The Polar Silk Road: risks and opportunities of the Northern Sea Route

Translated by Mariateresa Tauro

The Antarctic glacier’s progressive retreat, accelerated by climate change, has opened previously unknown navigation routes: the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs along Russia’s northern coastline, has become one of the most debated geopolitical issues of our time. In 2025, this route is no more a future hypothesis, but a reality that is regularly covered by oil tankers, cargo ships, and experimental convoys, feeding a debate related to commerce, energy, safety, and sustainability. Its main appeal lies in the intense decrease in the distance between Europe and Asia: up to 40% less than crossing the Suez Canal, resulting in savings in sailing days and tonnes of fuel. This advantage has encouraged shipping companies and governments to consider NSR as a shortcut capable of redefining global fluxes. It’s no coincidence that the first experiments of containerised services, supported especially by China and Russia, have confirmed the potentialities of this route. At the same time, the energy transport has already stabilised, in particular the one connected to liquefied natural gas projects like the Arctic LNG-2. The route has indeed taken on a strategic role in welding Russian energy interests with the Chinese request, bypassing some of the pressure of Western sanctions and creating an alternative economic axis to traditional channels.

However, a more complex reality hides behind these promises. The Northern Sea Route is a fragile route whose practicability depends on costs and risks that often overcome illusory savings. In fact, sailing requires fortified ships, highly qualified crews, in addition to icebreakers, which involve important additional expenditures. Climate conditions may change in a few hours, causing the blockage of whole convoys. Moreover, in case of accidents, rescue is complicated due to the shortage of search and rescue infrastructures. The route seems to be onerous on the insurance plan as well: by considering environmental and operational risks, the premiums required by the companies are more substantial than consolidated routes, and the absence of shared standard values increases uncertainty. The infrastructural context doesn’t guarantee stability either: the port network is limited, and the support bases are scattered. Even if Mosca affirms its supremacy over the NSR, it is partially dependent on external collaborations, especially with China for systems of satellite monitoring and technological support. In this sense, the Arctic becomes a paradox: a territory that Russia claims as an “internal sea”, but that it cannot fully manage without the contribution of third parties.

Even the supposed environmental sustainability of the route appears much more ambivalent than the commercial narrative suggests. It’s obvious that, compared to a passage via the Suez Canal, every single voyage alongside the NSR reduces fuel consumption, in purely geometric terms, thus resulting in savings of several days of sailing. However, benefits are far from being consistent when moving from the theoretical analysis to the operational practice. Indeed, Arctic sailing necessitates constant icebreakers presence, extremely energy-intensive means that consume significant quantities of fuel and produce additional emissions, which are not usually taken into consideration. At the same time, the unpredictable nature of climate conditions and the presence of residual ice during summer force ships to changes in directions or to long-lasting waits, frustrating times and fuel advantages. The type of fuel employed is a further issue: for the most part, Arctic voyages continue using heavy fuel oil, a fuel with a very high environmental impact. Its dispersion in a fragile ecosystem that is poorly equipped to deal with ecological emergencies amplifies the extent of its risks. Furthermore, there is a systemic aspect: if the appeal of the NSR were to lead to an overall increase in global traffic, the environmental benefit of reducing individual distances would be quickly cancelled by the net increase in aggregate emissions. The carbon black, produced by the incomplete fuel combustion, is a particularly relevant and often underestimated problem. Once emitted, the particles settle on ice and snow, thus reducing their albedo, i.e. the reflective capacity of white surfaces. This triggers a multiplier effect: more absorption of the solar radiation, an increase in surface temperatures, and the acceleration of the glaciers’ melting process. Several studies have shown that even relatively small quantities of black carbon may have an excessive impact on the Arctic climate balance, fostering a vicious cycle in which navigation indirectly contributes to making the very region that makes it possible increasingly fragile. Indeed, the route risks to become an accelerator of climate crisis: born as a consequence of the melting of glaciers, it ends up worsening its rhythm.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Mosca considers NSR not only a commercial path, but also a powerful tool of foreign policy. Russia exercises rigorous control over transit, imposing rules, permissions, and compulsory escort services, while at the same time consolidating its military presence through Arctic bases, nuclear-powered icebreakers, and surveillance systems. In this way, the route plays a pivotal role in the Russian strategy: strengthening its control over the Arctic, supporting energy export towards Asian markets, and justifying its military presence in an area that increasingly appears as a place of strategic competition. From its perspective, China has declared to consider itself as an “almost Arctic State” and invests in research, infrastructures, and logistics, making NSR part of its Polar Silk Road. Along these lines, the Arctic route turns into a lab for the new multipolarity: a place where economic interdependence and geopolitical mistrust coexist in an unstable way. Environmentalist organisations and independent think-tanks have repeatedly drawn attention to the risks associated with the growth of the route. In fact, NSR is mainly driven by oil and gas transport. If not regulated, it runs the risk of enhancing an energy model based on fossil fuels, thus undermining international efforts towards ecological transition. Moreover, the capacity to respond to environmental emergencies is minimal: a hydrocarbon leak in the Arctic would have a devastating and long-lasting effect, with immediate consequences on local communities and native populations that rely on fishing and natural resources. To cope with these challenges, several experts claim the need for a multilateral governance that imposes binding environmental rules, shared investments in rescue and monitoring infrastructures, balanced insurance standard values, and, above all, transparency mechanisms that prevent the route from being used merely as a geopolitical level. Only a cooperative approach, involving the Arctic Council, international organisations, the local community and the main commercial actors, may reduce the risk that the Arctic shortcut will become a source of new global fragilities.

The Northern Sea Route, also known as the Polar Silk Road, is indeed one of the most significant paradoxes in contemporary globalisation. It is made possible by the climate crisis; it promises economic efficiency, but at the same time, it produces hidden costs and strategic tensions. In 2025, it fully embodies the ambiguity of our age: as glaciers retreat, risks and opportunities advance together. The challenge is not only commercial or technical, but also primarily political: it has to be decided whether the NSR will be governed as a common good of humanity or remain a lever in the hands of a few actors ready to exploit its vulnerabilities. The Arctic shortcut, more than just a corridor, is the symbol of a transitioning world, where the border between progress and fragility is thinner than ever.

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