Abstract
Climate change and high population growth have led to the gradual degradation of the most important natural resource for the development of human civilization: water. The water crisis is an example of how climate crises and environmental resources can have serious consequences on international security. Water scarcity, in fact, adversely affecting the economy and food security of countries, leads to unrest and social discontent that often results in an increase in violence. This has led the international community to talk about the geopolitics of water resources, or "hydropolitics", or the study of the strategic role of water, which many consider the oil of the future. In particular, in an international context characterized by the constant increase in water scarcity, one of the most sensitive issues to be addressed is the management of transboundary water, which are the water resources shared among several states.
This analysis aims therefore to deepen the problem of transboundary waters, describing the context of six river basins (Colorado, Ganges, Indus, Nile, Tigris and Euphrates) on which a very high number of people depend and which in the future could be subject to serious controversy over the control of their resources.
Author: Margherita Camurri - Junior Researcher Political Area, Mondo Internazionale GEO
- Introduction: water, security and conflicts
Among all the natural resources on Earth, water is by far the most important, as it guarantees the continued existence of life on our planet. Humans have always been heavily dependent on water: since ancient times, civilizations that were able to exploit the water resources of their territory prospered, while those that were affected by long periods of drought decayed. Water is in fact an indispensable resource not only because it guarantees the very life of living beings, but also because it is the basis of all the economic and social activities of human civilization: from health and food security, to the economic and energy sector. However, the water resources of our planet are limited. In fact, despite the fact that 70% of the Earth’s surface is covered by seas and oceans, the human being needs fresh water, which represents only 3% of the total amount of water on Earth. Moreover, of this 3%, only one third is available for human consumption, as the remaining 2% is frozen in the form of glaciers and ice sheets (FAO, 2021). In recent decades, climate change (irregular rainfall and drought) and increasing water consumption, also due to the rapid increase in the world’s population, have contributed to a rapid deterioration of this naturally limited resource. As a result, today more than 2 billion people suffer from water scarcity and 36 countries have already experienced severe water stress and are likely to consume the full amount of water available to them each year (UNESCO, 2019).
Given the importance of fresh water for human life, its future availability is a central issue in the current international debate. Water crises have, for example, been placed among the main risk factors for the coming decades by the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2021) and, in recent years, The United Nations Security Council has given increasing attention to the problem of water scarcity, recognising a correlation between it and episodes of violence. Indeed, the case of water is, more generally, an example of how the crisis of climate change and environmental resources can have serious consequences for international security. Water scarcity, in fact, adversely affecting the economy and food security of countries, leads to unrest and social discontent that often results in an increase in violence. Already in 1995, for example, the then vice-president of the World Bank Ismail Serageldin sounded the alarm: "If the wars of this century were fought for oil, the wars of the next century will be fought for water, unless we change our approach to the management of this precious and vital resource". Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also remarked in 2001 that "the violent competition for fresh water could become a source of conflict and war in the future". Their predictions seem well-founded, since over the past 50 years it is estimated that there have been more than 500 disputes concerning "blue gold", including 37 serious conflicts (Pacific Institute, 2018). Although the recognition of the water crisis as a security threat is not recent, the rapid demographic and economic expansion and climate change have highlighted the urgency of addressing the issue.
- Transboundary Water Problems
In an international context characterized by the constant increase in water scarcity, one of the most delicate elements to be addressed is the management of cross-border water, which are water resources shared between several states. Today, there are about 276 large cross-border river basins in the world, covering almost half of the Earth’s surface, crossing the territory of 145 countries (UN Water, 2013). The problem with the management of border waters is that failure to cooperate in the exploitation of common resources may lead individual countries to take unilateral measures which can often adversely affect the water consumption of their neighbours. Indeed, unilateral measures such as the construction of dams or, in general, excessive consumption of fresh water, risk restricting access to other countries' water resources, damaging their food and economic security and thus leading to an intensification of tensions and regional instability that, at worst, could result in episodes of violence. The United Nations has declared that conflicts over cross-border waters could increase by 95% in the next century (UN Water, 2013). This concern has led the international community to include in the 2030 Agenda a specific indicator (6.5) regarding the implementation of "integrated water resource management at all levels, including through cross-border cooperation" (UN, 2015) aiming to encourage countries to work together to control water resources. The search for a dialogue and a fair sharing of the use of water is indeed key to prevent future conflicts.
If we look at the trends of recent decades, we can see that the cross-border water resources that most easily cause controversy and potentially conflict are river waters. Today, almost 40% of the world’s population depends on river systems common to two or more countries. In general, the problem of river resources supplying water to several countries is linked to the fact that the effects of climate change and excessive consumption of fresh water by some states, can lead those who are heading towards the mouth of the rivers to not have enough water (Wolf, 2007). As far as the current situation is concerned, the United Nations has identified six cross-border freshwater streams which provide water to a very large number of people and which in the future may be subject to serious controversy over the control of their resources. They are respectively: the Colorado, the Ganges, the Indus, the Nile, and the Tigris and the Euphrates.
- The Colorado
More than 2300 km long, the Colorado is a river that flows in the southwest of the United States (bathing Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming) and in the northwest of Mexico, to flow into the Gulf of California. Colorado waters provide water to more than 40 million people and irrigate 5.5 million acres of farmland. However, in recent decades, severe droughts due to climate change, the creation of dams and the excessive consumption of river resources to transform an almost arid area into a fertile territory, have led to a strong deterioration of the waters of Colorado, They come to a dramatic end when they reach the Mexican territory (Britannica, 2019).
The history of water management in this river dates back to the Colorado River Compact of 1922, thanks to which the seven American states touched by the river decided to divide its water resources between two basins (upper and lower), ensuring each 7,5 million cubic meters of water a year. Only in 1944, Mexico was included in this partition, through the Mexican Water Treaty, thanks to which the United States agreed to provide 1.5 million cubic meters of water to Mexico each year in exchange for a portion of the Mexican water resources of the Rio Grande. Although other river management agreements have been concluded over the years, they do not seem to take into account the increasingly serious impacts of climate change and the consequent rapid and incessant deterioration of water resources. In fact, the situation only gets worse: the flow of the river in the Mexican territory went from 1200 cubic meters to the second in the nineteenth century, to the present value of 0.5 cubic meters per second. In addition, this year, the United States Department of the Interior recognized for the first time a water shortage in Lake Mead (one of the main basins of Colorado, whose water level today is only 35% of its capacity) declaring the need to start reducing the water consumption of the local population and farmers (Kann, Rigdon, Wolfe, 2021). New uncertainties and concerns about the future are also emerging as the agreements that currently regulate the sharing of water between the seven American states and Mexico expire in 2026, and tensions for the future sharing of resources are already emerging. For example, in 2020, Mexican farmers in the state of Chihuahua managed to occupy the Boquilla Dam, securing control over one of the most important reservoirs on the border, and obstructing the water supply to the United States. Although they claim to seek dialogue, the protests of Mexican peasants have often resulted in violence, in which several buildings have been burned, some parliamentarians were kidnapped and some demonstrators were injured in clashes with the local police. Given the extreme importance of water for the economic and social development of the countries involved in this crisis, the stakes are high: "this is a war to survive", remarked one of the spokesmen of the group of protesters (BBC, 2020). Consequently, if the effects of population growth and climate change are not mitigated, and if the countries involved fail to reach new, fair agreements for the sharing of river resources, In the future, water scarcity of the river could further increase tensions and have dramatic effects on the food, national and economic security of the local population.
- The Ganges
The Ganges rises on the southern slope of the Himalayas and crosses for about 2510 km the south-east of India, China and Nepal up to Bangladesh, where it flows into the Indian Ocean. The Ganges region is characterised by poor weather conditions, with severe flooding during the monsoon season and severe water shortages throughout the rest of the year, adversely affecting the socio-economic development of the local population (through a sharp reduction in agriculture, fisheries and shipping). Since the 1950s, the dispute between Bangladesh and India over the exploitation of the river’s waters has further aggravated the situation, complicating the already problematic management of this valuable river resource (British, 2021).
In particular, the dispute between the two countries dates back to the construction of the Farakka Dam, commissioned by the Indian government, without consulting neighboring Bangladesh, to divert water from the Ganges in order to ensure the navigability of the Port of Calcutta. This project significantly aggravated the water stress of the Bangladeshi population, which, already marked by very high levels of poverty, in the following years suffered from a severe food shortage. Moreover, the situation caused a sharp increase in the flow of refugees (in this case environmental) from Bangladesh to India, aggravating the already existing controversy against illegal immigrants in the Indian region of Assam, where in the '80s a real conflict broke out (Climate Diplomacy, 2021). After years of negotiations, in 1996, the two countries took a decision on how to regulate the water distribution of the Ganges from the Farakka Dam through the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty. India’s willingness to settle the dispute peacefully, incorporating the principle of fairness and harmlessness into the agreement, was certainly a very important step for the stability of the region. However, over the years, the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty has also revealed its weaknesses. In fact, first of all, it is important to underline that the provisions of the agreement are based on the average water flow of the Ganges recorded between 1949 and 1988, and therefore do not consider the subsequent progressive deterioration of water resources due to climate change and increasing demand for water. Moreover, on several occasions, it has been noted that neither Bangladesh nor India have received their respective quotas under the agreement, especially during the driest periods of the year, when water demand is highest. Finally, while in general the agreement has brought positive changes to the region, when it expires in 2026 it is crucial that the two countries commit themselves to a new compromise that considers the ever-changing impacts of climate change and that meets the water needs of both (Rahman, Islam, Navera, Fulco, 2019). This is necessary because, although so far the water dispute has not led to actual armed clashes directly between the two countries over the years, Relations between India and Bangladesh have deteriorated considerably, and the problem of water management remains an issue that is still the subject of much discussion. In particular, the population of Bangladesh seems to be gradually transforming its resentment towards the Indian government into a more general anti-Hindu sentiment, favoring Muslim orientations and, therefore, closer to Pakistan, rival of India. Moreover, it is crucial that the future effects of climate change are not underestimated, as if the number of climate refugees continues to increase, regional tensions could resume. For these reasons, if the two countries fail to conclude a fair and effective agreement on the management of the Ganges water and resolve their disputes, new waves of violence could occur in the future.
- The Indus
The main problem relating to the transboundary waters of the Indus lies in the long history of rivalry between India and Pakistan, linked in particular to the disputed region of Kashmir and which, since the dawn, has also affected the management of water resources of the territory. The Indus is a river of about 3180 km that flows mainly along the Indian and Pakistani territory and that, In recent years, it has been hit by a severe water shortage due to the excessive extraction of its limited underground resources and the consequences of climate change.
The dispute between Pakistan and India over Indus control dates back to 1947, when the two countries gained independence from Britain and began negotiating a possible partition of the region’s natural resources. Since the 1950s, strong tensions began to emerge mainly because the new border lines allowed India to comfortably manage the sources of most rivers in the region, thus obtaining direct control over the flow of water that arrived in Pakistan. The situation was, and remains, particularly delicate for the latter, since, unlike its rival, the Pakistani population depends almost completely on the Indus river resources, which provide water to 80% of the country’s agricultural fields (Britannica, 2021). In 1960, thanks to the mediation of the World Bank, India and Pakistan concluded the Indus Waters Treaty, sharing control of the river and establishing the Indus Permanent Commission, composed of equal numbers of Pakistani and Indian representatives, has the task of ensuring that any decision concerning the river basin is reported, and of providing interpretations on the application of the Treaty. In addition, the treaty provides for the intervention of a neutral third party in the event that India and Pakistan disagree, and the establishment of an arbitral tribunal in the event that differences of opinion result in a dispute. This last measure was adopted only once since 1960, and has successfully resolved the dispute over the Baglihar Dam. Indeed, the Indus Waters Treaty is considered by many to be one of the greatest achievements of water diplomacy in history since, although in the years following its signing, the two countries have faced each other in three wars and several conflicts, its provisions have always been honored by both parties (Water Conflict, 2021). Despite this, the risk of a future conflict between the two countries due to the management of water resources is not to be underestimated. In fact, considering the wider political context, the tensions provoked by the dispute over the Kashmir region, where the main sources of the Indus are located, continue to provoke clashes, sometimes violent, deteriorating reactions between the two countries. For example, following the killing of 18 Indian soldiers by Pakistani insurgents in Kashmir, India has come to suggest its possible withdrawal from the Indus Waters Treaty. In addition, the Indian government recently declared its intention to accelerate the construction of a series of dams to produce hydroelectric power along some tributaries of the river that had originally been assigned to Pakistan (BBC, 2016). Although this measure respects the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty, excessive exploitation of these tributaries by India would have a disastrous impact on Pakistan, which remains to this day one of the countries most seriously affected by water insecurity in the world. In fact, the Treaty has been criticized several times because it does not foresee any restrictions on the construction of dams by India, which in fact leaves New Delhi the possibility of abusing this measure, leading to disputes and conflicts (for example for the Kishanganga Dam). In general, given the persistent political tensions between the two countries, in order to avoid a real water war, The Indus Waters Treaty should be revised taking into account the new effects of climate change and redefining formal limits on the exploitation of resources by both countries.
- The Nile
The Nile, with its 6693 km of length, is the longest river in the world: its waters cross 10 states of the African continent (Egypt, Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and South Sudan) and about 250 million people depend on its resources for their water security. However, even today, 4 million people in the Nile region suffer from water scarcity and, due to the increasing pressure on river resources due to rapid population growth and climate change, it is estimated that by 2040 this number will double (British, 2021).
Currently, the main controversy concerning the Nile Basin concerns the construction of the Renaissance Dam by the Ethiopian government, considered essential in order to alleviate the poverty of the country and to guarantee access to hydroelectric power to the more than 65 million Ethiopians who have so far not been able to use it, but potentially very dangerous for the water security of the downstream countries, like Egypt, which has opposed the project for years. Egypt’s concerns seem well-founded because, being located in the Lower Nile basin, the country cannot benefit from sufficient rainfall, which makes it heavily dependent on the river for its own water supply. In particular, several studies show that the construction of the Ethiopian dam (which is estimated to be completed in 2022, but which is already partially operational) could cause a decrease in river water flow in Egypt by more than a third, reducing by 70% the amount of fertile soil and aggravating the water scarcity of the population. Given the alarming data, for years Cairo has been insisting that the filling of the dam takes place in a gradual way, so as to mitigate the impacts on the flow of the Nile. However, Ethiopia does not seem to be taking into account the concerns of its neighbours, and on the contrary, it aims to accelerate the timing of using this important source of hydroelectric power as soon as possible. In 2021, the Ethiopian government successfully completed for the second consecutive year the filling of the hydroelectric reservoir of the dam, obtaining the amount of water necessary for the operation of the turbines (USC, 2019). Over the years, the two countries took part in several meetings, which sometimes also saw the participation of Sudan, in order to find an agreement on the functioning of the Renaissance Dam, but without success. In 2019, the International Crisis Group warned that, if not mitigated, tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, could lead the two countries to become involved in a conflict over the dam, destabilizing an already politically fragile region (International Crisis Group, 2019). Both countries seem to be reluctant to compromise, and have repeatedly exchanged hypernationalist and warlike threats. For example, the Egyptian Prime Minister has promised not to allow the dam to obstruct the country’s water supply and has authorised joint military exercises with Sudan, while the Ethiopian Prime Minister has declared that his country is ready to mobilize millions of troops' to ensure full exploitation of the dam if necessary (BBC, 2020). In order to prevent the dispute from becoming a real conflict, the governments of both countries must see the negotiations as an opportunity to adopt an agreement that can benefit both sides, possibly including other countries in the region. Finally, it is important to stress that the need to find a compromise between Egypt and Ethiopia in the near future is linked to the fact that, when the dam is fully operational, its impact on the downstream countries will be even more evident, and consequently tensions and the risk of conflict will tend to increase.
- The Tigris and the Euphrates
The Tigris (1900 km) and the Euphrates (2800 km) are two rivers that flow almost parallel in the heart of the Middle East, crossing Turkey, Syria and Iraq until they flow into the Persian Gulf. The importance of these two river basins is linked to the fact that, since ancient times, their resources have made habitable a territory whose environment is among the most hostile to the world. In fact, the region is characterized by average temperatures ranging from more than 32 degrees in summer, reaching peaks of 49 degrees, to less than 10 degrees in winter, when the temperature often drops below zero (British, 2016). However, in recent years, rising temperatures, record levels of rainfall and prolonged droughts are threatening the water and food security of some 5 million Syrians and 7 million Iraqis, directly dependent on the river basins of the Tigris and Euphrates. According to estimates, the region’s water shortage is likely to alter the fertility of almost 400 km2 of agricultural land and lead to a sharp increase in the number of environmental immigrants from these two countries.
The problem of the management of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin emerged after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when Turkey, Iraq and Syria gained independence and, as a result, the two rivers officially became cross-border waters. Until the 1960s, the limited use of the region’s water resources by the three countries ensured that they were able to maintain good relations. However, with the growing demand for water, due to severe droughts and a general increase in population, each country began to take unilateral measures that, most often, had the effect of destabilizing the flow of the two rivers, thereby threatening access to the water resources of their neighbours. For example, in 1975, a dispute between Turkey and Syria over the use of the Keban and Taqba dams during a drought threatened armed conflict. Moreover, in 1990, when Turkey blocked the flow of the Euphrates to fill the Atatürk Dam, temporarily reducing the water resources of Syria and Iraq by 75%, the Iraqi government threatened Ankara with blowing up the dam. Indeed, another factor that still contributes today to the tensions between the three countries is the hegemonic position that Ankara enjoys in the control of the water resources of the region, due to the fact that the origin of both the Tigris and Euphrates water basins is in Turkey. Indeed, since the 1980s and 1990s, the situation began to become more complicated as Turkey began to exploit its hegemonic position by exploiting water to pressure other countries on political issues. For example, in 1987, Ankara agreed to allocate more water to Syria in exchange for halting Syrian support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party and, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Turkish government decided to stop the flow of the Euphrates (Wilson, 2012). Over the years, the three countries have repeatedly tried to conclude a formal and not provisional agreement for the management of the Tigris and Euphrates basins, but every attempt at cooperation has failed, also because Turkey refused to sign the United Nations Water Convention, thus declaring that it was not bound by the principles contained in the Convention. Even today, the lack of an effective multilateral system for the management of water resources raises several issues since it potentially allows each actor to take unilateral measures in the promotion of its own interest without risking violating any agreement. Since the United Nations has predicted that the resources of the Tigris and the Euphrates could decrease by 30% and 60% respectively by the end of the century, tensions between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, already complicated by political issues, risk becoming worse, destabilizing the security of an already geo-politically unstable region (Climate Diplomacy, 2021). A trilateral agreement is therefore essential to address the environmental challenges of the two river basins, to reduce the water stress of the local population and to prevent the emergence of new disputes and conflicts.
- Conclusions
The analysis of the controversies surrounding river basins confirms that there is a strong correlation between the water crisis and international security. Observing the history of the management of these river basins, It is possible to identify several elements which have led the attempts at cooperation between the countries concerned to be ineffective in easing tensions and ensuring an equal distribution of water resources. First of all, it has been repeatedly pointed out that all the agreements concluded to date do not take into account the current flow of rivers, which has declined sharply over the years due to climate change and the increase in water consumption. For this reason, it is necessary to adopt new measures, updated to the current availability of water and flexible to the variability of weather conditions. Another problem common to the above mentioned situations is the disparity in the management of water resources, due to the geographical location of the countries. Indeed, countries such as Turkey for the Tigris and the Euphrates and the United States for the Colorado, enjoy an easy position for controlling the flow of water because the sources of the respective rivers are located in their territory. On the contrary, as water scarcity increases, there is a risk that the countries towards the mouth will not be able to enjoy enough water to meet their needs. For this reason, agreements should always include clauses ensuring fair access to water and preventing individual countries from taking unilateral measures, such as the construction of dams, which significantly threaten the water access of neighbouring countries. This is particularly important in already fragile and unstable contexts due to geo-political issues, where it would be desirable to involve a neutral third party to supervise and ensure the correct implementation of the measures.
Nevertheless, it is also important to remember that water crises do not necessarily have to result in conflict, but can also be addressed by the countries involved through an effective cooperation effort. In fact, avoiding unilateral measures to pursue the interests of individual countries is essential to ensure equal access to the resources of cross-border basins and to avoid the risk of new conflicts, which would increase even more dramatically the water and food stress of the states involved. Today, with increasing water insecurity around the world, mainly due to population growth and climate change, finding solutions to tackle the water crisis is increasingly urgent. The international community, in addition to adopting rules to combat the climate crisis more generally, could, for example, consider measures to reduce water waste, for example by replacing inefficient irrigation systems that cause losses, imposing limits on the consumption of water and food, and encouraging the planting of crops with low water consumption. However, these measures will be in vain unless there is an effort of cooperation. In general, it is therefore crucial that countries dependent on cross-border basins start to think of water management as an opportunity for cooperation rather than as an object of contention. In this sense, we can appreciate several attempts at collaboration between countries that have so far proved successful, such as the Southern African Development Community, coordinating cross-border water cooperation across 15 basins across South Africa and the Mekong River Commission, which instead promotes common measures for the management of Mekong resources between South East Asian countries. New agreements of this kind, in addition to avoiding tensions and potentially conflicts, would also enable the international community to support a dialogue on broader issues, such as economic and sustainable integration, in order to reduce disparities between countries and reduce the level of food and water insecurity in the world.
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Translated by: Angelo Di Marco