Abstract
Since its establishment in the 1990s, the European Union has grown to be one of the driving forces in today’s global economy. Nevertheless, it is still struggling to develop and implement a coherent foreign policy. This issue becomes even more pressing for EU member states as Washington’s strategic priorities move toward the Asia-Pacific region.
This paper analyses the question of European External Action (EEA) on three levels, by contextualising it into the current geostrategic landscape and by examining both the institutions and the national politics behind EU foreign policy. The aim of this paper is to single out strategic takeaways and possible areas of improvement that can give value to the future developments of EEA, and concludes that Germany and France are in a particularly strong position to push the EU to develop an autonomous, unified foreign policy.
Authors:
Kaitlyn Rabe- Research Director, Mondo Internazionale - G.E.O.
Chiara Malaponti- Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale - G.E.O. Politics
1. The United States turns away from Europe
On 15th September, 2021, the governments of the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom announced the creation of a trilateral security partnership, “AUKUS”, in order to “meet the challenges of the twenty-first century” throughout the Indo-Pacific (The White House, 2021). Calling upon the three countries’ shared histories as maritime democracies, the first act of the AUKUS was to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy, drawing upon the technical knowledge and nuclear capacities of the United States and United Kingdom. In the aftermath of this unexpected announcement, France, who previously possessed a 34-billion-euro deal with Australia to provide diesel-electric Barracuda submarines over a 25-year period, remonstrated by temporarily recalling its ambassadors from both Washington D.C. and Canberra in order to ‘restructure’ diplomatic relations with the respective nations (The Conversation, 2021). Although the ambassadors were eventually reinstated, France’s dramatic reaction to the break in the deal was only partially due to the incurred financial losses. In fact, the Franco-Australian submarine pact offered France, and all of Europe, an entrance into the Indo-Pacific sphere, an entrance which would be free from American influence. Thus, the creation of AUKUS essentially pulled the rug out from under a fundamental European strategy in the Indo-Pacific, a strategy which grows with importance as tensions between China and the rest of the world continue to rise (BBC, 2021).
The creation of the AUKUS also follows the strengthening and consolidation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), an informal alliance between the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, which began to collaborate on maritime operations following the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 but which has never engaged in consistent diplomatic activities. As of 2021, however, all nations have expressed concern over the rising levels of Chinese aggression in the area and the scope of the QUAD has since expanded from focusing on solely themes of maritime cooperation to include themes of security, economic cooperation, and, especially in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, health (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). Although the 4 participatory countries disagree about the general nature of the grouping – for example, Japan calls upon the countries’ shared democratic structures, while India prefers to emphasize practical cooperation efforts, and Australia has not been willing to formalize the alliance – the shared concern over Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region has led the 4 states to participate in their first joint naval exercise in over a decade (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
The addition of AUKUS to a growing number of minilateral pacts, alliances and groups crossing the Pacific Ocean was meant to augment the purposes of the QUAD and render Australia a maritime superpower in the face of growing Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific (The Diplomat, 2021). Such alliances, along with the US’s, Australia’s, and the UK’s clear breach of an agreement with France, imply that the Biden administration intends to strengthen its partnerships in the East, perhaps at the cost of Washington’s relationships with traditional NATO allies across the Atlantic. Such actions fit fully into Biden’s growing number of diplomatic moves and rhetoric against Jinping’s growing maritime aggression throughout the South China Sea (Foreign Policy, 2021). The AUKUS scandal stands as a case study for the Biden administration’s current intentions to focus less on supporting European allies in exchange for greater focus on maritime, Anglophone, and Indo-Pacific allies, leaving the European Union no choice but to prepare an autonomous foreign policy in a potentially self-insulating series of maritime alliances.
2. The complex European foreign policy machinery
Despite the need for the EU to consolidate a coherent foreign policy, internal confusion and conflicting priorities have prevented it from ever doing so. Since the ‘Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community’ entered into force on 1 December, 2009, the European External Action Service and European Council have encountered multiple difficulties in untangling overlapping diplomatic and foreign policy duties (Zotti, 2014). In particular, the Lisbon Treaty
"…formally recognises the European Council as an EU institution, responsible for providing the Union with the ‘impetus necessary for its development’ and for defining its ‘general political directions and priorities’... The President is elected by a qualified majority of the European Council for a renewable term of 30 months… The President also represents the Union externally, without prejudice to the duties of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (European Parliament, 2021)",
while simultaneously declaring that
"The [High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR)]... is responsible for the EU’s common foreign and security policy, with the right to put forward proposals. Besides chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, the VP/HR also has the role of Vice-President of the Commission. The VP/HR is assisted by the European External Action Service, which comprises staff from the Council, the Commission and national diplomatic services (European Parliament, 2021)."
In spite of the clause mentioning that the role of the President of the Council shall represent no ‘prejudice’ toward the High Representative and, consequently, toward the European External Action Service, the practical reality is quite different; in particular, due to the President of the European Commission’s role in mitigating the 2008 financial crisis, the President possesses a dominant position within European institutions. Thus, the European Council, because of its ability to determine the EU’s general long-term strategy, is also the de facto controller of the EU Common Foreign & Security Policy/Common Defense & Security Policy, despite the fact that the European External Action Service is the de jure controller (Zotti, 2014).
The ‘turf wars’ that arise between the European Council and the European External Action Service create the so-called ‘Capability-Expectation’ Gap, the name for the discrepancy between the EU’s rhetoric on foreign policy and its actual actions abroad (Bendik, Alander, and Bochtler, 2020). This phenomenon, in particular, is exacerbated by the intergovernmental operations of EU foreign policy decisions and the often contradictory behavior of the Member States. For example, in May 2020, current High Representative Josep Borrell outlined his most comprehensive plan on European policy unity to counter China’s divide et impera approach and, in particular, to protect European interests in Taiwan; despite calls for a more robust policy, it was not until July of 2020 that Member States were able to agree upon common measures, such as a ban on exports of surveillance and dual-use technologies and goods (Bendik, Alander, and Bochtler, 2020).
Furthermore, on October 19, 2021, Margarethe Vestager, Executive Vice President of a Europe Fit for a Digital Age, made the statement on behalf of HR Borrell that “The European Union Indo-Pacific Strategy is offering an excellent platform to broaden cooperation”, and “While enhancing ties with Taiwan, the European Union also has to address China’s assertiveness and attempts to intimidate Taiwan’s like-minded partners” (European External Action Service, 2021). Nevertheless, based upon the fact that the speech was given in October, 2021– successive to the AUKUS ‘scandal’ – the declaration was more a reaction to the broken deal, rather than a preemptive, concrete policy. Vestager furthermore stated that “The European Union encourages everyone to engage in a dialogue and avoid any unilateral actions that may increase tensions around the Strait. This is key for the peace and stability of the region and for the European Union’s interests”, which is an obvious reference to the creation of the AUKUS. Furthermore, the fact that the EU’s major strategy within the Indo-Pacific hinged upon a mere deal brokered by a member state, in this case France, is a clear indication that the European Union, despite its declarations, still does not possess a clear and cohesive foreign policy,
3. The core of the European international position: the Franco-German tandem
The EEAS was arguably created to resolve the duplicity existing between Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters, whose nature remained mainly intergovernmental, and those areas of external relations that were administered exclusively by the Commission. In a way, the EEAS stems from the reluctance of European member states to delegate international affairs to the Commission, which would shift all decision-making procedures to the supranational level (Gianniou, Galariotis, 2016). The institutional complexity of the European foreign policy framework and the heterogeneity of EU Member States hinders the effectiveness of the European External Action Service, and thus, Europe’s main diplomatic instrument remains that of economic sanctions, as exemplified by the Ukrainian crises (Council of the European Union, 2022).
Thus, the current balance of power between EU member states is essential to the future of the EEAS. In particular, the so-called “Franco-German tandem” has been of great value to the process of European integration; France and Germany have proven to be a driving force behind the European project since its beginning and have fostered their relationship in time through numerous bilateral initiatives. Today, as US interests turn toward the Indo-Pacific region and both France and Germany face changes in national leadership, the Franco-German tandem could provide impetus for a more autonomous and effective management of international affairs at the European level (Krpata, 2021).
a. Germany
Germany is widely perceived to be the most influential country in Europe. Berlin sits at the core of a complex puzzle of alliances and diplomatic exchanges that crosses the continent, and it is also deemed by its allies as an “honest broker” within diplomatic relations (Franke, Puglierin, 2020). Indeed, Berlin’s activity in the European arena represents more the one of a rule guarantor than one of a charismatic leader; this is not only because Germans tend to culturally abide by a so-called Sachorientierung– that is, they work best on tasks whose working framework is clearly defined by objective rules – but is also a question of memory and national identity. German foreign policy is pervaded by the so-called Erinnerungskultur, the culture of remembrance, that looks back to Berlin’s traumatic past during the Nazi regime, and thus Germany finds it hard to behave more assertively in the geopolitical arena. This posture was perfectly embodied by former Chancellor Angela Merkel, who put forward a dependable and predictable foreign policy outlook, yet sometimes was perceived as too equable or even morally ambiguous by international commentators, especially towards Russia or China (Karnitschnig, 2021).
However, there is a sharp contrast between how Germany approaches foreign policy matters and how it handles economical ones. In economic issues, Berlin cannot certainly be accused of any kind of ambiguity whatsoever, having always taken a central stand multiple times, for example during the European debt crisis–as in the case of Greece–and even during the ongoing pandemic, for what concerns recovery measures. As Europe’s largest economy, it is undoubtedly a leader in the field, but finds it hard to embrace the same kind of role politically (Statista, 2020).
This hesitant attitude has been compensated for by the engagement of the United States, which greatly shaped the EU’s position on foreign policy and security concerns. As a result, projects such as ‘European strategic autonomy’ have only received mild support by Berlin, and such discussions were reframed into the boundaries of NATO (Marafona, 2021). Nevertheless, the volatile behavior of the Trump administration greatly jeopardized the bond of trust between Berlin and Washington D.C., which was mostly based on the USA being a source of stability for Europe (Schwarzer, 2017). The attitude of the current administration has somewhat alleviated the situation, but the United States’ turn to the Indo-Pacific may finally push Germany to assume, at least partially, a more decisive role in shaping the EU foreign policy.
Despite the fact that during the AUKUS dispute Germany adopted a pacifying stance by underlining the importance of a collaboration with the US, the new German Foreign Affairs Minister Annalena Baerbock made declarations implying the creation of an autonomous German and European foreign policy (Noyan, 2021). During the electoral campaign, she stated that “it’s very much not only appropriate but also needed that Europeans, therefore Germans, to have to take more responsibility for their own security” (Brzozowski, 2021). Baerbock’s tougher stance on military and foreign affairs pushed commentators to propose that a “post-pacifist generation” would take government seats following Merkel’s farewell (Schulteis, 2021). The question for the post-Merkel and, in general, for the future of the European External Action remains whether Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Foreign Affairs Minister Annalena Baerbock will be able to break Germany’s long-standing pacifist stance and gain momentum with France, a traditional supporter of a stronger, geopolitical Europe.
b. France
At the beginning of 2021, an article published on the website of the European Council on Foreign Relations reported that “27 percent of French respondents to ECFR’s survey view protection from war and conflict as the area in which the EU provides the greatest benefits – a larger share than in any other national grouping” (Ciulla, Varma, 2021). France, in particular, has always been appreciative of the geopolitical role of the European Union, even before it came to exist as we know it. Under Charles De Gaulle, Paris viewed the European platform as a launchpad to enhance its global prestige, eager to free European countries from their bond with the US. Nowadays, French interests tend to coincide with European ones, so the final scope of French foreign policy has become to boost the European stance at the international level (Bouemar, 2021).
As for France’s relationship with the United States, in a way history may be repeating itself; in September, when the trilateral agreement between the US, Australia and the UK was announced, the French reacted by reinvigorating their support of the concept of an European strategic autonomy from Washington. Moreover, given the powerful state of its military, Paris is particularly suited to discuss such matters.
Nevertheless, even before the AUKUS fiasco, some commentators identified a sort of duality in the French approach to European foreign policy. France has always called for more cooperation on the matter, especially on defense, but it is also somewhat keen on embarking in unilateral endeavors that often do not consider the different visions of its fellow member states (Ciulla, Varma, 2021). For example, it upset the Italian government by awarding Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor while Rome was going through a diplomatic low with Egypt regarding the murder of Giulio Regeni (Roberts, 2020).
The hope is that with the French presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2022, Paris will be able to mold a shared understanding of the CFSP and contribute to the integration of different national foreign policies (Ciulla, Varma, 2021). The French-Italian Enhanced Cooperation Treaty signed at the end of November 2021 may constitute a first step in the right direction; the Treaty came after “years of diplomatic tensions” and it has been compared to the Élyseé Treaty of 1963, renewed in Aachen in 2019, that cemented the relationship between France and Germany (Amiel, 2021; Alcaro, 2021).
On 9th December, 2021, President Emmanuel Macron presented the priorities for France’s 6-month presidency of the Council of the European Union, which began on January 1st, 2022 - which nevertheless comes at a delicate time, since national elections are to be held in April. “The first objective of the French presidency will be to “move from a Europe of cooperation within our borders to a powerful Europe in the world, fully sovereign, free to make its own choices and master of its own destiny” said Macron (Pollet, Moussu, 2021).
As has already been stated, the French push towards a more cooperative and integrated approach to foreign and security policy at the European level may find a listening ear in Germany’s new government, especially in Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. France and Germany, "as the closest of friends at the heart of Europe, bear a special responsibility for a united European Union, capable of acting and looking towards the future” asserted Baerbock (France 24, 2021). Moreover, while working closely to develop a diplomatic solution to the crisis at the Russo-Ukrainian border, France and Germany displayed an united front and underlined the importance of working together within the EU, NATO, and OSCE” (ISPI, 2022). That is not to say that there have not been disagreements between the two allies; for example, Germany had a different view than France on weapons exports to Ukraine, once again influenced by its experience of WWII (Deutsche Welle, 2022). Nevertheless, the existence of the “Normandy Format”, composed by representatives of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany (ibid.), demonstrates per se the value of the Franco-German tandem in diplomatic relations.
4. Conclusions
The development of an EU ‘common strategy’ is dependent on a number of factors. On one hand, there are the institutional processes, bodies and reforms that contribute to the shaping of External Action, but also the national politics between and within Member States, that inform the development of a foreign policy concept. On the other hand, there is the external strategic landscape that the EU must address (Grevi, 2022). Regarding the latter, the EU faces an increasing need to develop an autonomous international posture, as the strategic objectives of the United States shift mainly towards the containment of China, especially in the Indo-Pacific theatre. The issue here, as demonstrated by the AUKUS case study, is to constitute a framework in which EU Member States can converge on a common assessment of the risks and opportunities that this historical moment entails.
Institutionally, the European Union is confronted by the existence of a relatively young body, the European External Action Service, which “still suffers from a lack of buy-in from member states and other parts of the EU administration” (Vimont, Hilion, Blockmans, 2021). Nevertheless, the biggest strength of the EEAS may actually reside in the fact that it constitutes an unprecedented experiment. Its hybrid nature, that touches other parts of the complex EU institutional machinery, may actually be the key to fostering an integrated and effective approach to EU foreign policy. Backed up by the EEAS, the HR/VP is in the position to conduct a wide range of activities that cover the different branches of EU External Action, together with the Commission. They could also work through the Council by tapping into their power of initiative and are in the position to “secure member states’ support for follow up of conclusions and decisions by the Foreign Affairs Council and by the European Council” (Vimont, Hilion & Blockmans, 2021). It is certainly a strategic post that constitutes a trait d’union between different EU institutions. This is particularly meaningful if we consider that one of the main ways to foster convergence at the European level could be by maximising the added value that institutions can deliver to MS through public goods such as pooled expertise, information and assessment (Grevi, 2022). The main challenge for the European foreign policy machinery is then to avoid a situation in which MS feel that they have to act alone, because they doubt that they can act effectively or at all through the EU (Smith, 2022).
Such a process needs to be backed up by a strong political and financial will. As for national politics, this is where the Franco-German tandem comes into play; as already mentioned, this partnership has been crucial to the process of EU integration. The emergence of a so-called “post-pacifist” leadership in Berlin, coupled with established geopolitical and economic features of France and Germany, may push towards the development of a solid European foreign policy through the implementation of a process of coalition-building at the EU level. While the two countries still display some differences, as a result of their distinct national histories and foreign policy traditions, their efforts could succeed at minimizing the effects of Great Power rivalry on the continent.
Information Content | ||
1 | Confirmed | Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
2 | Presumably true | Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
3 | Maybe true | Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic |
4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
Trustworthiness of the source | ||
A | Trustworthy | No doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence; has a history of total trustworthiness |
B | Normally trustworthy | Small doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence, nevertheless has a history of valid information in a majority of cases |
C | Sufficiently trustworthy | Doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence; however, has supplied valid information in the past |
D | Normally not trustworthy | Significant doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence, however has supplied valid information in the past |
E | Not trustworthy | Lack of authenticity, reliability or competence; history of invalid information |
F | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
Bibliography
Alcaro, R., “The Italy–France Treaty is an Example of Wise Diplomacy”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 22 November, 2021. https://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/italy-france-treaty (1-B)
Amiel, S., “Quirinale treaty: Will a new French-Italian pact shift the balance of power in Europe?”, Euronews, 26 November, 2021. https://www.euronews.com/2021/11/26/quirinale-treaty-can-a-new-french-italian-pact-shift-the-balance-of-power-in-europe (1-B)
Bendiek, A., Alander, M., and Bochtler, P., “CFSP: The Capability-Expectation Gap Revisited”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 1 December, 2020. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C58/ (2-B)
Bouemar, V., “EU COLLECTIVE DEFENCE: WHAT DOES FRANCE WANT?”, Clingendael Institute, September 29, 2021. https://spectator.clingendael.org/nl/publicatie/eu-collective-defence-what-does-france-want (2-B)
Brzozowski, A.,“German Greens leader Baerbock signals post-pacifist shift on foreign policy”, EURACTIV, 7 May, 2021. https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/german-greens-leader-baerbock-signals-post-pacifist-shift-on-foreign-policy/ (1-B)
Ciulla, M., Varma, T., “The lonely leader: The origins of France’s strategy for EU foreign policy”, European Council on Foreign Relations, January 6, 2021. https://ecfr.eu/article/the-lonely-leader-the-origins-of-frances-strategy-for-eu-foreign-policy/ (2-B)
Delphin H., Smith K.E., Grevi G., “The difficult emergence of an EU’s common strategic culture”, 3rd session of the Conference Cycle ‘Towards a common European strategic culture’, EEAS, 17 January 2022. (1-A)
EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine, Council of the European Union, last reviewed on 19 January, 2022. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/ (1-A)
Fathi, R., “Why the Australia- France submarine deal collapse was predictable”, The Conversation, 24 September, 2021. https://theconversation.com/why-the-australia-france-submarine-deal-collapse-was-predictable-168526 (3-C)
“France to send ambassador back to Australia amid AUKUS row”, BBC, 7 October, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-58824604 (2-B)
Franke, U., Puglierin, J., “The big engine that might: How France and Germany can build a geopolitical Europe”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 14 July, 2020. https://ecfr.eu/publication/the_big_engine_that_might_how_france_and_germany_can_build_a_geopolitical_e/ (2-B)
“Germany backs France for 'more sovereign' Europe as Paris set for turn at EU presidency”, France 24, 31 December 2021. https://amp.france24.com/en/europe/20211231-germany-backs-france-for-more-sovereign-europe-as-paris-set-for-turn-at-eu-presidency (1-C)
Gianniou, M., Galariotis, I., “The European External Action Service: Towards a More Coherent EU Foreign Policy?”, St Antony’s International Review, 12(1), 104–119, 2016. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26229162 (2-B)
Gross domestic product at current market prices of selected European countries in 2020 (in million euros), Statista, 2020. https://www.statista.com/statistics/685925/gdp-of-european-countries/ (1-A)
“Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS”, The White House, 15 September, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/ (2-A)
Karnitschnig, M., “Why Merkel can’t stop apologizing”, Politico, 15 July, 2020. https://www.politico.eu/article/why-angela-merkel-cant-stop-apologizing-germany-foreign-policy/ (3-B)
Krpata M., “The Future of the Franco-German Tandem”, ISPI, 22 September, 2021.
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/future-franco-german-tandem-31657 (2-B)
The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, European Parliament, September, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.3.pdf (1-A)
Marafona, M., “European Reactions to AUKUS and Implications for EU Strategic Autonomy”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 15 November, 2020. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/european-reactions-aukus-and-implications-eu-strategic-autonomy (2-B)
Noyan, O., “Germany declines to back up France in submarine row”, EURACTIV, 23 September, 2021. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/germany-declines-to-back-france-in-submarine-row/ (2-B)
Rajagopolan, R., “Does AUKUS Augment or Diminish the Quad?”, The Diplomat, 23 September, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/does-aukus-augment-or-diminish-the-quad/ (3-B)
Roberts, H., “Dishonorable: Italians return top French award over Macron’s Egypt ties”, Politico, 15 December 2020. https://www.politico.eu/article/dishonorable-italians-return-top-french-award-over-emmanuel-macron-egypt-abdel-fattah-el-sisi-ties/ (1-B)
Robinet-Borgomano, A., “Germany can no longer avoid its responsibility to European defense”, Politico, 25 September, 2021. https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-election-responsibility-european-defense/amp/ (2-B)
“Scholz, Macron say diplomacy can fix Ukraine-Russia standoff”, Deutsche Welle, 25 January, 2022. https://www.dw.com/en/scholz-macron-say-diplomacy-can-fix-ukraine-russia-standoff/a-60549166 (1-C)
Schultheis, E., “Germany’s Post-Pacifist Generation Is Nearing Power”, Foreign Policy, 3 May, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/03/greens-annalena-baerbock-germanys-post-pacifist-generation-election-power/ (2-B)
Schwarzer, D., “Future Pillars of German Foreign Policy”, ISPI, 22 September, 2017. https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/future-pillars-german-foreign-policy-17746 (2-B)
Smith, S., “The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What to Know”, Council on Foreign Relations, 27 May, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know (2-B)
“Speciale Ucraina: le diverse posizioni degli alleati occidentali”, ISPI, 26 January, 2022. https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/speciale-ucraina-mood-war-3-32987 (1-B)
“Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea”, Council on Foreign Relations, 28 January, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea (2-B)
“The Treaty of Lisbon”, European Parliament, October, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon (1-A)
“UK and Canada join diplomatic boycott of China Winter Olympics”, BBC, 8 December, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-59582137 (2-B)
Vimont P., Hilton C., Blockmans S., “FROM SELF-DOUBT TO SELF-ASSURANCE. The European External Action Service as the indispensable support for a geopolitical EU”, Report by the Task Force EEAS 2.0, January 2021. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/from-self-doubt-to-self-assurance/ (2-B)