Trump’s economic policy: more than a trade war

  Focus - Allegati
  20 marzo 2025
  22 minuti, 36 secondi

Abstract

Donald Trump, the new President of the United States, has a very new approach to the foreign and economic policy of his Country. After decades of free trade and support for developing good relations with close partners and allies, the US under Trump will likely have a more protectionist attitude. This new line of action is shown in his first acts, the President implemented tariffs on imports from some other States with the aim to make America less dependent on third Countries. This article focuses on the new tariffs introduced by the Trump administration and their possible consequences on the relationship with US allies and partners.

Author

Sharon Giacomelli - Junior Researcher - Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Politics


Introduction

On November 4, 2025, American voters chose Donald Trump as their new President. After a polarising and unpredictable electoral campaign, Trump managed to beat his rival, Kamala Harris. His promises recalled his actions during his first presidency, especially about illegal immigration, climate policy, government diversity programmes, and economic protectionism. Nationalism, and in some part even isolationism, have been the key elements of his discourses.

His leitmotifs, taken from his previous campaign and presidency, were "America first" and "Make America Great Again". In practice, those expressions mean stronger borders, fewer migrants, less climate attention, and new trade relations that aim to protect American industries and increase national production.

Trump believes that the best way to boost the internal economy is to use levies as a tool to diminish imports while financially supporting national businesses. During the electoral campaign, in October 2024, Trump declared that he wanted to favour companies that make their products in the US and at the same time protect them by imposing strong tariffs on goods coming from abroad (Schneid, 2025).

His economic vision, including this massive use of tariffs, it’s a clear rejection of the neoliberal conception of the economic world system, which was inspired and dominated by the US during and after the Cold War. Instead of free trade, he prefers muscular economic nationalism; instead of participation in international organisations , he prefers isolationism.

The President made clear his preferences since the very beginning of his second term. In fact, during his first day in office, he signed several executive orders that would, in his words, lead to a complete restoration of America (The Guardian, 2025). Some of the most discussed matters affected by those orders were the ending of birthright citizenship, the exit from the World Health Organization, the renaming of the Gulf of Mexico into the Gulf of America, the withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement, and the creation of a policy that recognizes only two genders. Those decisions underlined his view of how America should work and act on the international scene: more focused on itself and its own interests.


Trump’s tariffs: a chronology

During the first weeks of his second mandate, President Donald Trump has introduced and expanded tariffs on various goods, reaffirming the protectionist approach to international trade that characterised his first Presidency. These tariffs are primarily aimed at reducing the trade deficit, protecting American manufacturing jobs, and addressing what Trump has labeled as “unfair trade practices” by countries like China, the European Union, and others.

Trump's approach to tariffs builds on his "America First" agenda, prioritizing the US's economic interests over international trade norms. The intention behind these tariffs is to encourage domestic production, reduce reliance on foreign goods, and strengthen US economic resilience.

As of mid-March 2025, Trump imposed levies in particular on products coming from Canada, Mexico and China. The President also announced his intention to extend them on goods imported from the European Union, one of the three main economic blocs, threatening commercial relations with one of the main political partners of the US.

In more detail, on February 1, the White House announced new 25% tariffs on goods coming from Canada and Mexico and 10% on those from China. Canadian energy faced a lower 10% tariff. The American States and China responded immediately (White House, 2025).

A few hours after the US government statement, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced retaliation against Trump's decisions. He stated he would slap tariffs on $107 billion of US goods, including alcohol, clothing, sports equipment, and household appliances. Those on $30 billion would take effect on the same day as Trump's tariffs, whereas the remaining $125 billion would take effect in 21 days(). However, the following day, Canada's government released a statement in which it made known that Canada and the US agreed to delay imposing the announced tariffs on imported goods. This agreement was reached thanks to the commitment declared by Canadian authorities to reinforce the border with 1000 additional troops in order to attempt to stop, or at least diminish, the flow of fentanyl, a new drug that is causing problems of addiction in the US.

A similar course of events occurred with Mexico. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, too, ordered retaliatory tariffs in response to Trump's decision. Her Minister of Economy, Marcelo Ebrard, was instructed to define a plan that included tariff and non-tariff measures to defend their national interests. Possible new tariffs ranged from 5% to 20% on fresh products, manufactured steel, and aluminium. Yet, as it happened with Canada, on February 3, Sheinbaum posted on X the reach of a new agreement with Trump, according to which Mexico would put 10 thousand soldiers on its northern border to limit the drug trade in exchange for the delay of the enactment of the tariffs for a month.

While introducing new tariffs has been temporarily postponed for Canada and Mexico, the ones against China came into force on February 4, 2025. No agreement has been reached between the two global superpowers. Beijing announced a series of countermeasures, tariffs, and non-tariffs (). To give a few examples, China said they would impose tariffs of 15% on some US agricultural imports, like chicken and corn, and one of 10% on US aquatic products, beed, dairy, fruits, and vegetables. Other goods touched by the new levies would be US coal and liquefied natural gas, crude oil, agricultural machinery, and large cars. Among the non-tariff countermeasures there is the investigation into US tech giant Google, which has been blocked in all Chinese territory since 2010, and the addition of PVH Corp., the clothing company that owns famous brands like Tommy Hilfiger and Calvin Klein, to the "unreliable entity" list, making it harder for them to do business in the country. Moreover, China imposed export controls on 25 metals, including key components for some electoral products, but leaving out critical metals that China imports from the US and that are used to create semiconductor machinery and aerospace equipment. Chinese tariffs took effect on February 10.

Later, Trump raised tariffs on steel and aluminium imports to a flat 25% with no exceptions or exemptions. Previously, he had announced tariffs of 10% with numerous exemptions for both metals. This measure will be implemented on March 12 (Holland, Lawder, and Shalal, 2025).

Some days later, on February 13, the White House announced that President Trump had ordered the definition of a comprehensive plan to restore balance in trade with other countries. In fact, as of today, there is no reciprocity as far as tariffs are concerned. To give some examples, taken directly from the statement of the White House, the US tariff on ethanol is 2.5%, while Brazil imposes a tariff of 18%. The EU applies a 10% tariff on imported cars and the US a 2.5% tariff (White House, 2025B).

According to Trump's administration, this lack of reciprocity of treatment, especially considering allied countries, is one of the leading causes of the US trade deficit in goods.

This plan will take months to finish and implement, yet it could drastically change the economic relations between the US and many other countries, including the European Union. The European Commission responded to this plan with a statement condemning it and renewing its support for an open global trading system. It also promised to respond firmly and immediately against the imposition of economic barriers that would limit fair trade (European Commission, 2025).

On March 4, Trump's tariffs against Canada and Mexico came into force after a one-month delay. On the same day, he doubled the tariffs on all Chinese imports to 20%. Prime Minister Trudeau accused the US President of planning a collapse of the Canadian economy, linking the change of policy to the declared intention of Trump to annex Canada and make it the 51st American State. Criticism also came from Sheinbaum, who believed that levies have no justification. She also announced that Mexico would impose retaliatory measures on March 9 without indicating specific products, signalling hopes to de-escalate the tensions. China decided to respond by imposing tariffs up to 15% on a wide range of US exports, including soybeans, chicken, corn, cotton, seafood, and dairy products. It also doubled the number of companies subject to export controls.

Two days after the tariffs went into effect, Trump pulled back, temporarily delaying tariffs on a series of goods coming from Mexico and Canada. In fact, he postponed duties on goods coming from those two countries that fall under the USMCA, a trade agreement reached in 2018 by the US, Canada, and Mexico (Jones, 2025).

On March 11, Trump escalated the trade conflict with Canada by doubling the tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminium imports from 25% to 50% in retaliation to Ontario's decision to increase electricity prices for the US. The following day, however, Trump halted that retaliatory plan (Espiner and Sherman, 2025).



The consequences of tariffs

Given the predominance and the position of hegemony of the US in the international landscape, the drastic change in its economic policy will surely have many internal and global consequences in financial and geopolitical fields.


Effects at the national level

Effects on American economy

Starting from the national level, it is crucial to note that the three central countries touched by the tariffs, Canada, Mexico, and China, export to the US more than $1.3 trillion, nearly half of all US imports. The tariffs, according to Bloomberg Economics, could reduce the overall imports of the US by 15%. Tax Foundation, a prominent think tank based in Washington DC that studies tax policies, says this measure could potentially generate $142 billion this year in extra federal tax revenue. Yet, it could also have negative consequences on the broader economy. Among them are the rising costs for businesses and the consequent increase in prices for consumers. Moreover, according to Tax Foundation, due to the new tariffs, American families' tax burden will increase by more than $1200 yearly (Kazzaz, 2025).

Some sectors will suffer more than others due to these measures, especially automotive, energy and food. As far as the car sector is concerned, it is essential to mention the fact that nowadays, vehicles are not purely American-made because almost every component crosses the border with Mexico several times before it is finished. Anderson Economic Group, a think tank based in Michigan, estimates car costs will rise between $3000 and $12000 (Buchwald, 2025).

The American energy sector is likely to be highly influenced. In fact, Canada and Mexico are the two main suppliers, providing for more than 70% of crude oil imports to the US. Gas prices are estimated to surge as much as 50 cents per gallon in the Midwest, the part of the US affected the most (O’Neil and Huesa, 2025).

The new tariffs will highly impact the food sector as well, since Mexico and Canada are huge providers of some key food categories, particularly: fruit and vegetables, grain, livestock, and meats. Those agricultural products will likely become more expensive for consumers as grocery retailers typically have thinner profit margins than other industries and can not afford to absorb these higher costs.


Effects on Canadian and Mexican economies

The economic measure decided by the US will also affect Canadian and Mexican economies. And it will likely affect them more than the American one since America is their largest export market. In 2024, Mexico exported $505 billion to the US. That is almost 30% of its GDP, while Canada exported $412 billion, 20% of its national income. Meanwhile, US exports to Mexico were $334 billion, 1% of its GDP, and their export to Canada was $349 billion, just a little bit over 1% of the national income (Rios, 2025)

To give more details, in Canada the energy sector will take the biggest hit, given that Canadian exporters send huge volumes of sources of energy to their southern ally. According to the Canada Energy Regulator, in 2023 Canada provided 58% of the volume of hydrocarbons imported by the US. Specifically, it provided 60% of crude oil and 99% of natural gas imported by the US (Canada Energy Regulator, 2025). If producers decide to pass the rising costs on to consumers, the prices will rise. Moreover, if tariffs were to disrupt this supply chain, Canada would feel the consequences more than America since it would lose its primary customer while the US has more options to choose from.

With regards to Mexico, its automotive industry will bear the brunt: 80% of the cars produced in Mexico are sent to the US alone, amounting to around 2.5 million vehicles annually. Higher prices and fewer cars sold will lead to job losses in the country (Rios, 2025).



Effects on Chinese economy

China, being less dependent on the US and less reliant on international trade, will be less impacted by Trump's manoeuvre. In fact, the US imposed tariffs on Chinese products many years ago, starting with George W. Bush’s administration in 1991. Then, almost every President implemented levies on goods coming from China. In 2018, during the first Trump presidency, this element became a prominent topic in the context of Sino-American relations. So, over the years, in an attempt to anticipate crises and solve this matter, Beijing has reduced its imports and ramped up its domestic production. According to Scott Jenedy, an expert in Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China is now better prepared to respond to the American levies. Although its economy has slowed down in the latest years, it still possesses excellent technology capabilities, it has diversified its trade and investments (Hoskins, 2025).

This does not mean that the Chinese economy will not be impacted. For years, China has been the “world’s factory” since it provided the other States with goods at low prices due to cheap labour. In 2024, its global trade surplus set the record of $1 trillion (Guinto, 2025). Trump’s tariffs can hurt Chinese factories significantly. A 20% levy means a lower demand of goods from overseas and, consequently, a shrink of the trade surplus.

Yet, as said before, Beijing has anticipated this kind of problems long ago and diversified its manufacturing production. This implies that now they do not only produce goods at low cost, but they also create advanced tech like robotics and artificial intelligence. In addition, some of them cannot be easily replaced, as is the case with solar panels whose components are manufactured almost only in China.

Tariffs could also affect the global supply chains, especially if the levies target components or raw materials that China imports from the US. It is likely that on longer terms Chinese producers will increase their production in different locations, like Mexico, and Poland in an attempt to avoid US import duties (Maisonneuve, Guan and George, 2025). Companies are finding it difficult to reroute their supply chains since Trump’s policy is highly unpredictable and it is difficult to know which countries will be affected in the future. This raises operating costs for the businesses which should adopt a “China + many” strategy, establishing operations across multiple partner countries (Bao, 2025).


Effects at the international level

As underlined in the previous paragraph, the decision to impose tariffs can have global economic consequences. It can also affect the political relations between the United States and other countries and this is particularly true if we consider that two of the most affected states, Canada and Mexico, are longstanding and close allies of the US.

According to some experts, Trump's decisions do not aim at initiating a trade war but instead intend to create leverage to negotiate benefits for the US. This can be seen, for example, in the one-month delay of the measures with both Canada and Mexico. In fact, as previously stated, these agreements were reached when Trudeau and Sheinbaum agreed to act against drug trafficking and illegal immigration. Yet, the outcome of this policy will depend mainly on how third States respond. China and the EU, two of the biggest trading markets, are likely to implement target retaliation, but at the same time, they will also seek to negotiate.

Another important aspect is considering this change in the US's economic policy with regards to Trump’s relations with third Countries. Since his election, Trump has kept an aggressive stance towards some of the US's closest allies. For example, Trump demanded that Denmark sell Greenland, a part of its sovereign territory, to the US. After the Danish denial, the US President did not rule out the use of economic coercion and force to accomplish this objective, which, according to him, has a strategic meaning.

Another example is his attempt to regain control over the Panama Canal. The Canal is strategic because of its critical maritime trade route since 6% of global maritime trade passes through its locks (Fuller, 2024). Trump’s concerns also involved the perception of unfairness in the treatment of the US interests given that American shipments are charged high fees. The expanding Chinese influence in the region is another cause of apprehension. The US President has claimed that China controls the Panama Canal, therefore pressured CK Hutchinson, a Hong-Kong-based conglomerate, to sell its stake in the Panama Canal ports to US and Swiss investors. This is Trump’s attempt to regain some level of influence over the Canal after almost two decades and a half of Panamanian jurisdiction.

The highest risk of this way of conducting policy is a rethink of how its historical partners perceive the US. Trump's US is now perceived as a less reliable partner by many Countries. This change could also touch fields like defense cooperation, climate change programmes and military alliances.

It is not a coincidence that discussions about European strategic autonomy and independence from the US became, lately, more relevant among European politicians. At the centre of the European political debate is also the possible rearmament of the Old Continent, proposed by the European Commission, which announced, at the beginning of March 2025, its ReArm program to develop a deterrence capability. Many raised doubts about the chances that this plan will ever see the light, especially considering the internal differences of the Member States (Tornielli, 2025; Galeeva, 2025). Yet, it shows how the perception of global policy is changing.

A last crucial aspect to consider is that, as it is often said, in politics, there cannot be a political vacuum, and whenever it appears, it is quickly occupied by someone else. Political vacuums occur when a great power is in decline and it is less able to attract and influence other States. When this capability dissolves, others compete to fill the void left by the great power. This assumption is fundamental for the US and its role of hegemony of the international system. For American decisionmakers the US should leave no void of power that can be filled by China, Russia or Iran, as former US President Joe Biden stated in a discourse in 2022 (CNBC, 2022). In light of this vision, the turn into protectionism occurring in the US can leave the leadership in international trade empty, a position that China would be more than happy to occupy.



Conclusions

During his second term, Donald Trump will follow the principles of policy that he stated during his first presidency: nationalism and conservatism. This can be seen in its attempts to protect American interests at all costs abroad. To reach his objectives, Trump sees both allies and rivals the same way, as seen in the case of the tariffs that affected friends like Canada and enemies like China.

This approach is new for American policy and can potentially have dramatic consequences for the stability of the international system. A weaker alliance between the US and Europe, with the latter's desire to be less reliant on the superpower, can change the relation of power in the global system. In this context power is considered the ability of a State to make other States and organisations do something they would have not done otherwise. A modification of those relations can favour the rise of countries that do not agree with the principle of democracy and freedom, like China and Russia.

Even though this alternative system will require time to develop, and it is not certain that things will change towards this specific direction, what is sure is that the world is facing a time of uncertainty due to the unexpected behaviour of the new President of the United States.



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