Iraq: political crisis and the Shia schism

  Articoli (Articles)
  Sara Oldani
  07 October 2022
  5 minutes, 9 seconds

Iraq: political crisis and Shia schism

On 3 October, Iraq celebrated the 90th anniversary of its independence from the United Kingdom and the creation of a 'sovereign' state. Today, after decades of conflict and socio-political crisis, Iraq is still far from full and effective independence, not only because of internal security dynamics but also because of its geographical location. The latest clashes in the country - which occurred between Shiite factions - are an important event that could have repercussions outside of the Iraqi political landscape, with significant consequences for the entire Middle East and Iranian influence on it.

The assault on the palaces of power: the Green Zone

In order to understand the origin of the clashes and the storming of Baghdad's Green Zone - a district in which the headquarters of national institutions and foreign embassies are located - it is necessary to make a brief premise. In fact, the two main factions involved in the clashes are the Sadrist Movement, whose unofficial leader is the charismatic and controversial Moqtada al-Sadr, and the Shia militias linked to Iran. The competition initially began in the political arena, in particular following the elections of October 2021, which saw as the winner (with a relative majority) al-Sadr himself, whose coalition won 73 out of 329 seats in parliament at the expense of the factions traditionally close to Iran. In order to achieve the formation of a unity government, the populist al-Sadr - leveraging the important legitimacy he enjoys and his extensive network inherited from the fight against Saddam Hussein and the international coalition occupation in 2003 - wanted to reach an agreement with the other Sunni and Kurdish political forces. This strategy, however, was clearly at odds with that of the other pro-Iran factions, so after months of opposition-fuelled political stalemate, al-Sadr called on his followers to resign from parliament in protest.

After a further escalation of tension, which further sharpened the existing rift between civil society and the political elite, declarations about al-Sadr's withdrawal from political life plunged the capital into chaos towards the end of August: clashes between Sadrists and armed groups loyal to the Coordination Framework (close to PM al-Kadhimi and Iran in general) caused at least 30 deaths and 570 injuries. Subsequently, the crisis receded thanks to the intervention of al-Sadr and Ayatollah al-Sistani. The security crisis was quickly resolved, but the political crisis persists, as no agreement has yet been reached on the formation of a unity government. The Iraqi political system, of the consociate type, provides for the distribution of power between the sectarian quotas present within the country: the President of the Republic must be Kurdish, the Prime Minister Shiite and the Speaker of the Sunni Parliament. This system, already introduced in Lebanon with questionable results, is strongly opposed by Iraqi civil society as it is considered corrupt and a factor of polarisation in the country. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), aimed at fostering reconciliation between the various groups in the country, has so far not produced any noteworthy results, as can be seen from the emergence of violent intra-Shia confrontation.

The Shia divide and Iranian influence in the region

The power struggle dynamics are nothing new within the Shia community in Iraq. Representing around 62% of the Iraqi population and left on the margins of society during Saddam's regime, they have gradually replaced the political elite in the country, thanks firstly to US support following regime change and secondly to Iran's neighbour. Iran, after the 2003 war in Iraq, again expanded its influence in the country and generally in the whole Mesopotamian area, creating the so-called Shia Crescent, an area represented by Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen in which to exert soft power and hard power (through its proxies) to have a projection in the Arab world to the detriment of its regional adversary, Saudi Arabia. In this geopolitical project, Iraq is crucial due to its geographical position as a bridge between ancient Persia and the Gulf countries. Moreover, let us remember that Iraq is the first commercial partner for Iranian exports, so losing it would mean finding itself in an unsustainable security and economic situation for the Ayatollahs' regime, already bent by international sanctions, which could increase following the repression of the revolts that have taken place throughout the country over the killing of Mahsa Amini.

For this series of reasons, the failure to settle the dispute within the Iraqi Shiite factions would be a wake-up call for the Iranian power, whose influence would seem to be weaker in the short term. Iran's objective, therefore, is that there should be a return to the status quo in Iraq, preferably with a political class more in line with its interests and less to the officially 'nationalistic' ones of al-Sadr, who has also entertained relations with Turkey and the Gulf countries to free the country from dependence on its Iranian neighbour.

In general, a stable Iraq represents a stable Middle East, a situation that suits all the countries in the region and even overseas, despite the fact that it is not Washington's priority interest. In recent months, Iraq has become the mediator for the tepid dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for which a civil war in the country would be inconvenient for everyone's objectives, as well as for a people bored by years of occupation and violence. Iran, for its part, has not stood idly by: in the Middle East risiko, if you lose on one side, you have to rebalance on the other: a few days ago in Yemen, the Houthis, a Shia political and military movement, announced the end of the truce. We shall see what happens next and whether Iran, grappling with such an internal socio-political crisis as it has never seen since the Islamic revolution, will manage to recompose the Shiite schism and maintain its influence in Iraq.

Translated by Margherita Folci

Sources consulted for this article:

https://www.france24.com/fr/%C3%A9missions/on-va-plus-loin/20220831-irak-la-discorde-chiite

http://www.meri-k.org/publication/the-intra-shiite-battle-of-wills-peaked-but-by-no-means-over/

https://www.osmed.it/2022/10/04/linfinita-crisi-politica-in-iraq/

https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/iraq-how-political-deadlock-turns-violent-36038

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L'Autore

Sara Oldani

Sara Oldani, classe 1998, ha conseguito la laurea triennale in Scienze politiche e relazioni internazionali presso l’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, sede di Milano e prosegue i suoi studi magistrali a Roma con il curriculum in sicurezza internazionale. Esperta di Medio Oriente e Nord Africa, ha effettuato diversi soggiorni di studio e lavoro in Turchia, Marocco, Palestina ed Israele. Studiosa della lingua araba, vuole aggiungere al suo arsenale linguistico l'ebraico. In Mondo Internazionale Post è Caporedattrice dell'area di politica internazionale, Framing the World.

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Iraq Medio Oriente elezioni Iran