How the War in Ukraine threatens Austria’s Historical Neutrality

Abstract

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, not only has the European Union sharply condemned the invasion imposing sanctions against Russia, but it has also sold weapons to Ukraine. Although it might appear that all Member States share the same view on the matter, Austria represents an interesting case in the EU, being one of the few members of the Union, together with Sweden, to not be a NATO member. Unlike Sweden, Austria has never applied for NATO membership, as the Republic of the Alps wanted, and still desires, to be a neutral country (Özkan, 2023). This article aims to analyse the bilateral relations between Austria and Russia, taking into account the many other actors involved, such as the EU and NATO, to evaluate how Austria’s neutrality has changed over the past 50 years. After introducing the history of the international relations between Austria and Russia in contemporary history, the article will focus on how the relations between the two countries have changed since Austria has joined the European Union. Finally, the neutrality of Austria will be analysed, considering its political and economic stance towards Russia.

Author- Gabriele Silini, Junior Researcher - Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Politics

Historical Background

The history of Austrian neutrality began in 1955, when Austria became independent after the ten-year occupation of the Allies. However, Austria’s path to independence was far from being smooth, as the alliance between France, UK, US and Soviet Union was already weak during the Cold War and the four countries had different views regarding Austria’s independence. Western Countries wanted Austria to join NATO, while the Soviet Union wanted to have an ally in the Western side of the iron curtain. It is for this reason that the Soviet Union imposed as a condition for Austria’s independence its neutrality to avoid it joining NATO (Kunz, 1956). It must be noted that the first drafts of the agreement between the allies does not mention anything regarding a neutral country, this was a later imposition from the Soviet Union. During the debate between the Allies and Austria at the Berlin Conference in 1954 no agreement could be reached. Thus, the Soviet Union organised a negotiation in Moscow between Vienna and Moscow the following year, reaching an agreement in the so-called Moscow Memorandum.

On 26th October 1955, Austria adopted the status of permanent neutrality, remaining completely neutral throughout the Cold War. Austrian neutrality is based on military and security matters, which prevents the country from joining any military organisation or any foreign war. Moreover, Austria cannot allow any other state to establish any military bases on its soil (Skrabacz, 2022). However, Austria’s neutrality is also defined as a neutrality defended “with all means available” as stated in the declaration of neutrality, meaning that it is indeed an armed neutrality, as stated in the first two paragraphs of Article 1 of the Declaration of Neutrality:

« 1. For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of its external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of its territory Austria, of its own free will, declares herewith its permanent neutrality. Austria will maintain and defend it with all means at its disposal.

2. In order to secure these purposes Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign states on its territory»(Republik Österreich, 1955).

This policy of neutrality has, nevertheless, helped Austria in becoming an important pole for negotiations, being chosen by the UN as the third location for its headquarters, as well as a connection between East and West with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has its secretariat in the heart of Vienna. It must also be stressed that Austria’s permanent neutrality on its own could not make Austria a neutral country at the international level, as it was a self-declared neutrality. If this had been the case, a self-declared neutrality could be retrieved at any moment. For this reason, the Memorandum with Moscow was and still is a fundamental part, as Moscow internationally recognised Austria as a neutral country, thus binding Austria to perpetuate neutrality (Kunz, 1956).

The Bilateral Relations between Austria and Russia

Because of its peculiar situation, Austria successfully represented a link between East and West during the Cold War period, not aligning with any of the two counterparts, while keeping close connections with both. However, things changed in the post-Cold War period, when Austria in 1995 became, together with Sweden and Finland, other famous neutral countries in Europe, a member of the EU. However, it must be noted that, unlike NATO, the EU is not a security organisation. Nonetheless, Austria’s membership in the EU does imply that the country has to align with European Countries as a member of the EU. Moreover, the EU in the last 20 years has reshaped its identity, starting from an organisation dealing only with economic issues to a multifaceted organisation ranging from immigration to defence matters. It has been noted that the Ever-closer Union has, thus, allegedly pushed Austria far away from its original neutral status, although it still officially remains a neutral country. The Russian invasion of Ukraine showed a united European Union, with Austria denouncing the actions of Russia and imposing sanctions on the Kremlin, creating a deep change in Austrian-Russian relations.

Although the relations between Russia and the EU are extremely ambivalent, with a high rate of distrust between the two parties, the relations between Austria and Russia have always been an exception in the EU panorama. The EU and Russia deem each other as fundamental trade partners; however, the EU defines Russia unstable and unpredictable, while Russia perceives the EU as a rival that is implementing an expansion policy towards the Eastern parts of the European continent, especially with the enlargement of NATO (Skrabacz, 2022).

NATO is currently widening its borders, with the entrance of Finland and the formal request from Sweden, as well as the closer relations between Ukraine and NATO in the last years. The Russian invasion represents the main reason for this NATO enlargement, as demonstrated by polls conducted in Sweden, Finland and Austria. In the first two countries, polls showed that in 2017 only 20% in Finland and 32% in Sweden were in favour of joining NATO, while in June 2022 the polls demonstrated that respectively 75% and 60% of the population wanted their country to be no longer neutral and join NATO (Schwarz, 2022). On the contrary, in Austria still nowadays neutrality is preferred, with only 16% of the population willing to join NATO.

Despite Austria’s perpetuated neutrality, the Alpine Republic as a member of the EU had to change its stance after the Ukrainian invasion towards Russia, even though Austria still has a militarily neutral position. The Austrian Government repeatedly stated the full commitment to the sanctions imposed together with the EU, which ultimately affected its relationship with Russia. Since the EU had introduced sanctions against Russia, the bilateral relations between Austria and Russia have been as cold as never before in contemporary history. It is for this reason that the Austrian Government, willing to show its neutrality to the world, granted visas to Russian politicians to enter Austria for the OSCE Conference held on 23 and 24 February 2023. Despite many complaints from other OSCE members, as well as other Austrian parties, the government justified this decision with its neutrality, stating that the OSCE conference is a unique occasion to have dialogue with Russia. The EU has also commented on the Austrian invitation of the Russian delegation, stating that the Austrian position might undermine the efficiency of the sanctions the Union imposed, as well as affecting its international credibility (European Parliament, 2023). Nonetheless, the Austrian Government aimed to become once again in contemporary history the connection between East and West.

Before the invasion of Ukraine, however, the relations between Austria and Russia were extremely close; not only on the political level, with many meetings between Austrian and Russian politicians from 2015 to 2022, but also on the economical level, with more than 1200 Austrian companies operating closely with Russia. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Austria was forced to change its stance towards Russia. An example of this change in stance can be analysed in the behaviour of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). Although the Austrian Government supports the sanctions imposed by the EU to Russia, the FPÖ, a traditional Eurosceptic party that has always relied on Russian approval, supported Russia even after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, keeping close contacts with the Kremlin and praising its aversion towards Brussels and the EU. However, since Russia invaded Ukraine, the FPÖ has been silent on the matter, reframing the narrative of the conflict. The party, in fact, supports Austria’s neutrality, stating that the sanctions imposed by the EU damage the Austrian economy (Heinisch and Hofmann, 2023). The war in Ukraine not only produced a change in behaviour within the political sphere, but also on the social level, as Austria is currently debating whether it should remain a neutral country or join NATO. Between 2022 and 2023, in fact, Austria has long debated regarding its neutrality. Nonetheless, the population in Austria still interprets neutrality as the assurance that no country would ever engage in a war with Austria. Many defence experts such as Gustav Gressel, who works for the European Council on Foreign Relations, stated that Austria has lived in a “bubble” for decades (Jones, 2023).

As noted by Gressel, Austria is officially an armed neutral country; however, its army is weak and Europe has many suspects regarding Austrian intelligence agencies, as they might be influenced by Russian foreign policy and spy agencies. It must be stressed that Austria confines with NATO members on all sides; thus, it is unlikely that there would be an invasion such as the Ukrainian one by Russia. It has in fact been noticed that Austria mainly relies on NATO for defence, even without being a formal member. Unlike Switzerland, the Austrian army is highly unprepared in case of war, as neutrality has always been taken into account when cutting investments in military expenses for the modernisation of the army. Despite the neutrality of Austria, the country has failed to assume the role of mediator between Russia and the EU during the war in Ukraine, a role that has been taken by Turkey. Austria, thus, has now a different neutral position than the one it had during the Cold War period, as back then it was the main mediator between the two sides of the Iron Curtain thanks to the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna.

Conclusion

As already stressed, Austria has officially aligned with the EU fully supporting the sanctions imposed on Russia. The country as of today does not recognise the illegal referendum between 23rd and 27th September 2022 which took place in the regions of Kherson, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya and Donetsk, and neither the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.

On the other hand, many Austrian politicians, not only within the already analysed case of the FPÖ, recognise the important boundaries between Austria and Russia, criticising the sanctions imposed by the EU as detrimental. As analysed, Austria has more than 1200 companies operating in Russia, while being extremely dependent on the energy industry (O’Donnell and Schwarz-Goerlich, 2023). Despite Austrian criticism towards the Kremlin, Austrian commercial ties with Russia remain strong, unlike other countries, such as Germany, which does not receive gas from Russia anymore. As such, the EU perceives Austria as a threat to stability within the European Union, with a potential spill-over effect of tolerance in the Eastern side of Europe towards Russian behaviour (Karnitschnig, 2023).

In conclusion, Austria has an ambivalent stance when it comes to Russia, proving that, unlike in the Cold War period, Austria’s neutrality since its admission in the EU has slightly changed, mainly because of European policies. On the one hand, Austria fully supports the sanctions the EU has imposed on Russia, while on the other hand it keeps its commercial ties with Russia and still aims at presenting itself as a connection between East and West. Austria is still a neutral country and its neutral status is highly unlikely to change in the next few years, although the Russian invasion of Ukraine created a debate within Austria about its neutrality.

Classification of sources and information:

References

European Parliament (2023) Austrian decision to invite Russian delegates to an OSCE meeting – legal consequences and reputational risks, P-000472/2023. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2023-000472_EN.html (Accessed: 23 July 2023). (A-1)

Heinisch, R. and Hofmann, D. (2023) ‘The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe’ Available at: https://www.populismstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/DOWNLOAD-ECPS-REPORT.pdf. (B-2)

Jones, S. (2023) ‘“Austrian neutrality is peace policy in action”: Vienna’s stance leaves it isolated’, Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/a9b95774-52fc-4bba-b7a2-0e9c69b32005 (Accessed: 23 July 2023). (A-2)

Karnitschnig, M. (2023) ‘How Austria became Putin’s Alpine Fortress’, Politico. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/austria-russia-vladimir-putin-alpine-fortress-ukraine/ (Accessed: 23 July 2023). (B-2)

Kunz, J. L. (1956) ‘Austria’s Permanent Neutrality’, American Journal of International Law, 50(2), pp. 418–425. doi: 10.2307/2194959. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/i312090. (B-1)

O’Donnell, J. and Schwarz-Goerlich, A. (2023) ‘Austrian minister says Russia will remain important for Europe’, Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/austrian-minister-says-russia-will-remain-important-europe-2023-03-22/ (Accessed: 23 July 2023). (B-2)

Özkan, C. E. (2023) The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Austria’s Foreign Policy — ANKASAM | Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies. Available at: https://www.ankasam.org/the-impact-of-the-russia-ukraine-war-on-austrias-foreign-policy/?lang=en (Accessed: 23 July 2023). (B-1)

Republik Österreich (1955) Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich. Available at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1955_211_0/1955_211_0.pdf (Accessed: 23 July 2023). (A-1)

Schwarz, K.-P. (2022) ‘Austrian neutrality after the invasion of Ukraine’, GIS. Available at: https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/austria-neutrality/ (Accessed: 23 July 2023). (B-2)

Skrabacz, A. (2022) ‘The impact of the war in Ukraine on changing Russia-Austria relations.’, Przegląd Nauk o Obronności, 2021(12), pp. 50–65. doi: 10.37055/PNO/149970. Available at: http://www.defencesciencereview.com.pl/pdf-149970-76298?filename=The%20impact%20of%20the%20war%20in.pdf. (B-1)