Author: Filippo Valicenti, Junior Researcher
Abstract
Venezuela is estimated to possess the largest proven oil reserves in the world. While such resource wealth has the potential to drive national prosperity, it also poses significant challenges to the Country's social and economic development. This threat is not only confined to domestic issues—such as the corruption of the political system in recent years—but also extends to Venezuela's international relations, particularly with foreign powers, most notably the United States. This paper examines, through the lens of resource curse theory, the history of Venezuela’s oil industry and recent events, including the military capture of ex-President Maduro and the current American influence over Venezuelan oil revenues. The paper concludes with policy recommendations aimed at improving the governance and sustainable management of oil revenues.
Introduction
In 2024 crude oil export in Venezuela accounted for €10,2B, making it the 25th largest exporter of crude petroleum (out of 138) in the world. According to data gathered in the same year, oil export represents approximately 70,6 percent of national product export and 8,2 percent of the national GDP. Moreover, Venezuela is estimated to have the largest oil reserves, amounting for 303 billion barrels, located in the Orinoco oil belt, an area that is about 600 kilometers long, about 70 kilometers wide and stretches along the Orinoco river in the eastern part of the country. These data highlight the crucial role oil plays in the Venezuelan economy. However, despite its potential, oil has represented—and continues to represent—a challenge for the social and economic development of the country, rather than a driver of it. This controversial phenomenon is well explained by the resource curse theory.
Resource curse theory
The resource curse theory describes how the abundance of natural resources in a State—such as oil, gas and mines—threatens political transparency, social safety and economic growth, fostering underdevelopment and corruption. More specifically, this theory can be analyzed through two different lenses.
The structural approach argues that «The presence of oil and other mainly non-renewable natural resources structures incentives in a way that undermines building more democratic political regimes» leading to «consolidate and conserve ‘bad’ political regimes and undermines the social and cultural changes that have facilitated democratic transitions and consolidations elsewhere».
The agency-based approach, on the other hand, claims that «those holding power in resource-abundant countries—typically politicians or bureaucrats—take personal advantage of natural resource wealth. They engage in rent seeking and corrupt political and business practices and thus rob their countries of the opportunities that resource wealth could provide» (Stevens and Dietsche, 2007).
History of Venezuelan oil industry
Starting from the Seventies, Venezuela began a process of nationalization of the oil industry through the establishment in 1976 of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the main state-owned oil company, under Carlos Andrés Pérez Rodríguez’s administration.
Before the nationalization process, oil production was managed by a network of foreign companies operating under government concessions. Among these firms, many were American and had been present and active along the Venezuelan territory since the early twentieth century, when Venezuelan oil reserves began to be commercially exploited.
From its creation to the end of the past century, PDVSA was operating as a private transnational company, maintaining commercial relationships with several foreign companies and aiming to pursue capitalist efficiency. This orientation was further consolidated during the 1990s, the so-called periodo de apertura (opening period).
During this phase, Venezuela opened the oil sector to private and foreign capital: the State formally kept the property of oil reserves but with a reduced direct control over their management, with the simultaneous objectives of maximizing the production of crude oil while reducing fiscal burdens imposed on private foreign companies to explore and exploit hydrocarbons reserve. The aim was mainly economic: attracting investments and relaunching the economy after years of stagnation. The periodo de apertura saw PDVSA acting through what can be summarized as a system of operating agreements aimed at creating mixed companies with partners foreign firms, such as the American ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips and Chevron Corporation. American oil giants mainly operated in the Orinoco oil belt. These agreements allowed such mixed companies to exploit Venezuelan resources with the obligation to then share their income with PDVSA—namely, with the State.
Regarding the destination of the income, results were that oil revenues did not contribute to the need of the population as exemplified by Pérez’s «ambitious projects to create […] a welfare state […] involving vast investments, many of which failed to come to fruition» (Hammond, 2011).
When Pérez’s second administration came to an end in 1999, Chávez succeeded him after being the protagonist of the Bolivarian Movement, officially closing the period of apertura and implementing the anti-American and nationalist Chavist ideology. Chávez’s anti-colonialism concerned the reduction of the economic influence of international and especially American companies in Venezuela by putting the oil industry under stricter governmental control. This approach can be interpreted as a reaction to the fact that during the period of apertura, PDVSA directed oil revenues toward foreign investments, thus limiting their use for domestic political purposes. The nationalization was intended to serve an economic purpose while simultaneously pursuing broader social objectives.
Regarding the economic sphere, Chávez sought to reinforce Latin American integration by trading oil to neighboring countries at discounted price thereby moving beyond an era of U.S.-prescribed policies that promoted the opening of Venezuela’s oil industry to foreign investment.
In 2007, Chávez reformed the hydrocarbon law drafted in 2001 enacting fiscal austerity measures, replacing operating agreements with joint ventures and obliging transnational companies, such as Chevron and ExxonMobil, to transfer most of their participation quota to PDVSA. Some of those companies, such as ExxonMobil, decided to leave Venezuela upon refusal to agree on Chávez’s terms.
Moreover, he promoted economic diversification by funding small cooperatives in order to reduce dependency on the oil industry.
Finally, The Chávez administration implemented a strategy aimed at sustaining a surplus in the balance of payments and maintaining low levels of public debt—particularly external debt, as a response to the global 2008 financial crisis and rising inflation levels.
Concerning revenue investments, Chávez decided to use oil as a tool to foster human development within the Country, through the so-called project of “twenty-first century socialism”, that was specifically aiming at the poor sector of the population. The project consisted of the delivery—starting in 2003—of social programs—the so-called misiones Bolivarianas (Bolivarian missions)—in education, health, and subsidized consumption, challenging transnational companies.
Given such an economic and social scenario, Chávez’s decision to act in accordance with principles of Third World international solidarity and the social redistribution of oil revenues really seemed to allow Venezuela to escape the resource curse.
Nevertheless, during the second phase of Chavist administration the socialist and participatory project was diverted. As a matter of fact, during the 2006 elections he proposed a constitutional reform that substantially changed the concept of participation, which was no longer oriented toward social empowerment and protagonism in the management of oil resources, but rather subject to presidential control. This authoritarian drift undermined the effectiveness of public policies, which eventually led to the deep social crisis that the Venezuelan population is suffering nowadays.
The Chavist socio-economic plan was not structured to generate long-term benefits for Venezuelan society and it eventually deformed into a degrading dictatorship. Such downfall is embodied by Nicolás Maduro, who was handpicked in 2013 by Chávez himself as his successor. Since Maduro was a member of the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) party, personally funded by Chávez in 2008, this would have allowed the perpetuation of the Bolivarian and socialist ideology. This also fully applied on the oil production: Maduro continued Chávez’s nationalization project inducing other oil giants to leave the Country, as happened with ConocoPhillips in 2018. Besides, just as Chávez dismissed thousands of experienced PDVSA employees around 2002 and 2003—replacing seasoned personnel with political loyalists who often lacked industry expertise—Maduro continued this pattern of political purges, appointing loyal supporters to key leadership positions within PDVSA despite their limited technical qualifications.
The extreme politicization of PDVSA, together with the rumored corruption through which 2019 elections have been won by Maduro and the mismanagement of many oil infrastructures that have been left falling into disrepair, led the United States to reconsider their commercial relationship with Venezuela. As a response to «Maduro’s refusal to accede the presidency or hold new, fair elections, the United States issued a series of sanctions against the country» (Hammond, 2023), such as the Executive Order 13850, which prohibited all transactions between any person located in, or subject to the jurisdiction of, the United States and the Government of Venezuela, including Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA). More recently, in 2025, Trump’s administration intensified coercive measures against both firms and individuals linked to oil trade with Venezuela. In the same year, Executive Order 14245 was drafted, introducing a 25 percent tariff on all goods imported into the United States from any nation that imports Venezuelan oil, whether directly from Venezuela or through third-party intermediaries. Given that exports of crude oil to the United States accounted for a substantial share of Venezuela’s foreign revenue, such restrictions imposed by the U.S. against Venezuelan oil exportations hugely damaged the country’s economy. As a matter of fact, Venezuela’s gross domestic product experienced a dramatic contraction, with estimates indicating a reduction of more than 70 percent during Nicolás Maduro’s presidency, constantly declining from 2013 to 2020, when it reached €44,5B, an all-time low since the late Seventies.
American sanctions, along with diplomatic isolation and financial pressure, can be seen as a response to Maduro directly challenging the structures of colonialist dependency, but the incapability of the Venezuelan administrations to break the resource dependence cycle has prevented the mitigation of the economic consequences of Trump’s measures.
Maduro has actively contributed to human rights violations that the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resumed as: mass exodus, oppression of political opposition and rising poverty levels that have deprived millions of access to adequate healthcare and basic nutrition. As a matter of fact, according to the UNHCR Global Appeal 2026 situation review, as of 2026 7.8 million of Venezuelans were forcibly displaced. Furthermore, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the working poverty rate—defined as the share of employed individuals whose income falls below the official poverty line, leaving them unable to meet basic needs—has steadily increased since 2013, when Maduro came to power. This development marks a reversal of the relatively low and stable levels observed between 2006 and 2013 under Chávez’s administration, when the rate fluctuated between 7,2 percent and 6,2 percent, eventually reaching 28,9 percent in 2024.
Some scholars pointed out that it looks like what Chávez built through the «social distribution of oil income in the Country» has been eventually blown away by Maduro over the course of his presidency (Ramírez, 2021). This situation significantly undermined the prospects of overcoming the resource curse, as Venezuela— under Maduro more than ever—has confirmed itself as “petrostate”, namely a State where «the government is highly dependent on fossil fuel income, power is concentrated, and corruption is widespread» (Cheatham, 2021).
Recent events
On 3 January 2026, American military forces captured Maduro and President Donald Trump said the United States would have control over the sale of Venezuelan oil for an indefinite period of time. Trump—as explicitly stated—is aiming to control Venezuelan oil production, by attracting foreign investments and removing sanctions applied so far.
Both a significant part of popular opinion, the actual government held by the interim President Delcy Rodríguez and the opposition agreed on the need for investments. Recently, Venezuela’s National Assembly has approved a comprehensive reform of the Chavist hydrocarbons law through which private and foreign firms will enjoy greater autonomy within the country’s oil sector. The objectives of the reform were to reduce taxes, enhance autonomy for private producers and allow for the transfer of assets and outsourcing of certain oilfield functions. The approval of the reform has brought the US Government to ease its sanctions through licenses issued by the Treasury of United States (OFAC) and push American oil companies to invest at least $100B (€85B) in Venezuela’s oil industry. Trump’s decision to encourage investments in Venezuela can be observed as a response to the exit of some American oil companies, such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips as previously explained, going back to a more open extraction scenario that characterized Venezuela throughout the twentieth century. These measures are part of Trump’s oil plan, which, together with the way that the military capture of ex-President Maduro has been operated, are subject of international discussion.
As a matter of fact, UN General Assembly Resolution 1803—adopted in 1962—emphasizes the principle of permanent sovereignty of nations over their natural resources. This right is interpreted as a crucial aspect for the economic autonomy and the social wellbeing of a country. The Resolution also establishes that no country has the right to seize the natural resources of another state without the latter's consent. The appropriation of another country's natural resources—especially in contexts of colonization or aggression—is prohibited and considered a violation of international rights and sovereignty. In this regard, if PDVSA entered negotiations under coercion, the United States would be acting in contrast to international law.
On the other hand, it is unlikely that the United States will receive consequences for the potential violation of international law. As scholar K. C. Monnappa claims, Venezuela operation exemplifies the United Nations’ Security Council's irrelevance to great power action. As a matter of fact, Trump did not seek authorization before irrupting in Venezuela and this is due to the incompetence of the Security Council to deny authorization to a permanent member. The immobility of the United Nations regarding what recently happened has alimented public and international discussion over the further erosion of state sovereignty and the perpetuation of economic colonization models.
From a purely productive point of view, the U.S. seems to be acting towards the promotion of Venezuelan independence. As a matter of fact, the U.S. Treasury Department authorized a new license for the export and sale of American diluents to Venezuela, which are essential for processing crude oil into grades suitable for export. This means that Venezuela is being provided with the necessary resources to refine its crude oil, instead of exporting raw resources to foreign States and importing refined ones at much higher prices, as it’s been so far: this is an important step toward the creation of a domestic value chain and the reduction of economic dependency.
At the same time, this arrangement can also be interpreted as the perpetuation of contemporary neo-colonialism, namely the control by a state over another independent state through indirect means with the aim of extracting resources of the rentier state while maintaining its formal sovereignty. The typical neo-colonial progression—economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and military intervention—seems to be reproduced by the U.S. and this has raised concern over the fact that Venezuela will be subordinated to American interests and oil revenues will flow to American shareholders instead of the local population, therefore hindering the escape of the resource curse.
«US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the Trump administration would allow Venezuela to sell its oil but that “the funds from that will be deposited into an account that we will have oversight over”», also specifying that «US would ensure that Venezuela would spend the proceeds “for the benefit” of its people» (Buschschlüter, 2026). The central question concerns whether the revenues generated by increased oil sales will actually be invested for the benefit of the population, particularly given that no clearly defined social programs financed through oil revenues have yet been articulated by the United States.
The Trump administration has not laid out a clear plan to help Venezuela hold elections and transition to a democratic government. Senior administration officials have said they are focused right now on stabilizing the country and improving its economy through oil sales. The U.S. has been working with Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodriguez, who is a long-standing insider in the authoritarian regime that former President Hugo Chavez built. The cooperation with Rodriguez has raised concern among some observers that the current regime could remain in place so long as it meets the Trump administration’s demands on oil.
So far, U.S. and Venezuela’s joint efforts concern a reform in the purely economic side of oil industry: Rodríguez’s administration has been focusing on modifying or introducing articles 51, 55, 56, 57, 58 e 59 inside the reformed law text, in particular to update the oil and gas royalty regime. In fact, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez stated that the reform of the hydrocarbons law had been approved unanimously and would enhance the competitiveness of contracting both domestic and foreign companies for the exploitation of the world’s largest oil reserves. But the aim must also and above all be socially oriented.
Policy recommendations
As the scholar W. Zhou explains in his work The Resource Curse-Thoughts on How Resource-based Poor Countries can break the Curse, developing countries can adopt different approaches to overcome the resource curse. Some of these strategies can be particularly relevant to the Venezuelan case and can be broadly divided into economic measures and political measures. The former includes industry diversification, rationalization of the exploitation of natural resources and establishment of a natural resource revenue fund, while the latter concerns changes in the political system.
Regarding economic measures, the first crucial strategy is industry diversification. As Zhou argues, in order to break dependency on the natural resource sector it is crucial for developing countries to invest on the creation of a heterogeneous industrial network. As previously discussed, Chávez had explored economic diversification during his administration producing fairly positive effects on the Country’s GDP. Therefore, a continuation of this policy line could represent a viable option for Venezuela.
A second economic measure concerns the rationalization of the exploitation of natural resources which implies imposing slower extraction rates on oil production. In fact, an excessively rapid influx of resource revenues can create significant challenges for effective fiscal management in developing countries. By moderating the pace of resource extraction, income flows can be more effectively controlled. This point is particularly delicate given that—as a result of Maduro’s capture—oil exports rose by 302.000 bpd between December 2025 and January 2026 and Trump is pressing Venezuela to provide between 30 and 50 million barrels of oil to the United States in the coming months. It is therefore crucial that the American oil demand aligns with Venezuela’s capacity to manage its economic revenues efficiently, preventing non-transparent spending, especially during the present controversial interim administration.
Finally, the establishment of a natural resource revenue fund could facilitate diversified investments while also stabilizing the economy, particularly during periods of declining oil prices. A successful example of a natural resource revenue fund is the Alaska Permanent Fund, established in 1976. The fund allocates a share of the state’s oil revenues to various investments that have promoted economic stability and financed public services. However, the success of such funds depends largely on transparent governance and thoughtful management. In this sense, the current U.S. decision to oversight Venezuelan oil revenues might help prevent mismanagement and perpetuation of corruption, which characterized Maduro’s administration. Nonetheless, this oversight should be temporary: while it may be justified during Venezuela’s transition toward a more stable government, it should be gradually withdrawn once domestic institutions are capable of managing the fund independently, avoiding a rigid top-down control. This approach would, in fact, respect the principle of popular sovereignty, which states that:
it is the people of each country who should control the natural resources of their country. […] [It] requires only that the citizens of a country, as the ultimate owners of the country’s resources, can exercise some control over what is done with their resources – whether those resources will be conserved, nationalized, privatized, sold to foreigners, and so on. The less that citizens can control decisions over natural resources, the less legitimate those decisions are (Wenar, 2013).
Moreover, international attention should be put over an extremization of the current U.S. interference in Venezuelan oil revenues spending: if American companies capture most revenues, the Venezuelan state will lack resources to invest in diversifying domestic industry, resulting in the incapability of maintaining services once oil prices fall and eventually remaining economically dependent.
Turning to political measures, changes in the political system can also be decisive in escaping the resource curse, and this is particularly evident in the Venezuelan case. The central dilemma is whether democracy, especially when externally imposed, can genuinely guarantee economic growth and political stability. The current Venezuelan interim administration remains controversial and it is in the interests of the international community to ensure that Maduro’s mistakes and extreme ideology will not be reproduced. However, historical precedents demonstrate that the export of externally designed—and occidental tailored—democratic models has often produced destabilizing outcomes. Therefore, it is advisable that external actors limit their role to promoting governance transparency and supporting social reinvestment, rather than imposing structural political change.
Regarding oil revenues reinvestments—despite the controversies around Chávez Bolivarian missions—some argue that the hydrocarbon law he drafted has successfully demonstrated the capacity to recognize the Venezuelan population as the legitimate owners of the nation’s natural resources, while simultaneously attracting essential foreign investment. Of particular interest is Article 5, which states: «The income that the Nation receives due to hydrocarbons will be able to finance health, education, the formation of macroeconomic stabilization funds and productive investment, so that an appropriate link between oil and the national economy is achieved, all according to the well-being of the people» (Ley Orgánica de Hidrocarburos, 2006).
The commitment in addressing social issues was significant, producing positive effects in the short-term, benefiting a large segment of the population by improving their conditions of poverty. Thanks to Bolivarian missions Venezuela has witnessed a phase of general blooming. Human Development Index—a composite measure of health, education and living standards—steadily increased from 0,698 in 1999 to a peak of 0,773 in 2013. More specifically, years of schooling increased from 7,6 in 1999 to 9,4 in 2013 and life expectancy at birth was maintained at around 74 years, before decreasing during Maduro’s presidency.
Nonetheless, some scholars highlight the decline of these achievements starting from 2009. In 2013, ECLAC and the National Statistics Institute (INE) found that 27.3 percent of families were below the poverty line, of which 9.8 percent suffered from extreme poverty, proving the stagnation of Bolivarian missions’ effectiveness, despite official figures showing a steady decline in poverty levels. This trend reversal especially affected unemployment, education and social violence.
Moreover, these outcomes are embedded within a political framework that was prominently anti-American. As a result, it is expected that whoever is currently exercising active control over Venezuela, namely the United States—as Trump has publicly claimed—will show little interest in replicating reinvestment models previously pursued by Chávez. On the contrary, such models may warrant consideration as positive examples of social investment and the United States, which currently seem to claim control over oil revenues reinvestments, may also consider drawing inspiration from certain measures adopted by an administration regarded as ideologically “hostile”.
Below are two features of the Chavist missions that external and domestic actors could preserve in the development of social policies. One particularly relevant element is the missions’ social approach, that emphasized mutual cooperation and solidarity, but going beyond traditional forms of cooperativism. In fact, in the early stages, participants in educational and labor missions received financial support, making the missions both a resource transfer initiative and a mechanism that contributed to reducing poverty.
Another positive aspect lies in the comprehensive articulation of the missions, aimed at serving various social needs from different perspectives. Such social needs may vary according to the evolving conditions of the Venezuelan population. For this reason, it is essential that the policymakers carefully assess and remain fully aware of the population’s actual circumstances when planning future social policies.
On the other hand, certain aspects of the missions should be avoided during the development of future social programs. Some scholars argue that one of the main factors behind the failure of Bolivarian missions was that they were founded on the principle of addressing poverty and inequality with immediacy. In other words, Chavismo is criticized for only focusing on the distribution of oil tax revenues to excluded sectors, without having developed an alternative to a rentier economy. This remedial approach combined with administrative improvisation undermined the missions’ long-term effectiveness and eventually failed to respond to social needs. Future social policies should therefore be grounded in long-term planning, in order to drive sustained development over time.
Finally, during the Maduro presidency Bolivarian missions were used as a tool to «to achieve an attitude among the population that allows the ruling group to remain in power indefinitely» (Fuenmayor Toro, 2017). Therefore, it is in the interests of the international community to carefully avoid a repetition of the corrupt instrumentalization of public policy. In this regard, Venezuela needs an effective electoral system in order to achieve equitable representation of societal interests and strong political parties which foster societal engagement.
Source Classification
Information Content | ||
1 | Confirmed | Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
2 | Presumably true | Not confirmed; logical in itself; coherent with other information on the topic |
3 | Maybe true | Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; coherent with some other information on the topic |
4 | Uncertain | Not confirmed; possible but not logical in itself; no other information on the topic |
5 | Improbable | Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicts with other information on the topic |
6 | Not able to be evaluated | No basis to evaluate the validity of the information |
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