Russo-Ukranian War - General test for a Third World War or construction of a new international order?

  Focus - Allegati
  21 marzo 2024
  11 minuti, 56 secondi

Abstract

We conclude our publication cycle of analysis on the Russian-Ukrainian war by addressing the reading of the conflict as a possible prelude to World War III or an attempt to build a new international order. To shed light on these readings, the first section of this paper is devoted to an analysis of the new world war "fought in pieces" in which from the definition of world conflict, we aim to get to the question of whether indeed the Russian-Ukrainian invasion can be framed as a prelude to a new global conflict. In the second section, on the other hand, we turn to the analysis of the new world order by making a comparison with what has happened in the last century, which is useful for understanding the current trend of the deployments of major states.

Author

Federico Luciano - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politica

Introduction

The Russian-Ukrainian war fits into the contemporary context of world conflicts, characterized by the complexity of geopolitical dynamics, and it is precisely in this perspective that the concept of a "third world war in pieces" is presented, thus highlighting the central role of the Russian-Ukrainian war within this vision.

With this particular definition, new scenarios for reading a world conflict are opened up, and there are various opinions and insights in this regard. In contrast to those who speak of a regionally limited conflict, and those who open up about consequences and risks of such a conflict on a global level, the behavior of the leading actors are nevertheless crucial in trying to delimit the new "global blocs" that are set to lead the political, economic and social life of the coming years.

The new World War fought in pieces

In 2014, it was Pope Francis who coined the terminology "Third World fragmented War" during the flight back from his trip to South Korea, referring to all the international crises going on in those months, characterized by the heinousness of unconventional wars now approaching "a level of appalling cruelty" (Pope Francis,2014). Ten years later, the concept of a fragmented global war is still widespread and increasingly cited by mainstream news outlets and geopolitical analysts.

To be able to concretely define the actual unfolding of a new world conflict, multiple aspects must be taken into account: from the modes of conflict to the geographical involvement of states belonging to multiple continents. In the past century, global conflicts have been characterized by numerous participants in the conflict on different theaters of the globe and with a strong split and division of states into two main sides according to their interests and alliances.

According to the Crisis Group, the number of ongoing or potential conflicts has reached the threshold of 55, of which more than one-fifth can be identified as war or armed confrontation, causing 90% civilian deaths (Crisis Group, Watch List 2024). The clashes engage detached areas of different continents, which is why we can currently still speak of "regional character". What leads analysts and the media to talk about the widening of conflicts is certainly the presence and deployment of states that are "geographically distant" from the affected area but directly or indirectly involved in the issues arising from that conflict.

The current Russian-Ukrainian war is a glaring example of this especially with NATO's armed intervention in the conflict, although not physically fighting in that area: the strong Western involvement led especially by the US and witnessed by the sending of weapons to the Ukrainian state, confirms the centrality of this conflict within a world war stage. It should be emphasized that in addition to the defense of international law and thus the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine following democratic and Western values, the American interest in establishing world leadership that would be challenged by a Putin victory in Ukraine is primary.

The risks of escalation of a regional war to an all-out war are often described in connection with the nuclear threat: Putin has personally named several times the risk of military escalation accusing the West of wanting to go that far (Putin’s annual speech, February 2024).

The nuclear issue has always been central to Russia's invasion of Ukraine: it is no secret that Russia is currently the country with the largest number of nuclear warheads and related arsenals and that, together with the U.S., it covers 90 percent of the availability of nuclear weapons around the globe. A consequence of these data is certainly the concrete and extensive concern of European states about possible nuclear escalation, justified, moreover, also by the very flexible interpretation of Russian doctrine for the use of such arsenals based on responding to the use of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction and responding to large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons. So it is not incorrect to associate nuclear risk withPutin's now famous and repeated phrase about using "all necessary means” to ensure the country's security.

Likewise, it should be noted that the resurgence of the atomic bomb is a generalized and global phenomenon with multiple actors involved such as China, Pakistan, North Korea, and India. Moreover, according to an analytical and countervailing reading, the nuclear threat at the same time has historically assumed a significant role in maintaining stability and peace among world powers, deterring state actors from acting aggressively, considering that the cost of a potential nuclear war would far exceed the carrying capacity of any party involved.

The comparison of the invasion in Ukraine with the early episodes of World War III is certainly in vogue and not to be ruled out even if, at present, the threats approaching a world conflict remain as such and have not been followed up in their practical implementation. Quite another matter, however, is to associate the Russian-Ukrainian war with the identification of a new world order.

International order: building the new or destroying the old?

What is described as the liberal world order has seen instability growth especially with the Russian invasion of Ukraine but in reality it is part of a process that has been going on for more than a decade: from the political failure in Iraq, through the financial economic crisis of 2007-2008, to the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Thus, it is not an isolated case that emerging powers are presenting themselves to new challenges with Western countries similarly claiming to be able to exert a sphere of influence over the international political space while trying to make their previous hegemonic order survive.

The events of the last two decades have certified that the construction of a bipolar world order is to be considered out of date and now consigned to history. With the beginning of the new century, the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have indeed put a definitive end to the change in the world order that began with the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

In the last two decades, there have been many analyses and views on the new organization of major world forces: there has often been talk of multipolarity following the creation of new groupings of states such as the BRICS or the G20, again of bipolarity with the democracy-autocracy opposition represented by the United States and China, and finally the Russian invasion of Ukraine that brought the vision of a "non-polar" world.

The war between Russia and Ukraine has brought out the difficulties of charting the new world order: complexities and contradictions, also related to the tensions in the other current world "hot spots," thus raise the question of whether or not it will be possible to arrive at an exact distribution of the world's major powers. The path is by no means linear, and, in addition to the "surplus" of current geopolitical tensions, it is the international organizations themselves that are in trouble.

Although there are more than fifty open conflicts in the world, the one between Russia and Ukraine is among the most talked about in the media and among the most followed by the major world powers. This is no coincidence as the conflict is crucial to the shaping of the new European order especially when compared with Russia's position, and inevitably much of the resulting world deployment passes through these very regions.

Throughout the two-year conflict, all European states, to which the European Union itself and NATO should be added, have been watching the conflict closely, believing that the consolidation of the international community on several levels could be effective not only in securing Kyiv's independence but also in blocking Russia's "imperialist aspirations" on neighboring regions such as Kazakhstan, Baltic countries and Moldova. On the other hand, Russia's violation of numerous signed pacts, from the UN Charter up to the OSCE and the dissolution of the USSR, were inevitably read as a threat to the European and world order.

It is therefore no coincidence that the war between Russia and Ukraine becomes the key junction for the future of international relations. First and foremost, the conflict definitively closes the post-World War II Cold War era as it goes back to armed confrontation on the ground between states, and also reserves the trend of the last years of the last century in which the consideration of traditional warfare was no longer at the center of international politics.

The invasion of Ukraine, on the other hand, testifies to a reopening toward state militarization from a defensive perspective and inevitably contributes to the spread of a bipolarization of the parties to the conflit. The bipolarity of the parties to the conflict, however, does not find correspondence in an equally bipolar architecture related to the world order: the growing geopolitical breakdown of the international system, the bivalent behavior of European countries toward Russia regarding its involvement in the common European security architecture, and the differing consideration of the scope of the conflict all testify to the current attempt to create a new, well-defined political and diplomatic world order.

Based on this international disarray, the fate of the conflict could be decisive in overcoming this statemate and identifying a solid position of the major world players: much of it will depend on the role of the European Union and the direction of its new “neighborhood policy” both in relation to its American partner and with the coexistence of a possible new “iron curtain” in the east on the border with Russia.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the Russian-Ukrainian war is definitely to be read and considered as not only a territorial dispute but as a conflict of world interest. Considering, on the one hand, the complexity of the elements at stake and the interests of individual states and at the same time the manner of the conflict's conduct and the modern concept of war, the Russian-Ukrainian issue is identified in a much broader and displaced war stage with different fires on several continents; to this end, the association with the beginning of a new world conflict could be realistic in a framework of analysis that breaks away from the "old" conception and definition of World War, replaced with the consideration of new and proper characteristics of "modern warfare." At the same time, it is certainly possible to point to a change in the world order from the classical bloc alignments of the last century, although the many different international diplomatic issues in the making still make it difficult to establish a new fixed and stable world order, characterized instead by a high degree of impermanence and continuous evolution.



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