Abstract
We continue our cycle of publications on the Russo-Ukrainian War by analyzing the impact that the BRICS, a bloc composed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, has had in the current global order. In order to achieve this goal, the first section of this paper will explore the inception of the group as well as the years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Later on, the renewed interest in the group with the recently announced expansion will be in focus. This second section will be devoted to each individual member of the BRICS and some of the main elements and concerns that may cause the countries to intensify their efforts to make the bloc stronger. The final section will consider some of the future possibilities for the group, believing that it is not necessarily the case that the BRICS are trying to replace the current Global Order, but to form parallel institutions within the current status quo as a way to garner more support for their developing needs.
Author
João Victor Silva Rodrigues - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Introduction
As of the time of writing this report, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is heading towards its second year, after Russian president Vladimir Putin announced the special military operation in February 2022 (Osborn & Nikolskaya, 2022). At this moment, the conflicting parties seem to have reached a stalemate. On the one hand, Ukraine’s counteroffensive seems to have stifled some of the momentum that the Russian side had, recuperating part of the territory that was seized by Russian troops; on the other, Russia managed to expand their area of control in the region, not to mention the fact that the counteroffensive is coming at a huge human and material cost for both sides. Some, however, have argued that, in the current stage, Russia may have gained the upper hand, something that was, in part, attributed to the production of drones and shells that supersedes that of Ukraine, as well as foreign material support from countries such as North Korea and Iran. Moreover, Putin seems to have convinced some countries of the global south that they have no major stake in the conflict (The Economist, 2023).
This is particularly noteworthy amidst recent reports coming from the 15th BRICS summit that Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have received an invitation to become members of the organization (Ismail, 2023; Rai News, 2023). The new and bolstered BRICS+ is set to come to fruition on January 1, 2024 should the invitees decide to join, and it might very well be a sign of the global south searching for alternatives to the current global order. It appears that the bloc has found a way to modernize and strengthen its structure with the newcomers and by establishing guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures for the future of the partnership (Tripathi, 2023; BRICS Membership Expansion, 2023). Nonetheless, the prospects of the group seemed less promising if one is to hark back to the pre Russo-Ukrainian war period. First, however, understanding the origins of the organization may shed some light on their objectives.
Renewed interest
The COVID-19 Pandemic had a huge impact on the global economy. For instance, world merchandise trade volume was as low as -5.1% in 2020, rebounding in 2021 to a 9.4% rate. Moreover, rise in commodity prices in the second half of 2022 meant an increase in trade volumes, especially as European countries looked for alternatives to natural gas supply from Russia, which drove the price of the commodity up everywhere else in the world (WTO, 2023). The period also represented a significant shift for the relevance of BRICS in the world economy as a whole: for the first time in its brief history, the BRICS had a larger share of the world’s GDP in purchasing power parity than the G7, with 31.02% and 30.94% respectively (Statista, 2023; IMF, 2023).
Brazil
After dealing with a recession and political instability for much of the 2010s, prospects for the Brazilian economy look brighter. In an event at the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), recently-elected president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva stated that he believes the 3.1% increase estimates for the GDP to be small, even if it is more than the expected (Terra, 2023). His election also represented a revision of the country’s foreign policy. The South American state noticeably lost some of its international prestige during former president Jair Bolsonaro’s term, as his foreign policy at times appeared to cater only to his supporters with little to no interest in maneuvering their position in the international level. This was noticeable during his speeches at the UN General Assembly, where he claimed he had saved his country from socialism, doubted the credibility of data related to deforestation in the Amazon rainforest, going as far as to blame indigenous peoples for fires, and criticized the validity of COVID vaccines all the while promoting treatments that had been disproved by scientists (Bartolo, 2023). The lack of planning for their foreign policy and the ideology-heavy approach led many Brazilian analysts to believe that the country had become an international pariah (Sousa et al., 2022; Belasques et al., 2022).
While president Lula is himself a controversial figure domestically, his government’s foreign policy during his previous tenure as president was, in the words of former foreign affairs minister Celso Amorim, “active and self-assertive”. Lula’s foreign policy during his first two terms as president looked to expand South-South cooperation and solidify Brazil’s place in the international system as a relevant player. This was made clear by the creation of organizations such as the Union of South American Nations, the active participation of the country in the World Trade Organization as well as the Brazilian-led peacekeeping force sent to Haiti in 2004 (Hamann and Texeira, 2017; IPEA, 2017) and their push for a UN Security Council reform (MRE, 2021). In effect, it is an approach that they hope to replicate with his new term as president of Brazil (Ferraz, 2023). To do so, some of the omissions from his predecessor must be addressed. First, more comprehensive measures to contain deforestation and protect the Amazon are of paramount importance, and markers show that deforestation has fallen to a five-year low in 2023 (Andreoni, 2023). In addition, recovering Brazil’s relevance in the international sphere is certainly relevant. An attempt to do so may be found in the state’s active participation in the 15th BRICS summit discussions over the expansion of the group and their newfound interest in intensifying Global South cooperation.
Russia
The Russo-Ukrainian War can be traced back to the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and it gained a new chapter after the full-fledged invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops in February 2022. As a result, several sanctions were put in place against Russia, with western countries restricting or outright banning oil and gas trade from Russia, as well as Russian banks, individual businesses and oligarchs having their assets frozen by national governments (BBC, 2023). The crash of the Russian Ruble followed soon after, with the contraction of the state’s trade surplus and increased defense spending in the wartime economy, which subsequently led to greater government spending as a whole. Interestingly enough, they have found ways to reduce the impact of those sanctions, with their partners China and India willing to buy Russian oil. This, together with increased government spending has resulted in Russia’s economy holding up (McHugh, 2023). In fact, the International Monetary Fund estimates that it will grow at a rate of 2.2% in 2023 (October 2023). Thus, the financial and commercial sanctions in place against Russia means that Putin needs to look elsewhere so as to keep their economy afloat. Furthermore, the expulsion from the G7 and diminishing participation in international institutions might be shifting the focus of the country to the Global South and forums that run parallel to the current global order, something that is evident in the case of BRICS, especially in light of Russia’s 2024 summit and presidency of the organization.
India
India is currently living a delicate moment in its history. The ever growing population creates an equally large need for energy. Notwithstanding the environmental goals set by the 2030 Agenda, the country’s consumption of coal and oil continues to rise in an effort to meet the needs of their citizens. In fact, coal and oil represent, respectively, 57% and 27% of the energy demand in India. 70% of the increase in coal demand in 2021 came from both China and India, the two most populous countries in the world (BP, 2022, p. 8-9).
India’s prime minister Narendra Modi pointed to developed countries' part in climate change during the COP28 opening session, saying “over the past century, a small section of humanity has indiscriminately exploited nature. However, [the] entire humanity is paying the price for this, especially people living in the global south” (Gelles, 2023). His words, however harsh they may sound, echo the ongoing debate of how to better deal with climate change, the allocation of emissions and the costs of prevention and coping. Responses to this dilemma could fit into fault-based and no-fault based responses. The former is often related to “the polluter pays” approach, while the latter is commonly associated with the principle of payment according to the ability to pay (Shue, 1993). Modi implies that, due to the historical development of the western countries and an uncontrolled use of natural resources, developing countries now should have the opportunity, within reason, to increase their energy capabilities in order to promote development. The numbers seem to give credence to his point, as India’s per capita primary energy consumption is 25.4 EJ, more than ten times less than the United States, for instance (BP, 2022, p. 11). Regardless, India has made considerable investments in green energy, pledging US$4 billion from the national budget to be used in facilitating the energy transition (Madhok, 2023). The BRICS are also part of this discussion, and this is made clear by the most recent declaration coming from the XV BRICS Summit.
China
China is the largest economy in the group, and is also the most influential member. The concept of BRICS plus was, in fact introduced, by Chinese officials during the 9th summit in 2017, to some resistance by Brazil and India. For the latter, expanding the group would lead to a reduced power of influence within the organization. For China, however, the accession of new members may very well be a way to expand its soft power, and, in practice, shows the informal hierarchies that are formed within the bloc (Hooijmaaijers, 2019; Daldegan, 2022; Stuenkel, 2023). This could also be understood as part of a wider, overarching plan by China to expand its role in the international system. From what it seems, in spite of lesser growth rates than in previous years, China’s economic expansion will continue, at least at a higher rate than the United States’.
John Mearsheimer (2014) stated that the Chinese rising economy would lead it to attempt to dominate Asia in the same way that the United States dominates the West, which in turn would lead their neighboring countries, the likes of Japan, South Korea, India, Russia and Vietnam, to join forces with the United States in order to deter its plans. This led him to believe that China’s rise would not be peaceful. He might be right in some of his assertions, as China has been trying to expand its influence over the South China Sea in what is part of a longstanding dispute over the control of the region (BBC, 2023). Furthermore, the ongoing dispute with Taiwan has led to heightened tensions with both the latter and the United States, which has been intensified by Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen’s rejection of the idea that the island is part of the People’s Republic territory (Al Jazeera, August 2023). According to him, this might be a way to emulate the United States model by trying to control the region and maximize the power gap with neighboring countries, while also limiting Western influence in the area. Mearsheimer also believes that the security competition that will ensue after China’s rise to superpower status would have some elements, such as proxy wars, major disputes, travel restrictions, arms race, which would lead to a possible (albeit only an estimate) Sino-American conflict, which would supposedly be more likely than a Soviet-American conflict ever was during the Cold War.
For Oliver Stuenkel (2018), the rise of China will happen while the country still needs to deal with basic development challenges domestically, with a large focus on eliminating poverty in the country. Owing to this, Beijing’s focus is not to completely change basic norms and rules in the Global Order, but to refine its economic model and reassure that other countries would be willing to engage economically under Chinese terms. Stuenkel believes that this would result in a post-Western world order with asymmetrical bipolarity, i.e. China would overtake the United States economically while the latter would maintain their economic preponderance. Consequently, according to the author, a bipolar, or even multipolar world might culminate in greater stability for the international system, as he rejects that the decline of the United States would spell trouble for the international order and, instead, he believes it might result in a greater reach of local and regional approaches. Part of this effort is, undoubtedly, expanding the BRICS and making it more representative of the Global South than before.
South Africa
The latest summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, was the first since 2018 to take place in the country. The initial feeling prior to the event was of concern, given the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Russian president Vladimir Putin. Since the African country is a party to the ICC Rome Statute, they would be compelled to arrest the indicted president should he travel to South Africa. The conundrum was solved since Putin decided not to attend the summit in person, instead taking part in the summit virtually and sending his foreign minister Sergei Lavrov in his stead (Peyton and Miridzhanian, 2023). While this helped avoid the tough situation, South Africa has been under scrutiny due to accusations of weapons trade to Russia by the United States, which was later rebutted by president Cyril Ramaphosa after an independent inquiry found no evidence to the claims (Kumwenda-mtambo, 2023).
In spite of being the less representative economy in the bloc, South Africa is still the biggest one in the African continent, and a larger international role would not only be consistent with their past stance but also a possible avenue to find solutions for the domestic issues through international cooperation (Reuters, October 2023). This could also be seen through the country’s participation in the most recent BRICS summit, as they brokered the inclusion of African nations in the membership expansion, which strengthens their current efforts to improve integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (Gruzd and de Carvalho, 2023). Additionally, Chinese investment in Africa has risen considerably in recent years, and South Africa is no exception to this trend, with a recent deal for a 123-megawatt photovoltaic project signed by Power China in July (Zhang and Li, 2023).
Where it will go from here
Some still do not believe that the BRICS will amount to anything with enough weight to influence the global order. Some have stressed how disparate the group is, and doubt whether their decisions would still be seamless in case of an intragroup divergence, as could be the case with China and India (Acharya and Araujo, 2023; Ismail, 2023). Others have pointed out how the NDB failed to reshape the global financial system, arguing that it is committing some of the same mistakes as the financial institutions they wished to replace. They point to vague commitments and the need to take the consequences of the projects being financed by the bank more seriously (Millar, 2023). While this is valid criticism, there is one element that critics have wrongly assumed: the NDB, and by extension the BRICS, do not wish to rebuild the current world order from scratch, or have an entirely separate order. They wish to generate space for their own voices to be heard within the current global order, and to do so on their terms. It should be noted that, as Mearsheimer himself clarifies in the case of China, the interests of the members once they achieve their development goals may vary, as they could expand their ambitions to a more comprehensive order of their own, besides the fact that in-group tensions would still be a possibility. Hence the global south critique of financial institutions and their supposedly western-centric predilections. This is also made clear by the continued push for the internationalization of the yuan, which is also a part of the overarching Chinese initiative to enlarge its power of influence around the world.
For Oliver Stuenkel, a Western-centric vision of the world results in the underestimation of, on the one hand the role non-Western actors had in the past, and, on the other, the constructive role that they will have in the future. Instead of confronting the existing institutions directly, as they have done with little to no return, emerging economies will build a parallel order that will complement the current international institutions, while still investing in the existing forums (Stuenkel, 2018). The bloc becomes more attractive for non-Western actors as they seem to prioritize the agenda for the Global South. With the current expansion, the voices of more non-Western actors might be amplified as they strive to have their demands met. The success of the BRICS, however, is also dependent on their original members. As the group seems to be part of China’s plan to increase their soft power, the development of the largest market in the bloc might dictate what we see from the BRICS in the future. Moreover, as sanctions pile up, Russia has been looking for new allies in the Global South, but the next chapters of the conflict with Ukraine could be decisive for the intragroup relations. Despite the partnership, it is unlikely that the members of the group would go against their national interests in order to support the invasion of Ukraine.
Classification of sources and information:
Information Content | ||
1 | Confirmed | Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
2 | Presumably true | Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
3 | Maybe true | Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic |
4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
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