Abstract
Tensions between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan have persisted since the Maoist revolution of 1949. Beijing's ambition to unify the territories of ancient China by annexing the island of Formosa–also known as Taiwan–continues to clash with the firm will of Taipei to remain a sovereign country. Despite the nation's very limited international recognition, Taiwan's survival is guaranteed by a dense network of alliances and international relations, primarily with the United States. Washington is, in fact, the main financier and guardian of the small republic, repeatedly renewing its commitment to protect Taiwanese independence from the geopolitical aims of the Chinese regime.
This paper aims to illustrate the origins of the crisis between the two countries, to analyze the current situation and to provide a future perspective. Considering that China is one of the major players on the global scene, it is essential to understand the evolution of the Taiwan-China dispute. Beijing could choose to exploit the tensions in the great game of diplomacy or resort to hardliner methods to achieve its geopolitical goals.
Authors:
Davide Moschella - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Margherita Camurri - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Michele Gioculano - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
1. A brief overview of Taiwan’s status
a. Taiwan’s recent history (1949 – present times)
Taiwan became part of the Republic of China at the end of World War II, as foreseen by the Cairo Declaration of 1943, which envisaged that all the territories that Japan had annexed from the Chinese had to be restored to the Republic of China. In the 1940s, the Chinese territory was essentially placed under the control of three different entities: the Kuomintang (KMT), the Chinese Nationalist party which, led by Chiang Kai-shek, controlled the government, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong, and the Japanese Empire. Throughout the 1930s and 40s, the CCP and the KMT had been confronting each other in a long civil war, and the hostilities among them were only put on hold to create a united front in the fight against the Japanese invasion of 1937; as a matter of fact, when Japan accepted the terms for its surrender set in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, civil war broke out once again. After the unsuccessful attempt by the US-led Marshall Mission to convince the two sides to sign an armistice, on October 1, 1949 the CCP managed to prevail and its leader Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (Britannica 2021).
When Mao came to power, over 1,5 million refugees, mostly from the nationalist government and army, retreated to the island of Taiwan, moving the capital of the old ‘Republic of China’ to Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. At that time, the internationally recognized government of China was the KMT government; however, over the following decades, the international community gradually changed its recognition in favor of Mao’s government, and in 1971, the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 formally recognized the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate government of China (UN General Assembly, 1971). Even though the US and other Western countries voted against this resolution and supported the nationalist government’s bid to represent China in the UN and in other international organizations (IOs), in 1979 the US broke off its diplomatic ties with Taiwan, withdrawing its recognition.
The same year, the People’s Republic of China submitted a document called ‘Three Links’ to Taiwan, aimed at restoring the transportation, the communication, and the trade relations that had been suspended by Taipei since 1949. This proposal, however, was severely rejected by Taiwan, which responded with the ‘Three Noes’ policy, refusing to entertain any form of contact, compromise and negotiation with the CCP. The relations between China and Taiwan started to improve only throughout the 1990s, when the two sides initiated several negotiations with the aim of favoring some exchanges. Since 1979, the CCP has striven for a peaceful reunification with Taipei in the form of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, according to which Taiwan is to be considered to be part of the People’s Republic of China, while retaining some degree of autonomy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2014).
In 1992, the two governments signed the highly disputed 1992 Consensus, both theoretically adhering to the Chinese ‘one country, two systems’ principle, but in practice still conceiving themselves respectively as the sole legitimate government of China. The 1992 Consensus is highly controversial even today, as the two sides do not agree on the content of this understanding, and Taiwan even questions whether the meeting truly resulted in a consensus. At present times, under the KMT-drafted constitution, China, Mongolia, Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea are considered to be part of the Republic of China (Kuomintang, 1947), and the KMT has long supported the effort towards closer ties with Beijing. On the contrary, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, which currently holds a dominant majority within the country, rejects both the 1992 Consensus and the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, and openly advocates Taiwan’s independence from the People’s Republic of China, thus creating the dispute over Taiwan’s status as an independent state (Treccani, 2016).
2. Taiwan’s status and international recognition
The controversy regarding the political status of Taiwan must be addressed through a twofold approach: first, by investigating whether Taiwan's government, the Republic of China, is a sovereign state under international law, and secondly, by analyzing whether The People’s Republic of China enjoys sovereignty over Taiwan.
Taiwan holds a unique status in the realm of international law. According to many scholars, the Republic of China meets the basic criteria that define statehood under international law, and thus can be considered a state. These criteria are laid down in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 1933, and they include: permanent population, defined territory, and effective and independent government with the capacity to entertain relations with other states (Seventh International Conference of American States, 1993). However, although Taipei does enjoy these features, to make such an argument, one must reject Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over the Taiwanese territory. Moreover, over the years the international community has gradually come to accept additional criteria to be considered to determine statehood, including widespread recognition, which Taipei still does not enjoy (Rule of Law Education Centre, 2018). Consequently, the issue of whether Taiwan can be considered a sovereign state under international law is debatable.
Regarding Beijing’s position on Taiwan’s sovereignty, the CCP believes that there exists only one China and that the only legitimate government is the government of the People’s Republic of China. Since Taiwan is considered to be an inalienable part of People’s Republic of China, Beijing openly advocates for a peaceful unification process carried out according to the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, and believes that any issues concerning Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence should be decided collectively by all 1.4 billion Chinese citizens. On the contrary, the supporters of Taiwan independence believe that Taiwan has never legitimately been part of the People’s Republic of China, comprising mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau, and consequently that Beijing has no right of authority over the island. In particular, the support of Taiwan independence is often justified by the contents of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and the Treaty of San Francisco (1951), which hold that after Japan lost the control over the island, it did not indicate a successor state. Consequently, according to many activists, Taiwan is only controlled by the Republic of China and it is not part of the People’s Republic of China. On the other hand, the CCP rejects the validity of these treaties, claiming that the Treaty of Shimonoseki has been nullified and the Treaty of San Francisco, not having been signed in the presence of neither the CCP nor the KMT, was illegal, and it finds the legal basis for its sovereignty over the island in the Cairo Communique (1943) and in the Potsdam Declaration (Derek, 2021).
As for the rest of the international community, nowadays Taiwan holds formal diplomatic relations and is recognized only by 14 small states and the Holy See (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan, 2021). Indeed, since Beijing refuses to entertain any form of relations with countries that recognize both Taiwan and China, so far, no government has ever simultaneously maintained diplomatic ties with both sides. As far as Taipei’s international participation is concerned, Taiwan currently enjoys full membership in 38 intergovernmental organizations, including the World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Asian Development Bank, and it holds observer status in several other regional bodies (Government of Taiwan, 2021). Nevertheless, the People’s Republic of China still rejects Taiwan’s membership in the UN and in several other important international organizations, such as the World Health Organization.
3. China-Taiwan: the reasons behind the recent escalation
From early October, the Chinese raids in the Taiwanese air defense zone are at record levels. Consequently, the bilateral relations have reached an all-time low, which is the outcome of several factors: first, China’s rising economic and military prowess, secondly, the EU’s lack of political presence, thirdly, the United States’ isolationist decision-making, and finally, the lack of a strong pan-Asian institutional framework. Such factors have allowed China to dictate the terms of the current geopolitical dynamic. Moreover, as China’s defense capabilities are growing, more people within the CCP feel that it is time to think about the possibility of using force to address the problem of Taiwan separatism once and for all (Beneš, 2021).
In addition, it is essential to note that the Taiwanese ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its leader, Tsai Ing-wen, have as their professed goal the independence of Taiwan. Arguably, the current process of negative interactions started five years ago when Tsai Ying-wen won the election and rejected the “1992 Consensus”. In other words, under the administration of Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan is increasing its independentist orientation; this is happening in a framework where China’s recently accelerated military modernization appears to be, among other things, the result of the perceived threat posed by this Taiwanese approach abetted by anti-China forces in the US. Tsai Ing-wen – in addition to emphasizing the Taiwanese sense of identity – is sending the international community strong signals, as she believes that the entire arena, whose large number of actors acknowledge China as a threat, should comprehend the importance of Taiwan. Furthermore, the island’s claims cannot be overwhelmed, because the consequences could be catastrophic for regional peace and for the democratic alliances (Jia, 2016).
4. China and US: a Cold War with its epicenter in Taiwan.
It is not a mystery that the Taiwan Strait separating China and Taiwan, potentially the harbinger of a disruptive military conflict between the two sides, is one of the most sensitive flashpoints of the modern geopolitical scenario. The protagonists include not only the two countries, but also – and overwhelmingly – the United States of America, which is strengthening its contacts with and its arms sales to Taiwan (Hsieh, 2020).
China and Taiwan, which have a long and interconnected history, bring forward a tradition of very solid business relations. China – despite not recognizing the independence of Taiwan – is now the largest trading partner for Taipei, whose imports and exports to Beijing almost double those of the US. Apart from these economic ties, Taiwan is crucial for China because of its geographical situation, providing Beijing with a strong position in the China Sea (Haren, 2021).
On the other hand, the key geo-political reason for the US’ support of Taiwan is freedom of maritime transportation across the China Sea, while the key political reason is their commitment to a democratic regime. This happens in a framework in which Biden aims to show, on the one hand, that the US are not in decline, and on the other hand that the American effort against authoritarianism is still ongoing: a strong signal to their allies, but also a weapon of consent (Lamperti, 2021). In parallel, however, the White House is also trying to stress the importance of the “One-China policy”, according to which there is only one sovereign State under the name “China” and Taiwan is part of China. This is a contradiction that has characterized for decades American foreign policy and, nowadays, it is a move that reflects the attempt to diffuse the current tensions with China, still a pivotal partner to achieve results at international summit meetings (ISPI, 2021).
Additionally, there is a key business reason for the US’s support of Taiwanese independence: the strong dependence of the American economy on Taiwan’s electronics industry over the years. Over the years, Taiwan has built a unique position in a very technical industry: the semi-conductor sector, most notably with the Taiwanese “TSMC” (“Taiwan semi-conductor Manufacturing Company”). “TMSC'' is nowadays the largest manufacturer of electronic chips in the world, which provides these essential components to the most iconic US companies. In sharp contrast with Taiwan, the Chinese semi-conductor industry has lagged in technology and revenue, even if the drive to autonomy in semi-conductors has been sped up after the “technological decoupling” of China and the US that started during the 2016 presidential campaign and was accelerated by the 2018 tariffs and bans of the Trump Administration. The situation linked to the semi-conductor industry is very important, and the current utmost dependency of the US on “TMSC” would probably justify a war only if China was to try to take control of Taiwan in the short term.
On the sidelines of this scenario, the overall arena is enriched also by other players’ moves. Japan and the UK are carrying out military exercises in the South China Sea, while Taiwan (whose moves are always intended to prevent any risk of becoming a sort of ‘bargaining chip’ in the context of the tense relations between Beijing and Washington) has recently requested to join the CPTPP trade agreement, as China had done the previous week (Pelaggi, 2018).
Plus, Taiwan is preparing to welcome a delegation of French senators: a semblance of sovereignty for the island that Beijing opposes. In parallel, Beijing is testing the EU's waters: at the end of September, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and EU High Representative Borrell held meetings on the Taiwan issue. The EU has admitted its intentions to expand its relations with the island, but always within the framework of the “One-China policy”, an approach that obviously implies a lack of recognition of full statehood and official exchanges. Furthermore, pressure from the European Parliament is growing, in order to lay the foundations for a bilateral investment agreement between the EU and Taiwan, and for the first time ever, last July, a Member State (Lithuania) officially opened a Taiwanese representative office on its territory: a great little signal to deepen and investigate further in the near future (ISPI, 2021).
Conclusions
The Sino-Taiwanese crisis and Beijing's aims for Taipei have represented fixed points in the international scenario since 1949. That year, while Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China, the nationalist government of the Republic of China took refuge on the island of Taiwan. Since then, there has been no significant progress or improvement of relations. On the contrary, the rift between the two countries has been widening more and more, especially since economic expansion and technological progress have enormously increased China's power. It is therefore certain that, over the next few years, China will continue to make claims on Taiwan and thus take actions, both symbolic and concrete, to underline its claims for sovereignty. At the same time, a large part of the international community, mainly the United States and Western Powers, will continue to oppose Chinese plans in order to safeguard the rights of Taipei, despite the lack of official recognition.
However, Beijing's projects over Taiwan need to be evaluated within the framework of a broader foreign policy agenda. In addition to pursuing the goal of the complete unification of the Chinese territory under its jurisdiction, the People's Republic wishes to elevate its status, from becoming a Great Power to being a Superpower. President Xi Jinping wishes to translate the remarkable economic development of the last few years into geopolitical influence and military force on a global scale. In fact, although in the last twenty years the country has established itself as an essential player on a global level, its power still derives from an economic and commercial primacy. High growth rates and large amounts of liquidity, coupled with technological development and foreign dependence on its imports and exports, have given Beijing enormous power over the rest of the world.
Despite the numerous and increasingly frequent displays of force implemented through parades, military exercises, naval maneuvers and missile tests, the regime is still unable to compete militarily with its main international rivals, namely the United States of America and their allies. Currently, the People's Liberation Army does not have adequate armaments, preparation, means, logistical equipment or technologies to face a possible war against a coalition of the Great Powers. The two main forces of modern warfare, the navy and the air force, are particularly inadequate, requiring a significantly higher amount of investment and personnel training than that of the army. They need a network of bases and ports around the world that China does not and will not have in the short term. The inability of the People's Republic to forge military agreements and alliances that could guarantee this global projection reveals the absence of any real diplomatic influence. Chinese rigidity and geopolitical ambitions have stiffened international relations, both locally and globally. Instead of evolving into a political dialogue, Chinese foreign relations have stuck to a simple economical nature. Concern for Chinese expansionism has led many Southeast Asian countries to join forces with Washington against a neighbor deemed to be too bulky and potentially dangerous.
The fate of Taipei will be a pawn in this great game of Chinese foreign policy, which Beijing can try to use in various ways as needed, both to threaten and to appease the United States. American disengagement and the reduced European presence in the area could represent an advantage for the Chinese plans, but the unchanged international projection of Washington still constitutes a brake on the ambitions of the People's Republic. The American-Taiwanese political and economic ties remain strong enough to guarantee the survival of the Taipei regime. It is certain that Beijing will continue to exploit claims Taiwan but it is unlikely that President Xi Jinping will decide to use extreme means to secure control of the island. Therefore, the prospect of a Chinese annexation of Taiwan remains, for the moment, highly improbable. The slowdown in the economy and the emergence of significant internal fractures in the country will absorb much of the efforts and energies of the Communist Party. Consequently, the road to reach Superpower status remains very long and tortuous for Beijing.
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