Abstract
The 2023 coup in Niger marked another turbulent episode in the nation's tumultuous political history, characterized by the delicate balance between civilian and military rule, and the influence of its resource wealth, particularly uranium. The events of the 2023 coup emphasize Niger's persistent struggle for political stability, good governance, and socio-economic development since gaining independence from French colonial rule in 1960. The aftermath of the coup unleashed a series of global ramifications, as nations like France, the United States, and Niger's allies grapple with the challenge of navigating shifting alliances and maintaining strategic interests in the region. It also examines how Russia's potential influence in the wake of the coup introduces a new layer of complexity in the Sahel's geopolitical dynamics. The article concludes by addressing the growing public opposition to Western military presence in Niger and its implications for international partners.
Keywords: Africa, security, crisis.
Author
Simone Mezzabotta, Junior Researcher Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Introduction
The 2023 coup marked another turbulent episode in Niger's political history. Amidst growing discontent with the government and fractured political landscape, a group of military officers headed by General Abdourahmane “Omar” Tchiani seized power, suspending the constitution and dissolving political institutions (Al Jazeera 2023). Since becoming independent from France, Niger's political history has been characterized by a struggle to maintain political stability and democratic governance. The nation's resource wealth, particularly uranium, has been both a source of revenue and a point of contention. The delicate balance between civilian and military rule, as well as the presence of multiple political factions, has made Niger's political landscape intricate and challenging to navigate. The events of the 2023 coup underscore the nation's ongoing journey in search of political stability, good governance, and socio-economic development.
Niger's Political History
Niger gained independence from French colonial rule on August 3, 1960, and, soon after, Hamani Diori established a one-party regime, which he governed until a coup in 1974 removed him from power. Subsequently, the nation entered a period of military rule, initially under the leadership of Seyni Kountché, who held power until his passing in 1987, and then under the leadership of Ali Seibou. In 1993, Niger witnessed its first multiparty presidential elections, leading to the election of Mahamane Ousmane from the Social Democratic Convention. (Britannica)
During this time, a Tuareg rebellion, which commenced in the northern region of the country in the early 1990s, gathered momentum until a ceasefire agreement in 1995 helped quell much of the conflict. In 1996, Ousmane was ousted in a military coup led by Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara. Following a brief period of military rule, Maïnassara assumed the presidency through elections that were marred by irregularities, and his tenure was met with widespread discontent, ultimately culminating in his assassination during a coup in 1999 (Britannica). The aftermath of the coup saw a nine-month transitional government led by Major Daouda Malam Wanké and the Conseil de Réconciliation Nationale (CRN). Later in the same year, a new constitution was introduced, and elections were held, ushering in the return to democratic governance with the election of Mamadou Tandja, representing the Mouvement National pour une Société de Développement–Nassara (MNSD). Tandja's leadership was widely acknowledged for its role in achieving political stability within the country, a feat that led to his re-election in 2004.
Under the constitutional provisions of a two-term limit, Tandja was scheduled to conclude his term in December 2009, albeit Tandja aimed to extend his presidency by an additional three years, during which time a new constitution would be crafted to transform Niger from a semi-presidential republic to a full presidential republic under a continued leadership. To realize his ambitions, Tandja sought a referendum to amend the constitution, allowing for the extension of his term, but the National Assembly refused to endorse this proposal. In response, Tandja pursued the matter in the country's Constitutional Court. On May 26, the court issued a nonbinding ruling, asserting that the referendum would be unconstitutional without the approval of the National Assembly. Later that same day, Tandja dissolved the legislative body, and, soon after, he established a committee responsible for drafting a new constitution that would permit the three-year extension of his rule and eliminate presidential term limits. On June 5, a presidential decree was issued, setting the date for the referendum on the new constitution as August 4.
Tandja's actions fueled widespread discontent both within the country and across the international community. Strikes and protests emerged in opposition to the impending referendum. A coalition of political parties and civil groups, collectively known as the Front for Defense of Democracy (FDD), contested the presidential decree before the Constitutional Court. The court's ruling on June 12 invalidated the presidential decree, stating that the referendum could not proceed without the consent of the dissolved National Assembly. Unlike the court's previous non binding ruling, this decision carried legal weight. Tandja requested the court to reverse its decision, but on June 26, it upheld its previous ruling. Despite the protests and unrest, Tandja pressed ahead with the referendum as scheduled on August 4. Although opposition leaders encouraged a boycott, official results indicated that over 92 percent of voters approved the referendum, thereby enabling Tandja to remain in power for an additional three years beyond the originally mandated end of his term in December 2009 (Britannica). On October 20, an election was held to fill the void left by the dissolved National Assembly. In the days leading up to the election, ECOWAS called on Tandja to postpone the election to allow for talks with the opposition, but when its plea went unanswered, and the election took place as scheduled, ECOWAS suspended Niger's membership in the organization. Election results were announced several days later, indicating that Tandja's party, the MNSD, secured a majority of the seats.
Notwithstanding apparent referendum and election victories, Tandja's actions remained unpopular with many, and on February 18, 2010, he was overthrown in a coup. Later that evening, the coup participants announced the formation of a military junta, the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy, and declared the suspension of the constitution, the dissolution of state institutions, and their intention to restore democracy. On February 23, the junta appointed former cabinet minister Mahamadou Danda as prime minister, and, in October, voters approved a new constitution that curtailed the presidential powers Tandja had introduced in 2009. The junta organized presidential and legislative elections on January 31, 2011. The Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism–Tarayya (PNDS), an established opposition party, secured the most seats in the National Assembly with 39 seats. A presidential runoff was scheduled for March 12, pitting Mahamadou Issoufou, the leader of the PNDS, against Seyni Oumarou, a leader of the MNSD and former prime minister. Issoufou emerged victorious in the runoff, securing approximately 58 percent of the vote. His inauguration on April 7, 2011, marked Niger's return to civilian rule, and the peaceful transition was followed by a resumption of foreign aid, which had been frozen after the coup.
In the years following Issoufou's inauguration, various Islamic militant groups gained prominence in the region, leading to increasing attacks in Niger. Boko Haram, based in neighboring Nigeria and notorious for its attacks there, extended its violence into Niger, specifically in the southern region. Niger collaborated with several other countries to combat this threat and began accommodating tens of thousands of refugees who had fled from Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and sought refuge in southern Niger. Simultaneously, in December 2013, a substantial protest took place in Niamey, with Nigeriens expressing their frustration over the lack of significant improvements in living standards under Issoufou's leadership. This demonstration of discontent was the first of its kind since he took office, with some protesters also highlighting concerns about media censorship and alleged government corruption. Prominent opposition figures, including Oumarou and former prime minister Hama Amadou, voiced the grievances of the public.
In December 2015, Issoufou reported that the government had thwarted a coup attempt, resulting in the arrest of several military officers. However, some opposition leaders questioned these claims, accusing Issoufou of attempting to create a dramatic scenario before the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for February 2016. Issoufou was the flag bearer of the PNDS in these elections and faced 14 other contenders for the presidency. The most prominent challengers included Amadou from the Nigerien Democratic Movement for an African Federation (MODEN-FA Lumana Africa), Oumarou from the MNSD, and former president Ousmane from the Nigerien Movement for Democratic Renewal (MNRD). Notably, Amadou ran his campaign from his prison cell, where he had been incarcerated in November 2015 on charges related to a baby trafficking ring, which he vehemently denied. While a court of appeals denied him release on bail, the Constitutional Court cleared his path to run for the presidency.
The election took place on February 21, 2016. Issoufou garnered the most votes, with slightly more than 48 per cent, but because he did not achieve an outright majority, a runoff election was scheduled for March 12. The top two candidates were Issoufou, who received 36 per cent of the vote, and Oumarou, who secured 23 per cent. Issoufou triumphed in the runoff election, securing around 58 per cent of the vote. His inauguration on April 7, 2016, marked a historic moment in Niger's democratic journey, as it was the first time power had been democratically transferred from one elected leader to another. Nonetheless, Niger's security concerns persisted, with various Islamic militant groups, such as Boko Haram, operating in the region and launching attacks within Niger. These security threats remained particularly severe along the borders with Mali in the west and Nigeria in the south, where deadly attacks by these groups continued. Nonetheless, there was also some economic progress during Issoufou's tenure, with the country's GDP showing positive growth for much of his presidency and a decrease in the percentage of Nigeriens living below the poverty line from around 50 per cent in 2011 to about 41 per cent in 2019 (SOURCE). 2020 was a crucial year for Niger, as presidential elections occurred amid the global COVID-19 pandemic and its detrimental economic impact.
With Issoufou complying with the constitutional limit of two terms, Mohamed Bazoum from the PNDS, Issoufou's party, and Mahamane Ousmane received the most votes, with about 39 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. After the runoff held on February 21, 2021, Bazoum was declared the winner, receiving over 55 per cent of the votes, and soon after the Constitutional Court confirmed his victory. Nevertheless, just days before Bazoum's scheduled inauguration on March 31, the government reported an attempted coup, which was swiftly suppressed. The incident did not affect the planned transfer of power, and on April 2, Issoufou stepped down while Bazoum was sworn in as president. This marked a significant moment in Niger's history, as it was the first instance of a democratic transition from one elected leader to another in the country.
Approximately two years after Bazoum's inauguration, on July 26, 2023, he was deposed in a military coup. During this coup, he was detained by members of his presidential guard. Following this event, military leaders suspended the constitution, dissolved the government, and took control of the country. On July 28, General Abdourahmane Tchiani, the former head of Bazoum's presidential guard, was named the president of the military junta tasked with leading Niger.
The Aftermath of the Coup
Once the event was unequivocally labeled as a coup d'état, Paris, on July 29, suspended its development assistance and budgetary support to Niger, refusing to recognise the new authorities (France 24 2023). In the meantime, the EU also ceased all cooperation activities. Meanwhile, ECOWAS imposed financial sanctions and gave the coup leaders one week to restore constitutional order, including the threat of "using force" if necessary (Source). In response, the CNSP pledged an "immediate response" in case of aggression (DW 2023), whilst military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea, all members of the African organization, expressed their disagreement with ECOWAS's decisions. The military leaders in power in Ouagadougou and Bamako warned that any military intervention against Niger would be considered a declaration of war against them. They also threatened to withdraw from the economic community and affirmed their support for the Nigerien coup leaders.
On August 20, General Tiani, unveiled his roadmap in a televised address. This plan entailed a transition period lasting no more than three years and the promotion of an inclusive national dialogue. Tiani also reiterated that Niger would defend itself if faced with military intervention. Furthermore, the junta publicly accused France, which maintained around 1,500 troops in Niger, of attempting to destabilize the nation (France 24 2023). After several weeks of tensions with the regime in Niger, Paris ultimately recalled its diplomat at the end of September. The Nigerien military had revoked the diplomatic immunity and visa of Sylvain Itté in late August, but Paris had previously refused to recall him, arguing that it does not recognise the legitimacy of the military authorities and that its interlocutor remains the ousted President Mohamed Bazoum. Recently, Emmanuel Macron also announced that the 1,500 French soldiers deployed in Niger to support the fight against jihadism would leave the country by the end of the year, as requested by the Niamey regime. The President acknowledged that the "de facto" authorities in Niger "no longer wish to combat terrorism." (FranceInfo 2023). The military celebrated these announcements, even though they expressed their desire for this withdrawal to occur "within a negotiated framework and by mutual agreement.” (FranceInfo 2023).
At the same time, the United States has been watching closely the unfolding of events, as Niger is a crucial strategic partner for the US. It is essential to underline that Niger is the largest recipient of military assistance from the U.S. State Department in West Africa and the second-largest in sub-Saharan Africa. Washington has provided training and equipment to bolster Niger's military and security forces in their fight against terrorism and transnational crime. The United States also serves as Niger's leading bilateral development aid partner. (Carnegie 2023)
Following the events of July 26, the United States suspended specific aid programs to Niger, including funding for international military education and training, as well as programs supporting Niger's counterterrorism capabilities. Nonetheless, the Biden administration did not officially classify the military takeover as a "coup", although recent events suggest that they might do so in the near future (CNN 2023). Such a designation could lead to the termination of all U.S. security assistance and result in a suspension of Niger's privileges for duty-free exports to the U.S. market under the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act.
Indicating the importance the United States attaches to the crisis in Niger, Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland conducted an unexpected visit to Niamey on August 7. Although she was not permitted to meet with Bazoum or Tiani, she did engage in discussions with Brigadier General Moussa Salaou Barmou, the newly appointed chief of staff of the armed forces. In recent years, Niger has become the most crucial U.S. military hub in West Africa, hosting 1,100 U.S. troops and critical reconnaissance air assets (Carnegie 2023). In January 2013, for instance, the United States and Niger signed an agreement enabling Washington to operate drones based in Niger. The drone base, known as Air Base 201, was established near Agadez in central Niger and is the second-largest U.S. base in Africa, following the one in Djibouti. Since 2018, it has been utilized for targeting the Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen in the Sahel. Northern Niger, strategically located for surveillance of Libya, the entire Sahel-Saharan region, and beyond, holds immense significance (Carnegie 2023).
Prospective Analysis and Regional Impact of the Coup
From Niger's perspective, the stance of the most influential military authorities will determine the nature of future relations with foreign partners who have a military presence. A 2022 survey by the Afrobarometer Institute revealed that 64 percent of the population opposes the use of foreign forces to secure the country. Only 6.1 percent of those surveyed considered support from French forces or their European Union allies desirable, while 4.1 percent deemed support from American forces desirable (Afrobaromenter 2022). French military presence, more visible and discussed in the wider Sahel and West Africa, has elicited more open hostility than that of other foreign countries. In November 2021, protestors obstructed a French army convoy, resulting in two deaths. Further demonstrations against the French military presence took place in September 2022. On August 20, demonstrations were held in Agadez, demanding the withdrawal of all foreign troops, including American soldiers. Should French troops be compelled to leave the country while U.S. troops are allowed to remain, it would likely pose a diplomatic challenge for Paris.
The United States is interested in preserving its military bases in Niger, continuing its intelligence collection efforts, and executing offensive operations against terrorist groups. These objectives can only be met by maintaining privileged diplomatic and military relations with Niger's political authorities. On August 3, President Biden called for the immediate release of Bazoum and his family and for "the preservation of Niger's hard-earned democracy." (Carnegie 2023) On August 10, Secretary Blinken expressed appreciation for ECOWAS' commitment to exploring all options for a peaceful crisis resolution. In the absence of an immediate reinstatement of constitutional order, which now appears highly unlikely, the United States likely seeks a transition to restore the constitutional order swiftly.
The ousting of President Bazoum may also signify a potential shift in alliances towards Russia, although it seems premature to assess the extent to which that may happen. The display of Russian flags by certain coup supporters echoes past events in Mali and Burkina Faso. Niger, like many African nations, has a longstanding history of cooperation with Russia. In 2016, Niger and Russia inked an agreement to enhance their security and development collaboration. Following a meeting in November with the Russian ambassador to Mali, based in Niger, the Nigerien defense minister noted that over a hundred Nigerien officers had received training in Russia, and several aircraft in the Nigerien air force were of Russian make. Recently, Niger has been targeted by apparent Russian disinformation campaigns, particularly after the October 2022 coup in Burkina Faso. These campaigns were also possibly linked to rumors of a coup around February 2023. Antony Blinken publicly dismissed the possibility of Russian involvement in the July coup, and Russia condemned the junta while calling for a return to constitutional order. Nonetheless, relations between the junta in Niamey and the transitional regime in Mali, where the Wagner Group has established its West African base, are notably strong. The prospect of an opportunistic security offer from Wagner to Nigerien military rulers cannot be ruled out, further complicating the question of shifting alliances. The death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 23 introduces a new layer of uncertainty regarding Russia's ability to exploit the crisis in Niger, which once again places France in a challenging position.
In general, the developments in Niamey mark yet another setback to Paris's influence in the Sahel. Similar to the situations in Mali and Burkina Faso, the crisis in Niger has, to some extent, evolved into a standoff between France and Niger—particularly in the media and on social networks. Paris decided to evacuate any French citizens who wished to leave. Subsequently, the junta took actions reminiscent of the steps that led to the hasty departure of French troops from Mali and Burkina Faso, including terminating significant defense agreements between Niger and France that had authorized the presence of French soldiers on Nigerien soil. Niger was part of the scope of Operation Barkhane, the French military operation initiated in 2014 as an extension of a 2013 operation targeting armed jihadi groups in Mali (where the majority of French military action was focused). As tensions escalated and all French soldiers left Mali in 2022, Niger became the host country for French forces. In Mali, the colonels in power had openly aligned themselves with Russia, enabling the deployment of Wagner Group fighters, a presence never officially acknowledged by the Malian government. Nonetheless, Bazoum, who openly opposed military regimes, emerged as France's most dependable and least controversial ally in the region.
France's other key ally in the Sahel is Chad, led by General Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, who assumed power in contravention of the constitution following his father's death. One criticism leveled at France is the inconsistency between its support for dynastic succession and the military-dominated transitional regime in Chad and its strong condemnation of military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso. A forced withdrawal of French troops from Niger would distance France from the central Sahel, leaving only Chad and the West African coastal states of Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and possibly Benin as host countries for a significant French presence. Nevertheless, even in these countries, it is challenging to envision a heightened military presence for the former colonial power. France has become increasingly unpopular with public opinion in West Africa, extending beyond the Sahel. Cooperation with France in security matters is no longer seen as indispensable and irreplaceable by the countries in the region, which have observed the mixed results of nearly a decade of French military intervention in the Sahel and decades of military collaboration.
The coup in Niamey also caught Germany and Italy off guard. Germany has deployed troops in Niger to provide logistical support to its soldiers stationed in neighboring Mali, both as part of the United Nations stabilization mission and for training missions with the local armed forces. Italy, primarily motivated by the fight against irregular migration, has also prioritized the establishment of a military presence in Niger (Autorizzazione e proroga missioni internazionali 2023). Besides Italy, several other EU countries have regarded Niger as a crucial partner in the fight against irregular migration. While Nigeriens do not have a strong tradition of migration, the nation's geographical location has made it a major transit country for thousands of migrants from West and Central Africa who traverse the Sahara and North African countries on their way to France and other parts of Europe. The northern Niger region, particularly Agadez, has become a gathering point for migrants. In 2015, Niger enacted a law criminalizing any paid assistance for illegal border crossing and illegal stay. The implementation of this law weakened the local economy, which relied on the presence of migrants, leading to significant frustration in the region. It also reinforced the image of the Nigerien government as overly accommodating to the European Union's migration policy, which has become highly unpopular with West African public opinion.
Source and Information Classification
1 | Confirmed | Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
2 | Presumably true | Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
3 | Maybe true | Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic |
4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
Trustworthiness of the source | ||
A | Trustworthy | No doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence; has a history of total trustworthiness |
B | Normally trustworthy | Small doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence, nevertheless has a history of valid information in a majority of cases |
C | Sufficiently trustworthy | Doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence; however, has supplied valid information in the past |
D | Normally not trustworthy | Significant doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence, however has supplied valid information in the past |
E | Not trustworthy | Lack of authenticity, reliability or competence; history of invalid information |
F | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
References
Al Jazeera. (2023, August 20). "Timeline: What has happened in Niger since the coup." Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/8/20/timeline-what-has-happened-in-niger-since-the-coup 1-B
Afrobarometer. "Afrobarometer Niger." Retrieved from https://www.afrobarometer.org/... (Accessed 2023, October 6). 1-A
Autorizzazione e proroga missioni internazionali. (2023, May 16) Esame della deliberazione del Consiglio dei ministri del 1° maggio 2023. DOC. XXV - N. 1. DOC. XXVI - N. 1. http://documenti.camera.it/leg19/dossier/pdf/DI0037.pdf 1-A
Britannica. "History of Niger." Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Niger (Accessed 2023, October 4). 1-A
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2023, August 31). "Niger Coup's Outsized Global Impact." Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/... https://www.afrobarometer.org/... 1-A
CNN. (2023, October 6). "U.S. refuses to label Niger a 'coup' amid growing pressure for action." Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2023/1... 1-B
DW. (2023, July 31). "ECOWAS threatens use of force against Niger junta." Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008 1-A
France TV Info. (2023, September 25). "Emmanuel Macron annonce le retrait des troupes françaises." Retrieved from https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/niger/niger-emmanuel-macron-annonce-le-retrait-des-troupes-francaises_6083328.html 1-B
France 24. (2023, October 5). "French army says it will begin withdrawing troops from Niger this week." Retrieved from https://www.france24.com/en/li... 1-B