Title: A Historical and Contemporary Parabola of Turkey's Strategic Approach to the Mediterranean, from Northern Cyprus to Libya.
Authored by Edoardo Campanile, Senior Researcher, Defense&Security, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O.
Introduction: Tracing the Historical Significance of Turkey's Maritime Strategy.
On October 29th, 2023, from a vantage point on one of the hills on the European shore of Istanbul, I witnessed the Turkish Navy's massive naval military parade in the Strait of Istanbul. One hundred warships, led by Turkey's aircraft carrier, the TCG Anadolu, made a spectacular entrance into the Bosphorus waters. The event was part of the celebrations for the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, officially founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on the same day in 1923. Such a show of force would have been unthinkable a century ago when the Republic was proclaimed before the Grand National Assembly. The newborn country had nowhere near this maritime military potential.
Indeed, throughout history, the Ottoman Empire repeatedly relied on its naval military power, as extensively illustrated in Istanbul's Deniz Müzesi (the "Maritime Museum"), a vast collection in the Beşiktaş neighbourhood dedicated to the Ottoman-Turkish historical and strategic relationship with the sea. For a long time, the Ottoman fleet was one of the most prominent tools of power projection across the Mediterranean for the Sultans of Constantinople. To give an idea of the strength enjoyed by the Ottoman fleet in the sixteenth century during the Empire's maximum expansion, it took a joint naval military effort by the Holy League, especially Spain and the Republic of Venice, to stand up to and ultimately defeat the Ottomans in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Despite this devastating loss, the Ottomans rapidly rebuilt and strengthened their fleet, reaffirming their assertiveness in the Mediterranean and reducing their opponents' strategic advantage. The same year, the Empire reached and wrested the island of Cyprus from the Venetians, an event of uttermost relevance that will be further discussed later.
Despite the majestic victories at sea and the irrefutable maritime strength displayed by the Ottomans over the centuries, the Sublime Porte consistently underestimated the implications of possessing a solid navy for a long time. The Ottomans' geopolitical strategic thinking was tightly tied to the terrestrial element, and the concepts of sea power and control of the sea, thoroughly theorised in the nineteenth century by scholars such as A.T. Mahan and J. Corbett, among others, were not part of the rulers of Anatolia's approach to the Mediterranean. For them, the fleet was a tool to reach, conquer, and control the land, and the sea was nothing but a means to achieve and consolidate on-the-ground authority. Throughout several historical phases, and especially toward the ultimate decline of the Empire until its collapse in the early twentieth century, the failure to maintain a solid Navy severely endangered the Ottoman maritime security strategy. It was (also) because of this lack that, for example, Italy could easily reach the coasts of Tripolitania and later wrest those territories with the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk immediately acknowledged Turkey's backwardness in this field and began investing in building a fleet. However, domestic political dynamics and the persistence of a military culture deeply rooted in a land-centric mentality slowed down, ultimately putting attempts to fill this void on hold.
Ankara's rediscovery of maritime power in the twenty-first century.
Ankara's renewed dynamism in maritime military strategy reemerged in the early twenty-first century and is best represented by the doctrine of the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan, in Turkish). To properly understand the roots of this doctrine, it is essential to introduce the role played by the island of Cyprus in Turkey's strategic maritime awakening. In April 2004, the Annan Plan, the last prominent attempt to solve the Cyprus Issue, a term commonly employed to refer to the island's division between the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in the South and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the North, failed. The UN-backed referendum to re-unite the island shattered against the refusal of the majority of the Greek Cypriots, who perceived it as unfair. Just a few weeks later, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union, a momentous change that created further distance between the two sides of the island.
The Blue Homeland doctrine was born primarily as a reaction of several Admirals within the Turkish Navy to the maritime claims advanced by the Republic of Cyprus right after joining the European Union in 2004, based on the rules set by the 1982 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), also known as Montego Bay Convention, of which Turkey is not a member. In particular, the UNCLOS establishes the EEZ limit of 200 nautical miles and the territorial water limit of 12 nautical miles from the mainland. However, the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean regions are characterised by several constellations of small islands, most of which belong to Greece. This condition makes it extremely difficult for other countries in the area, especially Turkey, to carve out their own maritime space. In front of the renewed claims advanced by the RoC to expand its EEZ according to the Montego Bay Convention's principles, Turkish Admirals Cem Gürdeniz and Cihat Yaycı openly called on the Turkish government to claim a more extensive EEZ for the country, thus creating a shared maritime border with Libya and ensuring control over the waters surrounding the TRNC.
Specifically, the Blue Homeland doctrine is a combination of three crucial aspects. First, it addresses specific security concerns. According to the Admirals' vision, the fear of the possible revival of Greek irredentism and the widespread mistrust of the West, especially Greece and the European Union, make creating a maritime buffer zone necessary. Second, it fulfils paramount economic interests. The discovery of abundant natural resources in the area has significantly influenced Turkey's naval strategy. These resources, including natural gas, are highly tempting, and their usage would drastically support Turkey's economic growth while reducing its dependence on other countries. Third, it embodies a geopolitical vision that pictures Turkey as the maritime crossroad between the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Indo-Pacific, thus fulfilling the idea of Turkey as the centre of a broader region, a concept often referred to in Turkish as merkez devlet (literally "central state").
Over the years, this vision has attracted the attention and support of several layers of Turkish society. In addition to the Turkish Navy and the military environments, increasingly more actors within the Turkish political spectrum and public opinion eventually embraced protecting and expanding the Turkish EEZ beyond the region's maritime borders as established by the Montego Bay Convention. One of the primary instances advanced by the Turkish Admirals behind the Blue Homeland doctrine is that the Convention does not consider the Eastern Mediterranean's geography specificities. Because of the international laws governing EEZs, these Greek islands significantly limit Turkey's access to the sea. The Kastellórizo archipelago's case is emblematic. This cluster of Greek islands is only a few kilometres from the southwest Turkish city of Kaş. In contrast, the distance to the Greek mainland is considerable, a condition that decisively chokes Turkey's access to the sea while creating a decisive advantage for Greece. The cases of Cyprus and Libya constitute two columns of the Blue Homeland doctrine and, therefore, deserve special attention.
Turkey in Cyprus.
Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean, is a juncture between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Because of its invaluable strategic position, it has been ruled over by countless civilisations throughout the millennia. As mentioned above, in 1571, the Ottoman Empire wrested the island from the Venetians, who had administered it since 1498, and the Sublime Porte ruled over it for three centuries before the arrival of the United Kingdom on the Cypriot scene in 1878. However, even after the establishment of the British administration over Cyprus, the island remained de facto under Ottoman sovereignty for some time. The following decades, however, were characterised by greater freedom of expression on the island and the emergence of nationalist feelings and movements across the Greek and Turkish communities, resting primarily on ethnic and religious lines (Greek and Orthodox on one side, Turkish and Muslims on the other). Consequently, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, inter-communal violence and rebellions against the British set the island ablaze until, in 1959, the United Kingdom left, and the independent Republic of Cyprus (at the time, corresponding to the whole territory) was proclaimed in 1960.
Nevertheless, these events did not quell the outbreak of violence. Between 1963 and 1964, an UN-patrolled green line was established in the capital, Nicosia, to divide the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and to curb the issue decisively. Ten years later, in 1974, the island's history changed forever in just five days. The Greek military junta in Athens, which had been in power since 1967, organised a coup d'état to take complete control of the island and establish the Hellenic Republic of Cyprus on July 15th. As a response, the Turkish government launched a massive military operation on July 20th that led to the occupation of the northern portion of the island and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which became officially independent in November 1983. These events are of uttermost importance as they have determined the island's composition to this day, as well as the strategic and geopolitical implications that still drive the region actors' moves in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey maintains a solid grip over the TRNC, especially from an economic and military point of view. Furthermore, Ankara secured a leading role in other spheres, such as water security. It is emblematic of the fact that Turkey built the Peace Water Pipeline between 2011 and 2015. This 107 km long pipeline, of which 80 km runs under the sea, directly connects Southern Turkey to the TRNC and provides 75 million cubic metres (MCM) of water. This pioneering project has no equal in the world and has decisively addressed water stress among the Turkish Cypriot community.
At the same time, the TRNC is essential to Turkey. In addition to the ethnic, religious, and historical bonds between Turkey and Northern Cyprus, this small piece of land in the Eastern Mediterranean is strategically crucial for several reasons. Framed by the Blue Homeland doctrine as an "ally" in the region (together with Libya), the overflowing Turkish influence over the TRNC enables Ankara to maintain a convenient location for exploring and extracting natural gas. It also allows the country to keep a firm position against the initiatives carried out by other regional actors with ambitions over these abundant resources. For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has often pointed at those projects aiming to extract and allocate energy resources in the area without involving Turkey. One example is the EastMed Pipeline Project, a 1900 km natural gas pipeline built in 2015 connecting Israel, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Italy. Another example is the EastMed Gas Forum, established in 2020 among the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Italy, and France, whose primary purpose is to improve cooperation among these countries in natural gas exploration and extraction. On several occasions, the Turkish President condemned these initiatives as overtly against Turkey's and the TRNC's rights and interests in the region while often stressing the need to use energy as a tool for cooperation, not competition, in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Cyprus, where for a long time the Turkish government has been advocating for a two-state solution and the international recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Turkey in Libya.
While Turkey's influence over Northern Cyprus is not surprising, a different approach should be adopted when analysing Ankara's growing presence in Libya and its consequences for the Mediterranean's power balances. The historical bond connecting Turkey and Libya is also tight. Between 1551 and 1912, the Ottoman Empire exerted control over the territories that today are part of Libya for almost four centuries until the Italo-Turkish War and the annexation of the Northern African territories to Italy.
Today, the Libyan dossier possibly constitutes the strongest point of convergence between the Blue Homeland doctrine, whose creators framed Libya as the southern fortress of Mavi Vatan, and President Erdoğan's foreign policy vision. In November 2019, the Turkish President's support for the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Fayez al-Sarraj, was further consolidated by signing two crucial agreements. One of these involved the establishment of a joint Turkish-Libyan EEZ and maritime border between the two countries. The other involved military and security cooperation between Turkey and the GNA to face the growing threat posed to the GNA by the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in the Eastern Libyan region of the Cyrenaica and then led by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. These agreements have been pivotal in solidifying Turkey's influence over the North African country while fulfilling crucial foreign policy goals.
From Turkey's point of view, establishing a joint EEZ with the Tripoli-based government helped prevent the formation of a joint Greek-Cypriot and Greek-Egyptian axis, especially concerning natural gas explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean. It also allowed the Turkish President to show his willingness to support the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood in the country. What is even more relevant for this analysis, however, is the groundbreaking character of the military operation performed by Turkey from January 2020 onward to push back the LNA and stop its advance toward the Western territories. The Turkish military intervention in Libya, especially its maritime component, represents a historical novelty for its operational and conceptual framing of naval military operation. The victory on Libyan soil was achieved thanks to the active role played by the Turkish Navy's offshore frigates, which were vital to delivering supplies, instructing the troops, and providing aerial superiority. This intervention, which was not primarily aimed at land victory but rather at ensuring maritime success and conquering the sea, is a significant manifestation of the Blue Homeland doctrine and a turning point in Ottoman-Turkish strategic thinking.
Conclusion: The New Roots of Turkey's Mediterranean Influence, a Glance to Albania.
The Cyprus Issue and the Libya military campaign are critical pieces of the mosaic depicting Turkey as an influential regional power. Having decisive influence in these two scenarios means being a major player in the Mediterranean and influencing access and passage to the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Although Turkey already plays a crucial role in the Mediterranean, this might strengthen further. Like the TRNC and Libya, Albania shares deep historical, cultural, and religious ties with Turkey. The Ottoman Empire ruled over the Western Balkans for centuries. In Albania, Ottoman dominion began at the end of the fifteenth century and continued until the dismantlement of the Empire. After that, the relations between the two countries witnessed a long period of diplomatic distance and sometimes ideological clash until the end of the Cold War. Still, Turkey's active involvement in the Balkans witnessed new dynamism from the 1990s onward after the fall of communism in Tirana.
Bilateral relations increased in the new millennium, and recently, Turkey-Albania relations have gained momentum following the inauguration of the majestic Namzgjah Mosque in central Tirana in October 2024. The Mosque, which was entirely built and paid for by Turkey, is the largest in the entire Balkan region and overtly aims to address the issue of the lack of holy places for the Muslims of the country since many mosques have been destroyed during the enduring communist regime governing Albania between the 1970s and 1991. As some observers have framed it, the Mosque Diplomacy confirms the Turkish intention to employ soft power to foster economic and diplomatic ties outside its borders. The inauguration ceremony, attended by President Erdoğan and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama (a self-declared non-practising Catholic), was followed by the statements of the two reaffirming the mutual interest in enhancing bilateral economic, diplomatic, and military relations. As affirmed by the Turkish President, the latter point includes strengthening Albania's defence capabilities through joint training and equipment supply. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Ankara's increasing focus on its Albanian neighbour may also gradually lead to an increased maritime-military presence, thus adding a third crucial pawn to Turkey's influence in the Mediterranean after the TRNC and Libya. These considerations mirror some of the principles guiding Turkey's foreign policy since the introduction of Ahmet Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth doctrine in the early 2000s, according to which history and geography should constitute two guiding principles behind foreign policy.
The new attention displayed by Ankara toward the control of the sea constitutes a historical novelty and a geo-strategic shift compared to the past. To put it in the words of Çubukçuoğlu: "Turkey is a traditional land power trying to claim its place as an emerging maritime state and framing naval power as an influential element of its quest for strategic autonomy" (Çubukçuoğlu, 2023, p. 287). Today, the Turkish Navy is paramount from Libya to Cyprus. Still, several factors fuel doubts about Ankara's intentions. While the Turkish President has officially embraced the Blue Homeland doctrine in his speeches, it is unclear how much the Turkish government will decide to implement the doctrine as intended by its ideologues. In addition to the ever-changing contexts of the TRNC and Libya, Turkey's recent intention to strengthen bilateral ties with Albania may gradually bring the Balkan country closer to Turkey's sphere of influence, as well as in terms of maritime influence. This is a paramount shift, considering the importance played by Albania as a crucial access point to the Adriatic Sea. Either way, Turkey's ongoing heavy investments in maritime power are a testament to the importance attributed by Ankara to the geopolitics of the Mediterranean in the twenty-first century.