Abstract
We conclude our cycle of publications on the Russo-Ukrainian War by focusing on the repercussions that the conflict will have on an international level. In the last thirty years, there has been a shift from a substantially unipolar post-Cold War system to one tending towards multipolarity. The emergence of increasingly important players, such as China and the European Union, and the re-emergence of apparently waning powers such as Russia, have forced the chancelleries to reconsider their respective commitments on the global arena. The ongoing war has produced further conditions which will probably push China and Russia to reshape the balance of power between the two and Europe and the United States to rethink the nature and extent of their political-military collaboration.
Authors
Michele Gioculano - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Chiara Malaponti - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Chiara Merlin - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Introduction
Since the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the international system has radically changed. A system that used to be almost totally bipolar has slowly turned into a more multipolar one, with China and the United States of America being the main actors. However, the difference is that not only China and the USA are in the foreground, but that other states are emerging in the modern international order, aided by both military and political instruments. By superpowers we intend “a state that possesses military or economic might, or both, and general influence vastly superior to that of other states” (André Murno, Britannica, 2021).
From the 1990s to the early 2000s there was only one superpower, the United States of America, watching over a substantially unipolar order. This monopoly soon suffered a reduction after the rise of China, the resurfacing of Russia and the emergence of the European Union. The US remains a major player in international diplomacy. Over the past 20 years, it has maintained its military presence in numerous regions. The US poses as a guarantor of UN and NATO functions in critical countries, and as guarantor of the alliances established with Europe and allied nations. What can be emphasised is the soft power it holds by placing multilateralism at the centre of its policy.
Although it is not a state, the European Union participated in the establishment of what is now the international milieu. Officially born in 1993, the EU played an important role in creating stability within post-Cold War Europe. The purpose of the European Union is to protect the people within its borders and to improve the European countries' position in the international arena.
The rise of China and Russia is radically changing the world arena. In 2014 the International Monetary Fund published an annual report concerning the global economic situation. The comment of the magazine “MarketWatch” can be resumed in only one phrase: ”Now America is number Two” (Brendt Arendt, 2014). Looking at the surveys conducted by Macrotrends from 1991 to 2022, one could argue that China’s economic growth process had already started in 1991: with a growth rate of 9,26% Beijing exceeded Washington by as much as 5 percentage points - indeed an interesting figure, even though differences in the absolute value of GDP must be taken into account. However, China was not ready to engage in substantial military and economic competition yet.
During George W. Bush’s presidency, US unipolarity gradually started waning, and was soon compromised exactly by the rise of China. Although the policies of Deng Xiaoping’s predecessors were not as effective, they too set the path towards the advent of China as an emerging power. Even more with the new 'New Silk Road' policies fostered by Xi Jingping, China's rise in the international arena proved rushed. According to ISPI (2019), “The five-year plan 2016-2020 is built around the central theme of scientific development and the transformation of its development model towards a rebalancing of growth.”. In conclusion, China has thus increasingly pursued processes of modernisation and technological advancement; therefore, it can be considered a superpower able to compete with the United States.
On the other hand, Russia's status in the international arena followed a converse trajectory. Initially a superpower, Russia faced important diplomatic and economic challenges after the break-up of the USSR. Since the expansion of NATO eastwards, Russia has always felt threatened by the 'Western bloc', so much that with the ascendancy of Putin, an ex-KGB member, one of his priority policies was to slow it down.
For a long time, the role of the international organizations has been contested, first and foremost that of the United Nations and NATO, which are considered also uneasy partners in crisis management. Born in 1950, NATO was in its first years an instrument to combat the Soviet Union during the Cold War and later ended up becoming one of the most enduring military alliances in history. Born out of the failure of the League of Nations, the United Nations was created with the aim of maintaining peace between nations, of cooperating in the resolution of international problems and of promoting the respect of human rights. Since 1945, the membership of the UN has been enlarged from 51 to 193 Member States.
In conclusion, since the end of the Cold War, the international order has shifted from unipolar to multipolar due to the rise of several other powers than the US on the international scene. In this context, it must be remembered that when a power emerges politically, economically and militarily, within the international landscape international organizations remain an instrument to prevent conflicts from breaking out.
1. The West: between American strategic support and European military autonomy
For nearly a decade, the United States has been aiming to scale back its commitment globally. Crushed by the weight of a few significant failures, Washington has gained the awareness that, while it can still maintain a global strategic projection, it is no longer able to always easily achieve several objectives simultaneously. It has therefore initiated a phase of international disengagement, aimed at rationalizing the costs and efforts of the State Department and the Pentagon, in order to be able to focus on the main challenges and threats directed against American power and status (Stanley, 2007). This reorganization has undoubtedly made it possible to attention on China, considered the main opponent of the United States. Indeed, Beijing is no longer only an economic, commercial or technological competitor, but also a political, diplomatic and military one. Fears of other traditional rivals, such as Russia or Iran, reduced and placed on the back burner within the framework of national priorities.
At the same time, Washington identified Europe as the main source of spending and concern that prevents it from adequately focusing on the Far East. The allocation of military units and equipment in the Old Continent, once considered a great source of power and influence, is now perceived by American diplomats and officers as an unnecessary and unproductive cost (Friedman, 2021). Perceiving the Atlantic bond as indissoluble and not particularly fearing the consequences of greater European autonomy, the United States has constantly pushed NATO partners to reorganize their military apparatuses. Washington have also asked to increase defense appropriations with a view to a gradual withdrawal from the Western quadrant. This would in any case allow them to retain his current superpower status and, at the same time, hinder Beijing's rise as a dangerous equal competitor.
From this point of view, the Russian-Ukrainian war represents an opportunity for the United States to achieve two fundamental foreign policy objectives: to severely weaken Russia and definitively convince European allies of the need to improve their defensive capabilities. In fact, although it is not the main threat, Moscow has historically represented and still represents an important rival for Washington, especially in the military field. Weakening it would ease related concerns and related efforts. But, at the same time, the emergence of a concrete threat from the East would make NATO partners understand the importance of being able to face similar risks. The fear of their Russian neighbor would push them to initiate rearmament policies and to reconsider the possibility of greater European cooperation in the field of defense. For these reasons, the United States has generously supported the Ukrainian government, both politically and militarily, from the very beginning. Despite the existence of close diplomatic ties and cooperation agreements since 2014, no treaty obliged Washington to lend aid to Kiev. It is therefore easy to deduce that the will of the American government to support Ukraine is connected to the realization of a broader geopolitical project, whose fundamental nodes are represented by the aforementioned objectives. Therefore, the commitment of the United States in this conflict is supposed to continue in the future, as it is part of a complex strategic plan.
European countries, as well as NATO and allies of the West have certainly responded with great concern to the outbreak of a war on the Eastern fringes of the continent. Although to varying degrees, all have condemned Russian aggression and adopted benevolent neutrality towards Ukraine, imposing economic sanctions on Moscow and, in some cases, providing substantial military and financial aid to Kiev. The use of such measures, in such a short time and with an almost unanimous spirit, represents an unprecedented case for European countries. The European Union, driven by its senior members, Germany, France and Italy, responded immediately to the invasion, overcoming the traditional caution and reticence in terms of conflicts of different nations. At the same time, other important actors, outside the European Union but part of the Western system, such as the United Kingdom have also reacted with great firmness. NATO, defined "brain dead'' by French President Macron only a few months before, has regained vigor and influence, coordinating the supplies of equipment and support to the Ukrainian armed forces and becoming again attractive to historically neutral powers such as Sweden and Finland, which have forwarded formal application for membership (Macron, 2019).
However, the real change has been in the European approach to the risk of a conflict, initially considered remote and then suddenly revealed. All the chancelleries of the continent, in addition to recording this dramatic miscalculation, have also understood that they have dangerously underestimated the importance of maintaining adequate defensive capabilities. The illusion of being unconditionally protected by overseas allies was shattered in the face of the aforementioned reorganization of US forces and priorities and, even more so, in the face of the outbreak of a conflict in Europe (Bugajski, 2013). The awareness of not having been able to organize in advance a proper defensive apparatus t required a reflection and an adjustment, announced by all the powers, even those traditionally most reluctant. It is probable, also in relation to the costs and related needs, that the European defense project will transform or merge into a common path, maybe under the aegis of the European Union, involving the Member States and, in the future, also those that are currently candidates.
2. China and Russia: a partnership with limits
Just a few weeks before the invasion, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met in Beijing, on the eve of the Olympic Games. Soon after, they released the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development, in which it is stated that the “friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no ”forbidden“ areas of cooperation” (President of Russia, 2022). There is much speculation on the timing of Putin’s visit to Beijing - on whether the Chinese government was in fact informed of the upcoming offensive against Ukraine (Denisov, 2022). While the Statement underlines some areas of common understanding between China and Russia, there is no direct mention of Russia’s neighbor in the statement. On the other hand, Russia’s explicit support for the One China policy is put on paper. This gives already a hint that, in the friendship between the two countries, there could actually be boundaries and that one partner seems to weigh more than the other. Such a dynamic was already present before the war started raging in Eastern Europe, but will likely be exacerbated by the developments in Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine has swiftly evolved into a diplomatic conundrum for China. Many have spoken of Beijing’s “balancing act” between Russia and the West. While propping up Russia’s arguments for the invasion (e.g. the threat to its national security posed by the enlarged Eastern flanks of NATO) and refusing to join sanctions against Moscow, it has repeatedly called for peace. During the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in September, Xi met Putin again. The latter then acknowledged the “questions” and “concerns” posed by his Chinese counterpart over the situation in Ukraine (Zheng, Glamann, 2022). Moreover, during Scholz’s visit in Beijing in November, Xi warned the Kremlin against the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine (Lau, 2022).
Even if Beijing strives to pursue a policy of neutrality, China’s ideological convergence with Russia on matters of world order is common knowledge - and was also made evident by the Joint Statement on February 4th, 2022. So, while Moscow remains a partner in the establishment of a multipolar order away from the American influence, the Kremlin’s current endeavors in Ukraine may pose a challenge to China’s image and reputation (Kusa, 2022). Thus, Beijing is walking a tightrope when it comes to Ukraine, as it tries to deal with the situation in Eastern Europe in a way that does not jeopardize its national interest and the overarching potential gains in the competition with the United States. These remain China’s priorities - and even before the war its relations with Russia could be largely interpreted under this light. The strategic partnership between the two falls short of a full-blown alliance; areas of overlapping interests come together with reservations. For example, “The impact of the Ukrainian crisis is based on its complex and contradictory content, which covers both an open area, on which China and Russia – who oppose Western domination – speak out clearly and act accordingly, and a grey area – relating to Ukraine’s internal politics – where Moscow is not inclined to seek Beijing’s support and Beijing prefers not to speak out” (Denisov, 2022). In short, China and Russia tend to form a united front when it comes to Great Power competition, but distance themselves from one another on regional and internal affairs.
Still, Russia is likely to come out severely weakened by this war. It suffered a strategic loss in triggering a wave of European unity and solidarity and in reviving NATO, as well as national governments that had been long prudent with their military spending. It is also struggling under the weight of isolation and economic sanctions, as well as under the military costs of a prolonged conflict. A potentially weakened Russia might not displease China, as it “may drive Moscow away from the West and closer to Beijing as China’s “junior partner,” which is exactly how China has seen the relationship over the years” (Kusa, 2022). The Kremlin’s pivot to the East - which is largely taking place, at the moment, in the energy sector - will only make Russia more dependent on China (and the Asian markets overall), but likely not the other way around. This will enable China “to bind Russia as a “resource asset” and expand China’s presence in the Russian market in key industrial and economic sectors” (ibid.). It is hard to see Russia going to establish normalised relations with the West, as its leadership’s image is now tied to the war. So, Beijing may act as a safe haven, but at a cost. The way China exploits its ties with Russia to its own particular advantage becomes evident, when one looks at Beijing’s courtship of Central Asia - a region that falls under Moscow’s interests and sphere of influence, too.
In summary, the strategic partnership between Russia and China may come out even more polarized, in its internal dynamics, after the war in Ukraine. If, prior to the invasion, both were trying to productively exploit each other’s assets in the light of their own national interests, this strategic option may very well be waning for Russia. The Kremlin will likely focus on alleviating the immediate costs of the war. On the other hand, the Chinese will continue to play their long-game in the competition with the United States, and will make use of the partnership with Russia when suitable. Indeed, the war itself provided Beijing with some valuable information on Washington's response times and mechanisms, as well as its choice of conventional and unconventional measures.
Conclusions
It is possible to conclude that the Russo-Ukrainian war will not completely redraw the international geopolitical picture. It will only change some power relations between the major powers. The two superpowers, the United States and China, will continue to compete with each other unchallenged. Their supporting partners, Russia and the European Union, will take new paths, descending and likely ascending respectively. This process may affect the quality of their bond to the US and China.
Regardless of the outcome of the conflict, both the United States and China might benefit in the long-run from the current shifts in the system of international relations. Washington, having shown to the European allies the importance of expanding their defence budgets, could be able to progressively disengage troops and resources from the Old Continent to concentrate them in the Far East, in an anti-Chinese function. On the other hand, Beijing could be able to better juggle its bilateral relationship with Russia, now in an even weaker position to negotiate its interests with the Chinese partner.
Therefore, the two superpowers would be able to at least partially free themselves from the constraints associated with the respective allies and concentrate completely on their on-going competition. This could lead to an intensification of the Sino-American rivalry, albeit with changed power relations. The United States, currently in trouble, would optimise the use of resources, in the hopes of preserving its position of hegemony - which China puts in jeopardy. On the other hand, one might see the greatest changes in the posture of the Russian Federation and of the European Union.
As a result of the Kremlin’s war effort, Moscow will likely lose in status, while being confined to the margins of the international chessboard and relying on the asymmetric partnership with China to survive. This will engulf the Federation, reducing its national prestige. However, the international community - and, notably, the US - would still remain sensitive to the endeavours of Russia as a major nuclear superpower: “If Russia continues on its present course, we will be dealing with a very large nuclear pariah state with thousands of warheads and the missiles to deliver them. A major goal of U.S. policy must therefore be to move Moscow away from nuclear saber-rattling and back to the more responsible role it has played since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in controlling nuclear weapons and avoiding their proliferation” (Gottemoeller, 2023).
On the contrary, the European Union could probably become aware of the need for a greater unity of purpose, essential to withstand the shocks of the international system. It could therefore strengthen its hand, when it comes to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Having a somewhat coherent foreign policy is the necessary step towards increasing Brussels’ diplomatic weight. The first days of the war have shown the potential of the European project, as national leaders rallied together around the Ukrainian flag. However, in the medium- and long-run, the different strategic national interests of the Member States are bound to resurface. The real challenge is then exploiting the momentum in a realistic way, trying to deepen integration where possible as the Member States struggle for the old, common purpose - peace on the Continent. However, especially as the war in Ukraine contributes to a broad reshaping of the system of international relations, Europe must also be wary of “cutting itself off from the contemporary quest for world order by identifying its internal construction with its ultimate geopolitical purpose” (Kissinger, 2014).
Classification of sources and information:
1 | Confirmed | Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
2 | Presumably true | Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
3 | Maybe true | Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic |
4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
Trustworthiness of the source | ||
A | Trustworthy | No doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence; has a history of total trustworthiness |
B | Normally trustworthy | Small doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence, nevertheless has a history of valid information in a majority of cases |
C | Sufficiently trustworthy | Doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence; however, has supplied valid information in the past |
D | Normally not trustworthy | Significant doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence, however has supplied valid information in the past |
E | Not trustworthy | Lack of authenticity, reliability or competence; history of invalid information |
F | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
Bibliography:
- G. Aragona, “L’Unione Europea: attore o spettatore?”, ISPI 2019. (3-B)
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/lue-attore-o-spettatore-24172
- B. Arends, “Yes, China’s becoming No.1- let’s deal with it”, Market Watch, 2014. (2-C)
- I. Denisov, ‘No Limits’? Understanding China’s Engagement With Russia on Ukraine, The Diplomat, 24 March 2022. (3-B) https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/no-limits-understanding-chinas-engagement-with-russia-on-ukraine/
- Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead, The Economist, November 7th 2019. (2-B) https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead
- B. Friedman, US Engagement and Disengagement in the Middle East: Paradox and Perception, Strategic Assessment - A Multidisciplinary Journal on National Security, Volume 24, No. 1, January 2021. (3-B) https://strategicassessment.inss.org.il/en/articles/us-engagement-and-disengagement-in-the-middle-east-paradox-and-perception/
- R. Gottemoeller, A New Push for Nuclear Guardrails, in Lessons for the Next War, Foreign Policy, 5 January 2023. (3-B) https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/05/russia-ukraine-next-war-lessons-china-taiwan-strategy-technology-deterrence/
- A. Graham, Destinati alla guerra, possono USA e CINA sfuggire alla trappola di Tucidide?, 2018. (3-B)
- M. Graziano, United States: the end of an illusion of omnipotence, The Conversation, July 2020. (1-A) https://theconversation.com/united-states-the-end-of-an-illusion-of-omnipotence-186421
- M. F. Harsch, NATO and UN: partnership with a potential?, 2012. (1-B)
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2012_RP02_har.pdf
- J. Bugajski, Return of the Balkans: Challenges to European Integration and U.S. Disengagement, Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2013 2-B
- J. Delors, European integration and security, Survival - Global Politics and Strategy, 2008. (3-B)
- H. Kissinger, World Order, Penguin Press, 2014. (2-B)
- I. Kusa, China’s Strategic Calculations in the Russia-Ukraine War, The Wilson Center, 21 June 2022. (3-B) https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/chinas-strategic-calculations-russia-ukraine-war
- S. Lau, China’s Xi warns Putin not to use nuclear arms in Ukraine, Politico, 4 November 2022. (2-B) https://www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-warns-vladimir-putin-not-to-use-nuclear-arms-in-ukraine-olaf-scholz-germany-peace-talks/
- C. Layne, Superpower Disengagement, Foreign Policy, Winter 1989-1990. (2-B)
- Macrotrends, “U.S. GPD Growth Rate 1961-2022”, 2022. (1-A) https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-states/gdp-growth-rate
- Macrotrends, “China GPD Growth Rate 1961-2022”, 2022. (1-A) https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/gdp-growth-rate
- R. Mudge, What is NATO and why was it created, 2022. (1-B) https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-nato-and-why-was-it-created/a-60688639
- A. Murnò, Superpower, Britannica, 2021. (1-A) https://www.britannica.com/topic/superpower
- A. Nasti, Stati Uniti d’America, Treccani, 2016. (1-A)
https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/stati-uniti-d-america_(Atlante-Geopolitico)
- M. Pedrazzi, “ONU: quanto è necessaria una riforma?”, ISPI, 2019. (2-B)
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/onu-quanto-e-necessaria-una-riforma-23808
- President of Russia, Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development, 4 February 2022. (1-A) http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770
- T.W. Stanley, American strategy after the cold war: The price of disengagement, Comparative Strategy, 2007. (3-B)
- S. Zheng, P. Glamann, Putin Acknowledges Xi’s ‘Concerns’ on Ukraine, Showing Tension, Bloomberg, 15 September 2022. (2-B) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-15/china-s-xi-poised-for-first-putin-meeting-since-ukraine-invasion#xj4y7vzkg