Authors
Steven Paul Atwood (Junior Researcher Mondo Internazionale GEO - Ambiente)
Beatrice Sala (Senior Researcher Mondo Internazionale GEO - Economia)
ABSTRACT
This article explores the political upheavals across the Sahel region, specifically in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, marked by recent military coups. These shifts have profoundly impacted governance, economic stability, and diplomatic relations. As military regimes took control, the mining sector became a focus for regaining sovereignty over critical resources such as lithium, gold, and uranium, essential for the global green energy transition and digitalisation. These developments challenge Western dominance in the Sahel, redefining alliances towards Russian and Chinese partnerships, while exposing the paradox of local resource scarcity amid global mineral wealth. The newly formed Alliance of Sahel States (AES) took a step away from ECOWAS, causing disruptions in regional integration and trade. As the Sahel navigates its socio-political landscape, fostering sustainable development and transparent governance remains crucial. The future of mineral wealth in the Sahel hinges on its leaders' ability to transform resource sovereignty into real economic empowerment and environmental stewardship amid shifting geopolitical dynamics.
Introduction
Over the past five years, Sahel States have been severely destabilized by a series of coup d’états and since 2020, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have all fallen under military rule, each regime seizing power through violence and military repression.
Indeed, in August 2020, a military group led by special force soldier Colonel Assimi Goita, stormed Bamako, the capital of Mali, and overthrew Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s government, breaking an eight-year period of political stability for Mali. Goita initially took on the role of vice president in a transitional government but deposed President Ndaw in 2021 after Ndaw attempted to remove cabinet members implicated in the coup. Goita then assumed the presidency, delaying elections until May 2027.
Following instability in Mali, in Burkina Faso, growing dissatisfaction with Kabore’s government, coupled with a general discontent towards France led to the deposition of Kabore in January 2022. The coup was led by Colonel Paul-Henro Damiba. However, Damiba, who lost control of 40 percent of the territory to armed groups[1], was also overthrown by 34-years-old military officer Ibrahim Traore. Despite having one of the strongest popular movements advocating for democracy in the Sahel, Burkina Faso experienced two coups.
The coup-belt – a term used to indicate the long series of coup d’état which spread over Western and Central Africa – also affected Niger, a neighbouring country of both Mali and Burkina Faso. In July 2023, General Abdourahamane Tchiani led a coup that prompted the immediate response of the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) due to the recurring political instability in the region. The shutdown of Niger and its suspension from the ECOWAS, led Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to form their own alliance, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
The economic consequences of coups d'état in the Sahel region are closely linked to fragile governance systems, where power is still in the hands of small elites, and the inability of governments to address crucial issues like development, security, and corruption. Niger exemplifies this, with rising government debt (rising from 6 to 9 million US dollars from 2020 to 2023) and deepening poverty contributing to political instability. International involvement further complicates the situation, with countries like France and the U.S. having strategic interests in the region, leading to external pressure and competition from emerging powers such as China and Russia. In Niger, the French Development Agency (AFD) had committed to investing €100 million to support development projects in the region in the form of loans. Hence, France is the one paying the highest price from the political instability in the region. Niger produced about 5 percent of uranium globally in 2022[2], but the paradox is that where local populations face energy shortages, Niger’s uranium contributes to electricity needs of France and not only. Additionally, a young population with limited opportunities heightens economic despair, providing fertile ground for political unrest and the rise of populist leaders, like Ibrahim Traore.
The Sahel’s vast reserves of gold, uranium, bauxite, and lithium place the region at the heart of the global energy transition. These minerals are the foundation for the technologies driving decarbonization such as semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, grid energy storage to solar panels and nuclear energy. Yet, without transparent governance and local processing capacity, the Sahel risks reproducing the raw-material export model benefitting external powers more than local communities.
Before examining the impact of these coups and the departure of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso from the Sahel power landscape, and the consequences for civil society and Western interests, it is crucial to acknowledge the significance of these countries for the extraction of critical raw materials and the role of ECOWAS in regional economic development.
Mineral Wealth and Governance in the Sahel: Case Analyses
Despite being among the poorest countries in the world, the Western Sahel countries of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are rich in critical materials, like uranium and lithium, which are becoming increasingly important for digitalisation and nuclear energy production. According to data from 2023, in the three countries around 40 percent of the population lives below the national poverty line and according to the Human Development Index, that ranks countries based on life expectancy, years of schooling and gross national income per capita, the three rank among the lowest globally, with Burkina Faso ranking 186th, and Niger and Mali at 188th out of 193 countries.
Lithium is one of the key drivers of the digital and energy transition, since it is an essential component for the production of batteries needed for electric vehicles and energy storage systems. Lithium is a strategic material and the significant gap between demand and global supply is the main reason for it. Lithium is abundant in the Sahel, and China has already jumped on the opportunity of extracting it in Mali. In December 2024, Chinese company Ganfeng opened the Goulamina mine and annual revenue from the mine, where spodumene concentrate, a source of lithium, will be produced, is estimated at around 150 million euros (191.51 million USD)[3]. Mali's government holds 30% of shares in the mine, in line with the new 2023 mining law of the country, a testament to the aspirations of Goita’s interest in ensuring national sovereignty over critical materials.
The new mining code prioritizes the State mining company, or the mining company where the state is the majority shareholder, to obtain exploration permits. The state also has the right to own a 10% free, carried, and non-contributing shareholding interest in every mining company holding an exploitation or mining permit. The share can go up to 30% with the option granted to the state to additional contributing paid shareholding interest. However, the agreement to mine limits Mali’s ability to process minerals locally or capture greater value. Similar patterns appear in the Bougouni lithium project, operated by Kodal Minerals with Chinese financing. These contracts provide fiscal stability and export guarantees for investors but constrain the government’s capacity to enforce new local-content and beneficiation requirements. UNIDO in its market assessment on critical minerals innovation highlights how export-guarantee and stabilization mechanisms leave governments with little leverage to mandate processing or technology transfer after contracts are signed.[4] As a result, Mali risks remaining locked into the low-value export of concentrates, forfeiting the economic benefits associated with refining and battery-material production, and replicating its raw-material-export model even as it positions itself as a crucial player in the global lithium supply chain.
The introduction of new mining codes, with better conditions for the state participation and revenue collection, is not the only tactic used by military regimes in Sahel to hold greater power over their critical resources, like lithium, uranium and gold. In 2023, Canadian Barrick Gold Mining Corporation (Barrick Gold) had to close its Loulo-Gounkoto gold mine, after Mali’s government blocked shipping out of the site and started to cart off precious metals. This is no accident, rather a dispute over stabilization clauses that limited state revenues.
Mali’s gold fuels 43% of its export revenues and Barrick Gold was a key player in its mining sector, especially at Loulo-Gounkoto mine. Barrick Gold used to operate under a mining convention and stabilization clauses fixing fiscal terms for the lifetime of the project, in attempts to insulate the company from attempts by Mali’s military junta to obtain greater revenues from the mine. The forced closure in 2023 pushed Barrick Gold to invoke its contractual right to international dispute settlement while in 2024, the Malian government de facto held 4 senior employees as hostages, and in June 2025 seized the mine for six months. The evolving situation between Barrick Gold and the Malian government is a strong case study of how Western companies have taken advantage of poor governance in Africa. Additionally, while a country should have greater access to its natural resources, amplifying an environment known for human rights abuses, targeted violence, only disincentivizes long-term investment and growth.
Niger’s example is parallel to Mali’s in multiple ways. French state-backed company Orano (formerly Areva) dominated Niger’s uranium mining sector, owning majority stakes in Somaïr and leaving Niger’s firms with limited minority stakes. The concession agreements for Orano gave it operational control and export rights, reportedly extracting 86.3% of uranium production between 1971-2024, which blocked the Nigerien government’s ability to adjust fiscal terms as global uranium prices rose. However, like in Mali, the military junta ended Niger’s ties with France, nationalized Somaïr, which led Orano to initiate arbitration under its concession rights. In 2024, Orano reported a loss of €133 million in the first half of the year, since relations between the company and Tchiani’s government deteriorated. The government revoked Orano’s mining rights over the Imouraren mine, and forced it to halt production at the Arlit mine. In June of 2025 Niger announced it planned to nationalise the Somair mine, which was operated by Orano (the French government has 90% stake in the company). Moreover, Niger has granted copper and lithium mining rights to Nigerian companies Cominair SA (Compagnie Minière de l’Air) and Comirex SA (Compagnie Minière de Recherche et d’Exploitation) in an effort to enter the global copper market and explore lithium rich region of Dannet. These governance patterns reveal the tension between resource sovereignty and investors.
However, not all examples are wholly negative as Burkina Faso shows. Burkina Faso illustrates how through national legislation on mining codes can peacefully narrow the advantages previously offered to mining companies. Canadian company IAMGOLD had many fiscal benefits from its prior agreement under the 2015 Mining Code for operating Essakane, the country’s largest gold mine. The 2024 Mining Code aligned the mining investment regime with national tax laws and removed most exemptions, concessions, and incentives for mining companies after the exploratory and preparatory phase, and expanded non-contributing state ownership from 10% to 15% with a contributing stake up to 30%. The code also includes local transformation requirements and stricter permitting related to environmental and community development. As of June 20, 2025, to align with the Mining Code, IAMGOLD controls 85% of the mine. Most importantly, to demonstrate a positive future for more equitable relationships between private companies and Sahel states, the mine declared a record dividend of 855 million USD, and after accounting for taxes and ownership stake, IAMGOLD retains 680 million USD, which is an enormous profit, but can pay down its debt.
In both Burkina Faso and Mali, Russian-linked firms, notably Nordgold, have gained prominence amid deepening security cooperation with Moscow. Nordgold operates the Bissa, Bouly, and Niou gold mines under licenses including fiscal stabilization and long-term operational guarantees. The AES regimes increasingly view Russia as a political and security partner following the withdrawal of French and EU forces. Moscow’s role in the mining sector, which is often tied to defense cooperation and opaque, barter-style contracts, illustrates a transactional exchange of mineral access for military support. Far from dismantling neocolonial patterns, this model risks entrenching a parallel form of dependency built exclusively on security patronage rather than development.
The Withdrawal from ECOWAS: Impacts on Regional Integration
Since the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States in 2023, and its members subsequently left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2024, the process of economic regional integration, initiated in the 1960s, has faced significant disruption. The ECOWAS originally formed by 15 West African nations including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo, was created to facilitate the free movement of goods and people within the region. The economic repercussions of the withdrawal, decided without popular consultation, have been significant and have entailed a possible departure from the franc CFA.
First, the CFA franc was initially pegged to the French franc and later, the euro, continuing the beneficial rates. Second, the central banks of the countries using the CFA franc had to keep between 50 and 70 percent of their foreign currency reserves in France, leaving only 30% in Africa. The frustration and limitations posed by this relationship led in 2019 to French President Emmanuel Macron alongside Côte d’Ivoire President Alassane Ouattara to announce – not only the end to the foreign currency reserve requirement for West African CFA states, but the adoption of the eco, a new common currency for ECOWAS. However, since the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, there are plans to adopt a different common currency to replace the CFA franc.
The CFA franc allowed France and other countries to have financially advantageous access for natural resource extraction. For example, French company Orano acquired uranium from Niger while other firms from Australia, Canada, and South Africa mined gold and other metals from Mali and Burkina Faso at advantageous rates following decades of devaluation (1 euro = 655.957 CFA franc). However, capital is not the only tool at the disposal of these countries and their firms, rather, they also used unbalanced contracts and found governments willing to accept them.
ECOWAS members have enjoyed joint production enterprises, common markets, liberalized customs policies, and Standby Forces (ESF) capable of restoring peace and stability. The AES's withdrawal from the G5 Sahel, an organization countering terrorism and promoting security and development, severely impacted the regional security framework, compounded by the withdrawal of French and American troops. AES countries, reliant on imports from the Gulf of Guinea and being landlocked, anticipate increased import and export costs, reduced market competitiveness, and disrupted migration routes due to exiting the free movement protocol of ECOWAS. Imports typically transit through the ports of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Senegal, and Benin, necessitating new bilateral trade agreements for access
In an effort to mitigate complications from leaving ECOWAS, AES countries announced in 2024 that nationals of ECOWAS states would still be allowed to enter, move, and reside within AES territories. However, two years into the alliance, economic and security conditions have fallen short of expectations, marked by declining sales and rising violence—particularly in Burkina Faso, where the jihadist group JNIM tragically killed over 100 people in the northern region in May 2025[5].
Historical Legacies and Legal Constraints
The colonial legacy is inescapable when it comes to the Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In each country, France left political and economic infrastructures prioritizing resource extraction to send to France, rather than developing the local population, governing institutions, and territory. Then, after 1960, when many of France’s West and Central African colonies, including these three, became independent, France offered monetary stability in the form of the African Financial Community (CFA) franc. This came at a major cost for these countries as value continued to flow outward rather than be domestically reinvested.
In the last two decades, prior to the rise of the current military juntas governing the states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, there have been different mechanisms used to favor foreign investors such as stabilization clauses, long concession periods, limited state participation, and international arbitration. Stabilization clauses are provisions traditionally included in contracts between investors and states typically locking in specific laws and regulations of the country for a certain period of time. These clauses often cover all or a large portion of domestic law for periods spanning decades, have been common in the mining industry, and feature heavily in sub-Saharan Africa.
They have been previously enforced through international arbitration called investor-state dispute settlements which allow companies to challenge domestic policy changes as breaches of contract. Prior to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) publishing of “Guiding Principles for Durable Extractive Contracts” (Guiding Principles) in 2020, for example, laws protecting local communities, the environment, and human rights were often affected by these stabilization clauses. Since then, the International Institute for Sustainable Development recommends laws and regulations concerning environmental protection, human and labor rights should never be subject to stabilization clauses. The OECD’s Guiding Principles agree, promoting flexible, transparent contracts balancing investor certainty with the state’s right to regulate in the public interest while discouraging broad stabilization clauses as they can limit a state’s ability to adapt legislation in response to evolving environmental, social, or fiscal needs. The persistence of these colonial and legal legacies explains much of the tension between Western companies and the AES’ governments, however, the argument of violent takeovers for resource nationalism fall apart when such contractual dependency is maintained with partners such as China and Russia.
The Shift towards China and Russia
Gold, uranium, lithium, and others, are not only critical to the Sahel, but also to global efforts toward the energy transition. As previously mentioned, gold supports electronics and renewable technologies reliant on conductive materials, uranium is used for generating nuclear energy, and lithium is a key battery chemistry for electric vehicles and grid-scale energy storage. Thus, the Sahel's natural resources play a direct role in achieving decarbonization, however, the potential benefits of demand for these resources depends on transparent governance and equitable revenue sharing.
The relatively new military governments in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have sought to reshape the terms for mining developments with significant implications for the energy transition. This has been done through new mining codes, state seizure of the mines or the companies operating there, and shifting partnerships toward Russian and Chinese firms. This shift challenges the status quo of Western companies in the area, but does not guarantee more equitable or sustainable outcomes as Chinese and Russian actors often work through bilateral or opaque corporate agreements with limited local participation and industrial integration. Thus the governments of the AES have more space to define the terms of extraction to significantly benefit their economies, but they are doing so with actors traditionally disinclined to do so.
Foreign companies have traditionally used methods such as long concessions, stabilization clauses, the CFA franc, and limited state ownership to ensure operational and financial predictability and reap enormous profits. For the states involved, these tools have constrained their ability to implement policies supporting domestic industrialization or local economic development. Thus, current reforms focused on state equity and local processing are testing whether mineral wealth can be harnessed to advance national development and the global energy transition.
The new partnerships with China and Russia do little to actually improve transparency and local economies, unless the goal is only to have greater state ownership of the mines. Nonetheless, their growing presence in the Sahel adds a geopolitical element in the critical minerals race. For China, extracting lithium and rare earths serves a clear strategic purpose: maintaining its monopoly on rare earths and securing its raw materials for its growing renewable energy and electric vehicle industries. However, this reinforces Africa's role as a supplier of unprocessed resources and the value creation brought by refining, manufacturing, and technological development simply goes to China's industrial system rather than Europe's, Canada's, or Australia's. Russia's method is openly political as it tends to operate first through military cooperation and private security forces such as the Wagner Group, rebranded as Africa Corps. Through these organizations, Russia has obtained its mining concessions generating revenue and influence after the de facto forced withdrawal of Western actors. This combination risks fragmenting the governance of critical minerals and will undermine efforts by the EU and the UN to ensure transparent, sustainable, and ethically sourced supply chains.
Conclusion
The Sahel's political upheaval and shifting alliances are changing not only national sovereignty debates, but also the global energy transition. The military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger dismantled the Western dominance in the mining sector, and now appear headed toward replacing this with developing relationships with Russian and Chinese actors. This shift may mark a symbolic end to neocolonial dependency, but the underlying structures in the sector have not fundamentally changed. The new mining codes and nationalizations enacted by the new governments aim to reclaim control and increase state participation, but largely opaque contracts, limited transparency, and continued export of unprocessed resources risks rebranding rather than transforming the status quo.
Zooming out, the stakes are global. Gold, lithium, and uranium, are essential for the technologies and infrastructure needed for decarbonization. Thus, instability and governance failures in the region, which are continuing significant issues, can disrupt supply chains and undermine efforts for sustainable and equitable sourcing of these minerals for the clean energy transition. China's dominance in lithium processing and Russia's exchange of security assistance for resources are deepening the geopolitical great power competition.
For Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the challenge is to turn resource sovereignty into genuine sustainable development, whether this is through Western, Chinese or Russian partnerships. Nationalizations and forming new relationships will not be enough to improve revenues, economic development, and the well-being of the people who live there, as transparent governance, equitable distribution, and local value creation are the tools for benefiting citizens rather than elites or external powers. For global actors, such as the EU and the UN, prioritizing partnerships strengthening domestic development, community engagement, and environmental standards is fundamental. Whether the mineral wealth of the Sahel will empower or exploit depends on the region's leaders balancing national sovereignty with the shared global mission of a just and sustainable energy transition.
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[1] Al Jazeera. (2024). West Africa’s ‘coup belt’: Did Mali’s 2020 army takeover change the region? Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/27/west-africas-coup-belt-did-malis-2020-army-takeover-change-the-region
[2] Niger is among the world's biggest uranium producers | Reuters
[3] https://www.mining-technology.com/news/mali-ganfeng-lithium-operatorship/
[4] https://a2dfacility.unido.org/web/node/116
[5] apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-jihadi-attack-3770c89aff795dcf5829abd4fc7d04f2