New Transatlantic Relations: Risks and Potential

  Focus - Allegati
  02 maggio 2025
  13 minuti, 1 secondo

Abstract

Donald Trump's return to the White House has triggered an unprecedented crisis in relations between Europe and the United States. The threat of a bitter trade war and, above all, the new posture taken by Washington on the security of the Old Continent have alarmed overseas partners. Ignored in the negotiations for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine and fearful of finding itself politically isolated and militarily defenseless, the European Union has announced an unprecedented rearmament plan and multiplied initiatives in the field of defense that could represent the first step in a progressive emancipation from the United States.

Authors:

Michele Gioculano - Head Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics

Edoardo Tengattini - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics


Introduction

The publication of the ‘White Paper for European Defence—Readiness 2030’ marks a significant milestone in the EU’s efforts to strengthen its security and defence capabilities. However, its success will depend on swift implementation, member state commitment, and securing the necessary funding. The Commission will also work closely with industry stakeholders and international partners to ensure that Europe’s defence ambitions translate into tangible results. Among upcoming initiatives, the Commission plans to publish the Defence Omnibus Simplification Regulation by June 2025. By the end of the year, it also aims to present a European Armament Technological Roadmap, focusing on investments into dual-use advanced technological capabilities, alongside a joint communication on Military Mobility and the corresponding legislative proposals. Meanwhile, the European Commission has pledged to launch a strategic dialogue with the defence industry, involving entities such as the European Defence Agency and the EU Military Staff where appropriate. It has urged co-legislators to adopt the proposed Draft Regulation on Security and Action for Europe (SAFE) and to finalize the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) before the summer. Furthermore, Member States are encouraged to increase collaborative defence procurement efforts, aligning with the European Defence Industry Strategy (EDIS) target of at least 40%. Prior to the release of the White Paper, on March 4, was the announcement by Commissioner President Ursula von der Leyen of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, which lays the groundwork for more financial flexibility in the realm of defence expenditure with a view to ramping up defence-spending to the amount of 800 billion EUR.

Ultimately, as geopolitical tensions continue, the EU’s true test will lie in its ability to transform this strategic vision into concrete action, affirming its commitment to a stronger and more autonomous European defence. Speaking during a European Parliament Plenary session on 12 March, Commissioner for Defence and Space, Mr. Kubilius, invoked the words of EU pioneer Jean Monnet, stating that people only make great decisions when crisis is on their doorstep. In this context, it is possible to interpret the White Paper as a reflection of the EU’s crisis-driven approach to defence policy – where urgent geopolitical threats serve as a catalyst for greater coordination, investment and strategic ambition. It also sheds light on the EU’s thought processes behind the decision to ramp up defence capabilities in response to escalating security challenges, rather than through long-term strategic planning alone.


Days of uncertainty

European political reactions to the White Paper reveal broad support for enhanced EU defence coordination, alongside sharp divisions over its scope and ambition. The European People’s Party (EPP) strongly advocates for immediate and long-term security measures, highlighting the ReArm Europe Plan, Readiness 2030, and the need to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The Socialists & Democrats (S&D) also back deeper European defence cooperation but caution that social cohesion investments must not be compromised. S&D leader Iratxe García underlined that “true security isn’t just about scaling up military capacities – it requires common debt, coordinated strategies, and social welfare.” The Patriots for Europe (PfE) Group oppose the centralisation of defence policy, maintaining that defence should remain a national competence. Meanwhile, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Group emphasise protecting critical sectors within the Union, such as strategic infrastructure, raw materials, communication systems, and technological innovation. Renew Europe welcomes the White Paper as progress but criticises the lack of urgency, warning that Europe can no longer rely on the United States for its security and must act swiftly. The Greens/EFA Group argue that the proposals are insufficiently ambitious and fall short of setting a clear pathway to genuine European strategic autonomy, though they recognise the growing political consensus on the need for stronger defence capabilities. On a more general perpsective, the current period of insecurity has exposed a deeper crisis in multilateralism, particularly in the EU-US transatlantic relationship. As a result, the EU can no longer place unconditional trust in the US on critical issues such as trade and security. Early actions by the new US administration, including threats towards long standing allies like Canada and Denmark, have heightened these concerns. More recently, attention has shifted to the dialogue initiated between the US and Russia aimed at negotiating a peace agreement in Ukraine. However, the exclusion of both Ukraine and the EU from these talks has raised serious concerns across Europe about the risks of being sidelined in decisions that directly affect its interests.

There is still significant uncertainty over how the EU will manage its evolving relationship with the US and how constructive engagement with the new administration can be achieved. While the 47th US President maintains a good rapport with French President Emmanuel Macron, the only EU leaders invited to Trump’s inauguration were Giorgia Meloni and Viktor Orbán. Although Orbán ultimately did not attend due to a state address, the choice of invitees suggests which European leaders Trump seeks to build closer ties with—and hints at who could position themselves as his main interlocutor in Europe.

At the same time, there have been growing calls to rethink Europe’s defence strategy in light of a more isolationist United States. Nathalie Tocci, Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and a leading voice on European foreign policy, has argued that "Europe will need to do even more on defence if it is to defend itself against Russia without—or even in opposition to—the United States." She contends that if Washington continues to pursue policies that undermine Europe, the EU should not respond by increasing purchases of American weapons or liquefied natural gas. Instead, Europe should focus on reducing its strategic dependence on the United States.


A double change of posture

Donald Trump's re-election is indicative, much more than his first term, of a real turning point in US foreign policy. The undisputed winner of a no-holds-barred election campaign, the Tycoon has ridden long-underestimated but widespread sentiments within American society, such as isolationism, anti-Europeanism and protectionism. Consequently, from day one, the new President has decided to renounce his role as leader of the Western world, starting to close fronts that he considers secondary, such as Ukraine, to focus on what he believes are the main challenges for his country: deindustrialization, migratory flows and, of course, China, seen as a political and economic threat. The greatest obstacle to this new doctrine is represented by Washington's friendly powers, especially the European countries, traditionally diplomatically close, important economic partners and, above all, military allies. Even if it is part of a systemic trend towards redefining objectives and redeploying US forces, the initial refusal to initiate a dialogue or to start negotiations to renegotiate relations and conditions of collaboration has alarmed overseas partners quite a bit, triggering fears for their economic stability and security.

The previous Administration, led by Joe Biden, had restored, after the turbulence of Trump's first term, the traditional guidelines of the State Department, preserving pillars of American power such as NATO, relations in the Middle and Far East, and the vast economic and cultural influence. Considering Russian expansionism a danger for Europe, and therefore for its major allies, Biden decided to support European actors and provide political and military support to Ukraine in order to frustrate Moscow's ambitions. At the same time, Biden attempted to combine confrontation with China with the preservation of global economic balances or the close relationship with Israel with respect for human rights and international law. On the other hand, in accordance with the direct style and aggressive temperament that characterize him, President Trump has implemented muscular policies and measures aimed at forcing his counterpart, be they friends or enemies, to unilaterally review their positions. Tariffs are the most obvious example of this attitude on the commercial level, just as the start of bilateral negotiations with Moscow on Ukraine is on the political level.

The treacherous request made by the Pentagon to NATO members to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP, combined with the real fear that Washington would not intervene to defend countries that do not respect the terms set out in the treaties, has generated a climate of uncertainty throughout the Old Continent. In short, this has produced a reaction from European chancelleries as well as from the institutions of the European Union, where there has been renewed talk of a common defense mechanism, autonomous from the United States. The launch of the ReArm Europe plan by Brussels represents an unprecedented measure and a response, albeit with an uncertain future, to the maneuvers of the Trump Administration. Added to this is a new and broader involvement in continental affairs by the United Kingdom, which, despite Brexit and the so-called "special relationship", seems increasingly willing and interested in collaborating with its European neighbors, especially on matters of common security. Even non-European actors such as Canada, Australia or Japan, all directly or indirectly affected by the change of direction imposed by Trump, have given signals of wanting closer cooperation with Europe on strategic issues such as armaments and intelligence. The Coalition of the Willing, which is being formed, aiming to create an interposition force to be deployed in Ukraine following a ceasefire, constitutes, albeit with its many nuances and differences, the last and most concrete piece of the European reaction to Washington's solicitations.

Conclusions

In conclusion, it can be said that transatlantic relations have entered a completely new era. Since this phase actually began a few months ago, it is constantly evolving and, for this reason, susceptible to important changes, especially as a result of the climate of general international uncertainty and the unpredictability of initiatives to which the US Administration seems to be accustomed. However, it is still possible to draw several points for reflection and evaluate some consequences.

The muscular approach implemented, up to now, by the Trump Administration has certainly favored a unifying effect on the European Union, often characterized by internal divisions and differences of opinion. The launch of the ReArm Europe plan, aimed at strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Member States through common financing instruments and greater coordination between the various armed forces, represents, in this sense, an unprecedented measure in the European context. An ambitious program that could represent a first step towards the construction of a common European defense but, also, an important political signal addressed to Washington. The Franco-British initiative of the so-called Coalition of the Willing has the same intent, although with much more nuanced effects, aimed at establishing a multinational military force to guarantee Ukraine to be deployed after a possible cessation of hostilities. Added to this are rearmament and operational reorganization programs launched by numerous Actors, first and foremost Germany, apparently stripped of its traditional role as a reluctant Power. Ambivalent policies that, if on the one hand seem to meet the requests made by the Pentagon for increased investment in the defense sector, on the other hand could aim, in the long term, to prepare and promote a liberation from the Atlantic device.

Much of the future developments will depend on the continuation and/or outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian War, as well as on the role that Washington and its European partners will play respectively in this area. The very survival of NATO, not so much on a theoretical level as on an effective one, is linked to the results of the conflict and its consequences on the security of the Old Continent, in particular on the most exposed Eastern Members. The only fact that can be assumed as certain is that, until 2029, a US Administration will remain in office that is manifestly hostile towards Europe, and that will hardly be willing to review its radical positions, and therefore its geopolitical strategy. European politics will have to take this into account from now on.

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