Houthi vs the US/UK

Translated by Giulia Maffeis

In late December 2023, just over twenty years after the launch of the Iraqi Freedom operation, the United States inaugurated another one with an equally ambitious title, Operation Prosperity Guardian.

In 2003, the stated objective of President George W. Bush was to remove Saddam Hussein and deliver "a united, stable, and free country" to the Iraqi people. Today, Washington is once again leading a military coalition in the Middle East, aiming to protect the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks originating from Yemen.

Regardless of whether it is appropriate to draw analogies or distinctions, what remains unchanged after two decades is the volume of geopolitical, economic, and humanitarian considerations that arise following events of such magnitude in this region of the world.

To arrive at a diagnosis amidst the plethora of conflicting assessments, international law provides an operational framework with a certain claim to scientific neutrality. And it is with these tools that we will dissect the case of the Anglo-American missile attacks in Yemen.

What's happening?

The Houthi – also known as the "Defenders of God," Ansar Allah – represent a fundamentalist Islamic movement of the Zaidi denomination, a branch of Shia Islam. In 2014, they rebelled against the internationally recognized government of Yemen, enjoying the support of the Shiite theocracy in Iran, and to this day, they control significant parts of the country, including the capital, Sanaa.

Together with Hamas and Hezbollah, the Houthi militia is part of the axis of anti-American and anti-Israeli resistance under the leadership of Tehran. As such, from mid-October, the Yemeni rebel group started a series of attacks on commercial cargo ships in the Red Sea. The intent is to hit those directed towards or from Israel, in response to the war waged by Benjamin Netanyahu in the Gaza Strip.

In this context, the aforementioned US-led Prosperity Guardian operation was born, and signed, among others, by Great Britain, Canada, France, Italy, and Bahrain - the only Gulf country to have openly joined. American and British warships began patrolling the Red Sea to intercept Houthi missiles and drones.

On January 9th, the very United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2722 (2024) to order the militia to immediately stop their campaign.

Two days later, the US and the UK launched guided missile air and naval attacks against numerous Houthi strategic targets - radars, launch sites, and weapons depots - with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands. On Monday, January 22, the episode was repeated for the eighth time in what the US Army called Poseidon Archer Operation.

Attack and defence

The Anglo-American governments immediately presented their military intervention as a legitimate recourse to the right to self-defence, as carved in Art. 51 of the United Nations Statute.

“

No provision of this Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. [...]

”
- United Nations Statute, Art. 51

“No provision” implies the prohibition on the use or threat of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter, for which the right to self-defence represents a clear exception. The clarification of "armed attack" emphasizes that the invocation of Article 51 requires a higher threshold in terms of scope and effects compared to mere use of force. However, this threshold does not have a precise definition, and it often leads to contrasting interpretations.

It’s evident that Washington considers it well surpassed. As early as December, two American warships were threatened by Houthi drones, and their downing was justified as self-defence, although the US Central Command could not confirm whether the ships were indeed the primary targets. The US position is debatable but not untenable.

Back and forth

London, on its part, notified the UNSC specifying that its response to Houthi attacks was "necessary and proportionate." On the night of January 9th, the Royal Navy destroyer HMS Diamond reacted after being targeted along with American ships.

The two adjectives do not appear in Article 51, but they have established themselves as its restrictions under customary law – that is, a set of binding rules not because they are written in a treaty but rather because they result from general and established practices, accompanied by a sense of legal obligation.

In particular, necessity refers to the fact that resorting to the use of force in self-defence should be a last resort. In light of the aforementioned UNSC Resolution and joint ultimatum statements addressed to the Houthi, the military response, which came after months, certainly did not happen immediately and without warning.

Proportionality, on the other hand, is a more opaque concept. According to Professor David Kretzmer, there are essentially two interpretations. The first is the eye-for-an-eye approach, while the second is about 'means and ends', essentially echoing the concept of necessity. If you were to give me a black eye with a slingshot, a proportional response according to the first interpretation would involve me giving you a black eye in return. The second interpretation suggests that I should only use the means necessary to achieve legitimate ends, such as preventing another shot from you by disarming or breaking your slingshot.

The insistence of the USA and UK on having targeted military objectives to prevent further attacks and reduce the rebels' offensive capabilities would align with this latter interpretation of proportionality. The clarification that they acted "with particular care to minimize risks to civilians," in the words of the UK's Permanent Representative to the UN, Barbara Woodward, echoes the first interpretation, aiming to balance the scale of damage inflicted and suffered.

Dissenting views

In this sense, the cautious approach of the Anglo-American coalition seems aimed at distinguishing the operations in Yemen from those, decidedly disproportionate, carried out by Israel in the Gaza Strip.

However, a significant part of the world does not appear to appreciate the effort.

The Houthi themselves have pointed to the "American and British enemy" as entirely responsible "for its criminal aggression against our Yemeni people." The rebels continued to target Anglo-American interests in the Red Sea in retaliation for the attacks, which, as admitted by President Biden, are not stopping the Houthi.

Iran, the main ally and supporter of the militias, has denounced "these attacks as a clear violation of Yemen's sovereignty and territorial integrity and a violation of international law."

Before the Security Council, Russia's Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzya accused "the Anglo-Saxon jury and its satellites" of once again violating the UN Charter, bombing another country illegally and disproportionately. According to Russia, under the pretext of defending trade routes, the Anglo-Americans are destabilizing the already critical situation in the Middle East.

Persino Erdogan, Presidente di un membro della NATO qual è la Turchia, ha condannato i propri alleati di “trasformare il Mar Rosso in un mare di sangue” attraverso un “uso sproporzionato della forza”.

Even Erdogan, the President of a NATO member like Turkey, has condemned his allies for "turning the Red Sea into a sea of blood" through "disproportionate use of force."

No way out?

The use of the same terminology by all sides is a symptom of the ambiguity of terms such as "proportionate" or "armed attack," which allows different interpretations to clash without definitive solutions.

At the same time, the widespread use of this jargon testifies to the pervasiveness of a legal approach alongside strategic and ethical considerations.

It is precisely this centrality of international law that discourages neglecting it entirely, no matter how foggy it may seem.

And it is foggy, even more so than it appears from these lines. Those who are not yet satisfied – or nauseated – will have to wait for the second course.

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