Drones as an Emblem of the EU’s Critical Raw Material Dilemma

  Focus - Allegati
  24 February 2026
  17 minutes, 16 seconds

Abstract

This article examines Europe’s drone ambitions through the lens of critical raw material (CRM) security, highlighting the tension between industrial, defense, and ecological priorities. Drones are dual-use technologies that intersect with energy transition, digital infrastructure, and defense capabilities, relying on lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, gallium, and germanium. Europe remains structurally dependent on foreign extraction and processing, particularly in China, and domestic mining faces environmental, social, and regulatory constraints. The Critical Raw Materials Act (2024) seeks to diversify supply, expand recycling, and accelerate strategic projects, yet progress has been limited. Analysis with the United States and China illustrates contrasting approaches: the U.S. securitizes material policy to accelerate output, while China integrates extraction and processing into long-term industrial planning. Europe’s environmentally anchored model slows industrial growth to ensure longevity of projects and ecological sustainability. The article argues long-term security and technological sovereignty depend not on drones and similar technological races, but on a coherent strategy integrating climate resilience, sustainable mining, recycling, and international cooperation.

Steven Paul Atwood (Junior Researcher Mondo Internazionale GEO - Ambiente)

Drones, the EU, and the Critical Raw Materials Act

Drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are a key 21st-century technology and a prime example of dual-use systems. Civilian uses include environmental monitoring, disaster response, agricultural management, and infrastructure inspection. Military drones, often looking like civilian ones, have become so important in offensive and defensive operations, along with reconnaissance, they are transforming military doctrine. Thus, there is a clear dual-use dilemma when it comes to Europe’s future drone industry as drones are a prime analytical lens through which to study the European Union’s lack of focus on long-term climate and security strategy. Drones are major tools for reaching the Union’s climate, environmental, and security objectives, which are increasingly unstable as the political will for the ecological transition falters and the U.S.’ Trump Administration inspires the European Union toward reaching strategic autonomy.

Since the first von der Leyen Commission, strategic autonomy and industrial resilience have increased in saliency. First it was from a perspective of environmental security through legislation packages such as the European Green Deal, the Fit for 55 package, and Net Zero Industrial Act, aiming to transform energy systems, manufacturing, and environmental protections while reducing dependencies on third countries. Simultaneously, and especially in the second von der Leyen Commission, the goal of rebuilding European production capacity and reducing reliance on foreign suppliers for critical technologies, has taken a distinctly security perspective. Drones remain an area of convergence of these agendas as their materials and components are the same ones used for renewable energy production, battery storage, and digital infrastructure. Europe’s ambitions cannot be reached without examining the environmental and geopolitical dimensions of critical material supply chains. If the European Union is to develop a drone fleet for military or civilian use, it will require engineering, but also important decisions about extraction, processing, recycling, and international cooperation.

Critical raw materials (CRMs) and strategic raw materials, a sub-set of CRMs, began as a technical classification to become a central pillar of the European Union’s industrial strategy. The European Commission determined in the 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act, a material is considered critical when it is both highly economically important and has a high risk of supply disruption. Those strategic materials overlap with CRMs, but have strategic value, project global supply and demand imbalances, and are priorities for EU resilience in the areas of energy, digital, defense, and aerospace. Some of the examples of these vulnerabilities revolve around China. From cobalt processing where 63% of the world's cobalt, used in batteries, is extracted in the Democratic Republic of Congo, while 60% is refined in China. 97% of EU’s magnesium supply is sourced from China, and 100% of the rare earth elements (REE) used in the world’s permanent magnets also originate from China. This means for both the EU’s security and energy transition objectives, China plays a fundamental role in the short- and medium-terms, and likely the long-term if new viable deposits are not discovered.

Lithium, cobalt, REE, graphite, gallium, and germanium are among the materials most relevant to drone technologies. As the previous examples show, Europe has unavoidable dependencies due to its geographic misfortune of not having the necessary REE and battery mineral deposits. Even when extraction occurs in Africa, Australia, or Latin America, much of the processing takes place in China, before materials reach European manufacturers. This creates a structural dependence on foreign chemical and metallurgical capacity that extends well beyond mining itself.

The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) represents the European Union’s most ambitious attempt to address this vulnerability. The legislation establishes benchmarks for domestic extraction, processing, and recycling by 2030 and forces supply diversification through limits on sourcing from third countries. It also identifies strategic projects eligible for public support and universally accelerates CRM projects. The act seeks to reconcile industrial expansion with sustainability by maintaining EU rules on traceability requirements and higher environmental standards across the value chain.³ In March 2025, the Commission designated 47 projects toward fulfilling the Act’s benchmarks. Five of these are focused on starting production of REEs between 2026 and 2028: ReeMAP (Sweden) will be dedicated to extraction and processing; Caremag (France) and Puławy (Poland) are both charged with processing; and lastly, MagREEsource (France) and INSPIREE (Italy) will handle recycling and manufacturing.

These ambitions remain at a difficult stage as the European Court of Auditors found Europe has made only limited progress in diversifying CRM supply chains. Dependence on imports remains high for rare earths, lithium compounds, and graphite, and domestic refining capacity has grown more slowly than anticipated. Recycling rates for most critical minerals remain low as 7 out of 26 materials have recycling rates between 1% and 5%, and ten are not recycled at all. Lastly, refining capacity has declined over the past two decades also due to high energy costs. Nonetheless, beyond opening new mines, a major challenge constitutes rebuilding European chemical processing and refining capacity, which requires large amounts of electricity and generates possibly very hazardous waste streams: the latter being a reason why China has extensive control of the processing aspect.⁴

The issue of new mining projects has been a major stumbling point for EU domestic development as the dilemma of strategic supply and environmental protection remains in place. Mina do Barroso’s lithium project in northern Portugal has dealt with legal opposition from NGOs and residents against the European Commission after it was designated a “strategic project.” The main concerns by the NGOs and local communities involve potential harm to biodiversity, pressure on water resources, and disruption of traditional farming in Covas do Barroso. The NGOs argue the Commission granted strategic status without properly assessing environmental and social risks, even though the project’s open-pit design and tailings storage could threaten the Douro River system during heavy rainfall. Local communities warn mining would endanger their livelihoods and cultural heritage. According to the NGOs, the strategy by the Commission of fast-tracking the project under the Critical Raw Materials Act risks sacrificing rural regions for the green transition, thereby raising questions about transparency and environmental integrity in EU strategic project approvals.

European mining projects in Northern Europe and in EU-candidate countries show how this is not a localized issue. In northern Sweden, the proposed Per Geijer rare earth mine near Kiruna, promoted as Europe’s largest deposit, threatens to do enough environmental damage that it cuts off entire migration routes used by Sami reindeer herders whose livelihoods and culture depend on seasonal grazing land. Authorities argue the mine could reduce Europe’s dependence on Chinese rare earths, but Indigenous communities warn it would undermine reindeer husbandry already strained by climate change and existing mining activity. Similar tensions emerged in Serbia, where Rio Tinto indefinitely suspended the Jadar lithium project after years of permitting delays and strong public resistance over environmental and social risks. Although Jadar has high quality lithium, and one of the world’s largest amounts of it at 16.6 million metric tons of lithium-borate ore with an average grade of 1.8% lithium oxide. Complaints by local communities focused on potential ecological damage to the water system made the project politically and economically unviable. Thus, Europe’s mineral security is constrained not only by geology and investment, but by social acceptance and environmental law.

Recycling and circular economy frameworks are important parts of the entire supply chain, but cannot completely substitute extraction. Given the impossibility of completely replacing extraction with recycling, European initiatives such as the RESourceEU Action Plan must be praised and continued as they explicitly include measures to enhance the circularity of critical raw materials by boosting recovery from end-of-life batteries, electronics, and manufacturing waste, restricting exports of magnet and battery scrap, and expanding product labelling to encourage recycled input use. As part of the CRMA, the EU set a sourcing from recycling target of 25% for strategic material by 2030, and has funded projects such as DEMONSTR8 for lithium-ion battery recycling and New-RE for rare earth element recovery from permanent magnets. However, recycling capacity remains very low, and current volumes are insufficient to meet projected demand in the near term.

The European Union’s approach to critical materials is strong evidence of the current debate on how to manage the structural resource dilemma between environmental governance, national security, and industrial urgency. Politically, the second von der Leyen Commission aims to water down legislation it strongly pushed for in the previous von der Leyen Commission to satisfy the voices from industry and national security environments. While the Critical Raw Materials Act establishes quantitative targets for extraction and processing, it operates within a regulatory system prioritizing avoiding ecological harm. In this context, it is understandable why mining projects face long permitting timelines due to environmental impact assessments, water protection rules, and biodiversity safeguards. While these constraints are often portrayed as obstacles to strategic autonomy, they also represent deliberate political choices about how material security should be achieved. Thus, critical materials should be seen as structural frameworks in which Europe must operate and respect the finite supply of such materials. These link Europe’s climate objectives, industrial competitiveness, and emerging military capabilities. Lastly, any attempt to scale drone production must confront these limits and the ecological costs of overcoming them.

Drone, Critical Materials, and Technical Limitations

Drones consist of various technologies reliant on critical materials: propulsion, energy storage, navigation, communications, sensors, and payload systems. Electric propulsion systems rely on permanent magnet motors made from REE: neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium, which provide high magnetic strength at low weight, allowing drones to achieve longer endurance and carry heavier payloads. Virtually all of these magnets come from China.

Batteries and energy storage for many drones rely on lithium-ion batteries containing lithium, cobalt, nickel, and graphite. Lithium-ion remains the most common battery chemistry due to the energy-to-weight ratio and the ability to work better across different environments. Thus, manufacturers might seek to reduce cobalt content and change battery chemistries, new technologies need to be more efficient than their lithium-ion counterparts and those alternatives will still depend on the limited supply of CRMs.

At the core of all drones and advanced technologies are semiconductors which notably have added further vulnerabilities, as the global economy realized and the Russian military has been dealing with in its invasion of Ukraine. In semiconductors, gold is a prime component and its price has skyrocketed due to financial uncertainty. Gallium is not mined directly but recovered as a byproduct of bauxite and zinc processing, with primary output concentrated in China, followed by much smaller volumes in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Germany. In the compounds used for semiconductors, gallium nitride and gallium arsenide, it is used in radar and satellite communications. Germanium is similarly obtained as a byproduct of zinc smelting or coal fly ash, with production dominated by China and limited secondary suppliers in Belgium, Canada, and the United States. It supports infrared optics and thermal imaging sensors enabling night operations and all weather reconnaissance.

Material Security and Strategic Choice for Europe

The European Union’s approach to CRMs illustrates the structural tension between the Union’s decision-making processes and environmental governance, industrial urgency, and strategic vulnerability. The CRMA’s impact is limited due to national permitting regulations and approaches across the EU, leaving firms constrained by inconsistent regulations even when there is supranational support, significantly varied energy costs, and cross-border coordination challenges, and precluding innovation and economies of scale in CRM-reliant technologies. A more integrated European market, streamlining permitting and facilitating infrastructure for processing, refining, and recycling would greatly benefit the EU’s capacity to operate and strengthen its position compared to global competitors.

This stands in contrast to the United States, where critical materials policy has become increasingly integrated into national security and federal industrial priorities, including the Critical Minerals Ministerial held in early February 2026. Mineral supply is explicitly tied to defense readiness, semiconductor manufacturing, technological development, and infrastructure resilience. Environmental reviews are formally required, but the Trump Administration is doing what it can to weaken these requirements with faster permitting, removing them entirely, and opening protected areas. The American model prioritizes speed and capacity over consensus, producing faster industrial expansion, but also environmental negligence and geopolitical signalling.

China represents a third model, where mineral extraction and processing developed through long-term industrial planning. State-directed investment created dominant positions in refining, while environmental enforcement varies. Strategic objectives such as technological development, leverage over exports, and manufacturing outweighed ecological concerns. Control over processing stages, rather than mining alone, allows Beijing to have one chokepoint over the U.S. and EU through export restrictions. Whereas the EU slowly regulates material supply and the US securitises it, China integrates it into a coordinated industrial system.

Drone production provides a snapshot of the differences as their CRM requirements intersect energy transition technologies, digital systems, and advanced manufacturing. Civilian and military supply chains overlap extensively too, with batteries, motors, semiconductors, and sensors shared with electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, and consumer electronics. Thus, demand for materials created from climate policy and industrial policy directly affects drone and defense production capacity. Competition for lithium, REE, and semiconductor compounds, can tie decarbonization strategies to advanced manufacturing constraints if there is no public-private coordination. Thus, mineral security is the most important requirement for driving forward technological, ecological, and economic development.

Geography within drone production is very sensitive to CRM supply chains, exposing vulnerabilities because European drone production is concentrated in a few established aerospace hubs, for example, in France and Italy, led by their “national champions” Thales and Leonardo. These clusters rely on tightly coordinated supply chains delivering certified, high-purity materials on fixed schedules. The regulatory requirements governing aerospace components and their certification almost preclude materials from being easily substituted if a supplier fails or a shipment is delayed. As a result, disruptions in the supply of rare-earth magnets or battery-grade compounds can suspend entire production lines even when engineering design and software development remain unaffected. Unlike consumer electronics, drone manufacturing cannot rely on large stockpiles or rapidly switch suppliers without triggering lengthy requalification and certification processes. This makes physical access to stable material inputs a decisive factor shaping where and how production can occur.

The transatlantic relationship between the EU and U.S. is an increasingly relevant factor following increased tensions and the EU beginning to cease its reliance on the U.S. Currently, NATO interoperability standards help shape design, communications systems, and component certification, tying American technical norms into European production and vice-versa. This aligns European drone industries with supply chains influenced by US industrial policy. Dependence in this sector is redistributed rather than eliminated. Export controls imposed by China on REE and by the United States on advanced chips demonstrate how material chokepoints can be weaponized, and drones are exposed to such disruptions.

Ultimately, Europe’s stated drone ambitions in recent strategic white papers, instruments, and frameworks reveal a deeper strategic gap. Autonomy across sectors depends not only on industrial policy, budgets, technical knowledge, and regulatory choices. Geology, international partnerships, trade policy, environmental regulations, and diplomatic alignment guide supply chain stability and refinery diversification. Yet the EU has not yet prioritized these dimensions into a long-term climate and strategic security plan and the incoming European Climate Resilience and Risk Management Framework will likely continue this gap.

Conclusion

Europe’s ambitions in drone technology illustrate the limits of pursuing technological and strategic autonomy without simultaneously prioritizing the ecological transition. While drones remain important for military and dual-use applications, they are secondary to the strategic necessity of securing Europe’s long-term energy and material systems. Critical minerals remain largely sourced abroad, due to difficulties of extracting in the EU, complex and geographically limited extraction and processing supply chains. Without embedding climate resilience and sustainable resource governance at the center of CRM industrial planning, Europe risks mass producing goods such as drones, which will no longer be commercially or ecologically sustainable in 15 years.

While some will argue true European sovereignty and security will depend on manufacturing advanced UAVs and a broader defense industry, integrating climate, industrial, and material policies across energy, transportation, and digital sectors is a greater long-term priority. Recycling, substitution, technological development, community-supported extraction and processing, and careful management of resource interdependence must guide decision-making. Long-term European power rests on how the Union governs the minerals sustaining both technological and ecological systems.

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