Korea divided: lessons from Germany

  Focus - Allegati
  06 May 2022
  27 minutes, 27 seconds

Giulia Tessadri - Head Researcher G.E.O. Politics

Chiara Malaponti - Junior Researcher G.E.O Politics

Davide Moschella - Junior Researcher G.E.O. Politics


Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of the German division and the Korean division. Both partitions are related to the post-war scenario and operated in the Cold-War confrontation. Yet, the former managed to reunite in one single state, while the latter is still divided in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Through a comparative analysis, many similarities can be identified, yet many differences. What led to the division of Korea and Germany? What were and are the dynamics of the inter-Korean and inter-German relations? Why did Germany manage to overcome the division and why is Korea still divided in two Republics?

Firstly, the paper provides an analysis of the factors that led to the German and the Korean division. Secondly, the inter-Korean and the inter-German relations are assessed. Specifically, the transformations that occurred. Thirdly, the process and framework of the German reunification is analyzed, along with the persistence of the Korean division in a post Cold-war scenario.

  1. Germany and Korea: dynamics of the division
  1. Germany: from 1945 to 1949

When pairing the German case study with the Korean one, we deal with two divisions that arose out of the post-WWII power relations. With the defeat of Germany and Japan and the weakening of the UK and France, power in the world polarized into two centers: the US and the USSR.

Given this scenario, precise lines dividing the spheres of influence were drawn. In Germany this happened somewhere along the river Elbe, whereas in Korea this happened somewhere along the 38th parallel. Consequently, such a balance of power cut through nations and left them partitioned.

Ultimately, due to the developing and protracted conflict between the US and the USSR, what had originally been provisional military demarcation lines, temporary zones of occupation and provisional governmental setups in due course turned into boundaries and units that proved more or less permanent (Herz, 1975).

As far as Germany is concerned, the Potsdam Conference in August 1945, after the country’s surrender, was a turning point. There, USSR, US, UK and France (that no longer wanted to see a potentially destructive Germany) divided the nation in four military occupation areas. The Soviets took control of the Eastern regions of the country; the US of the South; the British army of the Northwest and the French army of the Southwest. Additionally, Silesia, East Prussia, East Pomerania and an Eastern part of Brandenburg – taken away from Germany – were placed under Soviet and Polish administration. Being the Capital, Berlin (nominally belonging to the Soviet portion) was also divided into four areas.

More in general, the defeat of Germany made some sort of conflict among the victors inevitable, since their interests were not identical (Wagner, 1980). With regard to the actual birth of “two Germanies”, our observations must start from the fact that the US, the UK and the USSR had agreed in Potsdam on a (disastrous) plan of decentralization program, dealing with Germany as a single economic entity. The idea at issue was soon shattered with the onset of the Cold War: it was a context in which Western powers were concerned about the awful economic situation in their areas, while the Marshall Plan was extended (from 1948 to 1951) to West Germany, and a currency reform introduced the German mark.

The Soviets disagreed with the reform, as well as with the Western rejection of Stalin’s proposal to turn Germany into a demilitarized and neutral State. For this reason, they decided to withdraw from the governing apparatus in March 1948. Later on, they established the so-called “Berlin blockade” (in force for 11 months) and barring all land access routes between West Germany and the city. The Allied powers replied with the “Berlin Airlift”, a continuous supply by air of the western half of the city.

The major international crisis due to the Berlin blockade in conjunction with the deterioration of relations between the West and the Soviets made it clear that a German reunification was implausible and unrealistic in the short term. As a result, on May 23, 1949, the US, the UK and France decided to cede the sovereignty of their respective zones of occupation to the newly established Federal Republic of Germany, with Bonn as Capital since 1955. In turn, on October 7, 1949, the USSR ceded the sovereignty of its occupation zone to the newly established German Democratic Republic. The Capital was located in the eastern sector of Berlin.

The Western, wealthy and capitalist Federal Republic of Germany was allied with the US, the UK and France. The socialist and authoritarian German Democratic Republic positioned itself as a solid ally of the USSR, becoming part of the Warsaw Pact at its constitution in 1955.

  1. Korea: from 1945 to the Korean War

After the Allied victory in World War II and the subsequent end of the Japanese colonial era (lasted from 1910 to 1945), the Soviet and the US governments – simultaneously “liberators” and occupants – designated an arbitrary line along the 38th parallel to establish a division of Korea. In particular, the US occupied the Southern region of the peninsula and the Soviets occupied the North. In fact, the USSR entered the war against Japan on August, 8, 1945, at midnight, a couple of days after the atomic bombing in Hiroshima. After that, the Red Army invaded Manchuria aimed at advancing all the way to the Korean peninsula as well. The Soviet penetration in Korea worried the US administration, whose mantra was to contain the Communist expansion all over the world. In order to avoid a total sovietisation of the peninsula, the US proposed an agreement for the temporary partition of the peninsula. However, the agreement provided for the assignment of a larger area to the USSR (Seth, 2019).

Although the two occupants tried – to a certain degree – to come to an agreement on the reunification of the peninsula, their efforts eventually failed. In order to give a semblance of legality to their actions, the US organized elections under the aegis of the UN in the area under their control. The elections were held on May 10, 1948. On the other hand, the USSR blocked elections in the Northern region and set up their own elections.

By August of the same year, the Republic of Korea was established in the South with Syngman Rhee as the elected president followed by the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with Kim Il Sung as the appointed leader in the North. From the very outset, both leaders claimed sovereignty over the entirety of Korea, increasing the tensions and making it clear that the idea of peace was a chimera (Horton, 2020).

The war actually began in 1950 – when North Korea attacked the Southern part – and lasted until 1953: the conflict, through a demarcation line along the 38th parallel, separated North Korea from South Korea. This situation helped fuel frictions between the States at issue, two political players that to this day, from 1953, have little relationship with minimal interaction both economically and politically.

The conflict also represents the epitome of a context in which, unlike the German case, Korea had to deal with a third power, in addition to the US and the USSR: China.

Going in order, in the fall of 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the birth of the People’s Republic of China in Beijing. In this arena, Stalin’s strategy was to re-establish Russian primacy over China. In Korea, the Soviet political leader believed that the US would not have been involved in the conflict. For this reason, he stated that he would not have sent the Red Army to fight along Kim. Consequently, Mao took the task of helping North Korea by providing military equipment. In this way, Stalin achieved a double advantage. On the one hand, he managed to jeopardize the US plans without putting boots on the ground. On the other hand, he successfully claimed his leadership over the communist world, relegating Mao Zedong to the role of junior partner.

In the summer of 1950, Kim attacked South Korea, occupying most of the country in a short time. In September, Douglas MacArthur (General of the Army for the US) conquered Inchon, regained the lost lands and subsequently advanced North. At this point, Mao’s army intervened in Korea: MacArthur wanted to attack China, but clashed with President Truman.

After that, the war continued for another two bloody years to end where it started from: on the 38th parallel. At the end of the war, South Korea experienced the very autocratic leadership of Syngman Rhee, while North Korea established itself as a socialist state, characterized by an isolationist posture and a growing economy until the collapse of the 1990s.

More in general, in that conflict, there were no winners or losers. However, Mao got undoubtedly the most satisfactory results, as he proved to be able to compete with the strongest army in the world (the American one), and to be no longer forced to have a subordinate role to the USSR. Plus, on the continent, other than the Korean case (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos), the process of decolonization would have offered further opportunities for the expansion of Chinese influence, increasingly evident over the decades.

II. Inter-German and Inter-Korean relations

  1. The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic

For many decades, two different entities co-existed in Germany, namely the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Both Republics had their own socio-political order, functioning and identity, which affected and determined inter-German relations. The FRD (Bundesrepublik Deutschland BRD) was strongly connected to the West. A clear sign of this position is represented by the Treaty of Rome (1957), which led to the creation of the EEC e and to the ECSC. The GDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik DDR) was supported by the East block and became part of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and of the Warsaw Pact.

A change in the inter-German relations is linked to the election of Willy Brandt and to the adoption of the Ostpolitik, which played a fundamental role in the easing of tensions. The Cuban Missiles Crisis in 1962 can be considered an important change in the dynamics of the Cold War towards cooperation, thus affecting also the inter-German relations. Specifically, the Cold War dynamics entered another phase in the mid-1960s, which was the détente. The emerging international interests in the détente led to an increase in cooperation between the two blocks. In this framework, many agreements were signed - such as the SALT I on arms limitations. The Ostpolitik was facilitated by these international factors.

The Ostpolitik led to an opening in the relations with the GDR and in general with the East. Before Willy Brandt’s election, the West was characterized by a detachment from the DDR and in general the Soviet block. Conversely, the Ostpolitik underlined the importance of a dialogue with the East and the Soviet Union. Brandt and Bahr’s principles can be summarized as the “policy of small steps”, the “change through rapprochement” and the “human facilitation” (Sarotte, 2001). The improvement in the inter-German relations can be analyzed through the treaties signed. In 1970 the Treaty of Warsaw and the Treaty of Moscow were signed, and the Treaty of Prague was signed in 1973. These treaties helped a normalization in the relations between the two Republics, through a protection of the borders and agreements of non-use of force. In addition, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin signed in 1971 represented the base of more East-West agreements and increased the relations and ties of Berlin West and East. This opened the path to a possible future reunification. The Basic Treaty of 1972 regulated the relations between the two Republics, which recognized each other's sovereignty for the first time. Thus, the Ostpolitik adopted by the West represented a key step towards the rapprochement of the two Republics, opening to a future reunification. Despite Brandt’s resignation due to the Guillaume Affair, the path towards a normalization and a change in the status quo was launched.

Nevertheless, the oil crisis had negative impacts on the economy of both states. Similarly, international trends of rearmament and conflicts - as the Afghan one - had negative effects on the détente with an increase in the Cold War tensions and on the progress of the Inter-German relations and on the Ostpolitik. Both events had particular consequences on the relations between the DDR and the BRD and on the termination of the Ostpolitik. The final change is linked to Gorbachev’s government and the adoption of the perestroika and glasnost, which resulted in the fall of the Soviet Union and the entire Eastern block.

  1. The Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

In 1953, with the end of the Korean War, an armistice established almost the same borders as the original ones. In addition, a Korean Demilitarized Zone was created between the North and the South.

The inter-Korean relations can be understood in the framework of the Cold War: competitive dynamics became the key. For instance, the construction of the Metro in Pyongyang encouraged the creation of one in South Korea.

At the end of the 1960s, the Korean DMZ Conflict took place, with clashes between South and North. During this time, the relations were tense, with many covert raids and retaliatory strikes. In 1972, the North-South Joint Statement was issued. It contained the three principles of reunification: reunification has to be reached independently from foreign powers, reunification has to be peaceful, reunification should not take into account different ideologies. Instead, the unification as one ethnic group has to be promoted. The Inter-Korean relations did not proceed linearly, since there were many meetings as well as incidents between the two parts.

With the election of Roh Tae-woo as President of the Republic of Korea in 1988, the Inter-Korean relations proceeded into a new direction. In particular, the South-Korean president promoted the Nordpolitik, in order to normalize relations between North and South. This policy contributed to the easing of tensions and to the Agreement of Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation in 1991 and to the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For the first time, a Korean Unified Flag was used during a tennis tournament in 1991 and a unified team competed in a football competition in Portugal.

The Nordpolitik aimed at normalizing relations with North Korea and its allies, such as China and the Soviet Union. Through this policy a new paradigm was adopted, which consisted in the indirect approach. Specifically, the Nordpolitik included six key points, among which a greater diversification of Seoul’s commercial partners and security and peace in the Korean peninsula. The policy increased the importance of South Korea’s economy, while the North was struggling due to a greater isolation. Despite this, the Nordpolitik aimed at reducing military tensions and normalizing the Inter-Korean relations.

This policy was feasible due to domestic and international factors: firstly, Roh Tae-woo was the first democratically elected President of the Republic of Korea and this factor contributed to a change both on the domestic and on the international level. Secondly, the rise to power of Gorbachev allowed an opening to the URSS, due to the domestic policies. It is also worth mentioning that Deng Xiaoping was the President of China and therefore the rapprochement was mainly on the economic level, due to the political ties to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Considering the step taken towards a dialogue with the communist countries - namely China and the URSS - Roh Tae-woo attempted an approach to Pyongyang through the Nordpolitik. Despite the important achievements, the policy failed due to the immaturity of the Inter-Korean relations and to the international framework.

Following the election of Kim Dae-jung in South Korea, a new policy emerged. The Sunshine Policy, known as the Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy Towards the North, was aiming at a normalization of the North-South relations and at addressing the increasing economic gap between the two Koreas. Indeed, North Korea was facing a severe economic decline. The change in Seoul’s approach - from a more conservative paradigm to one more cooperative - is related to the end of the Cold War and the consequent change in perspective. The Sunshine Policy led to a greater political contact between North and South and represented a key aspect in Inter-Korean relations. In particular, in 2000 the first inter-Korean summit was held, followed by two others in 2007 and 2018.

Kim Dae Jung recognized an opportunity for dialogue in the new international order - more fluid dynamics due to the end of the Cold War. The Korean division was strictly linked to a Cold War architecture, thus Kim Dae Jung’s actions are to be analyzed in this framework, as he attempted to change it. The final goal of the Sunshine Policy is not the reunification of the two Republics, yet a détente, in opposition to the previous aims. Operating in a post Cold War scenario, the Sunshine Policy is not only addressed to North Korea, but also to a détente between Japan and North Korea and between the United States and North Korea. The role of 9/11 is crucial in the Intern-Korean relations, since the USA’s policy and the identification of North Korea in the axis of evil, compromised a further implementation of the Sunshine Policy. Thus, it is clear that Inter-Korean relations remain complicated.

It is possible to notice some similarities between the German and the Korean paths, looking at their respective foreign policies. Indeed, the Ostpolitik shares some similarities with the Nordpolitik. Yet, the Sunshine Policy is more suited to a comparison, considering that both the Ostpolitik and the Sunshine Policy aimed at normalizing relations with the communist counterpart. The BRD’s opening to the DDR is strongly related to the figure of Willy Brandt, as the German reunification is to the Cold War and the dynamics involving the USSR. As for Korea, the timeline is quite different, since the opening began with the Nordpolitik quite later and the real change was represented by the Sunshine Policy at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union did lead to a distention in the inter-Korean Relations, yet not to a reunification.

III. Germany reunited, Korea still divided

  1. The reunification of Germany

On November 9th, 1989 the Berlin Wall fell. This event, considered by many a symbol of the end of the Cold War, opened the gates to Germany's swift reunification process. The latter, though, was not the product of mere circumstance, rather it was aided by the changing political and economic landscape.

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev had succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Soon, he recognised the need of implementing structural reforms within the USSR, following two principles known as glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). Because of the need to focus on internal affairs, Gorbachev’s leadership saw a shift in the perception of the strategic value of the regimes in Eastern Europe. The members of the Warsaw Pact were increasingly perceived as a liability, “that received enormous benefits from the USSR, giving little in return” (Keylor, 2012). A wave of revolutions then spread through the Eastern flank of the continent, this time without the fear of retaliatory measures coming from Moscow. Before that time, every political change within the Eastern Bloc had been repressed violently, such as in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, Honecker’s DDR fiercely resisted change. Even though he tried to hold the reins of the regimes by the force of repression, subsequent developments eventually led to his resignation and the granting of freedom of movement, which resulted from the events of November 9th (ibid.).

Nevertheless, the fall of the wall alone proved not to be enough to actually achieve reunification. This end result was brought about by the diplomatic work of the at-the-time Chancellor of the BRD, Helmut Kohl. The rise of a united Germany at the center of Europe reopened the German question, with all the uneasiness that it could bring to the European states. Indeed, he knew he had to gather the support of the four powers that had been directly involved in the occupation and partition of the country: the United States, France, Britain and of course the Soviet Union. These countries retained residual occupation rights and therefore their engagement was necessary to set out the legal basis for reunification (ibid.). Kohl was eventually able to gather their consensus, despite initial pushback from France and fierce resistances from Britain (Blitz, 2009), and on October 3rd, 1990 the two Germanies became one.

It is no coincidence, of course, that Germany was able to achieve reunification in the 90s. The end of the Cold War implied the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United States as the hegemon of the international order. This new posture had also regional consequences. Germany, specifically, was freed from the dynamics that had brought about its division in the first place, as the latter had emerged from the confrontation between the Western and the communist bloc. Then, one must also evaluate the characteristics of the international systems in which the events unfolded.

Moreover, the reunification process was not just a matter of politics, but of economics, too. For one, the citizens of the DDR supported it “in the hope of reaping the economic and political benefits that would flow from citizenship in a single Germany dominated by the capitalist, democratic institutions of the West” (Keylor, 2012). But the absorption of the communist East came at a cost. The DDR’s transition from a command to a market economy came with higher inflation and unemployment rates (Rhee, 1993). It is estimated that the absorption of the East into the West required an investment of 2 trillion US$ (Chan, 2019). Therefore, the socio-economic aspects of reunification constitute another variable that needs to be taken into account.

  1. The persistence of two Koreas

When evaluating the Korean experience in light of the German one, a study from 1993 had already singled out three potential factors that had to be taken into account: the role of the two-plus-four formula, value integration and the cost of reunification (Rhee, 1993). Looking at the latter two, it becomes evident how the Korean case posits greater challenges than the German one. The issue here is that the peninsula has been divided now for roughly three decades more: this means that the cultural norms and values of North and South Koreans are increasingly diverging and that reunification costs are getting higher. Indeed, a study conducted by the Korean National Institute for Reunification shows that “the vast majority of people under 40 years old eschew reunification” (KINU, 2021; Lee, 2022). That is because they tend to evaluate reunification not as the end goal of a national mission but in terms of economic benefits (Lee, 2022). And when it comes to costs, estimates on the actual cost of reunification vary on the scale of trillions of US$. Estimates from 2017 foresaw that uniting the two Koreas could cost 3 trillion US$ on the spot and up to an additional 7-8 trillion US$ for the first decade (Revesz, 2017; Chung, 2017). In this case, the catalyst of reunification would be the collapse of the North Korean regime due to a confrontation with the US on the issue of nuclear weapons. If one takes into account that South Korea’s GDP in 2020 amounted to 1.64 trillion US$ (Statista, 2021), then the shortcomings of the German absorption model become evident.

Furthermore, the so-called two-plus-four formula played a role in the German reunification process and could potentially influence the Korean one. In the case of Germany, the “two” were of course represented by the BRD and the DDR, and the “four”, as it has already been said, by the US, USSR, France and Britain. In the same way, one could draw a parallelism and see how inter-Koreans relations have often been mediated by the US, USSR (now Russia), Japan and China. Nevertheless, in this case, given the dynamics of the division, only the US and Russia may claim to have a right to interfere in Korean affairs. Besides, the two Koreas have been reluctant to use this format on the issue of reunification, given also the content of the 1972 Joint Statement (Rhee, 1993).

Moreover, the circumstances are complicated by developments in the Indo-Pacific region, by the presence of nuclear weapons and by the 2022 war between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, the recent past saw the emergence of China as a world-class power. Beijing is not new to Korean affairs. Nevertheless, the ongoing competition with the United States is affecting the Indo-Pacific region more than ever. For the Korean peninsula, this means being caught in the same old superpower dynamics, despite Seoul’s efforts to gain autonomy and act as a bridge between Washington and Beijing. This kind of competition is exactly what fostered the division in the first place. Nowadays, Washington sees Seoul as a “lynchpin for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia” (Kim, 2022), while South Korea considers the US as its main security partner, facing the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal (ibid.). On the other hand, China notably uses North Korea as a buffer between itself and the American-allied South (Pollack, 2014). While inter-Korean relations have historically cyclical patterns of escalation and detente, this remains, for now, a fact of political life. On one hand, the US would smile upon seeing a unified Korea under the lead of the South (taking for granted that it would choose to remain an American ally) (Revere, 2015). On the other hand, China has no interest in having such a neighbor, even though it has historically perceived Pyongyang’s volatile behavior as a burden (Pollack, 2014).

The recent developments in Ukraine further complicate things. An important issue, when speaking about Korean reunification, is the denuclearization of the peninsula. The Ukrainian experience proved that the relinquishment of nuclear weapons did not function as a guarantee of security. A poll administered by the Chicago Council shows that 71% of South Koreans are now in favor of the development of a nuclear program (Dalton, Friedhoff, Kim, 2022). Moreover, Biden’s reluctance to intervene in Ukraine to avoid a nuclear war may push Pyongyang to cling even more onto its nuclear arsenal and halt progress towards the denuclearization of the peninsula (Shin, 2022), which had been traditionally considered a precondition for reunification (Lee, 2022).

IV. Conclusions

The cases of Germany and Korea present some analogies, but also diverge in some key aspects. Both States have been originally partitioned due to the Great Power competition between the US and the USSR that eventually resulted into the Cold War. Nevertheless, in the case of Korea, we saw the emergence of a third player, China, that was able to assert its influence since the Korean War. Indeed, it is also important to note that a war has never been fought between the BRD and the DDR.

One must mention that, while the BRD was always a capitalist democracy, its Korean counterpart, the ROK, has a different history. Infact, in 1961 a military junta guided by general Park Chung-hee rose to power; by 1972, the country had become an autocracy. This state of the art was maintained even after Park’s assasination in 1979. He was succeeded by general Chun Doo Hwan, who stayed in power until 1987, the year of Seoul’s democratic transition (Seth, 2019; Fiori, 2010). This is important to note as it might have influenced South Korea’s foreign policy choices. Indeed, the two policies of inter-Korean detente, the Nordpolitik and the Sunshine Policy, came much later in respect to their German counterpart, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik.

This is not the only aspect that might have delayed the timeline of inter-Korean rapprochement. As it has been noted, the country was able to only partially benefit from the end of the Cold War. The XXI century saw China’s ascent to superpower. Given Beijing’s geographical location, its historical ties with North Korea and its ongoing competition with the United States, Seoul’s longtime ally, China’s posture vis-a-vis Washington has a major impact on the political asset of the peninsula.

Another issue that further complicates the situation is the one of nuclear weapons. Indeed, a big question on the topic of Korean reunification regards the handling of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal during and after the process. This sort of concern was absent in the German case.

To conclude, despite some structural analogies, a series of further developments have affected the case for Korean reunification. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the longer the division stays in place, the harder it will be to bring the two Koreas back together, due to diverging lifestyles and societal values, as well as their skewed perceptions of one another.

Bibliography

Armstrong, C., “Inter-Korean Relations in Historical Perspective”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2005: 1-20. https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/8888/1/0001477267.pdf. (2-B)

Bleek, W., Homer, E., “From Cold War to Ostpolitik: Two Germanys in Search of Separate Identities”, World Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1976: 114-129. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/from-cold-war-to-ostpolitik-two-germanys-in-search-of-separate-identities/7745C53E5254CC921D51864721EA2736#access-block (2-B)

Blitz, J., “Mitterrand feared the emergence of ‘bad’ Germans”, Financial Times, 10 September 2009.

https://www.ft.com/content/886192ba-9d7d-11de-9f4a-00144feabdc0 (2-B)

Cary, N. D., “Reassessing Germany’s Ostpolitik. Part 1: From Détente to Refreeze.” Central European History, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2000: 235–62, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4546965. (2-B)

Chan M., “What would it take to reunify Korea? Germany offers lessons”, The Atlantic, 7 November 2019.

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/11/german-reunification-offers-lessons-korea/601297 (2-B)

Chung, C., “Democratization in South Korea and Inter-Korean Relations.” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, 2003: 9–35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40023987. (2-B)

Chung, F., “North Korean reunification could cost $10 trillion”, news.com.au, 13 August 2017.

https://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/world-economy/north-korean-reunification-could-cost-10-trillion/news-story/e6fc62c5b29b45085eb4e64fdd43235d (2-C)

Dalton, T., Friedhoff, K., Kim L., “Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons”, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 21 February 2022.

https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/thinking-nuclear-south-korean-attitudes-nuclear-weapons?utm_source=media&utm_campaign=rpt&utm_medium=email&utm_term=korea-nuclear&utm_content=text (2-B)

Fiori, A., L' Asia orientale: Dal 1945 ai giorni nostri, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011. (1-A)

Gottfried, N., “Ostpolitik: Transformation through Communication and the Quest for Peaceful Change”, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2016: 14-59. https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-abstract/18/3/14/13625/Ostpolitik-Transformation-through-Communication?redirectedFrom=fulltext (2-B)

Herz, J., “Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact”, Asian Survey, Vol. 15, N. 11, 1975: 957-970 (2-B).

Hong, K., “Path Emergence on the Korean Peninsula: From Division to Unification”, Pacific Focus, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2012: 86-110. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2012.01077.x?casa_token=qYx8tL6twEYAAAAA%3AkR25ri_9mm_9X_c5RDZOH2WwT-omOkKkeqYeG88V39lP19MVz4yvttvRDRIDRVBxQCDm6nY5yAeOWz4. (3-B)

Horton, H., “North and South Korea: division by constructions”, Honors Theses, May 2020: 1-52. (3-B)

Keylor, William R., The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond: An International History since 1900, OUP USA, 2012. (1-A)

Kim, H., “South Korea’s Strategic Dilemma Amid US-China Competition”, Stimson, 2022.

https://www.stimson.org/2022/south-koreas-strategic-dilemma-amid-us-china-competition (2-C)

Lee, E., “South Korea’s Shift Away From Reunification Is a Bad Sign for the Korean Peninsula”, The Diplomat, 8 February 2022 (2-A).

https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/south-koreas-shift-away-from-reunification-is-a-bad-sign-for-the-korean-peninsula/. (2-B)

Lee, S., “The Korean War”, Routledge London, 2013 (2-A).

Lee S., Min T., Yoon K., Koo B., “KINU Unification Consciousness Survey 2021”, Korean Institute for National Unification, 2021.

https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/e17db3fa-a0ed-41c7-9067-81e3962cd34a.(1-A)

Leffler M., Westad O., “The division of Germany, 1945-1949”, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1, No. 7, Cambridge University Press, 2010: 133-153 (2-A).

Paik, H., “Assessment of the Sunshine Policy: a Korean Perspective”, Asian Perspective, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2002: 13–35. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704372. (2-B)

Pollack, J., “China’s Views on the Unification of the Korean Peninsula and US-China Relations”, The Brookings Institute, 2014.

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Jonathan-Pollack-paper.pdf (2-B)

Revere, E. J.R., “Korean Reunification and U.S. Interests: Preparing for One Korea”, The Brookings Institute, 2015.

https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/korean-reunification-and-u-s-interests-preparing-for-one-korea/ (2-B)

Revesz, R. “North Korea crisis: Re-unification alone 'would cost $3 trillion' after war, professor says”, The Independent, 30 April 2017.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-south-korea-reunification-kim-jong-un-dictator-donald-trump-president-nuclear-war-ballistic-missiles-a7710001.html. (2-C).

Rhee, K.S., “Korea’s Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience”, Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1993: pp. 360–75. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645103. (2-B)

Sarotte, M. E. “A Small Town in (East) Germany: The Erfurt Meeting of 1970 and the Dynamics of Cold War Détente.” Diplomatic History, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2001: 85–104. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24913822. (2-B)

Seth, M., “A Concise History of Modern Korea From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present”, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2019 (2-B).

Shin, M., “How Will the Ukraine War Affect the Korean Peninsula?”, The Diplomat, 4 March 2022.

https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/how-will-the-ukraine-war-affect-the-korean-peninsula/. (2-B).

“South Korea: Gross domestic product (GDP) in current prices from 1986 to 2026”, Statista, 2021.

https://www.statista.com/statistics/263579/gross-domestic-product-gdp-in-south-korea/. (1-A).

Wagner, R., “The Decision to Divide Germany and the Origins of the Cold War”, International Studies Quarterly, Oxford Academic, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1980: 155-190 (2-B).



Share the post