. The last section directly addresses the research question and draws some considerations in relation to a potential future wave of consolidation in the European defence industry.


2. Current Challenges Affecting the European Defence Industry

The first crucial challenge affecting the European defence industry is ramping up production to address the growing demand of capabilities. As Ukraine is fighting to halt Russia’s military advances, its European allies are facing significant issues in boosting arms production to meet its needs (Aries et al., 2023). At the same time, the current security landscape is driving substantial defence spending and procurement increases across EU Member States, and the industry is struggling to keep up (European Commission, 2024). This is a direct consequence of twenty years of defence budget declines that led to the downsizing of Europe’s defence industrial capacities (Aries et al., 2023). Overall, it is fair to state that right now ramping up production constitutes a significant challenge for the European defence industry.

Another challenge that the industry is facing involves reducing fragmentation. European countries have historically developed capabilities in isolation to a large extent, resulting in a wide range of different systems, platforms and equipment that, ultimately, are both financially untenable and strategically problematic (Barbieux, 2023). The degree of fragmentation largely depends on the market segment. For instance, the Main Battle Tank (MBT) and the fighter aircraft markets are more concentrated, while the Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), and the destroyers and frigates markets are highly fragmented (Olsson, 2021). As Andersson (2023) notes, the number of key weapon systems in production in the EU is decreasing, and is now largely comparable to the US. This indicates that the European defence landscape is moving towards lower fragmentation. Nevertheless, states still operate and feature a high number of different capabilities in their inventories. Hence, reducing fragmentation remains a crucial challenge for the industry.

3. The Benefits of Consolidation

From the perspective of European political stakeholders, consolidation entails four benefits. The first concerns increasing operational efficiency. Consolidation allows the companies involved to combine resources and programmes, advance a rationalisation of production processes, reduce duplications, save costs, introduce technology improvements and streamline supply chains (Schmitt, 2000; Deutch, 2001; Hoff, 2007; FasterCapital, 2024). Efficiency also relates to the potential of creating economies of scale. By growing through consolidation, companies increase their market power and production levels (Hoff, 2007). When R&D costs are spread over larger production runs, the cost to produce a single unit drops, thereby delivering more competitive products (Schmitt, 2000). For these reasons, consolidation constitutes an effective way for the industry to address a shrinking demand and decreasing defence expenditures (Deutch, 2001).

The second benefit relates to the enhanced capacity of contractors to manufacture more advanced and sophisticated capabilities. M&As lead companies involved to pool their R&D resources (Schmitt, 2000). At the same time, when two companies merge or one is acquired by a larger enterprise, the new industrial entity can cut the number of programmes developed. Comparing the number of programmes at the production stage in the early 2000s and in the early 2020s provides evidence in this regard (Vlachos-Denger, 2002; Andersson, 2023). When R&D resources are spread over a lower number of programmes, each programme receives a higher share of funds and is more likely to deliver a system that enjoys a higher degree of sophistication. This is particularly important due to the generally low levels of government investment in defence R&D in Europe (Fiott, 2019). Furthermore, consolidation is an effective strategy for companies to combine know-how and intellectual property, and, ultimately, gain access to cutting-edge technologies (Deutch, 2001; FasterCapital, 2024).

The third benefit involves increasing the competitiveness of the industry at the international level. Through M&As, companies increase their size, improve their efficiency, develop more advanced products, while becoming more resilient and financially stable. This puts them in the position to be more competitive on a global scale and increase their access to export markets (Schmitt, 2000). The European experience with trans-national programmes like the Eurofighter fighter jet and Airbus’s A400M transport aircraft provide some valuable insights in this regard (Vlachos-Denger, 2002). At a time when European companies are competing with a growing number of industrial contenders, this argument is particularly strong.

Lastly, consolidation benefits technical interoperability among armed forces in the framework of joint operations. Technical interoperability pertains to assets, systems, hardware, platforms and equipment (NATO, 2023). It does not necessarily entail using common systems, but rather using systems that may operate together from a technical standpoint (Moon et al., 2008; Gamble & Letcher, 2016). By increasing cross border industrial ties, consolidation plays an important role in increasing system standardisation, as well as synergies and similarities at the system and subsystem levels. While making states better suited to operate together, it also mitigates potential logistical issues thanks to improved and streamlined capability maintenance and replacement (Briani, 2016; Wille et al., 2021).

4. Risks of Consolidation

The risks that European political stakeholders should consider in relation to consolidation are essentially three. First, as stressed in a recent report of the US Department of Defence (DOD, 2022: 5), ‘consolidation and market concentration generally lead to reduced competition and create sourcing risks’. Competition within a defence market is crucial to spur innovation, improve performance and incentivise contractors to lower their prices (DOD, 2022; Andersson, 2023). As Hoff (2007) notes, the fewer the bidders for government contracts, the lower the advantages of competition. Therefore, by reducing the number of suppliers operating in a defence market, consolidation could reduce the incentives to innovate and keep performance levels up, lead to higher prices and overpricing risks, while increasing the vulnerability of supply chains (Linster et al., 2002; DOD, 2022; Clark, 2022).

Now, Europe constitutes an atypical case in point when it comes to a similarly atypical industry like defence and some considerations are due. First of all, attempts to promote competition by introducing rules for European companies to access defence markets in all EU Member States have been made through EU Directives (EurLex, 2009a, 2009b). Nevertheless, Article 346 TFEU creates an exception by allowing governments to exempt defence contracts from competition due to national security reasons (EurLex, 2016). Triggering this clause has essentially become the rule (Andersson, 2023). Therefore, in a sector where competition is already limited by governments involvement and significant entry barriers (Baronio, 2024), consolidation might reduce competition further among European companies.

However, while European states with a relevant defence industrial base can decide to protect their domestic market, this argument does not apply to smaller countries without the industrial power to manufacture complex weapons systems. The latter have to choose between purchasing capabilities developed by European or non-European companies. For instance, at a time when Eastern European states are sending their Soviet-made MBTs to Ukraine and procuring new ones, they are faced with three options: German Leopard 2s, American M1 Abrams or South Korean K2 Black Panthers (Ippolito, 2023). This provides evidence to argue that consolidation does not hamper competition in the European defence markets in absolute terms, but rather competition among European companies.

The second risk of consolidation involves potential impasses. On the one hand, political bargaining concerning trans-national European M&As have been frequent and difficult to solve. Matters discussed include division of labour, leadership roles, export policies, as well as main operational requirements that capabilities jointly developed are required to meet (Schmitt, 2000). This has resulted in companies involved maintaining production lines separate for some time, developing unique national variations and, in some cases, blocking M&As (Schmitt, 2000; European Defence Agency, 2016). On the other hand, companies might struggle in integrating their respective organisational cultures, but also the different systems, processes and technologies that they operate (FasterCapital, 2024). As a result, implementation challenges, production disruptions and further drawbacks may arise and fundamentally counter the efficiency associated with consolidation.

The last risk of consolidation is related to undersizing and job cuts that often come with the industrial reorganisation following mergers or acquisitions and results from a rationalisation of the production process. Along with possible political costs, workforce reductions might cause the loss of valuable talent as well as institutional and technical knowledge, impacting companies’ ability to innovate and adapt to changing market conditions (FasterCapital, 2024). In a sector that requires particularly high-skilled workers like defence, cutting jobs means losing valuable expertise and know-how that would eventually require significant time and costs to be reintegrated (Aries et al., 2023).

5. The Impact of Consolidation on the Current Challenges

The aim of this paper is to analyse how the consolidation of the European defence industry might impact the challenges that the industry is currently facing. In this section, these challenges are discussed in relation to the benefits and risks of consolidation that have just been considered. On the one hand, European states are experiencing hurdles in ramping up arms production to meet Ukraine’s needs, as well as to replete and modernise their national stocks. Consolidation might positively impact this challenge in two ways. The first relates to prime contractors, which are directly awarded defence contracts by governments. Companies grown through consolidation are better placed to scale up production when the necessity arises. In particular, their potential to create economies of scale allows them to reduce unit production costs, and their financial stability makes it easier for them to access capital markets and finance growth and production expansion (FasterCapital, 2023). Rheinmetall constitutes a fitting example in this regard (Aries et al., 2023). Nevertheless, companies require firm commitments from states to make meaningful investments and expand production (Aries et al., 2023).

The second beneficial impact of consolidation on production boosts involves subcontractors that provide prime contractors with components needed to manufacture the final product. By increasing system standardisation at the level of prime contractors, consolidation in turn sparks synergies and similarities at the subsystem level. In particular, synergies among components manufactured by subcontractors play a role in streamlining supply chains and, ultimately, uphold the efforts of prime contractors to increase production. Furthermore, once capabilities are manufactured, similarities at the subsystem level also facilitate maintenance and replacement processes.

On the flipside, consolidation might negatively impact production increases in three ways. As demand for military capabilities rises, conditions in turn emerge for the offer to grow. However, the size of enterprises born out of M&As, coupled with the significant entry barriers of the defence industry, make it extremely hard for new companies to enter the market as prime contractors and contribute to deliver the final products that European states request. This corroborates the argument that a strong economic rationale for consolidation only emerges as the demand shrinks.

The second negative impact of consolidation in this regard involves the potential impasses at the political and industrial level caused by this restructuring process. Crucially, such impasses might slow down attempts to increase production in a strongly consolidated European industry. Even assuming that companies have both the financial power and economic rationale to expand production, long and complex bargaining might prevent trans-national companies from addressing a burgeoning demand in a timely manner. Conversely, a higher number of companies in a less consolidated industry might not endure such impasses, or at least to a lower extent, and thus promptly react to a growing demand.

The third way in which consolidation might negatively impact production boost relates to job cuts. A crucial risk of consolidation comes with the loss of valuable technical expertise and know-how, which characterise the generally highly-skilled workforce operating in the defence industry. A highly consolidated industry at the European level could struggle in meeting an increasing demand for military capability due to the time and costs associated with re-integrating highly-skilled workers or training new ones.

On the other hand, arms production has historically followed national lines and the fragmentation of the European defence industry is ill-suited to current strategic imperatives and economic necessities. Consolidation can potentially play a key role in this regard in two fundamental ways. First and foremost, consolidation crucially reduces the number of suppliers in the sector and the number of programmes developed, thereby leading companies to manufacture a narrower array of models. Providing states with common or similar capabilities is the most direct and effective way for the industry to contribute to reducing fragmentation at the European level.

Tackling fragmentation concerns the industry as supplier and governments as customers. Even though companies can produce a lower number of models, it is still up to states to decide whether purchasing European capabilities or turning instead to off-the-shelf, non-EU procurement. Nevertheless, by placing contractors in the position to deliver more advanced and sophisticated products, consolidation makes European companies better positioned to face global competition. As a result, it could increase European governments’ inclination to opt for capabilities developed and produced by European companies. Ultimately, consolidation could incentivize customers themselves to reduce fragmentation, particularly those without a defence industrial base capable of delivering high-end capabilities.

The main risk for consolidation to hamper efforts aimed to limit fragmentation is again related to potential impasses. Delays in production resulting from the political and industrial impasses discussed in the former section could push European states to turn to off-the-shelf, non-European procurement, particularly when it comes to filling urgent capability needs. For their part, governments failing to agree on the requirements that joint capabilities should meet might result in the development of multiple unique national variations. While states would operate systems and platforms that feature similarities and synergies at different levels, the level of fragmentation of the European defence landscape would not change in a fundamental way.

6. Conclusion - How Does Consolidation Fit in the Current Landscape?

As the title suggests, this section directly tackles the research question and draws some conclusion on how a further consolidation of the European defence industry may fit in the current landscape. Concerning the challenge of ramping up arms production, consolidation can effectively establish larger contractors that are more capable to scale up production when the necessity arises, as well as create synergies at different levels that streamline supply chains. Conversely, consolidation risks closing the market to new enterprises that may potentially contribute to meet the increasing demand, while also preventing existing companies from promptly addressing the growing demand due to impasses and the loss of technical know-how. When it comes to reducing fragmentation, consolidation perhaps constitutes the most effective way to provide European governments with a lower number of more competitive and advanced models. However, risks might stem from political and industrial impasses, pushing European countries to procure off-the-shelf, non European capabilities.

Some conclusions can be drawn. In economic terms, consolidation entails both positive and negative implications on the necessity to ramp up production. It leads to the establishment of larger and stronger contractors, but it also entails a reduction in their overall number. There is no solid evidence of whether a production boost can be best driven by a lower number of larger companies or a higher number of smaller ones. However, what can be said is that consolidation affects competition only indirectly. What truly limits competition in the defence markets is government involvement and entry barriers. If large industrial players established through consolidation struggle to keep up with an increasing demand for military capabilities, space arises for other enterprises to enter the market as prime contractors and deliver them, notwithstanding the factors that hinder new players to do so.

It is also necessary to discuss the potential loss of valuable expertise and know-how associated with consolidation. What the post-Cold War experience can teach us is that defence industrial consolidation generally addresses a shrinking demand and, hence, results in companies reducing their cumulative workforce (Schmitt, 2000). The general conclusion that can be drawn is that when the industry consolidates before the demand increases, re-integrating skilled workforce and training new labour can be extremely costly and require much time. However, if the industry consolidates as demand is progressively increasing, organisational restructuring could not necessarily result in layoffs. Rather, faced with a need to ramp up production, new enterprises born out of M&As would likely rationalise the manufacturing process while expanding production levels overall and, possibly, increasing their workforce even further. Crucially, in the current scenario consolidation might not lead to downsizing.

When it comes to the challenge of reducing fragmentation, then, there is clear evidence to argue that consolidation constitutes an effective strategy. It drives contractors to provide more standardised capabilities and increasing synergies at every level. At the same time, it enables companies to develop a higher number of more competitive, advanced and sophisticated capabilities, without increasing investment levels. Ultimately, consolidating the European defence industry and establishing transnational companies would drive countries involved to operate joint capabilities to a higher extent. At the same time, a more efficient production that delivers more advanced and competitive products can realistically play a crucial role in pushing smaller EU Member States without a relevant defence industrial base to pick European capabilities over non-European ones.

However, failure or success of consolidation to meet the challenges that the industry is facing also largely depend on political factors. Even though their involvement in the defence industry has decreased to some extent, governments play a crucial role as they act as customers, investors and regulators at the same time (Baronio, 2024). In fact, the very possibility that the industry is going to consolidate further at the European level largely depends on political decision-makers (Baronio, 2024). In the discussion on how consolidation might impact current challenges, political factors play two major roles. On the one hand, the extent to which consolidation processes may establish European defence giants that are effectively capable of contributing to boost production in a meaningful and prompt way depends on both the success and pace of bargaining at the political level. Impasses in this sense might crucially lead consolidation to fall short of the urgent need to expand production.

On the other hand, political actors play a possibly even larger role when it comes to addressing fragmentation. Even though consolidation might put companies in the best position to increase system standardisation and advance synergies, the EU features twenty-seven different customers that ultimately decide what capabilities procuring. As much as they can opt for those developed by an increasingly consolidated European industry, they might instead turn to off-the-shelf, non-European procurement. Even when picking the first option, governments might still pressure companies to develop unique national variations that similarly undermine attempts aimed to reduce fragmentation. Nevertheless, Kluth (2017) finds that a more consolidated European defence industry has effectively reduced the inclination of the largest European states to procure domestic capabilities vis-a-vis those jointly developed. This provides evidence to argue that industrial efforts aimed at reducing fragmentation can effectively impact defence procurement decisions made by governments.

In conclusion, it is difficult to argue that consolidation has a clearly positive or negative impact on the challenge of ramping up production, as benefits and risks tend to balance each other. Recalling the research question, consolidation does not particularly fit in the current industrial landscape in relation to this first challenge, but it is equally unlikely to lead to significant drawbacks. Instead, it can be argued that consolidation fits perfectly in the current industrial landscape when it comes to reducing fragmentation. While addressing this issue primarily involves decision-makers, an industry that features a lower number of more integrated contractors effectively has the potential to improve system standardisation and provide national armed forces with increasingly joint capabilities. Ultimately, much is left to the political sphere to determine how and to what extent consolidation will impact each challenge.

These conclusions are not surprising. Fragmentation constitutes a long-term challenge for the European defence landscape, and this explains why increasing consolidation has been long advocated. Conversely, the need to ramp up production has emerged more recently, and the scenario of surging demand that we are currently facing fundamentally counters the premises of consolidation. Therefore, while this industrial strategy does not bear significant risks for the challenge to increase production, it is not particularly fit to address the issue either.


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