Authors
Giulia Casot - Junior Researcher
Carola Sanzio - Junior Researcher
Giada Acquadro - Junior Researcher
Rosa Santa Serravalle - Senior Researcher
Marta Thorbjornsen - Senior Researcher
Abstract
The 4B movement in South Korea represents a radical feminist response to systemic gender inequality, rejecting marriage, childbirth, dating, and heterosexual relationships. Emerging from digital activism, it challenges patriarchal structures, economic oppression, and rigid beauty standards. This study explores its origins, philosophy, and social impact, including declining birth rates and public debate. Comparing 4B to global feminist movements, it highlights cultural differences and its recent rise in the U.S. The article also examines critiques of the movement, questioning its sustainability and the need for a more inclusive feminist approach.
1. Introduction
Global feminism: overview and influence
‘Feminism’ refers to the “movement for the revindication of economic, civil and political rights of women; and, more generally, to the whole of theories criticizing the traditional conception of the woman and proposing a new relation between genres in the private sphere, as well as their egalitarian collocation in the public one”. (Treccani, 2024) Feminism is thus a specific social movement fighting for the acknowledgment of human dignity and fundamental rights to a specific group minority, namely, that composed of women. It must not be confused with matriarchy or misandry, referring to societies governed by women and to the feeling of hating men respectively. (Merriam-Webster, 2024)
The unjust and inegalitarian treatment suffered by female human beings is deeply rooted in historical political and religious assumptions painting the woman as an object at free disposal of men and, today, of capitalism. Indeed, feminism is closely tied to this economic system, based on labor-force and asset accumulation. It substituted the Middle Age feudalism, which women contributed to the fight against while asking for better living conditions for peasants and poor people. Unfortunately, they could not predict that as a result they would be subjected to even harsher exploitation and discrimination. (Curcio et al., 2020)
The witch hunt that followed lasted centuries; the word ‘feminism’ got back on the public scene only in 1837, when for the first time the radical socialist philosopher Charles Fourier cited it in connection with women’s rights and emancipation. (Offen, 1988) Then, the word acquired a political meaning when associated with the battle for female suffrage that took place in 1890, in particular in the United Kingdom (UK). Here, in 1903 the suffragists leader Miss Emmeline Pankhurst founded the Women’s Social and Political Union and later convinced more than 250.000 people to march in favor of women’s right to vote, eventually recognised in 1928. (Cosimelli, 2024)
Almost a century later, another important march took place in Washington on January 21, 2017, followed by other “sister marches” in different states of the United States (US): a total of about 4.6 million people protested against the newly inaugurated Trump presidency and in favor of gender and pay equality, LGBTQ and civil rights, and reproductive freedom among the others. (Rafferty, 2025)
Between those dates, the international community also raised in support of women’s rights and emancipation awareness. In 1946 the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted resolution 11(II) establishing the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). This body is charged with “promoting women’s and girls' rights, documenting the reality of their lives throughout the world, and shaping global standards on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.” The original mandate was further expanded in 1996 to encompass also the duty of “tak[ing] a leading role in monitoring and reviewing progress and problems in the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and in mainstreaming a gender perspective in UN activities.” (UN Women, 2024)
Such expansion resulted from the adoption in 1995, at the Conference of Beijing, of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BPfA), still “the most progressive blueprint ever for advancing women’s rights”. (UN Women, 2024) In this document, governments, NGOs, and private society representatives committed to effective positive actions tailored to guarantee equal access opportunities in fields where girls and women are discriminated against compared to men, such as political inclusion, reproductive rights, equal pay and equal access to education and justice. At its 64th session held on the 25th anniversary of the BPfA, the CSW assessed the efficacy of the national efforts undertaken to fulfill the aims set out in the document and constantly monitor them. (UNDP, 2020)
The Conference of Beijing was the last World Conference on Women; the others were held in Mexico City (1975), Copenaghen (1980) and Nairobi (1985) and all were convened to build and foster the socio-political consensus necessary to sustain women’s fight for their rights with more concrete and bolder actions and initiatives. (UN, 2024)
As of today, women are indeed acknowledged to have political and civil rights and they break the glass ceiling more often than before. For instance, now women become CEOs and judges and in 2023 they occupied 26.9% of national parliamentary seats (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2024); on the other hand, they represent only 5 out of 31 directly elected national presidents (UN Women, 2024).
This description is based on a wrong assumption, though. It implicitly assumes that women’s rights, like those of other minorities, are to be recognised by someone else, namely, capitalist white heterosexual cis-gender men. Conversely, human dignity and fundamental rights are inherent to the condition of human beings, notwithstanding any category of belonging imposed by capitalism, which feeds itself on social division, hierarchies, and on sectarian privileged-oppressed dynamics that weaken any battle carried out for the recognition of basic rights and equality for all.
Symptomatic of this assumption is the overturn of the famous Roe v. Wade decision in 2022 by the US Supreme Court: today, American women are not guaranteed the constitutional right to abortion anymore and any State can decide whether they can legally and safely access abortion pills and treatments, even when a pregnancy results from rape or puts the mother’s life at risk. In addition, in many other countries, considered liberal and democratic, sexual violence and abuses have surged, but too often women do not file a claim because they fear to be recognised as the culprits of such heinous actions. The number of femicides increased too: in 2023 one woman was killed every ten minutes. (UN, 2024)
It is thus to protect past victories while carrying out new battles that feminist movements still play a pivotal role today. They act differently in newly conquered fields and express themselves even through art, like the Guerrilla Girls, the #MeToo in the US and NiUnaMenos in Argentina do. Others keep preferring peaceful uprisings, just like the Pussy Riots and the Femen. Feminist scholars, such as bell hooks, and Flavia Dzodan, publish studies to further develop and adapt to contemporary needs the standpoints of leading figures like Simone De Beuavoir, Judith Butler, Angela Davis, and Carla Lonzi.
Many of them strongly advise mutual support and more inclusivity too. It is indeed important to highlight the birth of intersectional transfeminism, which aims at dismantling the whole capitalist system with its social distinctions. This movement calls for solidarity and alliance, rejects binarism and sectarian discriminations, instead viewing them as a single entity resulting from the sum of different “oppressive axes”, namely, different layers of inequality motivated by racial, sexual, gender, and disability distinctions. Embracing this feminism could result in mutually positive benefits for any minority willing to battle together in favor of a more just and equal world for anyone, from humans to animals (Arianna et al., 2017).
Socio-cultural context of South Korea: how patriarchy and traditional gender expectations feed Korean feminism
The link between economics and feminism is clearly visible in South Korea. Here, economic development occurred very rapidly in the second half of the XX century, after the cease-fire of the war against North Korea was signed in 1956. Since then, local authorities fostered stronger competitiveness and perfectionism in education and labour, which affected the Korean approach to aesthetics and physiognomy too. As a result, people experienced wealthier living conditions on the one hand, and a deteriorated relationship between men and women on the other hand. (Il Post, 2016)
Today, this relationship keeps falling apart because the worsening economic context directly influences how men and women perceive their mutual role in society. Late improvements in gender equality were small and in 2024 South Korea still occupies the 94th position of the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Gender Gap Report, placing in the second half. More in details, the country ranks 112 in the ‘Economic Participation and Opportunity’ section and 114 in the ‘Estimated earned income” subsection (WEF, 2024).
Indeed, South Korea shows the widest gender pay gap among the member States of the Organisation for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in 2023 only 9% of 899 executives at 23 domestic financial companies were women. Effective changes will difficulty occur until female professionists are forced to choose between career and family by gender norms charging them with almost the whole responsibility of children and house care.
However, many women seem to prefer working rather than building a family, which results in lower birth rates and an aging population (OECD, 2024). Current President Yoon Suk Yeol, renowned for his strongly patriarchal and anti-feminist assertions, overtly blamed women for these socially negative backlashes as well as for later marriages and higher divorce rates. He highlighted that feminism has become one of the main reasons why men are less willing to marry today than before (Sussman, 2024). His government has also aimed at women’s sense of guilt when he launched an online ‘National Birth Map’ showing both the number of women in reproductive age in every municipality and “what it expected of its female citizens” (Sussman, 2024).
YouTube influencers sharing the President’s standpoints helped spread this and other fake news, such as those linking feminism to complotist plans aiming at Yoon’s destitution.
Instead of guilt, women felt outraged and rejected these unjust and illogical accusations and the general discriminatory treatment restraining their path towards economic independence and political empowerment. Some foster economic and financial awareness and post job listings on online communities; fewer than before leave their workplace by default once married; and the bulk of the female younger generation commits most hours of daily life to either study or work. Their male fellows reacted with a mixed feeling of fear and rage to the latter behaviour, because of the consequent higher female college enrollment compared to male one and the harsher competition for scarce jobs in an ethnically and racially homogenous country, where gender becomes then the battle linchpin (Sussman, 2024).
Male sharpness against women resonates loudly online, where college-educated men define their female peers in pejorative terms like ‘kimchee women’ to refer to a stereotypical selfish, vain, and self-referential woman willing to exploit their partners. South Korean feminists started publicly displaying themselves precisely in female online communities, like Megalia, replying to those shameful definitions with ‘trolling responses’, namely, making fun of men (Jeong, 2021).
South Korean women combat against the patriarchal sexist heritage of beauty perfectionism too, derived from the 60s and 70s-era belief that Western wide round eyes and physiognomy were more attractive than local ones. Data supports this thesis.
Ten years ago South Koreans ranked first place in per capita expenses for plastic surgery, with between one-fifth and one-third of the national female population undergoing cosmetic interventions. The most sought are nose job and blepharoplasty, which Korean teenagers are used to be gifted for their high school graduation (Marx, 2015). Not adjusting nose and eyes to common standards at a young age would result in later social discrimination, because ‘naturally beautiful’ aging women would not abide by the dogma of assimilation permeating South Korean society (Il Post, 2016). This confirms how much in the country others’ opinion values more than one’s own about him or herself (Marx, 2015).
The absurdly high attention towards aesthetics became a component of the ‘Korean wave’ which from the musical sphere reached other social fields. Indeed, the country obtains economic gains from this trend, which in 2015 made so-called mostly Asian ‘surgery tourists’ accounting for one-third of gross domestic product (GDP) (Marx, 2015). No wonder that in this social context women rather than men are exposed to elevated social pressures and to higher risks of social isolation and discrimination.
Furthermore, since smartphones became easily accessible, South Korean men led off the unlawful and obscene ‘spy-cam porn’ practice, namely, they secretly take pictures and videos of what is under women’s skirts and often publish them without their consent. The preventive protective and punitive measures adopted by the government since 2004, such as imposing loud shutter noise on smartphones, were useless and did not stem the equally shameful practice of hiding small cameras wherever, from toiletries walls to shoes. Instead, spy-cam porn victims increased by 900% in less than ten years and 80% of them are female (BBC, 2018); and just 4% of the more than fifteen thousands requests of video deletion received in 2016 by the Communication Commission were accepted (Il Post, 2018).
Worse, only 8.7% of culprits are sentenced to prison, actually without hesitation when they are women, as experienced by a nude model in 2018, immediately jailed after being caught secretly taking and posting online a picture of a male colleague (BBC, 2018). Women’s outcry against this double standard, connivent, and sexist approach of both police and judges was vehement and grounded on previous sexist episodes when the police denied the label of hate crime for the murder of a woman in a public toilet even after the killer confessed he acted simply because women ignored him for a lifetime. A staggering stance in a country where femicide, revenge porn and dating violence mainly falls on men (Sussman, 2024).
To feel safer in a nation where intimate-partner violence accounts for 41.5% of the total (Sussman, 2024) and to escape patriarchal sexist standards, women gathered around the feminist cause and among the most prominent and publicly scrutinised is the recently born 4B movement, actually a real lifestyle openly condemned by President Yoon.
The name stands for ‘4NOs’ and derives from the initial letter of the social institutes women reject: heterosexual marriage (‘bihon’), childbirth (‘bichulsan’), dating (‘biyeonae’), and heterosexual relationship (‘bisekseu’). In this way, they aim at decreasing the risk of exposure to male violence. At the same time, these feminists do not abide by stereotypical beauty rules and prefer short hair and no make-up to ponytails and eyeliner (Sussman, 2024).
This paper deepens the story of this specific expression of Korean feminism, starting from the analysis of its foundation, strength and weaknesses. Then, it focuses on the 4B spread and influence on Korean contemporary society, assessing whether it can substantially change and perhaps even dismantle the century-old patriarchal and sexist local system. The use of social media will be particularly considered in this regard. Before trying to draw some predictive conclusions on the 4B possible evolution and impact both nationally and globally, the article will compare Eastern and Western feminisms, highlighting their common points but also their differences, as well as the unique traits of the 4B movement within the global context.
2. The 4B Movement
The history of women’s movements in Korea
Well before the advent of democracy in the country, Korea has been a theatre of powerful and unique feminist and anti-traditional movements.
In the late 19th century, as feminism began to take root in the peninsula, these movements emerged primarily as resistance against Confucian patriarchal politics and culture. Over time, they evolved, becoming integral parts of broader social struggles in the 20th century, namely the national liberation movement during the Japanese colonial period and the push for democratization under military dictatorships (Hur, 2010). During this early phase, due to the common and tangible objectives these movements pursued, they often appeared homogeneous, with participants largely belonging to a specific category of women who shared a collective identity as citizens of the nation, members of the state, and, more broadly, part of the working class.
The emergence of a distinct Korean feminist identity materialized as a struggle against Japanese colonization, during which education, and, more specifically, the fight for women’s educational equality, became a central tool for challenging traditional Confucian ideology, which was seen as an obstacle to modernization and independence (Moon, 2002).
Schools and educational organizations were subsequently established with the goal of dismantling the Confucian patriarchal system of the Yi dynasty, which was held responsible for enforcing legal and political institutions that controlled women’s rights and behavior.
When Japan annexed Korea in 1905 and later introduced the benefits of its industrial revolution, Japanese corporations, particularly in the textile sector, began exploiting the cheaper labor of Korean women. This led to a response in the form of women’s trade unions and socialist groups, the most notable of which was Geunuhoe, or the ‘Society of the Friends of the Rose of Sharon’ (Hur, 2010).
However, after Korea regained independence and the peninsula became a focal point of Cold War dynamics, left-wing movements in South Korea faced severe repression and were ultimately dismantled. This created an opening for right-wing organizations, such as the Korean National Council of Women (KNCW), which focused on integrating women into the nation’s social and economic development. The KNCW also addressed issues such as environmental concerns and youth welfare. In concrete terms, its efforts materialized through initiatives promoting the modernization of domestic labor, family planning and support to community development (Hur, 2006).
The first significant broadening of South Korean feminist movements, both in terms of membership diversity and goals, occurred in the 1980s with the emergence of a feminist faction within the Minjung social movement. Minjung women faced a dual oppression: not only were they subjected to the antagonistic forces that the movement opposed, such as neo-imperialism, military authoritarianism and neo-colonialism, but they were also oppressed by the unequal class and gender hierarchies and the repressive social structures of the time (Moon, 2002).
With the establishment of a democratic government in 1993 following South Korea’s first free elections, the Minjung movement’s political struggle against military rule came to an end, prompting a significant shift in feminist activism. Organizations like the Korean Women’s Associations United (KWAU) moved away from radical opposition to the capitalist world order and instead embraced institutionalized political participation, focusing on legislative reforms related to gender equality, labor rights, and social welfare. This transition brought KWAU closer to mainstream civic movements, such as the previously mentioned KNCW, as it prioritized policy engagement over direct activism. However, this shift had far-reaching consequences for Korean feminism. By distancing itself from its original struggles, particularly those of female workers and marginalized women, KWAU contributed to a homogenization of women’s issues, privileging the concerns of middle-class women while neglecting class-based inequalities. Moreover, its integration into state politics and dependence on government funding weakened its ability to challenge systemic power structures, making it less critical of neoliberalism and global capitalism than it once was (Moon, 2002).
As a result, leading up to the new millennium, KWAU and KNCW faced growing criticism from younger feminists and emerging activist groups, who argued that they had become too moderate and ineffective in addressing new feminist concerns, such as digital sexual crimes, gender-based violence and the systemic oppression of marginalized women (Hur, 2010).
The feminist movements that emerged after the 2000s differed significantly from their predecessors, both in their approach and ideological foundations.
This shift was largely driven by the dramatic social and economic transformations South Korea had experienced since the 1990s, marked by unprecedented improvements in quality of life and broader opportunities for its citizens. As a result, feminist discourse evolved beyond its earlier frameworks, embracing postmodernism, post-Marxism and post-colonialism while placing sexual issues at the center of its agenda (Hur, 2010).
This newfound consciousness was evident in the way these new groups became the first in Korean history to openly identify as feminists and advocate for equality within their membership, as they broke from tradition by setting aside the use of honorifics, a staple of Korean language and customs, to promote a more egalitarian culture.
Reflecting this shift in ideals and goals, they were also pioneers in utilizing digital spaces, signaling their intent to engage a wider audience and move beyond strictly regional concerns, positioning themselves as key players in the global feminist and human rights discourse.
The birth of the 4B movement
The growing discontent with the institutionalization of mainstream feminist movements in South Korea paved the way for more radical and unconventional discourse, particularly in digital spaces (Kim and Kim, 2011).
These new movements emerged from a convergence of various social and economic factors, all of which deepened a sense of frustration and anger among women.
One major catalyst was the coining of the term 3-po generation during the 2010s, which referred to young people who were forced to give up three key aspects of life, namely marriage, romantic relationships and childbirth, due to economic instability and societal pressures (Lee and Jeong, 2021).
As discussions about these struggles gained traction online, many young women began to recognize the gendered nature of these issues, fueling the rise of digital feminism in South Korea and the escalation of a sort of ‘gender war’, as women increasingly confronted the extensive misogyny present in their daily lives and across digital spaces.
However, what truly propelled the spread and intensification of these radical feminist movements was the infamous 2016 Third Plan for an Aging Society and Population, which aimed to combat declining birth rates by promoting early marriage. The government’s launch of online National Birth Maps, which visualized the number of women of reproductive age across the country, further intensified public outrage. Many women saw these measures as an attempt by the state to regulate their bodies, leading to widespread protests against government policies and reinforcing the urgency of a new, more radical form of feminist resistance (Lee and Jeong, 2021).
One of the most controversial and widely recognized movements to emerge from this context was Escape the Corset.
Rooted in online activism, this movement sought to liberate women from psychological, physical, sexual and social repression, using the corset as a metaphor for the various patriarchal structures that constrain both women’s minds and bodies (Yun, 2022). The term specifically highlights the deeply gendered and oppressive beauty standards that reinforce women's subordination, a phenomenon especially pervasive in Korean society.
Their activism primarily takes place on social media platforms like Instagram and Twitter, where they engage in ‘feminist sabotage’, a form of protest that challenges conventional portrayals of femininity. Through striking and unconventional images, such as the dramatic destruction of makeup products or women showcasing their bare faces and shaved heads, they express their rage against systemic oppression and the rigid beauty standards imposed on them (Yun, 2022).
Similarly, the 4B movement emerged around 2016 as another radical response to South Korea’s patriarchal structures. By rejecting marriage, childbirth, dating and heterosexual relationships, 4B feminists challenged the deeply ingrained societal expectations that confine women to traditional roles (Yun, 2022). This movement, much like Escape the Corset, represents a broader feminist resistance to the limitations placed on women’s autonomy and the failure of institutionalized feminist organizations to address these systemic issues.
In fact, both movements attempt to fill the void left by institutionalized women’s organizations, which, despite their focus on legislative reforms and integration into state governance, failed to propose effective policies or political strategies to address the growing sense of precarity among young women (Lee and Jeong, 2021). Therefore, by highlighting their everyday experiences of fear and frustration, these new feminists aimed at exposing the persistent structural exploitation and violence against women in South Korea that remained unresolved despite the few legal advancements, while also promoting a self-empowering approach to tackling these challenges independently through an all-encompassing lifestyle change.
The philosophy
The 4B movement and its philosophy is built around the idea of resistance to patriarchal structures that impose limitations on women’s autonomy and agency.
At the heart of this movement are the four refusals, each representing a rejection of traditional expectations and societal pressures that bind women to patriarchal norms. In this sense, these four modalities are devices against the power of ‘biopolitics’, which seek to take control of the population through the domination of women’s bodies (Yun, 2022).
These refusals envision the act of saying ‘no’ as a powerful form of resistance able to challenge and disrupt traditional institutions and societal norms, possibly even reshaping collective perspectives and expectations.
- Bihon: refusal of (heterosexual) marriage
In contrast to traditional Korean society, which views singleness as a temporary and precarious state, the Bihon movement encourages women to reimagine a future that has often been discouraged due to the systemic barriers faced by unmarried women (Lee and Jeong, 2021). These challenges include limited access to job opportunities and state-sponsored benefits, as well as economic instability.
In response, the Bihon movement advocates for women to pursue financial independence and self-reliance, shifting the focus from marriage as a source of security to individual empowerment and autonomy.
- Bichulsan: refusal of childbirth
The Bichulsan movement challenges the pro-natalist policies of the government, deemed as a reproductive duty imposed by the state as a way to take ownership of women’s bodies and tie their lives to those of men and patriarchal institutions (Jeong, 2020). By reframing this issue as a rational choice and political statement, the movement reclaims the agency that was previously stripped away from the 3-po generation.
- Biyeonae: refusal of (heterosexual) romantic relationships
Similarly to the Bichulsan movement, Biyeonae stands for the refusal to take part in patriarchal institutions that would endanger or limit in any way women’s agency. Furthermore, this aspect of the movement serves as a form of liberation from the emotional labor and expectations tied to romantic relationships, which are rooted in the gendered nature of family dynamics within South Korea's family-centered governance (Jeong, 2020).
Rather than focusing on romantic relationships, women are encouraged to pursue self-development and personal aspirations in order to create fulfilling lives independently and find purpose within themselves (Lee and Jeong, 2021).
- Bisekseu: refusal of (heterosexual) sexual relationships
In alignment with the core philosophy of the movement, the Bisekseu principle aims at distancing women from patriarchal control over their bodies (Lee and Jeong, 2021), while also rejecting the notion that women’s sexuality exists solely for men’s pleasure or that women have an inherent duty to engage in sexual relationships with men.
Stemming from these core principles of the 4B movement there are a set of key values that 4B women strive to embody.
One of those is a complete rejection of capitalism and consumerism, encouraging women to prioritize financial responsibility instead.
This is exemplified by the movement's dismissal of the ‘Little but Certain Happiness’ online trend, which encourages immediate consumption as a coping mechanism. This trend is viewed as a distraction that prevents women from pursuing long-term financial goals and exacerbates their economic vulnerability (Lee and Jeong, 2021).
Instead, women should focus on more long-term perspectives, aided by the movement’s strong community and solidarity among the members. In fact, the movement promotes a powerful space in which to seek help, guidance and mutual support as women deviate from traditional expectations and navigate the challenges that come with it (Shin and Lee, 2022).
These principles are often embraced by activists alongside the aesthetic precepts of the Escape the Corset movement, which calls for a broad rejection of traditional roles and societal expectations placed on women.
More concretely, participants in these movements often make visible changes to their appearance as a form of resistance, such as cutting their hair short and abandoning makeup altogether.
Rather than focusing on physical appearance, these women prioritize comfort, practicality and functionality in their clothing choices, gravitating toward loose-fitting garments, unisex or even men's clothing that reject the sexualized emphasis on the female body. In some cases, women have even adopted clothing like the bub-bok or ‘monk's clothing’ or a modernized version of the hanbok, the traditional Korean garment, both of which offer greater comfort and functionality while challenging the traditional expectations of feminine attire (Shin and Lee, 2022).
3. Development and Impact
The spread of the movement 4B among young women
This movement emerged in the mid late 2010s, following a surge of interest in feminism in South Korea, and it was developed especially in the women’s online communities. It was born after South Korea's rapid economic transformation and the subsequent challenges it has posed for younger generations of the 2000s, which is the most involved generation in the movement. Especially for young women, economic insecurity is compounded by systemic gender inequality. In fact, South Korea's ranking is one of the worst OECD for the gender wage gap, and social mobility remains limited. The aim of this movement is underlining the existence of many alternatives for women’s life instead of the classical, patriarchal one; and living an alternative life without men is a radical strategy for young digital feminists to challenge the rigid patriarchy in their home country. In 2016 after the murder of a woman in a train station by a man in Seoul, online platforms became spaces where women could share their frustration, criticising patriarchal norms and organising protests. (Ming Gao, 2024).
Regarding the spread and development of the movement in the other countries, social media played an important role. For the USA, the movement started becoming popular after the election of Donald Trump in November 2024 when the videos from 4B movement went viral.
The interesting point is that the 4B movement is not organised or centralised; what’s clear is that it could also be exploited with politicians. According to Katharine Moon, a US political science professor at Wellesley College, the difference between a potential 4B movement in America and what already exists in South Korea is the fundamental importance that is given to marriage. In South Korea if a woman doesn’t get married she is not recognised as an adult, this is the reason why their rejection of marriage is more a radical statement for South Korean women than American ones. In the US, the surge in interest is a temporary means to bring attention to the precarious situation of women, rather than a total commitment to life without men. In South Korea it is a way of life (Richard Windsor, 2023).
But why was the 4B movement born in South Korea? One of the principal reasons why the 4B movement was born in South Korea it’s because of the lowest fertility rate in the world that has been registered for many years in the country, in fact in 2020 South Korea recorded more deaths than births, and the solutions that the Conservative-led government found to solve the crisis were cracking downs against feminist efforts rather than expanding gender equality (Kathleen Walsh, 2024).
2024 has been the year when this movement spread out : “I had never heard of 4B until recently”, says Lee Min-Ji, an office worker in Seoul who was surprised at all the international attention. “I understand where all the anger comes from, but I don’t think avoiding all relationships with men is the solution”. Especially after the murder of a woman in Gangnam Station in 2016, the case sparked nationwide protests against misogyny driven violence. In addition to the problem of gender pay gap, in the state also digital sex crimes have further fuelled the feminist movement, from widespread illegal filming through hidden cameras to the latest epidemic of AI- generated deep fake pornography targeting young women. Online activists have also challenged South Korea’s demanding beauty standards. In 2018, some young women began posting videos of themselves destroying makeup products and cutting their hair short in what is known as the “escape the corset” movement. But there has been a backlash, to the point where the word “feminism” itself has virtually become a slur in South Korea, carrying connotations far removed from western views of gender equality advocacy. “Unlike the west’s long history with feminist movement, Korea is experiencing these changes in a very compressed way”, says Gowoon Jung, assistant professor of sociology at Korea university: “this has led many to view feminism only in its most radical form”. President Yoon Suk Yeol, who took office in 2022, partly rode to victory on anti-feminist sentiment, courting disgruntled young male voters by denying the existence of structural gender discrimination and promising to abolish the country’s gender equality ministry (Raphael Rashid,2024).
The role of social media in sharing experiences and promoting ideals
One of the most life changing events in our century is the nuisance of social media, they have become an undeniable force that changed our lives and shaped the way we connect, communicate, and engage with the world around us. What began as a simple means for friends and families to stay in touch has evolved into a powerful platform for individuals and communities to share experiences, amplify voices, and promote ideals on a global scale.
Social media’s influence extends well beyond the realm of entertainment or networking; it has become a critical tool for raising awareness, challenging dominant narratives, and reshaping societal norms. From sharing personal journeys of triumph and struggle to galvanizing mass movements, social media platforms have allowed individuals to break free from traditional gatekeepers and create a space for diverse voices to be heard. Whether it’s through a viral hashtag, a shared video, or an insightful post, people are using these platforms to make their experiences visible and to promote ideals that challenge the status quo. This democratisation of communication has only transformed personal interaction but has also sparked cultural, political and social shifts across the globe. This is the case of the spread of the South Korean 4B movement.
Anonymous online forums and social media serve as protected spaces for feminist discourse that might be difficult to voice openly. The online nature of the movement, however, makes it nearly impossible to measure 4B’s true scale or impact. This democratisation of communication has only transformed personal interaction but has also sparked cultural, political and social shifts across the globe. The 4B movement has involved many women with a really different background, especially thanks to its spread in social media. An example could be the story of Christine Ivans, a 30 years old woman that decided to reassess her priorities: what if she invested all her energy into herself instead of into trying to find the “right” man? This is the moment when she found the 4B movement on Tik Tok, and finally she realised that she wasn’t alone. Mingyeong Lee, a feminist South Korean author who has been a member of the movement since its foundation, is happy to see 4B's profile suddenly rising so fast. "I have been waiting for this to happen. It took eight years to reach you guys," adding that she sees similarities between the struggles for women's rights in the US and South Korea. Eight years ago, we found out that our friends, fathers, or others close to us, didn't share our perspective on gender issues," she explains. The 4B pioneer is referring to the Gangnam Station femicide, in which a man killed a woman in the restroom of a Seoul karaoke bar and later testified he did it because she had ignored him all his life. The murder set off a new wave of feminism in South Korea, led by young women decrying the country's misogyny problem online and in the streets. The femicide was the straw that broke the camel's back, with 4B activists like Mingyeong resisting a deep-seated patriarchal culture. Widespread violence and harassment of women regularly includes spy-cams in public bathrooms, digital sex crimes and ongoing sexism in the workplace. In 2019, nine-of-ten victims of violent crimes like mugging, rape or murder were women, according to South Korea's Supreme Prosecutors' Office. The new feminist movement has seen young women building solidarity through resistance. Furthermore, Mingyeong doesn't want children. She was born at a time when the abortion of female fetuses was still popular in South Korea, even though South Korea enacted a law in 1988 that prohibited doctors from revealing a fetuses' gender. Still, South Korea today has the lowest birth-rate in the world, and the reason why this happens is, for the president Yoon Suk Yeol, because of feminism. With Korean women at the wrong end of the highest gender-pay gap among OECD countries and, according to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, shouldering most of the care work, it's no wonder many don't want to have babies, Mingyeong says. "This is a cruel place for women," she explains. "If we give birth to girls, they'll be neither safe nor happy." (Orange de Oliveira, 2024).
As written before, when Donald Trump secured victory in the US presidential election, an unexpected phenomenon began trending on social media: young American women declaring their commitment to 4B, a fringe South Korean Feminist movement advocating the rejection of marriage, childbirth, dating and sex. The movement has sparked intense global interest, with millions of views on TikTok posts heralding it as a women's rights revolution. Yet within South Korea itself, the picture is more complex and in some places the feminist movement is under attack. This movement emerged in the mid 2010s amid growing online feminist activism in South Korea, a country where women face the widest gender pay gap among OECD nations. Alexa Vargas, a 26-year-old from Boston, says she stopped engaging with men a few years ago after a series of unhealthy relationships that included abuse and assault, and it wasn’t until earlier this year that she realized there was a movement and language that aligned with her actions. Though she says that “men need a wake-up call,” her decision is more about herself and other women. “I don’t know if men are going to change their ways. I don’t know how this is going to pan out,” she says. “My goal in life and in this movement is to protect young women and girls.” Women who have been talking about 4B online say the way some men have responded to their posts are already proving their point. Abby K., a 27-year-old from Florida, recently broke up with her boyfriend over dismissive comments he made about Trump’s history of sexual abuse. When she posted a video about that and her decision to join the 4B movement, she says men flooded her DMs with death threats and hateful comments about her appearance. “It doesn’t exactly entice you to re-enter the dating pool,” she adds. (Harmeet Kaur, CNN, 2024). As Donald Trump secured victory in the US presidential election, an unexpected phenomenon began trending on social media: young American women declaring their commitment to “4B”, a fringe South Korean feminist movement advocating the rejection of marriage, childbirth, dating and sex. The movement has sparked intense global interest, with millions of views on TikTok and viral X posts heralding it as a women’s rights revolution. Yet within South Korea itself, the picture is more complex and in some places the feminist movement is under attack (Raphael Rashid, 2024).
Social and economic consequences decline in marriages, birth rates and public debate:
Notably, South Korea has lowest/low fertility, which is a total fertility rate at or below 1.3. In 2010 the total fertility rate in South Korea was 1.23 and reached a record low of 0.98 in 2018 which has become an important social and policy issue. The reason behind this rate is because of the deteriorating economic circumstances of young adults, for instance, South Korea experienced a substantial increase in precarious work after the financial crisis of the late 1990s. In addition to the economical conditions, there is also the problem of the housing prices, that especially in Seoul-s metropolitan areas where the majority of population is concentrated, have also been identified as a major barrier to young people forming families. However, socioeconomic differentials in fertility are understudied in South Korea and other East Asian countries. (Sojung Lim, 2022). These extremely low fertility rates in combination with rapid population aging have been the subject of public and policy concerns. A growing body of literature explores various factors associated with fertility behaviours, from women’s labor force participation to fertility intentions to the availability of family policies. Women’s fertility behaviours are largely affected by their ability to balance work and child rearing responsibilities, which are further determined by country-specific institutions that include education, family, labor market, policy and gender relations. The fertility decline in Korea is largely driven by the trend toward delaying and even foregoing marriage, as childbearing occurs almost exclusively within marital union. As is well documented, the level of non marital fertility has been very low in South Korea, 1.9% when the OECD average non marital births was about 40%. It is also important to note the difference between gender contexts in order to understand fertility behaviours in South Korea: unlike the situation in western countries, socioeconomic changes exercised little direct impact on the mortality reductions in Korea. Industrial development in the colonial days was based on the exploitation of Korean labour and was achieved at the cost of deteriorating living conditions for the Korean population. With very slow restoration after the Korean War, economic conditions were not favourable for controlling mortality. Mortality decline during the colonial period and the post war years appears to be less related to socioeconomic development or the rising standard of living of the population. But, the actual question is whether mortality declined in Korea before fertility started to decline. We have to start by noticing that when mortality was declining from 1910 to 1925, fertility increased due to improved health conditions. A similar pattern is also observed in the late 1950s. About the out-migration, it is a short term safety valve relieving population pressure and delaying the onset of fertility decline. Empirical studies indicate that the timing and rate of fertility decline correlate negatively with out-migration opportunities. The timing and pace of the fertility transition in Korea have also been influenced by internal migration. During the colonial period from 1925 to 1944, the urban population increased from 3.2 to 11.7 percent of the total population and the number of cities increased from 12 to 21. By transferring a large proportion of the population out of the rural area that were faced with a high population growth rate, rural urban migration during the colonial period reduced population pressure considerably and retarded the initiation of fertility reduction. In contrast, massive rural/urban migration since the mid 1960s has expected the pace of fertility transition. It is generally agreed that those who migrate to urban areas have lower fertility than those who remain behind. Migrants are more prone or receptive to change processes, and in the process of moving, are likely to accept low/fertility oriented norms and attitudes. It is also argued that migration creates the condition necessary for fertility reductions, as it affects the role and status of women.
There is also another important reason why the fertility rate reduced that much: the labour market. Economists found a cubic relationship, that is, socioeconomic status has positive effects on fertility at a low socioeconomic level, but as socioeconomic status rises, the relationship becomes negative. For the highest socioeconomic group, the relationship becomes positive. Since the mid 1990s, in Korea, employment has become much less secure for young people at the ages of career formation and marriage as well as for those in their late thirties and early forties. Labour market insecurity due to a remarkable increase in unemployment, layoffs, and part/time and temporary jobs has played a decisive role in delaying marriage and widening the birth interval, and thus has had flow over effects on the decline of recent fertility in Korea. By creating fears of social slippage, labour market insecurity and high unemployment associated with the poor economy gave rise to declining fertility in Korea since the mid 1990s. Despite its downfall since 1999, the level of the unemployment rate has turned out to be still higher than the pre crisis rate. Other statistics on wages, part time work, layoffs and other conditions of the labour market also show that Korea has not recovered from the economic crisis. It is rather widely agreed that the security of the labor market has deteriorated in recent years. This explains the sharp falls in fertility rates for those aged 20/24 and 25/29, the prime ages of entry to the labor market. However, it is interesting to note that the fertility rate for those in their thirties show a slightly increasing pattern (Doo-Sub Kim, 2005).
South Korean society’s response through traditional media and public opinion
South Korean society's response to various issues through traditional media and public opinion reflects a complex and often dynamic interplay between historical, cultural, and modern influences. The country, known for its vibrant media landscape, has a long tradition of active public discourse, which is continually shaped by the rapid development of its media infrastructure and technology.
South Korea’s traditional media, including newspapers, television, and radio, has long played a central role in shaping public opinion. Major news outlets like Chosun Ilbo, Korea JoongAng Daily, and Yonhap News are influential in framing societal narratives, political discourse, and economic trends. These outlets provide a platform for public debate, often reflecting the country's values, such as respect for hierarchy, Confucian ideals, and national unity, while also pushing for social reform and addressing modern challenges.
The South Korean government has historically been involved in regulating and influencing traditional media, particularly during periods of military dictatorship. During the 20th century, especially under authoritarian regimes, censorship was prevalent, and media outlets were often used to promote state agendas. However, with the democratization of the country in the late 1980s, media outlets gained more autonomy, although government influence still lingers, especially concerning sensitive issues like national security, North Korea relations, and certain political topics. Public opinion, in turn, tends to be a reflection of these media influences, with some sectors of the population showing strong resistance to government control, while others align with the state's priorities.
In contemporary South Korea, traditional media continues to reflect and shape public opinion, especially during periods of social change, political unrest, or crises. For instance, during the 2016–2017 Choi Soon-sil scandal, which led to President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, traditional media outlets played a pivotal role in exposing corruption and amplifying public outrage. The mass mobilization of citizens, often guided by media reports, resulted in one of the largest public protests in South Korea's history. Here, traditional media acted as both a mirror of public sentiment and a catalyst for social mobilization.
Moreover, the public's relationship with traditional media in South Korea can be contentious. While many South Koreans still rely on newspapers and TV for news, younger generations tend to lean more towards digital platforms. However, the sharp contrast between the traditional media’s often conservative stance and the more progressive leanings of younger South Koreans can influence the way public opinion is formed. Traditional media outlets are sometimes accused of sensationalism, bias, or catering to powerful corporate and political interests, which can affect their credibility in the eyes of the public.