Is Europe's strategy to use its own deposits of natural gas resources effective towards its energy independence?

  Focus - Allegati
  11 marzo 2022
  17 minuti, 54 secondi

Abstract:

Energy dependence has been a dominant topic in the European Union political environment. With the emergence of the Russian threat, the EU has been motivated in distancing their own energy resources into a more sustainable domestic strategy. With the United States as an example of how certain countries are unable to be sustained from their own domestic product, the question of “Is Europe's strategy to use its own deposits of natural gas resources effective towards its energy independence?” is arguably unanswered, or has negative implications towards the environmental sector.

Theoretical Discussion:

Energy has profoundly influenced the European integration process from the very beginning. Just consider that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the EURATOM provided the historic foundation for this process. Yet, in the years that followed, Member States remained reluctant to develop a common energy policy. This was mainly because national governments were unwilling to cede their sovereignty over such a pivotal sector (Tekin & Williams, 2011). Member States have rarely taken the initiative to promote cooperation in the energy sector to take advantage of national preferences, thus allowing the unpredictability of events to dictate the rules of the game. In fact, most of the revisions implemented in the EU Energy Policy were more a reaction to the geopolitical instability originating from producing countries, as this condition was regarded as a threat to the Union’s security of supply.

At the time writing, the European Union is experiencing one of the toughest energy crises in its history. As the world seems to be recovering from the health crisis that shook the entire globe for two years, new threats are undermining Europe's ability to develop and implement strategies to mitigate and adapt to the new critical challenge of the 21st century: the climate crisis. Indeed, when it comes to finding a mechanism for overcoming the socio-economic consequences of the pandemic, rising geopolitical tension proves to be a serious key obstacle.

Many international policy analysts are considering Vladimir Putin's plan to invade Ukraine to be almost a gambit to re-establish more complex balances, namely the architecture of European Security. Certainly, the crisis between Russia and Ukraine has brought Europe to a crossroad and is putting tremendous pressure on its Member States to find a solution to the complex dilemma of how to balance the energy transition's ambitious commitments in the long run with the need to strengthen their energy security in the short and medium term.

Considering the increasing global tensions, it is almost natural to wonder whether the European’s strategy to label natural gas as green energy could be regarded as an effective strategy to enhance its energy security or rather if it is a mistake and thus a huge setback that would endanger all the progress made towards the energy transition.

On 2 February 2022, after months of strong political and economic pressure, the European Commission approved the Complementary Climate Delegated Act, an amendment allowing under strict conditions the inclusion of natural gas and nuclear energy within the EU taxonomy (European Commision, 2022). This decision sparked a great debate and raised a strong wave of criticism against the Commission, accused of being responsible for the same greenwashing it was against in the taxonomy. Despite the contrary opinion and the concerns expressed by the Platform on Sustainable Finance (PSF), the expert committee which was required to give an opinion on the amendment, what is surprising is precisely the EU Commission’s determination to continue unabated on this path (Platform on Sustainable Finance,2022). After all, the amendment would have been translated into legitimate investments in energy resources anything but green and sustainable. To put it in the words of Andreas Hopner, Professor at the University College of Dublin, part of the expert group that advised the European Union on the taxonomy, it is as if we suddenly considered “French fries like salad” (Rauhala, 2022).

In an interview published by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (2022), Mauro Petriccione, Director General for the DG Climate Action, the direction of the European Commission responsible to formulate climate policies and strategies, tried to justify this decision by declaring that “gas has its place in the taxonomy because, in some regions of the EU, it is simply not possible to build renewables quickly enough to replace coal. Hence, gas is only used as a necessary transition fuel before a full switch to renewables by 2035, which is in line with our global position on green finance”.

There is no doubt that the classification of nuclear and gas as green activities could undermine the leadership role of the European Union in the fight against climate change and its credibility when it comes to moving on to the facts and coping with the ambitious targets set to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 (European Commision, n.d.).

Moreover, this strategy could further jeopardize EU energy security since it would increase its dependence on Russia, from which it imports more than 40% of its fossil gas, for meeting the growing energy demand in the post-pandemic phase (Eurostat, 2021). The Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006, the invasion of Crimea in 2014 were all wake-up calls to remind Europeans of their vulnerability to supply disruptions and the urgency of putting issues like energy efficiency, investments in renewables and reliance on liquified natural gas (LNG), at the top of the EU’s political agenda (Renssen,2022).

Nevertheless, following the storm, “the EU was almost myopically focused on issues of climate change and energy efficiency to the extent of neglecting its own supply security” (Tekin & Williams, 2011). Indeed, Europe’s dependency on natural gas has increased from 71,914% in 2014, to 89,63% in 2019 (Eurostat, 2020). This is the umpteenth time that the EU has failed to take advantage of the opportunity to make the investments that would allow an efficient diversification of our energy mix and our energy suppliers to move forward with the energy transition.

Within four months of the Commission’s decision, the European Council and the European Parliament have the possibility to request the withdrawal of the amendment. Perhaps it is time for Europeans to put their national interests aside in order to take the necessary measures to strengthen the resilience of the European energy system (European Council, 2022). The time is ripe for Europeans to be masters of their own destiny and to leave the future of European Energy in the hands of its policy makers, especially since in a few years we will be faced with an enemy with whom we are unlikely to be able to sit down at a negotiating table: climate change!

USA Case Study:

In order to analyze Europe’s strategy on providing themselves with their own energy source towards a path of energy independence, it is relevant to study the United States use of their own deposits of natural gas over time. Until the 1970’s, the United States was able to supply about 90% of its own oil demand, with the rest of the 10% being imported by foreign countries. Throughout the decades, the United States has increased their dependency on imports of foreign oil, with over half of the countries natural gas being imported from the Middle East. To this scholars and the public ask, why?

There are many different explanations as to why, over time, the United States has relied on foreign imports of oil and exported their own oil reserves for revenue. United States oil production has been at record high, signaling economic growth and improving energy security. Simply put: location, quality, and quantity play a role in the factors influencing how the United States produces and exports its own oil supply. Unfortunately, it is against the United States economic interests to procure and consume their own supply of oil and natural gas.

Locale is a major contribution as to why the United States continues to import foreign oil for its population. A majority of North American pipelines are located in the middle mountain ranges and the Gulf Coast of the continent. It would be a taxing and economically detrimental use of funds to deliver transportation methods in-between those areas by train and trucking. Railroad use and trucking are both one of the most expensive forms of transportation of goods across the United States.

Due to the energy renaissance that has occurred in the United States, an obstacle in the factor using their own domestic oil production is the quality of the oil. The United States is abundant in light oil. Due to the viscosity of the oil found in the United States, it does not serve as things like motor fuel, but it can be refined into other products. “Since the U.S. energy renaissance has accelerated, however, most of the 4.8 mb/d of new U.S. oil production the past six years has been light oil. With U.S. refining capacity geared toward a diverse crude oil slate, a key implication for U.S. petroleum trade is that it would be uneconomic to run refineries solely on domestic light crude oil.” (Foreman 2018). Heavy oil, instead of light oil, has more complex molecules in order to turn it into higher quality of a product. This means that the capital and funds needed to do such a thing would exceed the funds needed for its counterpart, light oil. It is cheaper for the United States to import crude oil than acquire the funds needed to turn heavy oil into a different product. This goes the same for light oil. It is cheap to transfer light oil, in conclusion, it is profitable to export their light oil capacity and more expensive to use their heavy oil.

Quantity is also a factor in which the United States does not consume their own natural oil domestically. The United States has seen an unprecedented issue where there was an abundance of use of their oil refinery capacity. Averaging at 90.6% of their capacity, larger than any other refinery. This means that if the United States used their own domestic product of oil and reused to export, there would be an over saturation of the market and cause oil prices to plummet.

The relevance of United States stagnation on oil reliance intertwines with Europe's future discussions on alluding to their own energy dependence due to the precursor of their turmoil with the factors of location, quantity, and quality. Location is a pivotal factor in which is it unreliable for the EU to use their own domestic supply of natural gas and oil. The EU was once a supplier of its own oil sector, but over time, the reserves have shriveled and dwindled. The North Sea reserves dried up and the EU has now been reliant on alternative forms of energy and oil imports, mainly from Russia. The quantity of energy supplied by renewable resources does not make a dent in the energy sector needed for the total populace and institutions ran by the EU.

It is relevant to study further how the factors in which hinder the United States reliance on domestic oil interlude and compare towards the implications of similar factors of the EU and why it is not feasible for them to consume their own domestic oil product.

Russia Case Study:

The EU is one of Russia’s greatest business partners in the energetic sector. Indeed, according to Eurostat data of 2019, Russia is the first gas and oil supplier for Europe, and although some differences can be detected among single EU countries, its pivotal role in the energy industry is undeniable (Turksen, 2018). However, such strong economic relations also mean a great degree of energetic dependence for Europe. Despite the latter’s official goal to increase its energetic independence, the current energetic crisis that is hitting Europe shows the inefficiency of its strategy.

However, this balance is threatened by the EU's Green Deal and its standards set in view of the ecological transition. As a matter of fact, if Russia fails to adapt to Europe’s new rules, it will lose a huge share of its export market, which might explain Putin’s aggressive policy in Ukraine (which became a military intervention on 24 February 2022).

It is worth mentioning that energetic issues were more than once the source of political and institutional crises between the EU and Russia, many of which also involved Ukraine. Indeed, the former Soviet Republic acts as a bridge between the two continents, including in terms of gas supply, and the many disputes on gas, namely between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, inevitably had repercussions on the European market as well. The annexation of Crimea and the political unrest that followed showed all the disruptive potential of such energetic interdependence and its implications on institutional relations between the two regions (Prookip, 2020).

More recently, the energetic crisis that has struck European countries since October 2021 left no doubt as to Russia’s influence on the EU energy market. The situation is extremely delicate, especially considering that the EU is currently discussing which resources will be included in the Taxonomy Regulation. Nuclear energy and gas itself constitute the moot point of debates, and while debates are carried out, Europe’s behavior remains ambiguous.

On one side, Europe wishes to break the traditional energetic patterns and lose its ties with Russia (Nordstream 2). While it is looking for alternatives, its relations with Russia are getting more and more tense.

On the other hand, its de facto dependence on its Eurasian partner makes such a strategy extremely dangerous, since the Russian reaction could plunge (and is actually plunging) Europe into an unprecedented crisis. Europe’s difficult situation and ambiguous behavior is proving inefficient and contrary to the independence objective.

The Nord Stream 2 (the most recent pipeline built in the Baltic Sea) is particularly significant to show both Europe’s ambiguity and Russia’s influence. As a matter of fact, while in September 2021 the pipeline was completed and ready to function (Reuters, 2021), the German Regulatory Authorities refused to give its approval, which was necessary for its activity. In other words, first European and Russian companies cooperated in order to build this infrastructure, only for it to be left inoperative due to geopolitical issues. Curiously enough, in October 2021 the European gas demand started to increase, while Putin decided to withhold Russian gas until national stocks were filled. Europe faced an unprecedented energetic crisis, with gas prices increasing by almost 400% (Taylor, 2021), and some countries were already sounding the alarm for drastic measures. The Russian government was even accused of blackmailing Europe in order to ensure the approval of Nord Stream 2 (The Guardian, 2021). The Kremlin repeatedly denied the allegation and eventually opened its gas stream to Europe, but the situation provides a clear example of the delicate geopolitical equilibrium connected to the energy market and infrastructure (Scott, 2021).

Therefore, it can be said that Europe’s official wish is to slowly detach itself from its former partner. Geopolitical tensions, economic issues and environmental objectives make Russia a less attractive partner for Europe. However, the break-up will not be painless.

EU-Russia relations have been progressively deteriorating since the annexation of Crimea in 2013. Indeed, the sanctions imposed by Europe not only had an impact on the Russian economy but contributed to the cooling of relations between the two regions.

The current situation is the direct consequence of this historical process. Ten years of unsuccessful negotiations and ups and downs in economic and political relations led to a lack of communication and cooperation, up to a potential military clash.

Such a dramatic turn of events seems inevitable. However, Europe’s dependence may also become a leverage. As a privileged client of Russian companies in the energy sector, Europe could take advantage of existing connections and of its bargaining power in order to develop new projects, for instance in the renewable energies sector. European energy companies such as Enel and Total have been investing in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and many collaboration projects have already been carried out. Therefore, with the political will to do so, the Europe-Russia partnership could continue in the field of renewable energies (European Commission, 2011). After all, Russia officially declared the aim of carbon-neutrality was to be achieved no later than 2060 (Vesti.ru, 2021).

So one question may arise: why did Europe prefer to ‘corrupt’ the Taxonomy with gas while disrupting its relations with Russia, rather than pursuing a cooperation policy?

Whatever the answer, it is evident that despite big words on paper, the EU’s behavior did not show enough firmness of character. The gas crisis has proved its energetic weakness (with some exceptions, such as France), and the deterioration of relations with the Kremlin shows its will to find its own energetic path. However, including the resource on which it depends the most does not seem a very comforting initiative, if Europe wants to secure its energetic independence.

It goes without saying that Russia’s aggression of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 generated an escalation of tensions that inevitably affected the energetic sector. Europe’s sanctions have never been so strict and broad in scope, and Russia’s economy risks to feel their blow. However, several official sources assert that the existing contracts will continue to be performed (Tass, 2022). However, it is also true that some EU states, such as Austria, are officially declining any possibility of future agreements. Several EU countries, such as Italy and Germany, which depend most on Russian gas imports, are already considering alternatives to the Russian gas, either by folding back on other energy sources (especially coal and nuclear) or by looking for new partners such as the USA, Algeria and Azerbaijan (Repubblica, 2022). This means that in the short term, until contracts come to an end, Russia will continue to have an important influence on Europe. In the long term, however, the situation may change considerably. It is also true, though, that some measures, such as returning to coal, cannot be expected to last long, especially for environmental reasons (Germany had already begun the shut-down process for its coal and nuclear power plants) (Euractiv, 2022).

Whatever the outcome of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, its breakout undeniably exacerbated the situation, and the EU, like many others, openly took Ukraine’s side in the conflict. This decision is likely to have important repercussions on the future of energetic relations between the two regions, inasmuch as it could constitute Europe's definitive breakup with Russia. With time, we will be able to better assess the real implications of current events.

Authors: Valentina Horlander, Alessandra Colasanti, Erica Trotta

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