logo

Beijing, Manila, and Washington: A Complicated Relationship

  Articoli (Articles)
  Francesco Oppia
  14 April 2024
  6 minutes, 41 seconds

Translated by Giulia Maffeis

In early March, major news agencies reported the Chinese aggression against a Filipino supply ship near the Second Thomas Shoal, a contested atoll in the Spratly Islands. The Philippines first took possession of it in 1999, and it is currently controlled by a contingent of marines stationed on a deliberately grounded ship on the coral reef.

Immediately, statements of support for the Manila government arrived from Western chancelleries, particularly from the United States, followed by Australia and Japan, expressing their concern over China's actions. Matthew Miller, the spokesperson for the U.S. State Department, stated that the latest incidents had shown China's "reckless disregard for the safety of Filipinos and also for international law" and that China was interfering with "legitimate Philippine maritime operations." In response to the aggression, these countries organized a joint military exercise with Manila on April 7th.

This is the latest in a long list of aggressions for control of the South China Sea based on claims derived from the so-called Nine-Dash Line, an autonomously drawn line on a 1948 map that assigns much of the sea to Beijing. These waters are extremely important for China's economic security, as over 60% of its trade, in terms of value, occurs through maritime routes. According to estimates from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the South China Sea is crossed by about one-third of global maritime trade, with an estimated value of $5.3 trillion. China's claims were invalidated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 2016, which deemed the evidence presented by China insufficient to declare sovereignty over the contested atolls. However, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it "neither accepts nor recognizes" the court's ruling.

Although significant divergences persist regarding international policy, it should be noted that in 2022, China represented the Philippines' largest trading partner, with an exchange of about thirty-nine billion dollars, growing compared to previous years, followed by the United States with approximately thirty-six billion dollars in the same year. Nevertheless, Washington remains the primary security partner under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, reinforced first in 2014 and subsequently extended last year. The 2014 agreement allows for joint use by U.S. military forces and the possibility of rotating troops at Philippine military bases in exchange for assistance in their expansion. The bases covered by the agreement increased from five to nine in 2023.

The tensions between the Manila and Beijing governments take on further significance as China considers them expressions of the broader relationship between two different visions of the regional order, specifically the Chinese and Western ones. In a recent article in the Chinese newspaper Global Times, controlled by the Communist Party, the following words were reported by Ding Duo, deputy director of the Institute of Maritime Law and Policy at the Chinese Institute for South China Sea Studies: "The United States is the biggest external disruptor of peace and stability in the South China Sea [...] they are trying to reshape the strategic environment around China by strengthening their military alliance with the Philippines to intervene in the South China Sea issue, but it is useless and could even backfire when they use their 'mutual defence treaty' to threaten China.

As highlighted by Professor Matteo Dian in the essay "China, the United States, and the Future of the International Order" in 2021, China supports a Sino-centric regional order based on the principle of sovereignty and, consequently, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, placing China on par with the United States and progressively limiting the American alliance system. This project is embodied in a different approach to international cooperation, including the rejection of formal alliances. Indeed, China has developed an extensive and varied network of "Strategic Partnerships," which, however, excludes some key partners like North Korea. At the same time, Beijing pursues the gradual restructuring of multilateral governance, as demonstrated by the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative and the founding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Overall, China's vision of the regional order can be summarized in the phrase uttered by Xi Jinping in 2014: "It is up to the people of Asia to manage the affairs of Asia.”

In contrast, the United States, here considered as representatives of the diversified Western world, promotes a region strongly integrated into the liberal international order under U.S. leadership, both from the perspective of multilateral governance and from an economic and legal standpoint. Specifically, this is realized through the involvement of Asian countries in institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. This element is accompanied by the strengthening and development of a network of bilateral alliances to limit the rise of Chinese power and its initiatives on the global stage. The countries involved include Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. With the same goal on the multilateral level, Washington has fostered the development of the "Quad" group (which includes, in addition to the United States, Australia, Japan, and India), along with dialogue with the ASEAN group. This vision is encapsulated in the idea of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" expressed in the White House's Indo-Pacific Strategy published in 2022.

In recent years, much has been said about the concept of the "Thucydides Trap," coined by U.S. scholar Graham Allison, which predicts the inevitability of conflict between the United States and China. In a recent interview with the Global Times, the American political scientist indicated that together with Taiwan, the Philippines could represent one of the "hotspots" for the beginning of an escalation, given the recent tensions and relations among the three states. This idea, although plausible, in the short term seems contradicted by the relevance of economic ties between Manila and Beijing, as well as the resumed dialogue between the Biden Administration and the Chinese government after the San Francisco summit. However, given the high uncertainty both regionally and globally, it is essential to continue monitoring the situation.

Sources used for the article:

Copyright © 2024 - Mondo Internazionale APS - All Rights Reserved

Share the post
L'Autore

Francesco Oppia

Autore di Mondo Internazionale Post

Categories

Eastern Asia

Tag

Cina filippine US mar cinese meridionale AESAN Pechino Washington Manila philippines Beijing South China Sea

Potrebbero interessarti

Cosa sa veramente l’Occidente della Cina di Xi Jinping? Francesco Oppia
Risoluzione ONU: astensioni pericolose e cooperazione internazionale Francesco Oppia
La soia e le sue proprietà nutrizionali Francesco Oppia