Abstract
In June 2023, the Ukrainian armed forces initiated a large-scale counteroffensive with significant implications. The primary objectives included reclaiming territories occupied by Moscow, garnering support from allies, and potentially delivering a decisive blow to both the Russian military and public consensus. As we approach the seven-month mark since the operation's commencement, it is timely to evaluate the current status of the counteroffensive, examine the achieved and missed outcomes, and consider the overall prospects for the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Author
Pietro Bianchi - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics
1. Goals, field forces, and preparation
In February 2023, the Ukrainian high command began evaluating, with the United States, the possibility of launching a counteroffensive in the occupied territories. For this purpose, Kyiv allocated 60.000 additional soldiers divided into twelve brigades, largely trained and equipped by Washington, and sought assistance from the Allies to send hundreds of Leopard-2 and M1 Abrams tanks. The original intention was to start the operation as early as spring; however, delays in the delivery of armaments, logistical complications due to difficult weather conditions, and the unfolding of the Battle of Bakhmut, which lasted until May, delayed its start (Copp, 2023; Bachega, 2023).
For its part, the Russian armed forces had begun constructing a defensive line along the front as early as November 2022. This resulted in the implementation of an intricate network of anti-tank trenches and ditches, "dragon tooth" concrete barricades, artillery emplacements, steel "hedgehog" obstacles, barbed wire coils, and minefields (Miller, 2023). The main fortifications were concentrated in the Zaporizhzhia region, in what was to be the primary axis of the counteroffensive to break the links between Russia and Crimea. In this area, a first 150-kilometer line of defense was set up from Vasylivka to Novopetrykivka, a second 130-kilometer line from Orlynske to north of Kamianka, and a third to surround the main urban centers. The first two lines consisted of anti-tank ditches and infantry trenches supported by artillery positions placed 30 km to the rear. The third contained strategically placed fortifications intended to serve as an emergency to preserve Russian positions in case of a breakthrough by the Ukrainian side (Jones, Palmer, Bermudez Jr, 2023).
Other occupied areas saw a major concentration of Moscow's defenses, mainly those of major logistical importance. These include Berdyansk Airport near the Azov Sea, the cities of Tokmak, Polohy, Bilmak, and Ocheretuvate, the northern border of the Crimean Peninsula from Armyansk in the north to Dzhankoi in the northwest, and the eastern cities of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, and Popasna. In addition, Russia has erected three lines of fortifications along the border of eastern Luhansk province in the north, a further direction of the Ukrainian advance intent on breaking through near the city of Kupyansk (Olearchyk, Miller, Hall, Seddon, Rathbone, Reed, Chazan, Foy, Srivastava, Ivanova Judah, 2024). In the Kherson oblast, a dense network of trenches was set up along the course of the Dnieper River, while in the Donetsk region fortifications were concentrated near Olhynka, Donetsk, Makiivka, and Horlivka.
Unlike the first counteroffensive in 2022, the operation was thus launched against a complex defensive system. The date of the start of the operation itself is debated, as it was not announced by the Kyiv command to maximize surprise. The launch of the counteroffensive is identified as June 4, when Moscow announced it had repelled a large-scale attack (Al Jazeera staff, 2023). Of particular note for the Russian defense was the June 6 decision to destroy the Kakhovka dam in the south of the country, resulting in the flooding of more than 500 square kilometers of territory, affecting the mobility of the Ukrainian armed forces in the first and decisive days of the counteroffensive.
The first fighting along the front to test Russian defenses began on June 4, but it was not until June 11 that Ukrainian forces broke through the first line of less fortified defenses in the Donetsk region and liberated three villages in the southern Oblast. The advance continued until June 13, with the liberation of four more villages, only to halt with the arrival of Russian reinforcements (Olearchyk, Miller, Hall, Seddon, Rathbone, Reed, Chazan, Foy, Srivastava, Ivanova Judah, 2024). The counteroffensive was thus concentrated along two vectors in the Zaporizhzhia region, one in the direction of Melitopol in the west, and the other toward Berdiansk in the east. Concerning the first, Ukrainian forces managed to partially fragment the first Russian line of defense placed between the villages of Robotyne and Verbove. In the case of the second directive, the advance was limited to the liberation of a few villages, without opening significant gaps in the Russian fortifications.
A further offensive was launched in the direction of Bakhmut; however, the symbolic implications of capturing the town led the Russian command to station large forces there, locking the Ukrainians to their positions. Throughout June, the Ukrainian army advanced a few hundred meters in the direction of Bakhmut. HUR (Ukraine's military intelligence service) chief Kyrylo Budanov justified the meager advances by stating that Kyiv's overall goal in the region was to pin down Russian forces in a defensive effort that would otherwise be used to strengthen the southern front (Barros, Stepanenko, Harward, Wolkov, Kagan, 2023).
As for Kherson Oblast, the Ukrainian armed forces attempted on several occasions to establish new beachheads across the Dnieper, but failed to consolidate their positions on the eastern bank of the river. Attempts to take control of the centers of Dachi and Kozachi Laheri were repulsed by Russian army counteroffensives (Kyiv Post staff, 2023).
2. Results of the counteroffensive
The Ukrainian advance was halted in mid-June. In the months that followed, territorial gains were extremely limited, except for the August 28 takeover of the village of Robotyne in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The major successes reported in the summer mainly involved single actions with a strong media impact but marginal strategic significance when compared to the initial counteroffensive objectives. These include the July 17 attack on the Kerch bridge, the August 24 raid by Ukrainian special forces on the west coast of Crimea where 30 Russian soldiers were killed, the August 30 drone-guided attack that destroyed several Russian aircraft, and the September 13 missile attack on the Sevastopol shipyard (Olearchyk, Miller, Hall, Seddon, Rathbone, Reed, Chazan, Foy, Srivastava, Ivanova Judah, 2024).
The strategic objectives of the counteroffensive were not achieved. In the first three months, Ukrainian forces sustained about 100,000 casualties in dead and wounded, while in the entire operation, they advanced just 8 km into the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, soon becoming mired in wearisome positional warfare. The key objective of reaching the Sea of Azov by severing connections between Russia and Crimea was not achieved. By the end of September, the entire counteroffensive had resulted in the liberation of just 370 square kilometers of occupied territory and 14 largely depopulated villages in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts (New York Times, 2023). A subsequent counteroffensive launched in October by the Russians in Donetsk reduced that portion of territory to 320 square kilometers by December (Finn, Herszenhorn, 2023). The onset of autumn and winter further helped freeze the front line. The Ukrainian commander-in-chief, Valerii Zaluzhny, declared in early November 2023 that the war had reached a stalemate (Burridge, 2023).
The origin of these setbacks can be traced to multiple factors. First, unlike in 2022, the Russian armed forces were able to organize a more layered and effective system of fortifications. The placement of mines covering more than 170.000 square kilometers and the construction of anti-tank ditches and static barriers of various kinds slowed the movements of the Ukrainian mechanized infantry in favor of Russian artillery and drone fire. The completion of this defensive system was heavily dependent on delays in the start of the counteroffensive related to the timing of training, the provision of military aid, and the definition of the overall strategy of the operation (Zafra, McClure, 2023).
Second, it is likely that the ability to transform the Ukrainian army into a Western fighting force in a short period was underestimated, especially without giving Kyiv adequate air capability as an integral part of modern armies. This assumption may have wrongly influenced the definition of the initial strategies and objectives, especially when related to the massive defensive installation set up by the Russians (Washington Post staff, 2023).
Third, splitting the Ukrainian advance into several attack directives instead of a single one proved decisive. During the preparation of the operation, U.S. military advisers recommended concentrating forces in a single offensive toward Melitopol in Zaporizhzhia Oblast to cut the supply lines from Russia to Crimea. Otherwise, Kyiv preferred to launch simultaneous offensives toward Melitopol, Berdiansk, Bakhmut, and, although to a lesser extent, along the course of the Dnieper. The Ukrainian high command justified the decision as dictated by the total absence of air superiority and the intention to reduce the risk of heavy losses from an attack along a single axis (Zafra, McClure, 2023).
Finally, the wearisome battle of Bakhmut produced significant after-effects on the operation. First, it certainly contributed to its delay beyond April, given Kyiv's refusal to disengage from the city thereby freeing up important forces for the counteroffensive. First-rate Ukrainian battalions remained engaged in a complex urban conflict in order not to abandon a position that had become symbolically, but not strategically, important, taking thousands of casualties and exposing themselves to the gradual attrition of the Russian "meat grinder" (Zafra, McClure, 2023). The May withdrawal then convinced Zelenskyj and Zaluzhny of the need to maintain a major presence around Bakhmut and to strike Russian forces there as part of the counteroffensive as well. To this end, more forces were deployed near Bakhmut than in the south, including the country's most experienced units, further reducing the offensive's chances of success in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, where instead 60 percent of the troops from three of the brigades that led the offensive toward Melitopol entered battle with no combat experience (Washington Post staff, 2023).
3. Conclusions
The counteroffensive results listed above and the consequent spread of a generalized climate of uncertainty force a concluding reflection on the outlook for the conflict. Domestically, there is a decline in morale in Ukraine. To offset the efforts that have accompanied the operation, the government has advanced a bill to mobilize new troops, reducing the draft age from 27 to 25, limiting deferments for men with mild disabilities, and increasing penalties for draft dodgers. The proposal generated enough criticism to force the executive branch to withdraw it (Melkozerova, 2023). In a conflict-tested country that has already seen 5 million people expatriate since February 2022, retains nearly 1 million personnel in the armed forces, and has reported hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded, a new mobilization coupled with counteroffensive setbacks could increase war fatigue.
Internationally, several analysts viewed the eventual successes as proof that military aid to Ukraine was justified and that the reconquest of occupied territories was possible, which would encourage further aid. Instead, the weak achievements fueled Western public fatigue over support for Kyiv. This was reflected in setbacks in votes regarding the sending of new aid: in the European Union, the sending of a 50 billion aid package was blocked in December by the Hungarian veto, while in the United States, Republicans halted discussions in the Senate on sending 60 billion dollars in new aid. Given the substantial transformation of the Russian economy into a war production industry, Moscow is likely to regain a significant advantage over Kyiv in the medium to long term, which could prove potentially decisive for the outcomes of the war. In addition, the shift in media attention to new areas of conflict such as Israel, Gaza, and Yemen could foster political reluctance to contribute to a cause considered precarious.
Taken together, all these factors make Ukraine's victory less likely than years of war and destruction. Despite these assumptions, however, it is not a foregone conclusion that on the other side, Russia will achieve its strategic objectives, including the conquest of the Kherson, Mykolajiv, and Odesa Oblasts, thus excluding Kyiv from access to the Black Sea. Ukraine has proven itself capable of defending itself against Moscow's offensives, whose army has testified to an improvement in defensive techniques but has recorded, in offensive terms, as its only notable success in the last year the conquest of Bakhmut at the cost of enormous sacrifices. It is therefore likely that the forces on the ground will retain their current positions at least in the medium term. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that as Western aid fades, a negotiated solution will be reached, certainly different from that envisioned by Ukraine at the beginning of the counteroffensive.
Classification of sources and information:
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Sources
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