Abstract
With the re-ignition of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, relations between India and the State of Israel seem to have reached their zenith. Due to their shared experiences with internal violence, as well as their fear of jihadist terrorism, the two countries, over the past three decades, have established a solid and fruitful relationship in the fields of defence and intelligence, recently expanded to include technological research, trade and infrastructure. This has made Tel Aviv an essential part of a larger Indian project of economic integration within the West, and an advocate for India's wider involvement in Middle Eastern dynamics.
Author
Michele Gioculano - Head Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Introduction
The October 7th Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, the unprecedented attack perpetrated by the terrorist group Hamas against Israel and the ensuing reawakening of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict confirmed, once again, the intrinsic instability and changing dynamics of the Middle East. A region that is very challenging to understand, and even more difficult to manage. It is the cradle of the most ancient civilisations and eternal bone of contention, a battleground that seems to devour everything and everyone, without yielding any results, and from which all the Great Powers, after having committed themselves to it, seem destined to withdraw. In other words, a strategic geographic area with an uncertain future, where any attempt to establish order, the latest of which the “Biden Plan” to normalise relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, seems destined to clash with the historical rivalries and the complex networks of relations, discouraging any further intervention in the region. Over the years, this has contributed to creating a power vacuum in which unexpected and apparently distant actors, such as India, tend to make their way.
In times of war, indeed, the Indian government is not in the habit of siding with belligerentsAs demonstrated by the pragmatic response following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in which case, wishing to preserve relations with Russia, an essential ally against Chinese expansionism, New Delhi merely invited the parties to dialogue and to abide by international law. While reaffirming the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, fearing an excessive rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing, India has maintained an equidistant position. All the while, knowing not to risk going against the United States, which are too eager to establish an even closer alliance with the Subcontinent to be willing to make accusations of ambiguity. In this sense, it is possible to say that the concepts of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment represent a pillar of the Indian diplomatic tradition.
However, following the October 7th attacks, Indian Prime Minister, Nerendra Modi, strongly condemned the “terrorist attack” (Modi, 2023) suffered by the State of Israel, openly siding with his counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu. An uncommon and only apparently surprising stance, behind which stands a well-established relationship of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. A belatedly blossomed 'special relationship', which has yielded excellent results in recent years and seems destined to grow further, both in the context of India's economic development projects, and in the general reorganisation of diplomatic relations and the balance of power in the Middle East. Founded on a vital security and intelligence partnership, the Indo-Israeli axis shares, now more than ever, strategic objectives and systemic adversaries, as well as the fundamental desire to stabilise the region.
Genesis of a troubled relationship
The Republic of India and the State of Israel have not always had such flourishing relations as they do today. Until the 1990s, in fact, Indo-Israeli contacts were, due to various factors, unorthodox and highly volatile. Although many leaders of the Hindu nationalism, including Damodar Savarkar, sympathised with the Zionist cause, and Mahatma Gandhi himself supported the right of Jews to build their own homeland, in 1947, New Delhi continually voted against the partition plan for Palestine proposed by the United Nations. As a result, India did not recognise the Israeli government, and it opposed its admission the United Nations. The roots of these positions can be attributed to several reasons, both on the domestic front and the international one. For what regards the former, many Indian politicians feared that normalising relations with Israel would increase sectarianism and internal divisions within the Subcontinent, thus alienating the sympathy and support of the Muslim population. On the latter, the Indian government felt that such a step could jeopardise relations with Arab countries, especially the Gulf Monarchies, essential suppliers of the country’s energy resources and responsible for the remittances of hundreds of thousands of Indian emigrants who had settled there. Although the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, recognised the legitimacy of the State of Israel in 1950, and, in 1953, allowed the establishment of an Israeli consulate in Bombay, relations between the two countries remained informal in nature. Despite the de facto recognition, no embassy was opened in the respective capitals and no official act followed in the next forty years. Moreover, the proximity to the Soviet Union, the pro-Palestinian positions of the Non-Aligned Countries Movement - of which India was a promoter - and the desire to counter Pakistan's influence in the Muslim world, contributed to non-regularisation of the relationship with Israel.
Only in 1992, after decades of informal relations and pro-Arab policy, did India officially recognise Israel and set up a diplomatic legation in Tel Aviv. Various aspects contributed to this change of position: in addition to the profound change in the international situation following the end of the Cold War, New Delhi's exclusion from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation was seen as a sign of disregard for India's many millions of Muslims and as the failure of years of support for the Islamic world. Since then, despite the support of the National Congress and other Indian left-wing parties for the Palestinian cause, and some formal Indian condemnations of operations undertaken by Israel on Gaza, relations between the two countries have steadily grown and improved.
Common concerns favour common responses
The oldest and most solid field of understanding between the two countries is defence. Although informal relations have existed between the armed forces of the two countries since when General Moshe Dayan was Chief of Staff and, later, Israeli Defence Minister, cooperation in the field of military supplies only reached considerable proportions after the establishment of diplomatic relations. In fact, starting in the 1990s, India found in the Israeli defence industry a valuable source of technologically advanced weaponry, capable of providing for the modernisation of its armed forces. Currently, India is the world's largest buyer of Israeli armaments, makingIsrael the second largest supplier of weapons and military equipment after Russia. Specifically, Tel Aviv hassold remotely piloted aircrafts, anti-tank, surface-to-air, air-to-air, and anti-ship missiles, rocket launchers, and sophisticated radar equipment. All supplies intended to gradually replace old Soviet and American consignments, which have now become obsolete.
These fruitful economic relations have fostered an ever-closer cooperation of the two countries on a military and strategic level, resulting in mutual technical, logistical, and strategic assistance, to the point where it can be said that a large part of the most modern components of the Indian military apparatus are the work of the Israeli defence industry and military assistance. On several occasions, Israeli trainers, military advisers, and agents have carried out joint exercises, or shared information with units of the Indian armed forces. Similarly, naval units of both navies have participated in joint manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean, and Israeli special units have intervened in support of Indian colleagues in various instances, such as following the Bombay bombings in 2008. In this regard, it should not be forgotten that the rise of jihadist terrorism and the fear of Jihadist attacks has undoubtedly fostered greater symbiosis between the security forces and intelligence services of the two countries.
Obviously, the development and consolidation of such an important cooperation between India and Israel is not unrelated to the geo-strategic context in which the two countries insist. Firstly, India and the Jewish State share a condition of internal instability in relation to certain regions, which are secessionist or claimed by other parties, namely: Kashmir for the former and the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the latter. All of them are problematic territories, and perennial sources of concern for their respective governments, which have not failed to theories analogies and similarities, sometimes very unlikely. Secondly, both New Delhi and Tel Aviv, see in the Islamic Republic of Iran their biggest adversary in the Middle East. On the one hand, the Ayatollahs' Regime has never disavowed its aim of wiping Israel off the map and continues to actively support Hamas, and other Palestinian terrorist organisations devoted to that end. On the other hand, Tehran continues to cultivate good relations with Pakistan, India's historical rival, and to support the most extremist and fundamentalist parties, proponents of an interventionist policy with respect to the claimed territories. In other words, in deference to the old saying that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend', Tehran has acted as a glue between India and Israel, which are united by continuous internal turmoil, sponsored by the same power.
Israel as a hinge between East and West
Another crucial point in India's geopolitical strategy is represented by the creation of solid communication routes, both on land and sea, the result of a never-dormant desire to secure good connections with the West. An ambition repeatedly opposed by neighbouring Pakistan, which has always been reluctant to grant New Delhi land access to the Middle East. A reticence dictated not only by the historical rivalry between the two powers but also by the fear, not entirely unfounded, that the strengthening of ties between India and the Arab countries would end up by crushing Islamabad in a lethal vice. At first, New Delhi tried to circumvent the obstacle by turning to Iran, in the hope of being able to make use of the ports of Chabahar and Abadan to connect both to the Mediterranean and, via Afghanistan, to Central Asia and Russia. However, the ups and downs and geopolitical instabilities that have affected the area in recent years have, inevitably, caused the agreement with Tehran to stall and India's attention to turn towards the Persian Gulf countries.
On September 10th 2023, during the G20 meeting held in New Delhi, the United States, the European Union, Germany, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates signed a memorandum of understanding for the creation of an economic corridor connecting the Indian Subcontinent to Europe, via the Middle East. To date, the State of Israel represents a key piece of the so-called “Indian-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor”. An ambitious project, which envisages the construction or expansion of roads, rails, ports, and energy and telecommunications infrastructures to increase economic integration between Asia and the Old Continent. Although it is not yet among the signatories of the protocol, it is likely that Tel Aviv will, sooner or later, be heavily involved in the operation, with the aim of making it an integral part of the international network that will be created. After all, it is unlikely that the planned trans-Arab railway lines, which should start from the United Arab Emirates and cross the Saudi desert, will stop in Jordan, giving up on creating a connection to the Mediterranean through Israel. Similarly, it is difficult to believe that the increase in merchant traffic between the port of Bombay and the European ports of Valencia, Barcelona, Marseille, Genoa, Gioia Tauro, Trieste and Piraeus, via Dubai, Jeddah and Port Said, will end up excluding important Israeli ports such as Haifa and Eilat. Ultimately, without the Israeli contribution, the project would remain incomplete and would end up losing much of its inspiration. So the involvement of one of the richest and most developed country in the entire region, is an inescapable element for the Indian government. Tel Aviv's strategic position, together with its high degree of reliability, despite the contingent turmoil, are such fundamental guarantees for the outcome of the project, as to make Israel the perfect junction between East and West.
According to the opinion of numerous analysts, the Indian-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor would be India's answer to the Belt and Road Initiative, the pharaonic strategic plan aimed at improving Chinese economic relations and trade links, and ultimately, extending the People's Republic's political influence over Eurasia. However, despite the apparent similarities, it should be noted that the project drawn up by New Delhi is far less ambitious than that of Beijing, more focused on an effective growth in communications and trade between the Subcontinent and Europe, an hendiadys only marginally conducive to expansionist ambitions and power politics. These characteristics, perceived as more convenient for potential partners, combined with the involvement of leading regional actors, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, forecast better chances of success for the Indian Corridor than the Chinese Belt and Road. In fact, it should not be forgotten that the latter has lost all its attractiveness in the space of a decade, having contributed little and badly to the development of the countries involved, many of which have sunk into the debt trap or withdrawn, as, for example, Italy has recently done. Moreover, in view of the considerable costs incurred, it does not seem, to date, to have assured Beijing an effective extension of its influence. On the contrary, it seems to have increased mistrust and resentment towards the hegemonic plans of the People's Republic, to the point of slowly falling into oblivion, not even finding mention in the official documents of the Communist Party Congress that reappointed President Xi Jinping to office last year.
A change of strategy that promote coalitions of friends but also of enemies
In the light of what has been observed above, the relationship between the two countries can be seen as part of a general change in India's strategy, a rearrangement of its geopolitical horizons, and objectives, from the late 1990s. The progressive and, apparently, inexorable deterioration of relations between the United States and Pakistan - once a faithful ally of the Western bloc - has led New Delhi to loosen its close ties with Russia, inaugurating a season of renewed friendship with Washington in the last two decades. Consequently, this has led the Indian government to reconsider relations with other Middle Eastern actors, traditionally linked to the United States, such as Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and, indeed, Tel Aviv. The joint communiqué by India, Israel, the UAE and the US in July 2022, soon to be renamed I2U2, concerning core issues such as food, water, energy and transport, is one of the major demonstrations of this renewed interest in the Middle East and in the Gulf Monarchies, traditionally kept on the sidelines by Indian diplomacy. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, since 2017, New Delhi has been a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as QUAD, an informal strategic alliance, promoted by Washington, to contain Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific quadrant. Finally, the abstention during the vote on the United Nations General Assembly resolution for a cease-fire in Gaza, containing no explicit condemnation of Hamas's brutal attacks, plastically represents a break with India's traditional pro-Palestinian stance, and the transition to a position clearly closer to that of Israel and, more generally, of the West. These changes, which have taken place in recent years, seem to signal the birth of a new bloc that brings together US's allies from Suez to the Indian Ocean.
However, the possible compacting of very distant actors around Washington might realistically lead to a similar process in the opposing camp. In addition to Iran - a historically hostile Power to all players in this new regional axis, from the United States to Israel and Saudi Arabia - one of the biggest obstacles is certainly Turkey. Shortly after the signing of the memorandum of understanding for the Economic Corridor, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan commented: “There is no Corridor without Turkey” (Erdogan, 2023). With the intention of increasing Turkey's specific weight on the international scene, in line with the theories of neo-Ottomanism, Erdoğan can aspire to relaunch the shortest and most 'natural' route between India and Europe; the one that, once crossed the Persian Gulf, leads from Basra to Istanbul, crossing Mesopotamia and Anatolia. In other words, he would aim to re-propose the historical route of the Berlin-Baghdad railway, a former German project of penetration into the East, that troubled the British Empire at the beginning of the 20th century. A particularly tempting prospect, given the shorter journey times and the existence of a railway line already in place, but made unfeasible by the serious instability of the area, with Iraq and Syria currently having little to no effective control over their territory. Moreover, the high degree of Turkish influence over the regions affected by the route, would give Erdogan the power to disrupt the major trade route between the Subcontinent and Europe at his discretion, conferring him blackmail power over vastly superior powers. The major "revisionist" actors in the area would probably take place alongside Ankara and Teheran. First of all, Qatar, solid ally of Turkey, bitter enemy of Israel and main supporter of Hamas and many other extremist and fundamentalist organisations followed then by Pakistan, in need of allies in its eternal struggle against New Delhi.
Conclusions
In conclusion, it can be said that the development of relations between India and Israel has undoubtedly marked a change in the diplomatic approach of New Delhi, for years close to the Arab and Islamic world and, now, squeezed between Chinese power and Iranian hubris, eager to chart an autonomous and fruitful course as a Power as well. Indeed, in deference to their respective foreign policy doctrines, founded more on national interest than on fixed ideological blocs, the relationship between the Subcontinent and the Jewish state has consolidated to the point of being able to project its effects regionally. Certainly, the similarity between certain specific conditions of the two countries, combined with a fruitful cooperation in the field of defence and a certain fascination of the right-wing parties currently in power with so-called “ethnonationalism”, whether Hindu or Jewish, have been the driving force behind this “special relationship”.
One of the most interesting aspects of the unusual harmony and cooperation that has arisen between New Delhi and Tel Aviv and, more generally, of the renewed spirit with which India looks at the Middle East, is the fact that, despite its originality, it is perfectly in line with the national and systemic trends of the region. In a sort of heterogenesis of intents, which is very rare in international politics, the Indian Economic Corridor appears fully consistent with the objectives of all the actors involved and seems destined to favour the stabilisation of the area, which certainly increases its chances of success. Obviously, this does not mean that there was no consultation with the American State Department, only that the general framework of the project fits perfectly into the local dynamics. It also represents a further way of advancing the process of normalising relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, long advocated by the United States and then stalled, just a step away from the finishing line, due to the reignition of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, despite the blatant support given by Riyadh to its Palestinian brothers, the major chancelleries believe that the Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, is not willing to let the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv founder, with a view to building an anti-fundamentalist front linked to the West. A front which, at this point, could also include India, extending from the Middle East to the Subcontinent, allowing all of Washington's major allies to fill the vacuum left by the progressive US withdrawal from the quadrant and to erect a system of containment, both of Iranian expansionism and Turkish enterprise.
Of course, the future of the Indo-Israeli relationship and the fate of New Delhi's plans for the Middle East cannot be predicted with certainty. Nevertheless, it seems that India has made up its mind listening to Nehru's thought that “the policy of being too cautious is the greatest risk of all” (Nehru, 1946) and has, in the end, decided, with the clear proximity accorded to Israel, to take a more defined and incisive diplomatic path in its region of influence and, potentially, beyond.
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