Abstract
Rare earth elements (REEs) are critical components for strategic industries including defence, green energy, semiconductors, medical technology and advanced manufacturing. Over the past few decades, China has established a near-monopoly in the REE sector, from extraction to processing, which has been progressively integrated into Beijing’s negotiations and used as leverage against other countries.
This article examines how REEs became an important instrument of Chinese political strategy, highlighting the economic implications and debates over resilience and diversification of sources, it resulted in the rest of the world. Using the case study of Nexperia and the current vulnerability of the EU’s raw materials supply chain, the article evaluates the implications for the EU and the development of its strategy on raw materials.
Author
Gabriel Silini - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Introduction
Rare earth elements (REEs) are metallic minerals widely used in today's innovative solutions, including semiconductors and magnets. The term Rare Earths derives from the late 18th Century, when these materials were discovered, as they were difficult to isolate and extract.
Despite their names, these materials are actually relatively abundant on Earth, but their reservoirs are usually scarce, making their extraction usually not economically profitable. REEs are usually divided into 6 light REEs (Lanthanum, Cerium, Praseodymium, Neodymium, Promethium and Samarium), and 11 hard REEs (Europium, Gadolinium, Terbium, Dysprosium, Holmium, Erbium, Thulium, Ytterbium, Lutetium, Scandium and Yttrium) (International Gem Society, 2025).
These 17 metallic elements share similar properties and are often found together in the same deposits, making the separation process costly. These materials are the backbone of many modern innovations. As such, these materials have become essential for the modern economy. Rare earth minerals are crucial in many high-tech solutions and sectors, specifically defence, renewables, semiconductors, smartphones and other devices, health tech, industrial manufacturing and robotics.
Despite the vast deployment of these materials and their importance in the current innovation sector globally, many countries have diminished in the last decades the extraction, separation and processing of these materials, leaving China as the sole producer of REEs, which now dominates the market.
This article analyses the current role of China in the Rare Earth Elements market, considering its almost-monopoly and their latest trade policies. In order to better address the current threat the world's supply chain of REEs is facing, the article provides an overview of the history of the latest decades, to then present the current trade policies the Chinese Ministry of Commerce is issuing.
The article specifically focuses on the consequences of the trade restrictions on the European Union, also mentioning the example of Nexperia, a Chinese chip company in Denmark, which has caused turmoil in the EU manufacturing sector, particularly the automotive industry. Lastly, this research addresses the extent to which China’s rare earth export controls constitute a threat to the European industry and whether current EU mitigation instruments are adequate.
China’s Monopoly over Rare Earth Elements
China’s production of rare earths in 2023 accounted for 69%, significantly more than the second place in the list, the US, with 12%. In the last decades, China has focused its efforts in becoming fully autonomous in the processing of these materials, not only in extractions, unlike any other country in the world, such as the US, which now exports their extracted materials to China for processing. China consequently has a de facto monopoly in the 2020s, producing and processing 85% of the world's supply of light rare earths and 100% of heavy rare earths (Xémard, 2025).
China dominates the entire value chain of rare earths, as it progressively moved from extraction to the manufacturing of the final products. In the 1990s, Japan and the US were the main actors when it came to manufacturing the final products, while China was providing the extracted materials. Today, China does not sell rare earths and it is responsible for the production of 92% of the world’s production of magnets.
In the 1990s, China started buying US and Japanese companies, relocating them to China. At the same time, it offered lower workforce costs to other multinationals, allowing them to move production from their home states to China. This was the first step of China’s rise to dominate the industry (Zadeh, 2025). In fact, before the 1990s, the US was the dominant actor in rare earths production, with China producing almost nothing (Gholz, 2014).
It must be considered that while China was conceding massive subsidies and favourable environmental policies, the rest of the world was introducing stricter environmental rules, which led to a reduction of extraction and processing of REEs, as mineral processing of REEs can lead to significant environmental impacts if not properly managed (Gajendra, et. al. 2025).
The Chinese strategy has its roots in the 1980s, when the government began massive investments in rare earths mining, while the rest of the world was decreasing the manufacturing of rare earths due to lower margins. In the early 2000s, Chinese companies started acquiring foreign assets and experts, in order to consolidate their expertise. In the 2010s, the processing of rare earths was consolidated under state-owned entities. Today, China is implementing export quotas and restrictions, gaining immense power in trade negotiations for technology sectors (Zadeh, 2025).
Thanks to China’s predominant role, it can now artificially increase or decrease the price volatility of REEs, making it particularly difficult for the rest of the world to find private players to make the investments required to open new plants elsewhere (Xémard, 2025).
The First Export Restrictions on Raw Materials
The predominant role of China in raw materials was already evident in 2010, when China issued the first export restrictions of raw materials to Japan and the EU.
In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat had a collision with the Japanese coastguard, who arrested the captain of the Chinese fishing boat. In response to that, China announced an embargo on all exports to Japan for raw materials, which caused a huge halt of the Japanese automotive industry. Back in 2010, Japan was the main producer of magnets and other products, while at the same time being the biggest importer of raw materials for the production of these products, while the US was the main importer of Japanese processed goods (Bradsher, 2010).
Already in October of the same year, the Japanese government adopted a plan to enhance its REEs supply chain, particularly focusing on investment and recycling, as well as the development of alternative materials. In 15 years, the dependence on China for the supply of REEs dropped from 90% to 60% (Terazawa, 2023).
Again in 2010, China issued export restrictions of raw materials, particularly affecting the EU, which triggered the World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement proceedings. The raw materials involved in the restrictions were bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus and zinc, which represented around 1 billion euros a year of imports, affecting 4% of EU industrial activity, in particular the chemical and steel sectors, and around 500000 jobs (European Union, 2012).
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled in 2012 against the restrictions of raw materials imposed by China, affirming most of the EU claims. The outcome obliges China to remove the restrictions not only on raw materials as presented by the EU, but also on rare earths and other raw materials. “Today’s ruling by the WTO on rare earths shows that no one country can hoard its raw materials from the global marketplace at the expense of its other WTO partners,” said Karel De Gucht, former EU trade commissioner.
However, the 2015-2020 period marked a transition from the typical government quotas, which had been largely prohibited under WTO rules, to market-based pricing mechanisms, which reduced the international legal challenges China could face, while maintaining its influence over the REEs market (Hidayat, 2025).
The New Wave of Export Restrictions
In April 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce responded to the US President Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs with export controls on its rare earth materials, which impacted exports to all countries. Out of the 17 metallic materials of the REEs list, 7 were affected by the export tariffs: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium. These materials are used by companies such as Tesla and Apple for their products, thus strategically impacting the US economy (Jackson, et. al., 2025).
These export restrictions highlighted the strong dependence of US, EU, Canada, Australia and many other countries on China’s REEs, endangering their manufacturing production in key sectors such as automotive, precision manufacturing, semiconductors, medical systems, defence and renewables (Hidayat, 2025). The April announcement marked the beginning of the new implementation strategy of China, enabling precise targeting of significant industries worldwide, as well as proving once again that China has the means to counterattack in case of trade wars, and that it will not hold back.
In October 2025, China further enlarged the list of REEs affected by the export restrictions, adding 5 more REEs on the list. In November 2025, this policy was subsequently suspended until November 2026 following a meeting in Busan, South Korea, with US President Trump. However, the April policy remains fully active.
The one-year suspension will apply to the whole world, according to the Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment under the WTO legal framework expressed in Article I:1, which proves that a principle long used to denote a shared right is now used to implement an exception to a harsh policy (Vanberghen, 2025).
The new Chinese export restrictions require that foreign companies must have Chinese approval before importing any goods containing 0,1% or more of any of the REEs included in the policy. The motivation provided by Beijing is that medium and heavy rare earths are often implemented for military purposes.
Over the last months, the EU noted that only 50% of the applications filed by EU enterprises to request Chinese approval to import these materials were accepted, creating an important bottleneck for European industrial sectors. “Such restrictions have already forced some EU companies to halt production, causing real economic harm. This is not about security or non-proliferation. These controls are targeting civilian industries directly (Colin, 2025),” affirmed Maroš Šefčovič, the European Commissioner for Trade in October 2025 (Liboreiro, 2025).
The implementation of license-based controls in 2025 is strategically relevant in a global race in renewable transition, semiconductors and electronic vehicles, maximising the leverage of Chinese role in negotiations.
The Nexperia Battle
The EU is currently in discussions with China on the licensing of exports for REEs, while at the same time considering implementing a non-traditional trade measure for Chinese exports to the EU: instead of paying a tariff in money, Chinese exporters would be required to pay the tariff with other goods, in this case REEs. In addition, the EU is also considering plans to reduce its dependence on China.
In September 2025, tensions escalated when the Dutch government recurred to an emergency law introduced in the Cold War-era to take control of a Chinese-owned chip company in Denmark, Nexperia. The decision was taken to block decisions that might be potentially damaging the company and its role in the EU, particularly in its automotive sector. The decision came just after the US Department of Industry and Security issued an extension of the Entity List and Military End-User List specifying that all companies owned by at least 50% by a company on this list will automatically fall under the same trade restrictions. The parent company of Nexperia, Wingtech Technology, has been in the US Entity List since 2023 for its alleged relations with the Chinese military (Asia Media Research Center, 2025).
The Chinese Commerce Ministry spokesperson He Yongqian urged the Netherlands to adopt an independence stance, instead of following the US in harming Chinese enterprises. Beijing decided to stop deliveries of Nexperia chips from the Chinese facilities to Europe, which created a shortage of chips and highlighted a major weakness in the motor industry which heavily relies on China, showing that China does not only hold a monopoly in rare earths, but also in the products produced with them (Tewari, 2025).
In early November, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, Vincent Karremans, commented that the negotiations with Beijing are being constructive and that Nexpedia’s exports from its facilities in China are expected to resume soon (Murad, 2025).
The Nexperia incident is essential to prove that the one-year suspension on the Chinese October policy on REEs is a fragile agreement, but it also proves that the EU has little room between the US and China, and it does not have much leverage to alter these negotiations (Tewari, 2025).
The EU Dependency on Raw Materials
2025 marked the 50th anniversary of the EU-China diplomatic relations, a relationship that was marked by several ups and downs, especially due to rivalries and contrasting values (Murad, 2025). With the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between China and the EU being signed in 1985, the two established close ties, which were deepened with the comprehensive and strategic partnership established in 2003. Nonetheless, the past two decades have marked a more conservative stance towards China, especially exacerbated by the post-Covid China’s transformation.
First of all, the pandemic highlighted several weak points where the EU is extremely dependent on China, not only in pharmaceuticals, but also in industrial and agricultural machinery. At the same time, while the imports from China were drastically growing, the exports to Beijing were stagnating, if not diminishing, particularly because of China’s rapid industrial transformation, which became competitive to the EU. In the last decade, China invested heavily in European manufacturing, automotive and green sectors, particularly through merging and acquiring European companies (García-Herrero, 2023)
In addition to economic rivalries, other political tensions have altered the bilateral relations between the EU and China. The Union, being an active advocate of human rights, imposed sanctions on many Chinese officials and entities for human rights concerns because of the treatment of the Uighurs. China responded to these sanctions imposing sanctions to EU nationals and EU entities. Additional tensions were added when, in December 2021, China blocked all Lithuanian exports into China after the former allowed a Taiwan Representative Office in Vilnius. This action was strongly condemned by the EU, which sued China at the WTO for punitive trade restrictions. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ambiguous role of China represented another clash between the EU and Beijing, specifically after the latter did not impose any sanctions on Russia (Jochheim, 2021)
As a result, the latest developments in their bilateral relations urged the EU to diversify its imports, aiming at reducing its dependence on China. Because of this, already in 2020, the EU announced the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA) managed by one of the communities of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), EIT Raw Materials, in order to make Europe economically resilient by diversifying its raw materials value chain.
Following the April restrictions from China, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, addressing the Chinese behaviour as unjustified and coercive, as China has a quasi-monopoly over REEs. The Parliament urges the EU to identify areas where the Union can exercise strong leverage in negotiations with Beijing. At the same time, the Commission must accelerate the implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) which should ensure that the EU has diversified and sustainable access to raw materials (European Parliament, 2025).
The CRMA was approved in March 2024 to address Europe's exposure to market disruptions in terms of REEs. Compared to the ERMA, the CRMA represents the first legal act on critical raw materials in the Union and it highlights that non-regulatory actions have not been sufficient. The act is divided into two parts: the first introduces the legal changes, while the second outlines the strategy of the EU (Tröster, et. al., 2024).
One of the essential instruments of the CRMA is the identification of ‘Strategic Project’ which is considered as of public interest and can obtain simplifications in the bureaucratic processes (Tröster, et. al., 2024). As such, the main legal consequence of the act is the modification of the permit granting processes, which will be limited to a maximum period of 27 months for extraction projects and 15 months for processing or recycling.
These simplifications aimed at increasing the extraction and processing of REEs, attracting investors to participate in those operations within the Union. Nonetheless, the availability of rare earths in Europe is uncertain, as there are no clear ecological data in the EU for these materials. In addition, there are no such data for several EU countries, including Germany (Tröster, et. al., 2024).
As of 2024, the most promising resources in the EU seem to be for lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite and manganese. Despite the recently announced new mining projects in various EU countries, specifically for lithium, which should by 2030 cover 55% of the European demand, processing activities within the EU remain not financially viable, both because of the high costs of energy and labour and the stringent environmental regulations (Tröster, et. al., 2024).
In March 2025, the EU announced 47 selected Strategic Projects to secure access to REEs in the EU. These projects are located across 13 different EU countries and cover 14 out of the 17 strategic raw materials (European Commission, 2025). The EU aims at reducing its dependence on China through diversification, both by extracting and processing its own REEs and by shifting its supply chain to other countries, such as Africa, Canada and the US (Gao, Chen, 2025).
Conclusion
China's rare earth policy exemplifies how control over the supply chain may be used to exert geoeconomic power against other countries. When it comes to REEs, China has established a dominating industrial position that is difficult to replicate elsewhere. The 2025 export control measures demonstrate that rare earths have progressed from a commercial resource to a strategic tool capable of influencing foreign industrial policy decisions.
The European Union, in order to address China’s behaviour in REEs exports, has initiated implementing several measures to diversify its sources of raw materials. However, structural vulnerabilities are still present and it is highly likely that diversification of sources will be a long process, especially considering the limited domestic reserves, the slow permitting process, but also high energy costs, stringent environmental regulations and high labour costs.
Even more concerning is the idea that China’s strategic approach to control its exports might be an example for other resource-rich nations, as it represents an interesting model for maintaining control over a strategic sector while avoiding trade dispute mechanisms, especially not triggering the WTO mechanisms. As a result, China’s strategy found a structural gap in the current international trade law, exposing the WTO’s need to adapt the current international trade system.
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