Is Russia still interested in Tartus?

  Focus - Allegati
  17 April 2025
  13 minutes, 26 seconds

Abstract

On January 20, 2025, the Transitional Syrian Government revoked Russia’s access to the port of Tartus - a strategic naval facility it had held since 1971, initially under the USSR. As Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean, the loss of Tartus compels Moscow to reassess the deployment of its military assets in the region. While this development carries potential long-term strategic consequences, Russia’s presence in Tartus - and in Syria more broadly - is not an indispensable pillar of its foreign policy. This analysis aims to demonstrate that not only is the replacement of Tartus feasible, but that alternative arrangements are already effectively underway.

Author

Gabriele Junior Pedrazzoli - Senior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. - Politics

Introduction: the long game

“Since Peter the Great created the regular imperial navy in 1696, Moscow’s diplomacy and military forces have persistently striven to access to “warm waters”. Indeed, Russia’s access to the global sea lanes of communications passes through enclosed seas (namely Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Sea of Japan) - which do not afford Russian ships unimpeded access to the world's oceans - or hostile natural environment (Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea) were conditions tend to make navigation perilous”

Basil Germond, 2025

Until the beginning of this year, the port of Tartus held significant strategic value for Russia, serving as its primary naval foothold in the Mediterranean and a crucial asset for projecting power in the region. Established during the Soviet era, the facility in Tartus has been Russia’s only naval base outside the former Soviet Union, offering logistical support and repair capabilities for Russian naval vessels operating far from home ports. While relatively small in scale compared to full-fledged naval bases, Tartus allowed Russian warships to maintain a permanent presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The base has provided logistical support during Russia’s intervention in Syria and served as a hub for resupplying forces, launching naval operations, and maintaining deterrence against Western military actions in the region.

The replacement of Assad by a government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has severely threatened the strategic gains Moscow once enjoyed through its ties with Damascus. Syria’s new leadership has openly associated Russia with the former regime’s violent crackdowns on civilians — including suspected chemical attacks — and voiced clear opposition to the continued presence of Russian forces in the country. Accordingly, on January 20th the government announced the termination of the Russian presence in Tartus and Latakia.

Losing presence in Syria damages Moscow, but to consider the effective consequences of any events it is necessary to look at the broader picture. In this particular moment, the Center of this metaphorical picture is always the war in Ukraine.

Accepting Liddell Hart’s postulate “The object in war is a better state of peace - even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire” (Hart, 1954), trying to understand what are the conditions Russia seeks to achieve becomes essential.

There is a growing global perception that American dominance on the geopolitical stage is waning. There are alternatives. Russia has long been aware of the phenomenon and each of its efforts must be read in the sense of reorienting its strategy to the context that will emerge. This means understanding what the priorities are and, consequently, moving from a disrupting approach to regional contexts to a systematic view of the world order.

Are we sure that Syria was so important? The Middle East is full of actors and conflicts that are local before than regional. Strategic advances are difficult to achieve in the Middle East. In Africa, on the other hand, Putin has organized an impressive geopolitical offensive, designed on the rediscovery of communist third worldism, on the sale of weapons (also to create markets for the war economy) and on the former Wagner Group. Not only that, several other contexts seem to turn in favor of the Russian strategy: Georgia and the Black Sea in its entirety, the Arctic and its commercial routes, as well as Libya and the Sahel.

Considering this, the question related to the loss of Tartus we are dealing with changes: how does Syria's replacement fits into Russia's new strategy?

Out of Syria - Into Libya

There has already been one important piece of evidence of the direction taken by the Russian army in terms of replacing Syrian facilities: the reconstruction of the Maaten al-Sarra airbase. Maaten al-Sarra is a remote military airbase located in southeastern Libya, near the border with Chad. It gained strategic importance during the Libyan-Chadian conflict in the 1980s, particularly as a key operational hub for Libyan air and ground forces in the region. Its location allowed Libya to project power deep into Chad and other parts of central Africa, supporting Muammar Gaddafi’s broader ambitions in the Sahel. After the fall of Gaddafi’s regime the base was almost abandoned. Its strategic value lies in its location, offering potential for projecting influence across southern Libya and the whole Sahel region. According to Foreign Policy sources, Russia has reconstructed the runway, built a new storage facility and boosted its logistical capability.

Maaten al-Sarra then seems to be the elected location to substitute the Latakia airbase, compared to which it offers two more strategic options: a strong presence near the Sahel and the opportunity to empower logistically the various Private Military Companies (PMCs) that were created after the dismantlement of the Wagner Group.

Russia’s ties with Eastern Libya do not end here: Haftar’s territories appear to be the solution to the Tartus issue as well. Libya Review indicated already in late January that vessels (Gorshkov and Grigorovich Frigate) and submarines Kilo-class were leaving Syrians coasts for Libyan ones; furthermore, the massive relocation of equipments from Syria to the Al-Khadim air base (East of Benghazi) confirms the interest of expanding the naval presence there. The chosen harbour would be Tobruk. It is although important to note that this port lacks deep-water facilities, meaning it would need substantial development to accommodate some of Russia’s naval assets.

This massive turn to Libya should not come as a surprise; on the contrary, Moscow’s top diplomats in recent years have greatly strengthened relations with Haftar, particularly through the Deputy Minister of Defence Junus-bek Evkurov, who seems to be in charge of the operation. Already in 2023 frequent visits of Evkurov to Benghazi and other parts of Haftar’s Libya were noted, constant contacts continued steadily throughout the following year and the last official visit dates back to March 7, 2025.

Russia's presence in the port of Tobruk would grant the possibility to retain capabilities in West Africa and still provide a strategic hub against NATO in the Mediterranean Sea, confirming Libya’s role as a stronghold to continue tapping Russian interests in the continent, namely Central Africa, Mali, Niger and Sudan.

Bolstering presence in other contexts - the Black Sea

Map by Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute

As already mentioned in the introductory paragraph, let us consider, for the purpose of this analysis, the war in Ukraine as a moment of transition towards a realignment of the geopolitical balances in the medium term, because that is Russia's game. Realignment means defining priorities and securing (winning) positions in contexts resulting from these priorities that may (and in most cases do) vary from the previously held position. That is not the case for what concerns the Black Sea where the programmatic idea is the same since the times of Potëmkin: full control. In 1793, the Russian Empire annexed Crimea, founded Sevastopol, and, the following year, the city of Odessa. The third article of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact states the German disinterest in Bessarabia in favor of Russian assertiveness along the entire northern coast of the basin. This clear conception of the Black Sea has always pushed Russian rulers to implement uncompromising policies. The most evident goal of the invasion of Ukraine is to create territorial continuity through the occupied oblasts towards Crimea while also allowing full control of the Sea of ​​Azov. But there’s more to secure a strong position in the Black Sea: Caucasus, namely Abkhazia.

The construction of the Ochamchire naval base is a fundamental element of the implementation of the Georgian separatist republic in the broader Russian horizon: Abkhazia can provide a safe haven for Russian vessels as they will be in Georgian territorial waters, thus complicating potential Ukrainian strikes. Ochamchire’s location would enable Russia to more effectively control sea lanes and enhance surveillance in a region where Western military activity has increased since the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Additionally, the use of a port in Abkhazia helps Russia further isolate Georgia and assert its influence over the breakaway republic, effectively integrating the region into its military and economic sphere despite international non-recognition (the recent reopening of Shukumi International Airport should also be viewed in this way). From a logistical standpoint, Ochamchire’s development could support supply chains for Russian forces in the Southern Military District and provide support for naval operations, especially in times of heightened tension or conflict. In a broader strategic context, Russia’s interest in the port fits within its doctrine of creating layered defense zones and forward positions along its periphery, reducing the space for NATO expansion and enhancing its capacity for rapid response in the Caucasus and Black Sea regions. Although the port’s current infrastructure is limited, its potential for expansion, combined with Russia’s political control over Abkhazia, makes it a relatively low-cost yet high-impact addition to its military posture.

There are two more things to keep in mind when addressing the Caucasus region these days. First: the southern Caucasus is now relatively stable, extremely stable if compared to last year’s situation. Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to be finally addressing the border issue and the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is over. Tensions are not fully absorbed (it is legitimate to doubt that they will ever be) but this new situation provides a solid bedrock for Russian strategy anyway. The second thing to note is the Georgian internal political progressive shift towards more Russian-accommodating policies.

Bolstering presence in other context - the Arctic

The Arctic region is emerging as a new frontier of strategic competition, international security, trade and shipping routes. Climate change is the main force behind this dynamic: it opens up vast mineral resources never before tapped and makes waterways until now closed by ice increasingly practicable. The lack of attention from the United States and Europe facilitates Russian plans, given that the Arctic route is 27% faster than the one passing through the Suez Canal (Matisek, 2024). The lack of US infrastructure allows Russian control of the Arctic, and that is problematic because it challenges freedom of navigation.

The Russian Federation has seven nuclear icebreakers and over thirty diesel ones (the United States has only two) and eleven more are under construction. These are noteworthy developments, given the crumbling American hegemony and the decline of the liberal order that Russia challenges. Moscow has invested heavily in militarizing its Arctic frontier, reactivating Soviet-era bases, deploying radar systems, and establishing new airfields and missile defense installations across its northern territories. The Northern Fleet, headquartered in Severomorsk, plays a central role in this posture and is being modernized with advanced submarines and surface vessels, many of which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. This assertive military build-up signals that Russia views the Arctic not merely as a commercial opportunity but as a critical zone of defense and power projection. Given the region’s proximity to North America and Europe, Russian control of key Arctic chokepoints and infrastructure poses significant challenges to NATO and Western strategic interests.

The absence of a coherent and unified Western Arctic policy amplifies these dynamics. While NATO has begun to recognize the strategic significance of the High North, member states often prioritize different concerns, and the United States remains constrained by limited Arctic capabilities and political inertia. This disparity has allowed Russia to take the lead in shaping the narrative and reality of Arctic geopolitics. The longer the West delays developing infrastructure, enhancing icebreaker fleets, and reinforcing legal frameworks for navigation and resource use, the more entrenched Russia’s dominance in the region becomes.

Conclusions

What we have tried to highlight in this analysis - which does not claim to be exhaustive - is that the conflict in Ukraine has a relevance that goes beyond the simple territorial and political implications limited to that quadrant. In parallel with the "main" conflict, many issues that have been pending for years, sometimes decades, are finding new developments (some examples mentioned in this paper are the ones of Syria, Artsakh, Georgia and, partially, the Arctic - but the list goes on). In every evolving scenario, Russia plays an important role. The war in Ukraine is one of those events that sums up the changing times. Some, if not many, of the geopolitical constants that have always been taken for granted could radically transform or disappear in the post-war period. In the shadow of Donbass, Russia is moving and moving its pawns. We must not be blinded by mere contingencies, but think forward and understand what each move implies.

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