Ankara, Tripoli and the disputed EEZs: maritime (and geopolitical) hegemony according to Erdoğan

Translated by Elena Santanelli

Since 2019, a geopolitical game involving regional and global actors has been played out in the middle of the Mediterranean, suspended between contested agreements, expansionist ambitions for influence, and fragile balances. The protagonist of this silent dispute is Turkey, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which, through the alliance with Libya's Government of National Unity (GNU), has attempted to chart its own control over an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) linking Ankara to Tripoli, ignoring Greece's possession of the transit area and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The maritime agreement signed between Turkey and GNA in 2019 raised controversy from other Mediterranean players, who claimed violation of UNCLOS and the Skhirat agreement, which regulates the powers of the Libyan government. Greece called it “geographically absurd” because it does not consider the existence of Greek islands such as Kastellorizo, which interrupt Turkish-Libyan maritime continuity. Egypt and Cyprus expressed clear opposition, while Chevron, the US energy giant, offered support to Athens, thus revealing a stance against Turkish ambitions.

In 2021, the Al Bayda Court of Appeals annulled the agreement, but not even a year later, the Government of National Unity (GNU) - a merger between GNA and the Al-Thani faction - signed a new energy memorandum based on that deal. However, the agreement was nullified by the Tripoli Court of Appeals in February 2024, due to violation of Libya's oil law, interference in the powers of the Turkish company TRAO, allegedly undermining the autonomy of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC), and due to the government's lack of authority to enter into international agreements.

The Blue Homeland doctrine

Central to Turkish ambitions is the Blue Homeland doctrine (in Turkish, Mavi Vatan), coined by Turkish nationalist Admiral Cem Gürdeniz. Over the past few years, this theory has begun to echo in the Turkish and European media as a constant in the Turkish leader's foreign policy. The goal is to succeed in gaining control of the eastern Mediterranean and, above all, its energy resources in order to impose its influence and hegemonic plans.

Turkey has already shown how it intends to pursue this goal. In 2019, in Libya, it offered direct military support, drones and mercenaries in exchange for influence. Today, a similar dynamic looms in Syria, where Ankara promises economic and political aid in exchange for access to Syria's resources and potential EEZs.

Turkish strategy is not limited to energy gains. Controlling the Mediterranean sea routes means having economic, military, and diplomatic leverage over the entire surrounding region. in this context, Libya becomes a platform for power projection toward Africa and Europe.

The seemingly stable competition in Libya and Syria

The apparent calm in the rivalry between Moscow and Ankara conceals a shared fear - losing influence in two strategic areas such as the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Both powers move on the same geopolitical chessboard, where control of coastal areas and energy routes is a crucial objective.

As for Libya, Turkey is not expanding alone. Russia, through the Wagner Group (now Africa Corps), supports General Khalifa Haftar, the rival of the Tripoli government. The rivalry between Moscow and Ankara has so far remained contained within a tactical balance, as neither power intends to openly challenge the other, preferring instead a regional balancing act that serves the interests of both.

At the same time, the similar pattern of confrontation is replicated in Syria. For Russia, Damascus is not only an ally, but the only stable military outpost in the Middle East and a platform for projecting power in the Mediterranean. For Ankara, on the other hand, the expansion of Turkish influence in Syria also serves to contain the Kurdish forces of the YPG, seen as an extension of the PKK, a historical enemy at home.

Thus, on the one hand, Turkey is conducting military operations against the Kurds in northern Syria; on the other hand, Russia is supporting the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, which sees the Kurds as a strategic component for the stability of its own power. In this context, the new Syrian government led by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani is moving to integrate the different entities within state institutions, trying to avoid escalation and get the different sides to cooperate.

However, the Turkish position is more delicate compared to NATO, Israel and the North African and African powers. In fact, the NATO member Turkey is often at odds with Western interests, and has in parallel developed an additional defense alliance with Moscow (e.g., the purchase of anti-aircraft defense missiles). This not only complicates international diplomatic dynamics, but also places the EU in rivalry both in the anti-Russian deployment and in the Mediterranean.

Any expansion of Turkish influence in Syria could provoke a reaction from Tel Aviv, which could destabilize the Syrian regime by supporting ethnic and religious groups, generating internal tensions in Turkey as well. Moreover, Ankara's moves risk irritating Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, traditional competitors in the North African leadership.

What is being played out in the Eastern Mediterranean is a game that goes far beyond the demarcation of EEZs. It is a strategic challenge for control of resources, trade routes and the regional geopolitical narrative. Turkey, with Blue Homeland Doctrine, aspires to transform itself into a hegemonic maritime power, but it will have to contend with a dense network of alliances, overlapping interests, and potential diplomatic fires.

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