Abstract
Following the 2015 annexation of Crimea by Russia and subsequent sanctions by Western nations, the Kremlin has been seeking to expand its influence and relationships with African countries, through both official accords and unofficial, hybrid methods (namely, through interventions by the Wagner group). Furthermore, in the context of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, African nations have constituted a large portion of those unwilling to condemn Russian intervention in Ukraine or suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, as seen in the results of the UN General Assembly votes. Such events have brought international observers to conclude that many nations on the African continent are potentially falling into a Russian sphere of influence. This report concludes, however, that African statesmen and women’s reactions toward Macron’s victory and Annalena Baerbock’s visit to various nations of the Sahel region demonstrate an openness to collaborate and welcome European intervention, potentially indicating that African states, rather than having fallen into one “sphere of influence” or another, are simply widening their base of diplomatic, economic, technical, and military support, and that the future of EU-African relations is dependent upon the EU’s and its member states’ initiative in collaborating with and intervening in the African continent.
Author: Kaitlyn Rabe - Research Director, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O.
Throughout the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the African continent has shown a divided face at United Nations General Assemblies; on the first resolution of March 2, 2022, “demanding that Russia immediately end its military operations in Ukraine”, one of the 6 countries voting against the Resolution was an African state (Eritrea) while 17 of the 35 countries abstaining from the vote were from the African continent (The Conversation, 2022; General Assembly Vote on Ukraine, 2022). Furthermore, on April 7, 2022, during the UN General Assembly vote to suspend Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Council, African states constituted 23 of the 58 countries abstaining, and 9 of the 24 countries voting against the resolution (“The UN General Assembly votes to suspend Russia's membership in the UN Human Rights Council”, 2022).
Such events have taken place in a much wider context in which Western nations are preoccupied with the role of Russia on the African continent; for example, the Wagner group (a Russian-owned Private Military Contractor whose tactical objectives are often in line with the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals) has worked within Libya, Sudan, Madagascar, Mozambique, the Central African Republic and, most recently, Mali to lead training exercises for the national militaries, fight anti-government forces, and quell protests through disinformation campaigns. In particular, as French forces began to withdraw from Mali in 2021, partially due to Wagner activities in the territory and after almost a decade of unsuccessful anti-insurgency and anti-terrorism interventions, the Malian government had already begun to accept Wagner contractors as well as Russian attack helicopters and MI-171 helicopters (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2022).
Furthermore, beyond the unofficial operations of the Wagner group, on April 12, 2022, Cameroonian president Paul Biya reportedly signed a ‘revised’ military cooperation agreement with Russia, in which the two countries are to share opinions and information on security issues, development of joint training, medicine, topography, and military hydrography. The accord also provides for the two countries to operate together in peace operations under the patronage of the United Nations; the timing of such an agreement is notable and rather peculiar, as it occurred 5 days after the vote to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council (AfricaNews, 2022). The renewed agreement between Cameroon and Russia constitutes only one of the agreements signed between Russia and 20 African countries since 2015 alone, with cooperation ranging from counterterrorism and peacekeeping to weapons sales, and Russia is currently Africa’s main weapons supplier (Green European Journal, 2022).
Since Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent sanctions imposed by the West, the Kremlin has also been reinforcing its attempts to expand its influence in Africa in order to find new business opportunities and make new geopolitical friends in contexts outside of military matters; for example, over the past decade Russia has been seeking to reinforce and expand its relationships with the African continent in terms of energy, striking up deals with at least 7 confirmed African nations, while Rosatom–the state-owned Russian nuclear company–claimed to be working with at least 15 countries throughout Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022; Power, 2020).
In regards to Mali in particular, France admittedly has the potential advantage of having been engaged in the country in several operations for an extended period of time and having deployed between 3,000 and 5,100 troops, an effort which far surpassed its other missions in, for example, Sudan and the Central African Republic, countries in which the Wagner Group were successful in their disinformation and defense campaigns (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2022). Nevertheless, at the African Union European Union Summit, which took place in February of 2022, Macron met with the Senegalese, Ghanéan, Chadian, Mauritanian, and Nigerian leaders to discuss future military operations in the Sahel, while the Burkinabé and Malian ad-interim Heads of States, not recognized as legitimate, were not invited to the summit (AfricaNews, 2022). Relations between France and Mali, moreover, appear to be soured as Mali has both expelled the French Ambassador and accused France of ‘spying’, following the release of drone footage of what the French army claims is the Wagner group digging mass graves (France 24, 2022).
Given this context, as well as the recent results of the UN General Assembly votes, observers have posited that African states are tipping toward Russian influence; undoubtedly, in light of the sheer number of countries which have brokered energy and military agreements with Russia, as well as those who have remained neutral or against condemning Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, such a conjecture is certainly not without merit.
Nevertheless, recent events have highlighted that there is a possibility that African nations, rather than choosing to ‘side’ with Russia or the West, are choosing to widen their base of support, as the Western nations are typically involved in stability, development, and peacekeeping missions increasingly demonstrate dwindling dependability in their interventions in Africa. In light of the French elections in particular, several African leaders, including Paul Kagame (Rwanda), Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi (President of The Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as Chairperson of the African Union until February of 2022), and Samia Suluhu (The United Republic of Tanzania) have recently expressed their congratulations to Macron and a willingness to collaborate more closely with France in the future.
Furthermore, on April 12th, only hours after the EU’s announcement that it would halt its military training missions in Mali, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock landed in Mali to decide the fate of German boots on the ground (DW, 2022), prompting ad interim Malian President Colonel Assimi Goita to welcome the visit with hopes for “reinforcement of bilateral cooperation” between Mali and Germany. Most recently, Germany has also decided to end its EU training operations in Mali, while it remains open to remaining engaged in UN peacekeeping operations (DW, 2022; The Egyptian Gazzette, 2022).
Conclusions
Although such declarations may only be diplomatic lip service, they potentially demonstrate that Africa has not necessarily descended into an absolute sphere of Russian influence, but rather, that African nations are simply seeking to diversify support with the highest bidders. Nevertheless, several possible predictions may be made about the situation at hand:
- If the EU and its member states were to disengage from the Sahel region, and in particular, if France and the EU were to continue to not include the current governments of Mali and Burkina Faso in discussions on future interventions in the area, the Wagner group would find itself with essentially free reign to manifest the Kremlin’s foreign policy interests using hybrid methods,
- If the declarations by African leaders in support of Macron and expressing interest in continuing bilateral cooperation with France and multilateral cooperation with the EU are sincere, African nations (as well as the African Union) will seek to collaborate with European countries as far as such countries are willing to collaborate and intervene; and, finally,
- It will ultimately be the decision of the European Union and its Member States–in particular France, who traditionally has attempted to maintain a presence in Sub-Saharan Africa–to take full advantage of African nations’ potential interest in widening their base of support and collaborations.
Source Classification Table
Information Content | ||
1 | Confirmed | Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
2 | Presumably true | Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
3 | Maybe true | Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic |
4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
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