Abstract
The achievement of a project aimed at normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia and, consequently, at a general stabilization of the Middle East, seems to have become one of the major targets of United States foreign policy. The creation of such an axis, apparently unnatural, would reshape the geopolitical landscape by increasing Iran's isolation and restoring strength to a faded Biden Administration. However, this goal is difficult to achieve and riddled with pitfalls, from historical rivalries between the two countries to current political contingencies. It lacks an obvious outcome and, much like a Great Game, projects its effects on a global scale.
Author
Michele Gioculano - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
Introduction
The Middle East has represented, since the rise of the first civilizations, one of the key arenas of geopolitics and the scene of international clashes and rivalries. For this reason, it is apparently condemned to perpetual instability. Ever since it definitively rose to the rank of global superpower at the end of the Second World War, the United States has paid particular attention to developments in the region, aiming to build a profitable network of relations that would allow it to wield significant influence. Currently, two of Washington’s major allies in the Middle East are Israel and Saudi Arabia. Below, we will discuss the historical ties and political relations that bind the United States to these two important partners in order to understand the role they play in US political strategy, both regionally and globally.
The State of Israel represents one of the largest and most steadfast allies of the United States on an international level. Over time, the relationship between the two countries has evolved, moving from an initial solidarity and a generic sympathy for the creation of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East to a very close political-military partnership, a genuine special relationship, which has become an essential element of the White House's global strategy. This has obviously led Washington to adopt very clear positions towards the Palestinian cause and to support almost all of the choices made by Tel Aviv over the years, in the long epic in which Israel is the protagonist. Naturally, the location of Israel, strategically overlooking the Mediterranean and in proximity to all the major countries in the region, constitutes one of the aspects in which both the Pentagon and the State Department are strongly interested. In the words of Republican Jesse Helms, a long-time member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Israel constitutes "America's aircraft carrier in the Middle East" (Helms, 2018). This is a partnership so important for the United States that it gives the Israeli Government a fair amount of blackmail power over its Senior Partner, as well as the ability to conduct parallel policies which are sometimes in contrast with Washington's lines of action. In any case, according to many US political decision-makers, the political-strategic weight of the alliance is enough to justify any cost.
Since the beginning of the partnership with Tel Aviv, the US Administrations have constantly provided substantial economic aid, aimed at promoting the growth and development of the Israeli economy as well as ensuring considerable military and strategic assistance to strengthen the country's security and increase its defensive capabilities. Over the last twenty years, almost all of the material support provided to Israel has been represented by highly sophisticated military weapons and technologies, not shared with any other ally. Currently, the greatest support guaranteed by the United States to Israel is undoubtedly political and diplomatic. The State Department has been and still is the major international promoter and sponsor of the Israeli cause at the global stage and its most active supporter in practice. This is evident in the use of the U.S. veto power in the United Nations Security Council, with the U.S. Representative vetoing resolutions related to Israel Forty-two out of eighty-three times in total. A policy of friendship that culminated with the mediation and signing of the so-called Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and Arab countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which were subsequently joined by Morocco, and Sudan. This marked a considerable turning point that had not been recorded since the signing of the Camp David Accords between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, which took place thanks to the intercession of US President Jimmy Carter.
On the other hand, we have the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which is an essential element in understanding political developments and evolutions in the Middle East. The recognition of the Wahhabi monarchy in 1931 and the start of Standard Oil drilling in the desert of the Arabian Peninsula led to a complex and fluctuating relationship that has continued to this day. At first, despite the mutual defense treaty with the Pentagon and the inclusion of the Kingdom in the Lend and Lease program, Saudi intolerance for Western interference and exclusion from the Baghdad Pact led Riyadh to distance itself from Washington and to forge stronger relations with Egypt, at least until the socialist turn brought about by President Nasser and other Arab leaders. However, this did not lead to an improvement in bilateral relations due to the unconditional support granted by the United States to Israel in those years. Only the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet-Afghan War and the First Gulf War brought to a significant rapprochement and intensification of political and military collaboration between the two actors, confirming the sinusoidal trend of US relations with Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War and the changes that have occurred in the last thirty years have undermined the primary reasons for the partnership between Washington and Riyadh, namely: the strategic importance of Saudi oil resources, the weight of the Middle East for the State Department, and the common aversion to Moscow, no longer perceived as the main global threat. In fact, if on the one hand the diversification of US energy sources has made the deposits of the Arabian peninsula increasingly less relevant, on the other hand, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has distanced the strategic priorities of the two countries. The White House’s focus is now concentrating its attention on its main competitor, China, while those of the Wahhabi Monarchy are shifting to its more dangerous neighbor, Iran. However, as in the past, these upheavals have not undermined the foundations of the American-Saudi relationship, as neither of the two actors would be able to easily replace the other. In fact, no other Power is currently willing to maintain such firm positions with respect to the Tehran regime as the United States, just as no other Middle Eastern actor can boast a certain degree of stability, influence and prestige in the region as Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this remains a marriage of convenience that neither party would find useful to dissolve, despite the contingent difficulties that they have to face from time to time. Proof of the importance of the relationship between Washington and Riyadh lies in the fact that President Biden, despite the harsh criticisms made during the election campaign against the unscrupulous policies of the Crown Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, not only continues to supply the Saudi regime with weapons, but also wishes to relaunch the partnership by focusing on the Monarchy's main concern: the containment of the Islamic Republic.
The Great Game of our time
It is well-known that, for several months, the State Department has developed and is actively working on the implementation of a vast and ambitious diplomatic plan aimed at normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. An important goal that, however, would not see the United States as protagonists on the field but only as mediators. The White House aims to reach an agreement between Tel Aviv and Riyadh, historical rivals united by their common aversion towards Iran and their common friendship overseas. However, as can be easily understood, the road to reaching an agreement of this type promises to be long and riddled with pitfalls. Israelis and Saudis share an atavistic rivalry, both from a cultural and religious point of view and from a geopolitical one, which certainly makes the transition from a period of confrontation to one of cooperation and, potentially, alliance more difficult for both. In any case, it is appropriate to take a step back to observe this picture from afar, not limiting ourselves to a regional vision but considering global systemic trends. Exactly what the National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, did while recalling the so-called Great Game, which pitted the United Kingdom against Russia in Asia, between the end of the 19th and early 20th century. He hopes, after decades of conflict, for the achievement of a diplomatic solution which, now as in the past, aims to stabilize the region. The pursuit of a new triangular diplomacy promoted by Washington which involves two allies rather than two enemies, could lead to a paradigm shift, the effects of which, in today's reality, could prevail over unfavorable historical pasts.
It is now clear that the slow but inexorable withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East and the progressive shift of their forces and interests towards the Far East will lead to a general reduction in the level of security of their partners in the region. In other words, their allies, primarily the State of Israel and Saudi Arabia, will no longer be able to count on direct US military support to safeguard themselves. Consequently, it is likely that these actors will have to implement a new defensive strategy. From this perspective, the State Department seems willing to bet that an increase in perceived insecurity, both from Tel Aviv and Riyadh, could lead the two countries, if appropriately guided by diplomacy, to start a fruitful collaboration, aimed at isolating effectively the regime of the Ayatollahs and to guarantee the stability of the area, even in the absence of the US armed forces. In fact, although Israel has resources and technology that are superior to those of Saudi Arabia, not least a nuclear arsenal, it is clear that its small population and the permanent state of internal tension would not allow it to effectively manage a possible regional crisis. At the same time, despite the undisputed stability of the Wahhabi monarchy and the large population, it is equally clear that the Saudis do not possess the means and technical-organizational capabilities needed to face the onset of a conflict in the Middle East without significant external support. Therefore, both actors, although very important in their respective region, are not and, presumably, will never be able to respond autonomously to any external threat or, much less, to acquire hegemony over the entire region. It follows that the establishment of an axis between Tel Aviv and Riyadh could remedy the shortcomings of each country and constitute the basis of a new Middle Eastern security order. As a matter of fact, it is not excluded that reaching an agreement could push other allies of the United States with a Muslim majority to normalize their relations with Israel and initiate collaborations. Among these could be actors of primary importance on the global scene such as Pakistan or Indonesia, both closely linked to Saudi Arabia and of crucial importance in the Indo-Pacific scene, which is now crucial for Washington's foreign policy. The possible normalization of relations between Israel and these two countries would strengthen the bond with the United States and the anti-Chinese axis in Asia.
Heavy conditions and political unknowns
The meeting that took place months ago between National Security Advisor Sullivan and Crown Prince Bin Salman could represent the prelude to an agreement. The United States would obtain a greater Saudi commitment in Yemen, to definitively put an end to the civil war that has inflamed the country for decades, the allocation of an unprecedented aid package to support Palestinian institutions in the West Bank, and a downsizing of relations between Riyadh and Beijing (intensified in recent years and culminated in the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran). Nonetheless, what Riyadh would ask for in exchange should absolutely not be underestimated: the signing of a mutual defense treaty on the NATO model with an anti-Iranian function, US support in the launch of a civil nuclear program monitored by Washington, and the sale of particularly sophisticated armaments, including a modern anti-ballistic missile system. However, although the Prince does not appear to have any intention of imposing particular conditions regarding the Palestinian issue, his father, King Salman, seems firmly intent on seeing substantial concessions recognized in their favor. As the promoter of the historic Arab peace plan of 2002, the Sovereign wishes to obtain Tel Aviv's assurance that there will be no new annexations in the West Bank, that no new settlements will be created, that existing ones will not be expanded, and that those currently illegal will not be normalized. King Salman is also likely to insist that the Palestinian-majority areas of the West Bank, currently controlled by Tel Aviv under the 1993 Oslo Accords, be handed over to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). In any case, the greatest difficulties would be faced by Israel, where the most nationalist members of Prime Minister Netanyahu's Cabinet could oppose the acceptance of such large sacrifices and the extension of such important concessions towards the Palestinians. Not to mention that, predictably, the unprecedented attack conducted by Hamas on October 7th 2023 has done nothing but increase Israeli hostility towards the Palestinian population, reducing to a minimum the willingness to make agreements or, even less, to make concessions. The loss of support from far-right parties, combined with the creation of a unitarian national majority with left parties could cause a new political crisis. Despite the importance of what is at stake, the possibility that the Parliament will quietly approve such a complex project seems very remote, despite the fact that the US Administration appears to be exerting pressure on several left-wing leaders of the Knesset. The firm opposition against the law that abolishes the possibility for the Supreme Court to invalidate the decisions of the executive, combined with the hostility towards Prime Minister Netanyahu’s national security policy represent, in this view, two of the major obstacles to reaching a transversal agreement. Only great foresight, which keeps electoral and party interests out, would allow Israel's political divisions to be overcome.
However, the difficulties in implementing what is now defined as the “Biden Plan'' do not derive only from the mutual distrust between Israelis and Saudis but also from a lack of support for the initiative in Congress. If the aforementioned interlocutory conditions were actually put on the table, it is very likely that they would encounter strong opposition on Capitol Hill, where the Democratic majority would disapprove of the launch of a Saudi civilian nuclear program and the signing of a mutual defense agreement with an authoritarian government like that of Riyadh, which is known for its involvement in the death of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. It is also known that a large part of the Democratic Representatives and Senators have particularly critical positions towards the leaders of the two countries. On the one hand, they accuse Prime Minister Netanyahu for his muscular policies, association with far-right parties and corruption trials. On the other hand, they oppose Crown Prince Bin Salman for the repressive campaigns and brutality that characterize the Saudi regime. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that President Biden will have to use the support of part of the Republican opposition, historically well-disposed towards Israel and eager to extend the scope of the so-called Abraham Accords, signed by President Trump in 2020. At any rate, it is not excluded that the possibility of a normalization of relations between the State of Israel and Saudi Arabia could prevail over the many doubts of the US Congress.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the success or failure of this project will have certain consequences on the 2024 US presidential elections. In view of his likely re-nomination, President Biden would greatly benefit from an important international achievement that he could juxtapose with former President Donald Trump, currently the Republicans' preferred candidate. It is known that, in the United States, international political choices can prove decisive during an electoral cycle, both positively, as when Nixon made a historical turning point by recognizing the People's Republic of China, and negatively, as when Carter was not able to successfully solve the hostage crisis in Iran. Despite the great effort made, the Russian-Ukrainian War does not seem capable of ensuring the White House a major success, at least not in the short term. In fact, the bogging down of Kiev's counter-offensive would require a change of approach and the sending of even more sophisticated equipment by NATO countries. A highly costly choice, both in economic and political terms, which, in any case, is not certain to enable Ukrainians to achieve objectives of great strategic importance. Not to mention that time is playing in Russia's favor while the cohesion of the Western coalition is eroding as the months pass, especially in the face of tiredness and opposition from public opinion, unwilling to sacrifice huge resources to support Kiev. Added to this is a not brilliant four-year period for the Biden Administration, incapable of gathering broad consensus and adequately addressing the great challenges of the United States: from major global issues, such as the containment of China, to traditional political problems internal, such as the inefficiency of the health system, the free circulation of weapons, racial discrimination, and ethnic conflicts. For this reason, the plan developed by the State Department, aimed at solving the decades-long conflict between the two main partners of the United States in the Middle Eastern , could represent the triumph the President is looking for.
Conclusions
In conclusion, it is possible to state that the so-called “Biden Plan”, although full of unknowns and aimed at achieving a very ambitious goal, does not just represent a utopia. The strategic and geopolitical premise on which it was conceived, i.e. overcoming the differences between two allies of the United States in order to face a common enemy, is bold but valid and reasonable. The adoption of political choices marked by clear realism by Israeli and Saudi decision-makers, who are not very indulgent towards contingent trends and dedicated to achieving important long-term goals, could favor the search for an agreement under the aegis of Washington. However, it is essential to bear in mind that many forces, internal and external to the actors involved, are openly against the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations and, even more so, the creation of a pro-Western and anti-Iranian axis in the Middle East. A clear example of this is provided by the recent attack launched by Hamas against Tel Aviv, aimed, among other things, at hindering negotiations and reigniting the conflict between Arabs and Israelis. The help that Iran, through its official media and institutions, first claimed and then denied having provided to the operation, further supports this thesis, demonstrating once again the complicated intertwining of relations in this region.
Regardless of its outcome, the Biden Plan shows us with extreme clarity in which direction US foreign policy is going. The State Department wants to close the many, perhaps too many, open issues around the world, which are the cause of an excessive and unproductive waste of resources that could be used more effectively in important scenarios such as the Indo-Pacific. The protagonist of this disengagement is, first of all, the Middle East, a strategically fundamental region which, due to the tensions that characterize it and the presence of a rival Power such as Iran, cannot be simply abandoned but requires to be managed with care. Only time will tell whether Israel and Saudi Arabia will be able to overcome their differences to increase their influence in the region by taking on this onerous task. Turmoil such as that caused by the Hamas attack can certainly widen pre-existing fractures, but in some circumstances accelerate unlikely unions to face forces that are difficult to control and whose underestimation, in the past, has been paid dearly. Therefore, we will know if the bet made by the United States on a normalization of relations between the two countries will be won or not.
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