Abstract
This paper gives a broad overview on the development of the Russian political system since the end of the Cold War, focusing on the shortcomings of the country’s democratic transition. It then evaluates Vladimir Putin’s multi-decade rule, that effectively rolled back the Federation towards autocracy. Finally, it sums up the two most-debated issues on the topic - the importance of endogenous cultural factors incompatible with democracy and the existence of a grassroot support for the latter – while highlighting some areas of concern.
Author
Chiara Malaponti - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
1. Russia’s failed democratic transition
As the Russian troops marched into Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, a wave of protests broke out across the Federation. People took to the streets under the slogan “Нет войне” (No to war); on the first day of the conflict only, the police was reported to have made more than 1,700 arrests (Sauer, Roth, 2022). A second wave of demonstrations was later triggered by Putin’s decision to declare a partial mobilisation in September 2022. The popular dissensus was met by increasing repression by the Kremlin. However, it also reopened a debate as old as time, that of the difficult relationship between Russia and democracy - whether they are compatible and, if so, what the future might hold for a transitioning Russia.
In 2022, Freedom House ranked the Russian Federation as “Not free”, with a score of 19/100 - totalling 5/40 in the Political Rights subsection and 14/60 in the Civil Liberties one (both are aggregate scores). To give some context, a country can be considered an electoral democracy when it scores at least 20 in Political Rights (while getting a minimum of 7 in the Electoral Process subcategory - Russia’s score was 0) and at least 30 in Civil Liberties. According to the American non-profit, however, “Power in Russia’s authoritarian political system is concentrated in the hands of President Vladimir Putin. With loyalist security forces, a subservient judiciary, a controlled media environment, and a legislature consisting of a ruling party and pliable opposition factions, the Kremlin is able to manipulate elections and suppress genuine dissent. Rampant corruption facilitates shifting links among state officials and organized crime groups” (Freedom House, 2022).
The flawed nature of the Russian political system is confirmed by another index, namely Varieties of Democracy’s flagship indicator of Electoral Democracy. According to their website, “The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens [...] political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance” (Varieties of Democracy, 2022). Moreover, electoral democracy is considered as the conditio sine qua non for the establishment of other forms of democracy, such as liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian. On a scale of 0 to 1, Russia’s Electoral Democracy score was 0.26 in 2021.
Source: https://v-dem.net/data_analysi...
The graph effectively communicates the failure of the Russian democratic transition process. First of all, one may easily spot the communist democratic “plateau”: indeed, up until 1985, Russia (then part of the Soviet Union) never scored more than 0.11. In 1985, however, things changed. In March, Michail Gorbačëv became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Faced with national stagnation, he then launched a series of reforms that fall under the name of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). By enhancing civic liberties and decentralising the economy, Gorbačëv’s reforms would eventually trigger other mechanisms, which eventually contributed to the collapse of the USSR.
In 1991, Boris El’cin was democratically elected as President of Russia: “It is hard to imagine a more challenging starting point than what Yeltsin faced as he simultaneously tackled the triple transformation of empire to nation-state, dictatorship to democracy, and command economy to capitalism” (McFaul, 2021). Looking at the early years of his presidency, one might identify two crucial missteps. One lies in the implementation of a plan of swift economic liberalisation (commonly referred to as “shock therapy”). As this process unfolded, huge amounts of wealth fell in the hands of Russian oligarchs. Moreover, it triggered a political crisis: in 1993, El’cin unconstitutionally dissolved the Parliament. Protesters struck back by taking control of the mayor’s office and attempted to capture the Ostankino television station. Eventually, military forces loyal to the President seized the Parliament building to restore order. The outcome of the crisis was then the approval of a new constitution by referendum, which designed a system that has sometimes be described as “superpresidential” - a tool that would later be wielded by Vladimir Putin.
In 1996, El’cin was elected for a second term. Facing illness and internal strife, he was moved to devise a succession plan, which would eventually lead to the rise of Putin as President between 1999 and 2000 (first as acting after El’cin’s resignation, then in office).
The debate on Russia’s failed democratic transition has been torn between the relative importance assigned to either structural or agency factors. However, just as leaders were fundamental in initiating the dismantling of authoritarianism (even if it was not their original aim - such as in Gorbačëv’s case), leadership was also crucial in producing Russia’s democratic setback. “Yeltsin, his government, and his supporters had a formidable negative inheritance—that is, structural factors beyond their control”; however, “Yeltsin’s most consequential choice was naming Putin as his successor. [...] Yeltsin had other options, but he picked Putin or at least acceded to the choice [...] because Yeltsin’s inner circle thought that Putin could win and would not disrupt the status quo” (McFaul, 2021).
2. Putin’s Russia
In 1999, Vladimir Putin was appointed Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. He has now been in power for almost 24 years, either as PM (1999-2000; 2008-2012) or President (2000-2008; 2012-present). His time in office saw a radical erosion of democratic safeguards in Russia. This process was reinforced by a flawed process of economic transformation characterised by high levels of corruption: “Throughout Putin’s tenure, formerly powerful oligarchs who show political disloyalty or simply lose internal power struggles have been arrested on politically-motivated charges and had their assets seized by the state for distribution to other oligarchs in better political standing. As a result, it is well understood by Russia’s oligarch class that it is in their personal interest to use their wealth in ways to maintain the regime’s political favor” (Myles-Primakoff, 2018). The Corruption Perceptions Index assigned Russia a score of 29/100 in 2021 (where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean); the country ranked 136th out of 180 countries surveyed (Transparency International, 2021).
Already in the early days of his presidency, Putin started institutionalising the Russian democratic rollback. However, he “did not completely crush all political opposition or debilitate every democratic institution. Instead, he created a system his advisors described as “managed democracy” and later as “sovereign democracy.” This regime tolerated pockets of pluralism [...]” (McFaul, 2021). This first phase was largely based on the vast popular consensus Putin enjoyed, especially as the Russian economy boomed.
However, amidst waning consensus, his rule was challenged by the protests of late 2011 and early 2012, described as “the biggest since the fall of the USSR” (Sandford, 2011). The demonstrations were sparked by allegations of rigged parliamentary elections and by Putin’s announcement that he would run for his third term as President. As he eventually occupied the post, Russia witnessed a large crackdown on political dissensus - e.g. by the imposition of rising fines to punish the participation in unauthorised protests - and on the activities of NGOs. For example, in 2012 Putin signed the “foreign agent law”, “which requires NGOs that received funding from outside Russia to register as “foreign agents” and be subject to mandatory audits [...] The Kremlin cast the law as a way to prevent “foreign meddling” in Russia’s domestic politics and increase transparency” (Boghani, 2015). Contextually, his third term was characterised by the passing of bills aimed at the protection of traditional morals - e.g. the ban on “gay propaganda” in 2013 - undermining the civic rights of citizens (Luhn, 2015).
If popular support was not restored by means of coercion, it eventually benefited from the Kremlin’s portrayal of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2018, Putin ran for the fourth time to win the Presidential post. However, concerns emerged on the fairness and freedom of the electoral process: “President Putin’s 2018 reelection campaign benefited from advantages including preferential media treatment, numerous abuses of incumbency, and procedural irregularities during the vote count. His most influential rival, Aleksey Navalny, was disqualified before the campaign began due to a politically motivated criminal conviction” (Freedom House, 2022). Moreover, in 2020 a series of constitutional amendments was approved via referendum. They allow Putin to run for President for a third term in a row (which was previously forbidden by the constitution) and potentially extend his rule to 2036, while introducing “a guaranteed minimum pension, a ban on same-sex marriages, the inclusion of ''a belief in God'' as a core value, and it would emphasize the primacy of Russian law over international norms” (Deutsche Welle, 2020).
Putin’s regime then proceeded to criminalise a series of media outlets and to jeopardise millions of Russians’ right to vote by changing the electoral laws, as well as carrying out more brazen acts of repression - such as the 2020 poisoning of Aleksey Navalny and then his incarceration, as well as that of other opponents. As “the net is spreading beyond politics”, in 2021 The Economist referred to this new phase as “Russia’s new era of repression” (The Economist, 2021). Of course, the 2022 anti-war protests after the invasion of Ukraine are met by equally, if not harsher measures, raising increasing concerns of police brutality.
3. Conclusions
The contemporary debate on the complicated relationship between the Russian Federation and democracy frequently raises two questions.
The first one broadly ponders aspects of political, as well as historical and sociological nature. Looking at the country’s path through time, it has often been suggested that democracy might not be compatible with Russia per se: “In Russia itself, the belief that Western-style democracy is impossible is shared not only by Putin supporters but also monarchists, communists, nationalists, and Eurasianists. They all argue that Russia must follow its own culturally determined path and that exactly because of Russia’s unwillingness to bend to the diktat of liberal democracies, it inevitably finds itself in conflict with the West” (Kim, 2022). A Western-style liberal democracy might not be the most suitable model in the case of Russia (as well as of many other countries, e.g. in the Middle East). However, this does not preclude the future development of a form of government that encompasses some qualities that could be described as democratic and that moves away from the current state of internal affairs. Moreover, history itself has scaled back the importance of strictly endogenous cultural factors in the face of exogenous factors, showing the complex interplay of forces that shape democratic transitions - e.g. in the case of North and South Korea.
The second involves the question of a grassroot support for democracy. Especially as the war in Ukraine broke out, Western observers have been puzzled by the reportedly high consensus for Putin’s regime. For example, in December 2022, when asked if they approved of Putin’s activities as President, 81% of Russians answered ‘yes’, 17% answered ‘no’ and 2% did not answer (Statista, 2022). It has been argued that, given the current iron fist on political dissensus, these results must be taken with a grain of salt. Besides issues of methodology, according to a report by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “a careful reading of popular Russian attitudes toward the war reveals important nuances that all too often are overlooked. First and foremost is the fact that rather than consolidating Russian society, the conflict has exacerbated existing divisions on a diverse array of issues, including support for the regime” (Volkov, Kolesnikov, 2022). The socioeconomic impact of the war on public moods needs further evaluation. However, it must also be noted that the preparation for the 2024 presidential election among an increasing repressive environment might serve to “frighten key parts of Russian society, which, as experience teaches, will ultimately lead them to rally around the regime yet again” (ibid.).
However, some argue that, in principle, the war has changed the nature of the citizens’ relationship with Putin’s regime. In short, “For many years, it was generally agreed that, under Putin, most don’t get involved in politics, that a pre-determined winner is elected, and in return the state provides security and stability. Putin’s mobilisation has torn up that social contract. Suddenly, tacit approval is no longer enough” (Suleymanov, 2022). The Western media has then depicted a series of scenarios in which Putin’s regime may collapse. They underlined a few aspects: the social costs of the war, Putin’s loss in reputation and the role of inner circles (Bergmann, 2023; Suleymanov, 2022). These factors may engineer a scenario where the government is simply unable to govern, the elites stage a coup, Putin is removed from office in order to save the regime or mass protests arise (Bergmann, 2023). Regarding the latter, it has already been noted how polls suggest that Russians are, for the time being, unlikely to take on the regime. As for Putin’s removal from office, it is hard to see how that could be wielded as an option to preserve the status quo. It would require solving the puzzling question of his succession, which might lead to even more instability.
Finally, even the role of the elites is contested. According to political scientist Vladimir Gelman, “such a split in the elite would require a system in which there is collective leadership and several competing factions, such as in the late Soviet era in the Politburo” (Bathon, 2022). Things are different in contemporary Russia. “Meetings of high-ranking government officials with Putin are currently limited to demonstrating approval for decisions made by Putin alone”; there are “no factions around the leadership, but rather temporary cliques in the power struggle around the central figurehead – with criticism, such as that from the war hardliners Yevgeny Prigozhin and Ramzan Kadyrov at their own Ministry of Defence, being episodes in the battle over distribution of power” (ibid.). Such remarks would then be misunderstood by Western media as signs of regime instability. According to this view, an overthrow of the government is unlikely: neither Prigozhin nor Kadyrov are part of an independent faction which can count on an independent source of income to successfully topple Putin’s regime.
Therefore, the future of Putin’s Russia remains obscure, especially for what concerns its potential for democratic transition. International and domestic instability will likely be affected by the future developments of the war in Ukraine. It must be noted, then, that in the broader framework of European relations “although the West has a post-victory strategy for Ukraine, namely a framework for reconstruction and a path toward EU and NATO membership, it lacks a vision for Russia in the aftermath of a Ukrainian victory” (Bergmann, 2023).
Classification of sources and information:
1 | Confirmed | Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
2 | Presumably true | Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
3 | Maybe true | Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic |
4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
Trustworthiness of the source | ||
A | Trustworthy | No doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence; has a history of total trustworthiness |
B | Normally trustworthy | Small doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence, nevertheless has a history of valid information in a majority of cases |
C | Sufficiently trustworthy | Doubts about authenticity, reliability or competence; however, has supplied valid information in the past |
D | Normally not trustworthy | Significant doubt about authenticity, reliability or competence, however has supplied valid information in the past |
E | Not trustworthy | Lack of authenticity, reliability or competence; history of invalid information |
F | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
References
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