Russia and China: an increasingly unequal partnership?

Translated by Martina Ravasi

The meeting between Vladmir Putin and Xi Jinping on May 20th in Beijing reaffirmed once again the increasing relevance of the relations between China and Russia in terms of international balance. The real meaning of this summit – which took place a few days after the visit of the American President Donald Trump to China – goes beyond the mere bilateral dimension. Indeed, Moscow and Beijing took this opportunity to reaffirm their common view of the international political order, based on their criticism against the American hegemony as well as on the defence of national sovereignty and their willing to establish a more multipolar global system.

During their talks, the two leaders were politically aligned against Washington. In a joint declaration, Moscow and Beijing criticised the risk of a return of the “law of the jungle” in international relations and accused some States of managing global affairs unilaterally and imposing their own interests to the rest of the world. It's evident that they were referring to the US, especially if we look at the criticism towards the American project “Golden Dome” - a 175-billion-dollar missile defence system – and the result of the last agreement between Russia and China on arms control. Therefore, the political message of this summit was clear. Russia and China are two powers able to resist to Western pressions and they want to propose an alternative pattern of global governance. On one hand, Xi Jinping underlined the stability of China’s relations with Russia, and he spoke about his political trust and strategic coordination that would counter any difficulty. On the other hand, Putin stressed his intention to carry on with an “independent and sovereign” foreign policy with China and described bilateral cooperation as a tool for international stability. Nevertheless, behind the appearance of an increasingly stronger partnership, asymmetries and interests not fully coincident are emerging too. The war in Ukraine accelerated a mutual approach between Moscow and Beijing, but at the same time it made Russia more dependent on China. Following the invasion of Ukraine on a large scale in February 2022, Western countries progressively reduced their economic and energy relations with Russia, thus forcing the Kremlin to look for new markets in order to compensate for Europe. Against this background, China has become a crucial partner for Russia, particularly in the energy sector. And energy was one of the core points of the summit between the two leaders. Putin defined the energy sector as the “leading force” of the Russia-China economic cooperation, while for Xi their cooperation in terms of resources and energy is a kind of “burden”. Russia needs to consolidate new gas and oil exportation markets, while for China Russian supplies are a possible warranty in terms of energy security, especially in an international context marked by instability, strategic competition and vulnerability of sea routes.

However, the most critical issue is Power of Siberia 2, the pipeline carrying Russian gas from Western Siberia to China through Mongolia. The project – which has been discussed for years – is expected to be 2,6 km long and has a capacity of 50 billion cubic metres per year. Therefore, this infrastructure has a huge strategic value, almost like North Stream 1 in terms of capacity. Before the energy crisis and the Ukrainian war, it used to be one of the main Russian gas exportation pipelines to Europe. Power of Siberia 2 has an essential function for Russia, namely turning some gas exports that used to be allocated to Europe in the past into new exports to Asia. In this sense, this project is a fundamental step of the so-called Russian “pivot to Asia”, which is even more urgent following Western sanctions and the collapse of energy supplies to Europe. Russia isn’t only looking for new customers, but also new incomes for Gazprom and the whole industrial sector linked to the building of energy infrastructures. On the contrary, for China Power of Siberia 2 has a different meaning, since Beijing isn’t in the same urgency situation as Russia. Therefore, they can negotiate from a higher position of power. Russian gas may contribute to diversify Chinese energy supplies and reduce their dependence from liquefied gas transported by sea, since it is often exposed to geopolitical risks in some strategic points, such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. However, since China has some alternatives, they are under no pressure to accept Russian conditions quickly. And the summit in Beijing confirmed these dynamics. As a result, in spite of positive declarations, no definitive agreements have been reached about Power Siberia 2. Dmitry Peskon, The Kremlin spokesperson, said there is a “basic mutual alignment” on the main parameters of the project – including its route and its building modalities, but he admitted there isn’t still a clear timing. According to several analysts, the real issue is commercial – the price of gas. In particular, Russia needs sufficiently advantageous price conditions in order to justify the cost of this infrastructure, while China aims to obtain reduced prices while benefitting from the negotiation weakness of Moscow. This situation shows the main limit of the partnership between Russia and China. Indeed, their relations are increasingly stronger, but they aren’t necessarily equal. On one hand, Russia offers energy resources, diplomatic support and anti-Western convergence. On the other hand, China offers markets, political backing and trade access. However, Beijing has more room of manoeuvre, since it can reinforce its relation with Moscow without turning it into a formal alliance and without too many costs. China can benefit from the Russian weakness, but it avoids depending too much on a supplier that is politically exposed and internationally sanctioned. Therefore, the geopolitical meaning of this summit is based on this double dimension. On one hand, Russia and China seem to be closer than ever in contrasting the international order led by the United States. On the other hand, the lack of an agreement on Power of Siberia 2 shows that cooperation between these two countries remains driven by pragmatic calculations and different national interests. The image of unity projected in Beijing is politically real but more complex under an economic point of view.

The development of this situation is particularly relevant for Europe. Russia is trying to compensate for the loss of the European market looking at China. However, Power of Siberia 2 can’t fully replace the role that Europe has played for decades as the main buyer of Russian energy. Even though the project was completed, it would reinforce the Russian energy balance in the East under circumstances that are less favourable comparing to the past. Moscow may reduce its own immediate vulnerability to the detriment of an increasing dependence on Beijing. Ultimately, the Xi-Putin summit confirmed the strength and at the same time the contradictions of the relations between China and Russia. The rhetorics of multipolarity and shared sovereignty is useful for both leaders to reinforce their own position against the Western world. However, concretely, the Ukrainian war has turned Russia into a weaker partner needing trade outlets and political backing. On the contrary, China can wait as well as negotiate and obtain advantageous conditions. China is an important political ally for Putin, although an energy agreement that Russia would benefit from is yet to be reached.

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