Abstract
The President of Belarus, Aleksander Lukashenko, has recently announced that a "joint military unit" with Russia will be deployed in response to alleged NATO and Ukrainian attacks against the country. While the Kremlin's pressure on Lukashenko may be high, the decision to join the conflict may be politically risky considering Putin's ally unpopularity among the Belarusians and their disapproval of Russia's special operation. This analysis will assess Belarus' potential role in the conflict on the side of Russia but also discuss the potential domestic consequences that the Lukashenko would have to face if he decided to deploy troops in Ukraine.
Introduction
While Belarus’ involvement in the conflict in Ukraine has been indirect so far, early in October, the president of Belarus, Aleksander Lukashenko, announced that a “joint, regional military group” with Russia will be deployed. The joint military group is an institution of the Union State alliance, a treaty Belarus and Russia signed in 1999 and according to which “if either Russian or Belarusian territory comes under threat, the Union State can set up a joint military unit for self-defense” (Beardsworth, 2022). Despite no evidence having been found of an armed attack against Belarus, Lukashenko claimed that the deployment is a response to “NATO provocations on the border, the formation of sabotage units staffed by Belarusian emigrés, and Ukrainian plans to attack Belarus” (Shraibman, 2022). However, while Lukashenko is attempting to justify Belarus’ potential entry into the war as a “defensive” move, the decision to eventually send troops will depend much on the pressure exerted by Putin, on which the president of Belarus is dependent to remain in power. In fact, sending Belarusian soldiers in Ukraine may be a politically risky decision for Lukashenko because of two main reasons: his unpopularity in Belarus after the 2020 elections and the public’s negative opinion vis à vis Russia’s “special operation”.
The aim of this paper is to assess the likelihood of Belarus' direct entry into the Russo-Ukrainian War on the side of Russia and the potential role it may play in the conflict. Given that Belarus’ deployment of troops in Ukraine depends, to a large extent, on the pressure exerted by the Kremlin, in the first part of the paper the ties between the two countries will be analyzed as well as the role Belarus played in the conflict so far as Russia’s “ally”. Moving on, the strategic and military benefits of Belarus’ army involvement will be discussed while specific attention will be devoted to the domestic socio-political dynamics Lukashenko needs to consider before committing his troops if he wants to avoid popular unrest. In the last section of the paper some possible future scenarios will be presented considering that Belarus’ direct military involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war is improbable, for the time being.
Belarus’ involvement in the conflict so far
Albeit not being directly involved in the conflict, Belarus has supported Russia’s “special operation” against Ukraine since the very beginning. Back in February, given its geographical position, Belarus served as a “launchpad” for part of the Russian troops that invaded Ukraine. Indeed, the 800km long border with Ukraine and the closeness to Kiev, made Belarus a strategic area to launch part of the operation (Il Post, 2022).
The invasion of Ukraine through Belarus in February was made possible by the presence of Russian troops on the Belarus territory since January 2022 for a joint military exercise between the two countries. In addition to Russian soldiers, there were also warplanes, at least 50 helicopters, tanks as well as rocket launchers, all of which were deployed in what NATO defined as the largest deployment of Russian troops in Belarus since the end of the Cold War (Il Post, 2022).
When Belarus then announced that the joint military exercise would be extended and that Russian troops would remain on its territory, it became clear that what was presented as a military drill was instead part of a larger deployment and massing of troops along the Ukrainian border in preparation for a full-fledged invasion (Simon, Cunningham, 2022). Apart from allowing Russian troops to cross its territory, Putin’s ally and President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, “cracked down on antiwar protests, detaining about 800 demonstrators on Feb 27 alone” (Simon, Cunningham, 2022) while also amending the constitution and ending Belarus’ nuclear-free policy (Simon, Cunningham, 2022). As the conflict ensued, Belarus continued to play the role of “springboard” but “Minsk has also provided logistical support, supply lines, medical care for Russian soldiers” (Glod, 2022).
Lukashenko’s support for Russia’s “special operation” stems, first and foremost, from his dependence on Putin for political survival. Back in 2020, Lukashenko turned to Putin to deal with “the biggest popular challenge in his 26 years of power” (Sullivan, 2022) when popular demonstrations broke out against him for the controversial, manipulated elections in which he allegedly obtained 80% of the votes (Sullivan, 2022). In addition, Belarus is politically and economically tied to Russia. Indeed, the two countries are part of the Eurasian Customs Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization while Belarus’ is dependent on Russia’s gas and oil supplies and on Russian loans and subsidies which “prop up the Belarusian economy to a significant extent” (Foster, 2020). Overall, it can be said that Putin has managed to include Belarus in Moscow’s sphere of influence thus limiting Minsk’ freedom of maneuver and foreign policy choices, especially vis à vis the situation in Ukraine. Nonetheless, despite pressure from Russia being strong, Lukashenko’s actually tried to engage in a sort of balancing act since the war started: indeed, “Lukashenko has tried to present himself as one of Russia’s more reasonable allies and a potential interlocutor for the West; he wanted to look like a man of peace” (Seibt, 2022). In this sense, the president of Belarus, while supporting Russia rhetorically, attempted to slightly distance himself from his “ally” as soon as the conflict escalated. Indeed, he even agreed to release some of those people who were arrested and convicted of “political crimes” (Ilyash, 2022) while the Belarusian foreign minister, Vladimir Makei, held “behind of the scenes” meetings with Western diplomats during a UNGA session back in September (Ilyash, 2022), which signaled Lukashenko’s readiness to dialogue with the West. More precisely, according to analysts, “Lukashenko’s strategy is to show the West he is independent of Moscow” (Seibt, 2022).
Belarus potential role in the conflict
Since Belarus’ army is quite small and its arsenal outdated, the country’s direct entry into the conflict is unlikely to benefit Russia from a strictly military perspective. While, back in March, experts believed that Belarus involvement could “spearhead the Russian advance on Western Ukrainian regions that have so far been untouched by the hostilities” (Mirovalev, 2022) or even “help Moscow seize Kiev”, as Russia gradually lost ground to Ukrainian forces in the recent weeks, these scenarios became unlikely.
Given the current situation on the battleground, Belarus’ deployment of troops may only be strategically beneficial for Russia as it “will force Ukraine to shift some of its reservists to the north or maintaining a meaningful presence there, limiting its progress on other fronts as part of a counteroffensive Russia is bent on slowing down at all costs” (Shraibman, 2022). Also, the deployment of the joint force may be aimed at disrupting Ukraine’s supply routes from the West (Rainsford, 2022) and for this reason analyst believe that a new offensive would not be aimed at Kiev “but far to the West, near the border with Poland, to disrupt Western shipments of arms and other supplies” (Higgins, 2022).
While the advantages of Belarus’ direct entry are limited, having the country’s troops directly involved would lead to long-term geopolitical benefits for the Kremlin, because “if Lukashenko does indeed send troops to Ukraine, he will find it exceedingly difficult to carry on his diplomatic dance between Russia and the West. So Moscow is “cementing the Belarusian government’s loyalty”” (Seibt, 2022).
Overall, Lukashenko’s decision to eventually deploy the joint military group would inevitably lead to a further escalation of the conflict thus complicating any cease-fire agreement due to the presence of a “third” actor (Il Grand Continent, 2022). Moreover, Belarus’ involvement may also increase tensions in the Suwalki gap, a corridor connecting Kaliningrad Oblast with Belarus cutting through Poland and Lithuania, thus “spreading” the conflict in neighboring areas (Il Grand Continent, 2022).
A direct involvement by Belarus may be a “political suicide” for Lukashenko
The potential benefits of Belarus’ more active role in the war need, however, to be weighed against the complex, domestic dynamics. According to many analysts, Belarus’ direct involvement in the fighting is highly unlikely and risky because, as already discussed, popular dissatisfaction vis à vis Lukashenko reached a level-high after the highly contested 2020 elections. In fact, should Lukashenko decide to deploy his troops on Ukrainian soil, he may not count on the loyalty of the military apparatus, given the magnitude of the 2020 popular manifestations against him (Il Grand Continent, 2022). According to Franak Viacorka, an adviser to the Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaja, “several military officers have resigned, fled the country” as they do not want to intervene in the fighting in Ukraine (Whitmore, 2022). Some of them, known as Kalinouski Regiment, are even fighting alongside the Ukrainians with the hope that, if Ukraine wins, it will be easier for Belarus to free itself from Russia’s pressure (Higgins, 2022). Svetlana Tikhanovskaja herself believes that Lukashenko, despite his recent statements, is actually determined to avoid sending Belarus’ troops in Ukraine as he is unsure of their loyalty. In such a scenario, deploying Belarusians soldiers in Ukraine may in fact be counterproductive as a “high rate of desertions and refusals to fight are expected” (Yeryoma, 2022) thus affecting Lukashenko’s reputation internationally and especially vis à vis Putin (Nova News, 2022).
Most importantly, given Lukashenko’s unpopularity in Belarus, the civil society in may not accept seeing Belarusians fighting a war in which their country was dragged into (Il Grand Continent, 2022), even more so because Belarusians, unlike some part of the Russian’s society, have nothing against the Ukrainians and do not actually support Russia’s “special operation” (Moretti, 2022). According to a survey conducted by Chatham House in January 2022, only 12% of the population in Belarus was in favor of Belarus joining Russia in the conflict against Ukraine, a percentage that dropped to 3% once the war broke out in February (Boni, 2022). The popular discontent may be further fueled by a new wave of economic sanctions that would be imposed by the “West” as a reaction to Belarus involvement in the conflict (Glod, 2022) in a moment in which “Belarusians are (already) feeling the effects of crippling Western sanctions and spiking inflation, which is already twice as high as last year” (Karmanau, 2022).
In this context, not only would a direct involvement further increase Lukashenko’s unpopularity among the population but would also strengthen the arguments of the opposition according to Tikhanovskaja (Nova News, 2022).
Military aspects also seem to make Belarus involvement in the conflict unlikely. In fact, the Belarusian military army has currently 50,000 soldiers while the number of reservists in case of mobilization amounts to 300,000 (Yeryoma, 2022). According to some analysts, “at best, Minsk will be able to deploy 20,000 troops” (Karmanau, 2022) thus not being able to play a significant role in the conflict. Apart from being relatively small, Lukashenko’s army is also inexperienced as “the Belarusian military holds regular drills but hasn’t taken part in combat since World War II” (Karmanau, 2022).
The small, inexperienced army combined with domestic challenges to his power are two factors that Lukashenko needs to consider before joining the conflict on Russia’s side. The Kremlin, for its part, seems to be aware of the potential consequences that would derive from Belarus’ involvement in the conflict and that “a popular uprising in Belarus could also be highly dangerous for the Russian president, as it could eliminate one of his close allies and inspire political turmoil in Russia itself” (Glod, 2022).
However, if Lukashenko is determined to avoid sending troops in Ukraine, why did he announce that he may commit his army in support of Russia’s “special operation”? According to some analysts, the role of Lukashenko’s recent statements is “tactical”. As Ukrainian troops are managing to push the Russian soldiers from the East and the South, the threat of an invasion from the North may force Ukraine to move parts of its troops close to its border with Belarus thus allowing Russia to reconquer the territories it has recently lost (il Grand Continent, 2022). In fact, Lukashenko’s announcement can be seen as part of Moscow’s recent escalation marked by the bombing of Ukrainian infrastructure and missile attacks (il Grand Continent, 2022).
Conclusions
Considering the unpopularity of Lukashenko and of Russia’s “special operation” among Belarusians, but also the success of Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russian troops in the last weeks, Lukashenko has no incentive to deploy his troops in Ukraine for the time being. However, many analysts believe that, in fact, should Putin request Belarus to directly intervene if, for instance, Russia keeps losing territories and soldiers in Ukraine, the president of Belarus would not be in the position to oppose given his dependency on the Kremlin. Some even argue that Lukashenko may deem direct involvement necessary as “Lukashenko’s worldview has been deeply shaped by the conspiratorial reports of his spymasters, which may have combined with Russia’s defeats on the battlefield and chatter about where NATO might retaliate to a Russian tactical nuclear strike to convince him of a coming assault on Belarus” (Shraibman, 2022).
Overall, whether Belarus will eventually undertake a more active role in Ukraine will depend much, but not only, on what Lukashenko and his establishment believe is the biggest threat to their political survival. Given his unpopularity within the country, the most likely scenario will be one in which Lukashenko will try to convince Putin that Belarus’ direct military involvement in the fighting is pointless from a military point of view and risky politically speaking both for him and for Russia. In fact, should Belarus’ troops be deployed, popular discontent against Lukashenko may lead to civil unrest and result in regime-change allowing the pro-Western opposition to gain power thus distancing Belarus from Moscow’s sphere of influence. In turn, this would imply the loss of a buffer state which may, under a pro-Western government, seek to join EU or NATO in the following years, a scenario which is to be avoided at all costs by Moscow.
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