ISIS Foreign Fighters: a sociological and criminological profile [Part 1]

Photo credit to "NATO" https://www.nato.int/docu/revi...

“Foreign fighters” are the large group of individuals, especially young adults, but also women, who have answered the transnational call to "little jihad" from one of the most structured and organised terrorist groups - Da'esh or Islamic State. There are an estimated 30,000 foreign fighters active and deployed no longer exclusively in Iraq and Syria, but in other theatres of war including Libya, Yemen, the Sahel region and central Africa.

Despite the territorial defeat of ISIS and the decrease of foreign recruits in the field due to the pandemic, the problem of foreign fighters is a security threat both in the countries where the militants have fought or are imprisoned and in their countries of origin. In this brief analysis, we will outline the determining factors (although varying from case to case) that led some citizens to abandon their former lives and join ISIS. In the next focus, we will focus on the critical issues concerning their repatriation, especially to Western countries, and attempts to reintegrate into society.

Who are the foreign fighters

Most ISIS foreign fighters come from North Africa (6,000 from Tunisia alone) and the Middle East (12,000 in total); Russia and the former Soviet Republics were also a significant hub for the fighters, with 8,700 in number. On the other hand, at least 3,000 came from European countries, including 1,900 from France, more than 900 from Germany, 850 from the United Kingdom and 480 from Belgium, while southern and eastern Europe were less affected by the phenomenon.

What drove these individuals to make such an all-encompassing choice? Academic literature and research centres, through the comparative analysis of data, have come to partial conclusions: the relative socio-economic condition, the age, the success/failure of integration policies and the levelling of inequalities in the countries of origin seem to be decisive. Focusing on foreign fighters coming from Western Europe, the great majority of the subjects is represented by young men, on average 26 years old [the range is between 18-29] and women, equal to 18%, on average 21 years old. Of these, most are single, but a third are married - i.e. part of a couple - with children. These individuals were 80% citizens of the state they left, second or third generation Muslims on the margins of society, with a low level of education and problems of identity loss and alienation.

The French case is emblematic in this sense: due to the forced assimilationist policy, in the wake of the Enlightenment's laicitè principle, and the urban plans of big cities, young French Muslims felt excluded from the Republique and segregated in the banlieue. They thus found a sense of belonging in ISIS's call to arms to build an Islamic state, with a fair and just Islamic society. In addition, France, due to its colonial legacies, has a large Muslim community of Maghrebi origin (especially Algerian): having such a homogeneous immigrant community or second/third generation, victims of discrimination and acts of Islamophobia, has led to a strong identity reaction that in some cases has resulted in radicalisation, thanks to online propaganda and proselytising among friends and acquaintances.

As can be seen from this analysis, the religious element has little to do with the choice to become foreign fighters. Two issues must be clarified: the first is that the adhesion to the cause of the Islamic State has nothing to do with Islam as a religion per se, but is an ideological interpretation of an extremist kind aimed at pursuing a political project; a large part of the militants were Muslims "on paper" and others - 20% - had no connection with Islam.

It is precisely with regard to this important exception that the socio-economic conditions of some foreign fighters from Germany and the United Kingdom are different from those of France and Belgium. In fact, these militants come from good families, with high levels of education and formally without particular deviant attitudes. However, it must be taken into account that also the integration policies of the United Kingdom have not been a success: unlike the French case, a "multicultural" policy has been adopted, which has however determined the birth of a parallel judicial system, with the creation of the so-called Shari'a courts and the epithet Londonistan to some districts of the great British cities. Although based on different paradigms, allowing the existence of a parallel society - thus not favouring dialogue between cultures and religions - has caused a tear in the social fabric and segregated certain portions of citizens.

As can be seen from this brief account, although one can find push and pull factors common to the transnational call of ISIS, the reasons that push foreign fighters to enlist are among the most disparate and vary, both from country to country and from individual cases. It has not been possible to identify a standard model for the foreign fighter: the criminological profile of the individual does not seem to be decisive, since most of the militants were incensed, and the psychological profile does not show a deviant attitude, except for some inclinations towards rage. We can therefore state that “radicalisation is a highly complex and individualised process, often shaped by a poorly understood interaction of structural and personal factors”.

Translated by Margherita Folci