Russo-Ukrainian War - The origins of the conflict: from brotherhood to enmity?

  Focus - Allegati
  10 novembre 2022
  24 minuti, 18 secondi

Abstract:

We begin our cycle of publications on the Russo-Ukrainian War by providing a historical picture of relations between Moscow and Kiev since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The evolution of relations between the two countries represent an essential element for understanding the origins of the conflict. The tensions, which arose following the deposition of President Yanukovych in 2014 and culminating in the annexation of Crimea and the support provided by the Kremlin to the breakaway republics of Donbas, led to the definitive compromise of Russian-Ukrainian relations. The Russian invasion of last February and the start of a real war between the parties, represents the epilogue of these events. Unexpected turnaround or inevitable consequence?

Authors:

Michele Gioculano - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics

Simone Mezzabotta - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics

Nicola Zanini - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics

Introduction

On the 24th February 2022, Russian armed forces launched a large scale invasion of Ukraine, following several weeks of intense diplomatic confrontation and military tensions. This invasion started after a televised speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin, in which he explained the reasons of what he called a “special military operation” to protect the populations of the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk and of Russia itself. (Putin, 2022). The origins of this conflict, as it was presented by President Putin himself, are rooted in the complicated and variegated relationship that Russia and Ukraine have had, since the end of the Second World War and, especially, after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

Ukraine and the Russian sphere of influence: from World War II to 2014

In order to talk about the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, it is important to understand that it has not always been one of conflict. It has, in fact, always alternated between brotherhood and hostility and this can also be seen in the large percentage of Ukrainians of Russian origins, and vice versa. After a brief independent period after World War I and the annexation to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the 1920s, during World War II, Ukraine was essentially split into two. In fact, Western Ukraine was invaded by Nazi Germany in 1941 and remained under its control up until 1944, whilst the eastern part remained under the control of the Soviet Union. Independently from the ruler, during the Second World War, Ukrainians suffered from famine and extreme suffering.

With the end of the Second World War, the winning countries, i.e. the United States of America (US), United Kingdom (UK) and the USSR decided to divide Europe into two zones of influence, in the West there were to be countries allied with the US, whilst in the East the ones allied with the Soviet Union. It was as if “an iron curtain […] descended across the Continent” (Churchill, 1945) because of the lack of connection between the two blocks. Each of these two blocks had formal military and economical ties with the respective Great Power. It has to be remembered that, in fact, in 1945, Europe exited from the war completely devasted, from the bombings and the fighting. It was therefore extremely important to have great sums of money to be dedicated to the Reconstruction, and there the two Great Powers saw the opportunity to exercise their great influence.

The USA, in fact, approved the so-called “Marshal Plan” which put forward, starting in 1947, 13.3 billion dollars, providing their allies with the much needed resources. In the USSR, instead, as a response to the US’ Marshal Plan, in 1949, Stalin created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECOM in Russian), which lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. This council was planned to lead the economic growth of the Eastern European satellite countries closer to the Soviet Union and its ideals.

In following years, These two economic plans were accompanied with the creation of military alliances, with the formal intent of reciprocal defence, and the implicit one of being a way for the Great Powers to assume an even greater role in the national and international policies of their allies. In the West, this organization took the name of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO came to be after the signing of a series of treaties amongst Western countries, the first one of them being the “Brussel Treaty”. This was signed in March, 1948 and had the aim of providing collective defence to the various signing parties. At the same time a resolution in the US Senate was passed, asking US President Truman to sign a treaty of defence with Western Europe, in order to have a military force independent from the Security Council’s Russian Veto. This led to the signing, after extensive negotiations, of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, that was soon followed by the Mutual Defence Assistance Program that appropriated 1.4 billion USD to building Western European Defences. Some years later, in 1955, the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, unofficially known as the Warsaw Pact, was signed between the USSR and its allies, just after the accession of West Germany to NATO, and it was seen as a response to the Western alliance. The two military alliances were opposed up until the time of dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact in 1991.

In the years of Soviet rule, Ukraine always was on challenging ground with its ruler. In fact, if on one side the economical help was well seen from the Ukrainian people, on the other, there have been many clashes between them, especially regarding political rule. The central Soviet Party and its Secretary General, in fact, effectively decided many of the policies of the country, in particular those connected to the industrialization and the economical development. Moreover, the Secretaries General of the Ukrainian Soviet Party were nominated by the Russian one and, depending on the nomination and the figure that was in charge of the national section of the Party the relationships between the two countries were more or less conflictual.

In 1989 and 1990, a wave of protests against the central Regime swept across Central and Eastern Europe; in part, this was also started by the fall of the Berlin Wall on the 9th of November 1989. In Ukraine, in the first months of 1990, more than four hundred thousand people joined hands creating a human line that stretched more than 600 kilometres. In July of the same year, the new Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, declared independence for the first time, but was contrasted by the USSR. Just one year later, with a crumbling Soviet Union, the Parliament declared independence for the second time, officialising it with a vote in December of 1991, just a handful of days before the official dissolution of the USSR.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the extremely divided Continent started to unite once again. Already in the summer of 1990, the vast majority of the former soviet countries had held free elections and elected their new democratic leader. This was, however, not well seen by many exponents of the Soviet leadership and the high ranking officers of the Security Services, of which President Vladimir Putin was part. They saw the independence of the Soviet Republics as a weakening of the Russian power, caused by the Soviet Union, that by giving them their own territories, detached them from the Russian sphere of influence and carelessly created the conditions for the independence of a vital part of Russia. This point of view was further detailed in the speech delivered by Putin on the 21st of February, showing how contemporary it still is.

The process of democratization of the old Soviet Republics was not without contrasts and bloodshed. A clear example is Romania. Its dictator, Nicolae Ceaceşcu refused to concede any reforms and repressed the protests against his government with the use of force. In the month of December 1990, therefore, he was arrested by some military units in the countryside and executed soon after. The governments of the new-born states changed drastically the landscape of Europe itself. Many of these new republics, in fact, in the years following the fall of the Soviet Union, demanded to join the European Union and NATO. This therefore determined the change in positioning of these countries in the world’s geopolitical exchequer: from being part of the Eastern Bloc, they assumed a more western prone role. Czechia, Hungary and Poland, the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia all joined NATO between 1995 and 2004.

Some other countries, instead, continued having good overall relationships with Russia. Belarus is a brilliant example of it. Out of all the former Soviet republics of Europe’s, Belarus is the one that has closer ties with its former ruler and whose closeness has also been shown in the facts of this war. After an apparent estrangement in the early years of the fall of the Soviet Union, the two countries reconnected with the rise to power of Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko in July 1994. A series of reconciliation policies were enacted, first of them all being the signing of the “Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation” in 1995.

It can be said that Ukraine has a peculiar position in this framework. During the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union, in fact, the country brought forward a series of anti-Russia policies, that could, however, not be too strong, in order not to completely lose an important economic partner, as Russia is for Ukraine. Moreover, with the change of governments, so did the attitude of Ukraine’s leaders towards Russia, and thus the policies that were brought forward.

From its independence in 1991, a series of confrontations and political unrest cyclically shook Ukraine. These episodes increased the tensions, not only in the relationship with Russia, but also within the population of Ukraine itself. The public opinion, in fact, became more and more divided between “pro-Russia” and a “pro-West”. At the end of the Cold War, in fact, many of Russia’s Nuclear Weapons were stored in Ukraine, making it the third nuclear power of the World. Moreover, Ukraine was greatly dependent on Russian gas and oil that was delivered to the rest of Europe through pipelines that passed into Ukrainian territory. Last but not least there was the problem of the Black Sea Fleet, whose base was in Sevastopol, formally recognized as Ukrainian territory. It was seen of utmost importance for Russia to regain control of its nuclear assets and a base for its fleet. A series of treaties and agreements were, therefore, signed in the years after the independence. Some of the most important ones are: the “Budapest Memorandum” that was to cede to Russia the nuclear assets, with, in change, a recognition of the Ukrainian borders and its independency; and then a series of three treaties, known as “Partition Treaties” in which it was allowed to Russia to continue using the naval base of Sevastopol, in change of the payment of a lease from Russia’s part and the inviolability of Ukrainian Territory.

In the following years, Ukraine and Russia began a period of increased cooperation. In 2005, however, with the election of President Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine changed its geopolitical posture, strengthening its partnership with the European Union and bid to join NATO. This bid was placed in January 2008, one month prior to the Russo-Georgian war, an event that further complicated the relations between Russia and Ukraine. The latter, in fact, declared its support for the Georgian cause and was accused from the former of providing Georgia with weapons. The situation further precipitated in 2009 when the export of natural gas from Russia through Ukraine was cut, due to disputes over gas prices. The relationship, however, changed again when Viktor Yanukovych was elected as Ukrainian President in 2010. He started a friendly approach towards Russia, starting a series of negotiations and agreements with then President Dmitry Medvedev in order to increase cooperation between the two countries. It was, for example, negotiated a price cap on Russian gas, in exchange for a prolongation of the lease of Sevastopol’s naval base.

From Crimea to the Donbas

In November 2013, trade and association talks with the EU came to a standstill. As Kyiv’s economic ties with Moscow were revived, protests and civil unrest broke out across Ukraine. The wave of demonstration that followed became known as Euromaidan, since Kyiv’s Maidan Square seemed to be the nevralgic centre. In February 2014, a series of clases occurred between protesters and government forces, with dozens of casualties among the former. Eventually, the Ukrainian parliament voted for the removal of Yanukovich as president. These events were later called the “Revolution of Dignity” by the supporters of Euromaidan. In the same period, armed men began occupying key facilities and checkpoints on the Crimean Peninsula. The Kremlin, which had initially denied any ties with the occupying forces, eventually went on to admit to their association with Moscow and by March, Russian troop presence had expanded across the Peninsula. Through a referendum conducted without the presence of any international observers, Moscow’s claims to Crimea were strengthened, with local authorities announcing that 96.7% of the voters had chosen to join Russia.From Crimea to the Donbas

In November 2013, trade and association talks with the EU came to a standstill. As Kyiv’s economic ties with Moscow were revived, protests and civil unrest broke out across Ukraine. The wave of demonstration that followed became known as Euromaidan, since Kyiv’s Maidan Square seemed to be the nevralgic centre. In February 2014, a series of clases occurred between protesters and government forces, with dozens of casualties among the former. Eventually, the Ukrainian parliament voted for the removal of Yanukovich as president. These events were later called the “Revolution of Dignity” by the supporters of Euromaidan. In the same period, armed men began occupying key facilities and checkpoints on the Crimean Peninsula. The Kremlin, which had initially denied any ties with the occupying forces, eventually went on to admit to their association with Moscow and by March, Russian troop presence had expanded across the Peninsula. Through a referendum conducted without the presence of any international observers, Moscow’s claims to Crimea were strengthened, with local authorities announcing that 96.7% of the voters had chosen to join Russia.

The annexation of Crimea was completed with the signing of the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia on March 18. In the same month, pro-Russian separatist groups began demonstrating in the Donbas, a collective name for the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Whereas pro-Russian protests took part in the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine, the situation precipitated in Donbas. There, some anti-government protesters seized multiple government buildings, causing Kyiv to react violently. The following month, Ukrainian armed forces launched the “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO), a counter-offensive aimed at regaining control of the breakaway provinces.

By the end of the summer, the ATO managed to reduce the portion of territory under rebel control and came close to reaching the border between Russia and Ukraine. At that point, Russia reportedly armed, trained, and financed anti-government militias, who were progressively joined by unmarked Russian contingents, especially when the pro-Russians were on the brink of defeat. Notwithstanding the accusations by various actors, the Kremlin denied any direct involvement in the conflict despite accusations by various actors.

With Russian support, the separatist forces launched a counter-offensive that allowed them to reverse some of the ground losses that had occurred during the summer. On 5th September, Ukraine and Russia, which also acted as the guarantor of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), reached a ceasefire agreement that included a series of measures aimed at easing tensions in the region. Nevertheless, violations of the agreement, which was also known as Minsk I, became increasingly common towards the end of the year, until the ceasefire collapsed altogether in January 2015. Heavy fighting resumed and, at the end of the month, DPR forces seized the Donetsk International Airport, located in the last neighbourhood of the city under government control. This victory galvanised rebel troops, who went on to occupy the crucial railway of Debaltseve.

In February 2015, French President François Hollande and the German chancellor Angela Merkel proposed a new peace plan for the resolution of the conflict. After hours of discussions and negotiations - brokered by France and Germany - in Belarus, leaders from both sides agreed upon a package of peacekeeping measures that is normally referred to as Minsk II. Some analysts saw the latter as more comprehensive than Minsk I, insomuch as it included the promise of constitutional reforms in Ukraine, an OSCE-observed unconditional ceasefire from mid-February, partial disarmament, and the release of prisoners of war. Others, however, underlined its high complexity and its similarity to the failed Minsk I. In the following months, multiple skirmishes occurred along the frontlines without any major territorial changes. The conflict gradually became static, as both sides fortified their positions with trenches, bunkers, and tunnels. In 2018, the Ukrainian ATO was renamed "Joint Forces Operation" (JFO), whilst the region remained a war zone, with dozens of soldiers and civilians regularly being killed.

In January 2021, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made an appeal to US President Joe Biden to allow Ukraine to join NATO and this was accompanied with sanctions against the opposition leader, Viktor Medvedchuk, over his ties with Putin. During the spring, Russian troop presence increased along the Ukrainian border in what were described as “training exercises.” In October, Ukraine’s use of the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone to destroy mobile artillery in the Donbass particularly angered the Kremlin and the build-up continued, whilst denying any plans to invade Ukraine.

While the U.S. warned Russia of serious consequences in case of an invasion, Russia presented its own demands for the cessation of NATO military activities in eastern Europe and Ukraine. In response to growing Russian troop build-up in neighbouring Belarus, NATO put troops on standby in addition to sending ships and fighter jets to bolster Europe’s eastern defences. With Washington refusing to rule out the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO and Putin’s allegations of NATO expansion and deployment of “strike weapons systems near Russia’s borders,” tensions continued to grow.

The Vanishing Point

Relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine began to deteriorate further between late 2021 and early 2022. The mutual exchange of accusations between Moscow and Kyiv about violence and meddling in the Donbas has exacerbated positions, leading to an increase in clashes between separatist forces and the Ukrainian army, starting in mid-February. The turning point took place on February 21, with the signing by President Putin of the resolution, approved by the State Duma, with which Russia diplomatically recognizes the republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. At the same time, the Kremlin announced the signing, with the two separatist republics, of a military cooperation agreement and the sending of Russian troops and mechanized units to Donbas as part of a peacekeeping mission. Although devoid of any international assent or endorsement, the formal Russian recognition, as well as the displacement of troops in Ukrainian territory, has inevitably increased the level of tension with Kyiv, as well as arousing the indignation of much of the international community and the United Nations. In the same hours, the FSB, the Russian security service, reported Ukrainian bombings and raids on Russian territory, more precisely in the Rostov Oblast. This accusation was denied by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, which defined the attacks as false flag operations by the Russians. Fearing an aggression, Ukrainian President Zelenskiy declared a state of national emergency on February 23 and mobilized his reservists, as the Russian legation prepared to leave Kyiv. Some commentators have argued that these events were to be understood as a new phase of the Donbas War, with Russia officially becoming part of the conflict.

On February 24, through a televised address, President Putin announced the start of a "special military operation" in eastern Ukraine, aimed at guaranteeing the security of Russia and the populations of Donbas, deemed threatened by the "Nazi government of Kyiv". This triggered a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. After numerous air and missile raids, Moscow's troops advanced in three directions: in the north from the border between Ukraine and Belarus, in the east from the border between Ukraine and Russia, and in the south from occupied Crimea. Kyiv government responded to the aggression by breaking off diplomatic relations with the Kremlin, ordering the general mobilization of its armed forces and enacting martial law throughout the country. Despite the tenacious Ukrainian resistance, in a short time, Russian units managed to occupy large portions of the Ukrainian territory and to encircle the capital, Kyiv. However, within a month, the Russian advance lost all momentum and the occupiers began to suffer from major logistical problems and gaps in the supply and command chain. On 25 March, taking advantage of the exhaustion and scarce resources of the Russians, Ukrainian troops launched a counter-offensive in the Kyiv region, leading to the breaking of the siege of the city. The inability to ensure adequate supplies, coupled with constant sabotage carried out by Ukrainian partisans in the rear, forced Russian commands to order a general retreat from the northern quadrant. This operation ended only in April, with the complete recovery of the area by the Ukrainian forces.

In the other quadrants, with the support of the forces of the Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk, Russians quickly took control of a part of Donbas and the regions of Kherson, Kharkiv and Melitopol. In Donbas, between May and June, the invasion forces concentrated their attacks, managing to occupy, after fierce fighting, strategic cities such as Mariupol and Sievierodonetsk. Subsequently, with the declared intention of occupying the entire claimed territory of the separatist republics of Donbas, the Russians concentrated their operations in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. However, the resistance of Ukrainian forces, supplied by Western partners, has led to a period of stalemate, made up of modest advances and retreats, of little importance on a strategic level.

Only in September, after meticulous preparations and a long campaign of disinformation, Ukrainian forces, also thanks to Western military supplies, launched a vast counter-offensive in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. These operations have already led to the liberation of the entire Kharkiv region and significant advances in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions by the Ukrainians, as well as in Kherson. Russian abandonment or withdrawal from important cities allowed Ukrainian troops to quickly regain important portions of territory, inflicting significant losses on the occupiers. The counter-offensive is still ongoing, although it has lost much of its initial momentum.

Conclusions

In the weeks following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many have questioned why the Russian intervention was not foreseen by analysts and institutions. First of all it must be said that, starting from the end of the Second World War, the conventional military instrument is no longer considered a legitimate means of foreign policy for a country. War is no longer one of the many options available to governments for resolving international disputes. It is relegated to the role of extreme eventuality, to be resorted to with extreme caution and, preferably, behind adequate reasons to justify the intervention, which can be shared by many parties. Obviously, this did not produce the disappearance of armed interventions from the global scenario, many conflicts have occurred since then, but it has imposed, in an ever more stringent way, a new grammar of international relations. It requested that a military intervention, especially if conducted by a Great Power, be supported by reasons deemed legitimate and shared by a relevant part of the international community. Looking back over the history of the last few decades, it is easy to see how all the actions of force that have had a global impact have distinguished themselves for the characteristics mentioned above. To most experts and analysts, it therefore seemed unlikely that Russia would intervene personally in Ukraine. It was much more likely to be Moscow's bluff to increase its pressure on Kyiv. Furthermore, beyond the systemic conditions, Russia's modest international projection and low economic strength have made intervention even more unlikely. Although several NATO intelligence agencies and staff have repeatedly stressed the possibility of invasion from a military point of view, political and diplomatic considerations prevailed, suggesting that the Kremlin would not have launched into a war on a large scale that would upset the international system. The factual error of this prediction has inaugurated a new scenario in the field of international political grammar.

In the next publication of this cycle, we will analyze the cultural aspects characterizing the Russo-Ukrainian War.


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