Abstract
One year after our first edition, we begin a new cycle of publications on the Russian-Ukrainian war by providing an analysis of the eternal clash between autocracies and democracies brought back to the center of the debate by the conflict that erupted in February 2022. Supporting the simplistic thesis of the irreconcilability between opposing government systems, it is often believed, trivially, that these countries always have different objectives and resort to different strategies. The advent of the idea of democracy, peaceful and respectful of fundamental freedoms, has not really changed how international affairs are conducted. It has simply forced democracies to seek a new coherence between image and actions, often generating criticism of inconsistency and inability to respond adequately to problems. This difficulty can clearly be seen in the progressive laceration of the Western Front in Ukraine and imposes important reflections aimed at resolving not the irreconcilability between democracies and autocracies but their internal contradictions.
Authors
Michele Gioculano - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Jaohara Hatabi - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Gabriele Junior Pedrazzoli - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Introduction
In the intricate tapestry of contemporary global dynamics, the traditional dominance of democracy within the Western thought paradigm finds itself at a crossroads, undergoing a profound metamorphosis. Once an unquestioned cornerstone, democracy now assumes a role less of unwavering certainty and more of an intrinsic necessity, a foundation that is, perhaps surprisingly, seldom challenged. The post-World War II world order, anchored in democratic principles, is encountering formidable challenges as the global stage witnesses a discernible resurgence of authoritarian regimes. Amidst the evolving landscape, underscored by economic competition and trade wars, the longstanding discourse on the inherent conflict between democratic and authoritarian systems is experiencing a revival. The aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine acts as a crucible, testing the resilience of the democratic ideals that have historically shaped the Western world order. While the narrative emphasizes heightened unity among Western democracies, pragmatic considerations lead to deeper collaborations with authoritarian regimes, particularly in countering shared threats such as Russia. The nuanced approach of Western states, seeking alliances based on strategic interests rather than strictly ideological grounds, poses a formidable challenge to the prevailing discourse of defending democracy. President Joe Biden's rallying cry in the wake of Ukraine's invasion underscores the heightened stakes: "We emerged anew in a great battle for freedom. A battle between democracy and autocracy. Between liberty and repression." However, this battle unfolds not in a realm of clear-cut ideological confrontations but within the intricate subtleties of international relations, where the convergence of interests often blurs the lines between democracies and autocracies. As the world grapples with the complexities of power dynamics, economic interdependence, and shifting alliances, the traditional dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism faces a critical reassessment. The Russian-Ukrainian war, unfolding as an emblematic example, serves as a poignant backdrop to explore the intricate challenges democracies encounter in navigating the delicate balance between ideal principles and the pragmatic exigencies of the contemporary geopolitical landscape.
The dream of democracy produces monsters
In recent times, economic competition and trade wars seem to have eclipsed the recurring debate on the conflict between democratic and authoritarian systems. Democracy, once an unquestioned backdrop for Western thought, has now assumed the role of an intrinsic necessity, a foundation we seldom challenge.
This evolution in our perception bears significant consequences, particularly within the Western world order established post-WWII, where the supremacy of the democratic system stands as a cornerstone.
Amidst this intricate landscape, a palpable resurgence of authoritarian regimes has begun to reshape the global political narrative. The rise of such systems poses a formidable challenge to the long-held assumption that democracy is the default path to societal progress. As the allure of authoritative governance gains momentum, it prompts a reevaluation of the principles that have underpinned the international order for decades. This resurgence invites us to scrutinize the very foundations upon which our convictions about governance and societal structures are built and suddenly the confrontation between the two systems of government is, once again, critical in the political debate.
Despite the apparent polarization of the world, autocracies and democracies are not as different from each other as they seem: the international context often reveals a subtler interplay between these seemingly opposing ideologies. Both systems, in their pursuit of stability and longevity, grapple with the challenges of governance, socio-economic development, and international relations. Democracies, in spite of their emphasis on individual freedoms and participatory decision-making, face the pragmatic reality of balancing diverse interests within their borders.
On the international stage, the convergence between democratic and authoritarian states becomes evident in their shared pursuit of national interests. Realpolitik considerations often compel nations, regardless of their governance structure, to engage in strategic alliances, trade agreements, and diplomatic negotiations to safeguard their economic prosperity and security. The commonality lies in the pragmatic recognition that states, regardless of their internal governance, operate within a global system where power dynamics, economic interdependence, and geopolitical realities transcend ideological boundaries.
In essence, the international arena serves as a complex stage where the rigid dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism softens.
On the other hand, significant differences between the two systems can be found in the way of maintaining power. Democracies, as epitomized by regular elections, are characterized by a competitive and pluralistic political arena. Elections serve as a mechanism for citizens to express their preferences, ensuring a peaceful transfer of power and providing an avenue for diverse voices to shape policies. The inherent tension and competition among political parties contribute to a system of checks and balances, fostering accountability.
In contrast, autocracies typically operate on a model of consensus-building around a central authority. Decision-making is concentrated within a select group or an individual, often without the need for regular electoral validation. The absence of competitive elections can lead to a more streamlined decision-making process, ostensibly allowing for swift implementation of policies. The Russian example is enlightening: the Russian population does not seek representation in government and institutions, they are fed a narration of the Federation of glory and international importance while, regarding the internal factor, the central state guarantees a high living standard. In other words: Moscow does not want people to identify with the authorities, they want the population to bear them.
The emergence of a moral dimension in democracies is a consequential aspect of the electoral process, transcending mere political considerations to encompass a broader sense of shared values and ethical principles. Elections, as a pivotal expression of popular will, serve as a platform for citizens to not only participate in the selection of leaders but also to endorse a set of moral imperatives. In democracies, individuals often seek to identify not just with political figures or parties but with the overarching institutions that embody collective ideals. This moral dimension involves a connection to values such as justice, equality, and individual freedoms, transforming the electoral act into a moral expression of civic duty. The emphasis on moral alignment within democratic processes contributes to the continual negotiation and redefinition of societal norms, as citizens, through their electoral choices, actively shape the moral character and trajectory of their democratic institutions. In this way, the democratic experience transcends a mere exercise in governance, becoming a profound expression of shared moral convictions that underpin the social contract within these political systems. But is that so?
The moral dimension inherent in democracies can face challenges on the international stage, where the pursuit of strategic objectives may sometimes lead to the compromise or even sacrifice of these values. Nations, driven by geopolitical interests, economic considerations, or security imperatives, might find themselves making decisions that, while pragmatically sound, may contradict the ethical principles championed domestically. In some instances, political leaders may instrumentalize the moral dimension associated with democratic values to manipulate public opinion and garner support for actions that, under scrutiny, might appear inconsistent with the professed moral framework. This manipulation can manifest in the framing of international interventions as moral imperatives, even if driven by strategic goals. Thus, the interplay between the moral underpinnings of democracies and the exigencies of international relations introduces a complex dynamic where moral dimensions can be both a guiding force and a malleable tool subject to strategic calculations and political maneuvering. This tension underscores the delicate balance democracies navigate between upholding their moral ideals and responding to the multifaceted challenges presented by the international order.
By saying “I believe at our best America is a beacon for the globe. And we lead not by the example of our power, but by the power of our example” President Biden is highlighting the moral dimension of his executive, promoting the image of democracy, and in particular US democracy, as an exporter of democratic-republican values; but by reading carefully it’s impossible not to notice how the focus is on the term “power”. There's always a priority, and that is not (at least in the majority of cases) the moral dimension.
The Perils of Autocratic Decision-Making
Autocracies, distinguished by their centralized power structure and limited political pluralism, often display a certain proclivity for swift decision-making, especially in the realm of foreign policy and military actions. Unlike democracies, where decisions are subject to intricate processes and checks and balances, autocratic regimes concentrate authority within a single leader and its small circle of loyal people, therefore facilitating rapid responses to perceived threats or geopolitical ambitions. This streamlined decision-making process certainly minimizes bureaucratic hurdles and the need for extensive public debate, allowing autocratic leaders to initiate wars more swiftly.
However, the same concentrated power that enables speedy decisions also introduces a set of inherent contradictions within autocracies. The suppression of dissent, restrictions on free speech, and the lack of internal mechanisms of checks and balances can lead to strategic myopia, and leaders may be operating within an echo chamber, insulated from diverse perspectives and alternative viewpoints. The absence of robust internal debate, which is a hallmark of democratic systems, increases the risk of poor foresight, contributing to a higher likelihood of strategic failures.
Autocratic leaders throughout history have, at times, demonstrated a penchant for decisions that, in hindsight, appear bewilderingly misguided. Drawing parallels across different eras and geopolitical landscapes, these instances offer valuable insights into the perils of unchecked authority. Emperor Nicholas II's foray into World War I in 1914 serves as a poignant example. In the absence of any immediate threat to Russia's core security interests, his decision set in motion a chain of events leading to revolution, the collapse of the empire, and the tragic demise of the imperial family [Lieven, 2015].
Moving forward in time, Hitler's strategic miscalculations underscore the recurring theme of autocratic overreach. His ill-fated decision to invade the USSR, following the failure to conquer Britain and the premature declaration of war against the USA, stands as a glaring misstep. Scholars argue that Hitler's actions made Germany's chances of winning the war unattainable as early as 1941, demonstrating the far-reaching consequences of autocratic decision-making [Harrison, 1998; O'Brien, 2015].
In the Middle East, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991 showcased a striking lack of strategic foresight. The highly predictable military defeat at the hands of an international coalition set off a chain of events that included protracted reparation payments spanning over two decades and ultimately culminated in Hussein's fall from power and subsequent execution [Karsh and Rautsi, 2007]. A similar pattern unfolded in 1982 when General Leopoldo Galtieri, the leader of Argentina's military junta, decided to invade the Falkland Islands. The result was a foreseeable military defeat, Galtieri's ousting, and the subsequent collapse of the regime [Lewis, 2002].
Putin’s choice to invade Ukraine, a European country with a relatively modernized military apparatus, a quite resilient political system, and a well-developed sense of national identity, is perhaps the most recent example of the vulnerability inherent in centralized power and its limited capacity to adapt to unexpected shifts in the international landscape.
The historical episodes provided above illuminate a common thread in autocratic decision-making — an inclination to underestimate the complexity of geopolitical realities and the potential consequences of their actions. Autocracies, often centralized in power and driven by a singular vision, may project an image of strength but are susceptible to internal contradictions.
It should be noted that autocracies often grapple with societal discontent. The illusion of unity projected by these regimes is frequently at odds with the reality of internal strife. The suppression of protests, erosion of civil liberties, and curtailing of political opposition exemplify the challenges autocracies face in maintaining social order through coercion.
The historical echoes of autocratic hubris resonate across diverse contexts, offering valuable lessons for understanding the inherent risks associated with unchecked authority. As we analyze these instances, it becomes evident that the allure of centralized power comes at a cost — one that autocracies, blinded by their own convictions, often fail to foresee. The ramifications extend beyond military defeat to societal upheaval, economic decline, and, ultimately, the unraveling of the very foundations upon which autocratic rule stands. These cautionary tales underscore the imperative of fostering a nuanced understanding of autocratic governance and its inherent pitfalls in the ever-evolving landscape of international relations.
In light of the complexities surrounding the current geopolitical landscape and the evolving dynamics between democracies and autocracies, the prospect of autocracies outpacing democracies in certain contexts cannot be ignored. While the narrative emphasizes enhanced unity among Western democracies, pragmatic considerations have led to deeper cooperation with authoritarian regimes, particularly in countering common threats such as Russia. The nuanced approach of Western states, seeking alliances based on strategic interests rather than strictly ideological grounds, poses a challenge to the prevailing discourse of defending democracy. In the wake of Ukraine’s invasion, President Joe Biden’s words resonated as a rallying cry for defending liberal values: “We emerged anew in a great battle for freedom. A battle between democracy and autocracy. Between liberty and repression.”
The strategic balancing act between democracies and autocracies becomes more pronounced when examining the diverse responses to Russia's invasion. Instances of democracies abstaining or refraining from condemning Russia, and authoritarian States displaying a range of positions, suggest the possibility that autocracies, leveraging strategic alliances and maintaining flexibility in their approaches, may gain influence over democracies. The emphasis on defending democracy appears to be more about safeguarding national interests rather than actively promoting democratic values globally. This divergence between rhetoric and action underscores the challenge of sustaining a unified front among democracies, leaving room for autocracies to exploit geopolitical nuances and potentially assert their dominance in the international arena.
The case of the Russian-Ukrainian War
The Russian-Ukrainian War represents the emblematic example of what has been explained so far. On the one hand, the Western Bloc’s support to Ukraine is an attempt to reconcile the principles of pacifism and liberalism with its own geopolitical interests, on the other hand, Russia and its supporters continue to pursue a traditional foreign policy, making the most of all the weaknesses and contradictions of their opponents. It is undeniable that behind the defense of Kyiv's freedom, sovereignty, and independence, there are much broader strategic objectives for Western countries, which range from the enlargement of NATO to the isolation of Russia, up to the disarticulation of the Kremlin's power system, and the possible overthrow of President Putin. Just as it is undeniable that, behind the extension of the Russian sphere of influence through the use of force, there is Moscow's desire to show to the world the contradictions and hypocrisy of democracies, as well as undermining from within the unity of the Western Front. The only difference is that the democracies allied with Ukraine, in order to formally keep themselves out of the dispute and remain consistent with their values, have always been very cautious in expressing clear positions on the conflict, in ensuring unconditional support for Kyiv, or granting unconditionally what could be used to turn the tide of the conflict.
Since the first days of the war, distinctions and different positions on many issues began to emerge among many of the supporters of Ukraine. As it is known, these differences concerned, and still concern, the degree of intensity of the sanctions to be adopted, the amount of aid to be sent to the Ukrainian government, the nature of the armaments granted, etc. They are not the result of strategic reasoning connected to the conflict, as is it obvious the need to provide maximum support to an ally in such a precarious position. These originate from assessments connected to the specific political opportunity, economic situation, or cultural context of the analyzed country. In fact, each government, whilst having a need and an interest in stopping Russian expansionism, has needed to constantly consider the implications that every single measure it adopted would have had, not so much on the progress of the war, but on the image of its own country and its own public opinion. These legitimate concerns were the cause of a significant reduction in the effectiveness of these measures compared to the country's strategic objective: the outcome of the dispute. A clear example of this can be obtained by analyzing the behavior of the major European Power: Germany. From the beginning, whilst always firmly underlining Russian responsibilities and support for Ukraine, Berlin found itself in a very difficult position. As a result, the Federal Republic, always cautious about the possibility of military interventions and supply of armaments, due to its economic and energetic ties to Moscow, was forced to stall and intervene to make its public opinion accept the measures taken.
Therefore, nowadays democracies show all their tiredness, their intolerance towards a problem that they do not believe concerns them closely, and their unwillingness to commit and make sacrifices to carry forward a strategy that does not seem to produce great results in the short term. The absence of rapid successes and good news from the field frustrates Western public opinions which was initially alongside their respective Governments. This leads to accusations of inconsistencies with the democratic principles and to calculations on the fate of the war that come, nowadays, more from within the countries, than from the adversary. The firmness of the Governments' position begins to falter, shaken by the opinions of their citizens, leading to the suffering of the pro-Ukrainian bloc and the benefit of the pro-Russian one. It can be said that the greatest success of the Kremlin's strategy is certainly not connected to the battlefield, but to the ability to highlight the internal inconsistency of the Western narrative, insinuating doubts among people and putting democracies in crisis.
At the moment, given the military stalemate, Moscow strongly hopes that the Western support for Ukraine will become unsustainable and unjustifiable for the allied countries, pushing their respective governments to reduce it and ultimately withdraw it, even at the price of abandoning Kyiv to its own fate. The only hope for democracies would be to accept the inevitability of the conflict, accustoming public opinion to its presence and, at the same time, reducing its importance and the attention given to its developments. In other words, trying to make people forget about its existence, by shifting interest to other issues. A cosmetic and fixed-term strategy, which cannot be brought forward forever, and, which will require a turning point at a certain moment. This method would support the Russian thesis not being, evidently, very consistent with the principles of transparency and freedom of information, that should distinguish democracies. In other words, democratic regimes would sink deeper and deeper into their contradictions, without achieving concrete results.
Conclusions
The Russian-Ukrainian war is clearly showing us how difficult it is for democracies to take sides, and assume a firm and coherent position that reconciles the ideal principles and the concrete objectives of a political and strategic nature. Like autocracies, democratic regimes have never agreed to give up the natural tendency that characterizes any international actor: the preservation and growth of their own power. Such a possibility would not be accepted by the people, legitimately interested in improving their condition, and that of their nation, nor would it be practicable in a world full of threats to international stability. Therefore, both the democracies and the autocracies have aimed, and still aim, at self-preservation and, generally, at the expansion of their own influence. The only difference between the two, lies in the fact that, at least in the years immediately following the two world wars, as a result of the horrors experienced, and the devastation suffered, democracies aspired to be able to conduct their foreign policy consistently with their principles.
The construction by democracies of an apparently idyllic image of their own, adhering to their ideal values, and functional to fueling their mythology, has inevitably shown all its limits in a short term. In fact, the hope of exploiting this narrative to seduce and convert a world in which autocracies are the majority has proven to be illusory. The utopian prospect of democratizing the entire international community, also resorting to a complex set of principles, laws, and ad hoc institutions, soon clashed with authoritarian entities, with different values and needs, not particularly interested in embracing such a model. Even more so, if this, very often, did not appear as a disinterested gift but as a sophisticated means deployed by democracies to extend and consolidate their own power. Consequently, forced to choose between adhering to their ideals and achieving their political goals, democracies have inexorably decided on the second option, agreeing to contradict themselves. Faced with its own incoherence, the ideal representation of democratic regimes quickly gave way to a cynical and hypocritical image, sinking into a slow but inevitable crisis, external as much as domestic. The supporters of the democratic model themselves have come to question its validity, without arriving at alternative solutions.
Not considering that, noting all the relevant differences, geopolitical dynamics have not changed much over the last century, democracies still believed they could impose their rules in a world that they did not control, if not in part. Furthermore, they thought that they could reconcile the irreconcilable by adopting traditional methods of foreign policy and, at the same time, continuing to support their narrative, inevitably producing bad results in the international arena. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes, according to their respective capacities, have continued to pursue their objectives, ignoring and circumventing the weak obstacles, legal or moral, posed by democracies. In other words, the structure put in place by democracies for their advantage, quickly backfired, transforming into a complex set of constraints that prevented them from effectively facing much freer and more unscrupulous adversaries. Naturally, this is not intended to deny the greater difficulties inherent in democratic systems and the efforts, even sincere, that they make to mitigate international conflict.
Faced with this crisis, today more than ever, self-reflection and a return to a more realistic and less ideological vision of international politics are called for, and the Russo-Ukrainian War seems to be a clear proof of this. It would mean, for democracies, to solve the eternal internal conflict that characterizes them, accepting the irreconcilability of democratic idealism with the pragmatism of international politics. By assuming Headley Bull's idea of an international society as intrinsically anarchic, it would be possible to abandon the unrealistic idea of ordering and dealing with foreign relations according to rules and principles not shared by everyone. This could be a way for democracies to face autocracies on equal terms, functionally limiting their ideal image to only the relationships between authentically democratic entities. Obviously, this does not imply that conflict is always inevitable or that it represents the only solution to conflicts between Powers. It only intends to reaffirm the need to accept, in some circumstances, the unavoidability of conflict and, consequently, the duty to face it appropriately in order to achieve success.
In the next publication of the cycle, we will talk about the economic dispute between the BRICS and the West in relation to the war in Ukraine.
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