Abstract.
Since the beginning of the year, North Korea has already conducted at least nine missile tests, drawing condemnation from the US, Japan, South Korea and the international community.
This paper traces the history of the North Korean nuclear programme, investigating the motivations behind its inception and pursuit up to the present day, with a focus on the type of weapons that have been deployed using this technology.
Finally, an attempt will be made to determine the extent to which the steady increase in the North Korean arsenal is affecting the difficulty of completing the peace process with South Korea.
Authored by:
Giulia Scazzino, Junior Researcher, Defense&Security Team
Jovan Knezevic, Junior Researcher, Defense&Security Team
Angela Allegrucci, Junior Researcher, Defense&Security Team
North Korea’s road to nuclear power. An historical overview.
North Korea's interest in nuclear development started in the 1950s, because of the geopolitical dynamics in the area - such as the Korean War and the frictions between China and the Soviet Union. The North Korean leadership deeply understood the political and strategic relevance of nuclear knowledge and for this reason many students went to China or Eastern Europe in order to build an élite of experts. During the 1950s, research institutes in nuclear physics were established - as the Academy of Sciences, founded in 1952 with the support of the Soviet Union. In 1965, the Soviets and the North Korean government of Kim Il-Sung reached agreement on the construction of a five-megawatt nuclear reactor. It went operational in 1967, with the Soviets supplying the fuel rods. By 1974, the North Koreans had upgraded that facility on their own, by using indigenous fuel that let the facility achieve an eight-megawatt power level.
The Soviet support has been crucial for the North Korean nuclear program, but at the same time, it was clear that the intent of Moscow was to limit the spread of knowledge and not let North Korea develop a nuclear military capability. Knowledge continued to be limited to the civilian context until, in the 1970s, regional dynamics changed. On one hand, in 1968 the Soviet Union and the US agreed on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and a broad-based non-proliferation policy. On the other hand, in the early 1970s China and the US became closer and began to establish diplomatic relations - although formal diplomatic relations would come in the late 1970s. South Korea then began to feel insecure as the US, their ally, moved closer to Communist China. South Korea at this point tried to ensure its national security through a national nuclear programme with a military direction - trying to obtain plutonium. North Korea tried to pursue this goal by seeking more supplies in terms of increased technological capabilities and power reactors. The Soviet Union resisted North Korean demands, precisely because it had embraced the policy of non-proliferation and because of fears of a military drift. Kim Il-Sung then went to great lengths to develop an indigenous capability. In the 1980s, and with the coming of Deng Xiaoping in China, serious nuclear weapon developments began to appear. A reactor was built in the Yongbyon area, thanks to the knowledge acquired through the study of publications and thanks to scientists who had studied abroad. The five-megawatt reactor operated with natural uranium and graphite - as it was built using illicitly procured designs for the UK's first-generation Calder Hall reactor. It went critical in 1986, and the construction of a reprocessing facility began, in secret, in 1987.
The change in Soviet power – the coming into power of Gorbachev - introduced a new element into North Korea's position. With Andropov and Chernenko, there was a partial opening to conclude an agreement for the supply of power reactors and an acceleration on these supply projects. Instead, Gorbachev confirmed the Soviet willingness to supply reactors but with a precise condition: North Korea had to adhere to the NPT.
Despite joining the treaty in 1985, North Korea resisted for a long time before moving towards full NPT membership.
In the early 1990s, an alternative path was pursued to military build-up at all costs. The regime sought to improve relations with South Korea, and with the US. In 1992, the country adhered to the Safeguards Agreement and allowed IAEA inspectors to carry out inspections on its territory. However, as early as 1993, IAEA inspectors who went there for inspections realised that there were discrepancies with the statements made by the North Korean authorities. Through inspections of the reactor, doubts were raised regarding the extraction time of the fuel rods. It seemed to be faster than what was stated. According to the inspectors, the reactor did not seem to be used in order to extract maximum energy power, but rather it appeared to have been used to produce plutonium. They also found out that there was a laboratory for reprocessing plutonium. The North Koreans confirmed its existence, but they affirmed that it was a small laboratory for small-scale experiments. It is likely that, when North Korea's leaders accepted the inspections in 1992, they had not considered how scrupulous they were going to be. They may have believed they could keep some operations secret and at the same time demonstrate to the international community their commitment to the NPT. Thus, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty after the IAEA findings.
In 1994, North Korean technicians started removing spent fuel rods in the Yongbyon reactor, without any supervision from the IAEA, something that heightened the crisis. The Clinton administration approached the United Nations Security Council calling for economic sanctions on Pyongyang. North Koreans affirmed that those sanctions would have been considered an act of war. The crisis was partially resolved when the Clinton administration, assisted by former President Carter, opted for negotiations. The North Korean government agreed to an eight-year nuclear truce known as the Agreed Framework. According to the Framework, North Korea would have to close down its reprocessing and plutonium production facilities - including the reactor - and the international community - especially the USA - promised to provide North Korea with the supplies of technology needed to produce atomic energy and which was necessary for its economy. The aim was to replace the old plant with new reactors using low-level enriched uranium and light water in order to prevent any North Korean military nuclear proliferation.
Nevertheless, in the meantime the state undertook contacts and negotiations with the A.Q. Khan network, without giving up its own aspirations.
The second half of the 1990s saw a delay in the implementation of the agreement by North Korea but also by those who were supposed to be providing new facilities. Mutual resistance and distrust were growing. An appropriate moment for implementing the agreement faded when the Bush administration came to power, and particularly when North Korea was included among the 'rogue states' after 9/11. Such harsh tones of condemnation hindered a cooperative response, so much that the Agreed Framework broke down in 2002.
In 2003, North Korea announced and completed its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since then there has been an escalation of North Korean capabilities, starting with the first test in 2006 and culminating in the most recent missile tests.
After the withdrawal from the NPT, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States tied to engage North Korea in the Six-Party Talks in a further attempt at a diplomatic solution to the country’s nuclear program. The talks fell apart in 2009, and no serious diplomatic initiatives to denuclearize North Korea occurred until 2018.
In 2010 North Korea revealed that it had converted its Fuel Fabrication Facility into a uranium enrichment facility. Scientists that visited the site estimated that the building contained nearly 2,000 centrifuges. Construction in 2013 doubled the floor space of the facility, but it is unknown whether the number of centrifuges also doubled. The US suspected that North Korea was operating a secret uranium enrichment program fuelled by Pakistani AQ Khan's illicit network for decades.
At the June 2018 U.S.-North Korean summit, Kim Jong-Un “reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” although North Korea’s definition of “denuclearization” is ambiguous. North Korean commitments to denuclearization were further called into question in July 2020 with the identification of a previously undeclared facility in Wollo-ri thought to be a nuclear warhead or component-manufacturing site.
In 2021, analysts estimated that North Korea could have had more than sixty nuclear weapons, and has successfully tested missiles that could strike the United States with a nuclear warhead. A 2021 RAND Corporation report projected that North Korea could have around two hundred nuclear weapons and hundreds of ballistic missiles stockpiled by 2027. The country has been conducting regular missile tests as part of its weapons development programme. Hypersonic as well as short-range, intermediate-range and long-range ballistic missiles have all been tested since the start of 2022. The test launch of March 2022 was of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), according to South Korea. If confirmed, this would be the first time an ICBM has been fired since 2017, breaking Pyongyang's self-imposed moratorium on such tests.
Foreign contributions to the development of North Korean nuclear weapons.
The development of the North Korean nuclear programme has benefited from numerous inputs from various external sources over time. Nevertheless, it has now become predominantly autochthonous. North Korean expertise, in fact, has absorbed know-how and training from other international actors who tried to incorporate North Korea first in their political and economic orbit, and then in their subsequent plans to achieve transnational nuclearization. Consequently, such spill overs have been decisive in providing Pyongyang with the technological and scientific bases on which its current military technologies are based.
The powers that most affected the North Korean military organisation were primarily the Soviet Union and China. Moscow, in particular, played a fundamental role in the history of the country both as the main proponent -together with the People’s Republic of China- of the recognition of the North Korean state in 1948 and for the role of superiority over North Korea, which should have been a virtuous example of communism for the entire Soviet bloc. As in many other cases of Communist countries in the world, the Soviet Union had begun to invest in infrastructure and economic aids of various kinds also in North Korea. In the wake of its economic objectives, the USSR not only developed manufacturing industry and infrastructures, such as railways, but also devoted itself the modernization of the army by redesigning the Korean People’s Army (KPA) out of the model of the Soviet Army, as well as the whole military organisation of the state (Tertitskiy, 2017). At the same time, North Korea also developed an increasing interest in nuclear programs, which were proliferating in many Asian states under the anti-American pressure of the Soviet and Chinese governments in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1959, following an agreement between North Korea and the USSR, Moscow began supplying Pyongyang with scientists and engineers in order to install qualified personnel in Korea to start its nuclear program. However, it was not until the 1980s that the first graphite-moderated nuclear reactor was built at the Yongbyon site, which was officially inaugurated only in 1986. The support of the Soviet Union in the preliminary phase of the first reactor’s development lasted until the mid-1970s, while the supply of military equipment and armaments gradually declined and finally closed in the mid-1980s by decision of Mikhail Gorbachev, who had begun considering Korea a parasitic state for the Soviet economy.
As a matter of fact, in the thirty years of close cooperation with North Korea, the Soviet Union not only laid the foundations for the building of the first nuclear reactor, but also supplied Pyongyang with nuclear fuel and provided the state with several projects to assemble both missile models and light-water reactors (LWR). It is important to highlight, however, that the Soviet support, as well as the Chinese one, in the preliminary phase of the first North Korean nuclear plants’ construction had no official military implications. Even the official propaganda of the current North Korean regime is likely to affirm that the subsequent use of nuclear power in the military would be inaugurated on an exclusive national initiative, regardless of the Russian or Chinese will. Despite that, however, the numerous bilateral trade exchanges and development plans of military programs for defensive purposes that the Soviet Union pursued between 1960 and 1980 show that some foreign inspiration in the military field is likely to have been transmitted to Pyongyang.
As the Soviet intervention, the other driver of nuclear programmes in North Korea was China, notably the Asian alternative to Soviet communism, which, after the application of the Brezhnev doctrine, was getting rid of the characteristics that until then had united Moscow to Pyongyang, such as the Marxist-Leninist component and the so-called proletarian internationalism (Zhebin, 1995). Chinese attraction thus provided a potential ally in many areas for North Korea.
China, in particular, had already sided with the Soviet Union and North Korea during the Korean War (1950-1953) by sending military contingents through the northern border of the peninsula. Initially, the newly formed People’s Republic of China did not want to support North Korean military ambition towards the unification of the two Koreas because of several domestic political problems but, after being convinced by Stalin and Kim Il-Sung in a sort of fulfilment of the communist ideal, China eventually joined the Soviet Union as North Korea’s main ally in the war (Kim, 2018). During the years of the conflict and the subsequent division of the two Koreas, the Sino-Korean economic, political and military cooperation in support of Pyongyang was thus confirmed. In the 1970s, China and North Korea began implementing bilateral plans for defence cooperation, which also included the development of ballistic missiles. Coverseley, the 1980s were marked by a progressive political detachment of China, due to the reform and opening policies of Deng Xiaoping that led to a new era of diplomatic détente and rapprochement between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, thus embracing opposing ideals to the anti-imperialist view of Pyongyang.
The third international actor that contributed to the development of the North Korean nuclear sector was Pakistan, which emerged as an important military collaborator especially in the Seventies and Eighties, though in a more marginal way than Russia and China. Although trade relations between North Korea and Pakistan had begun in the early 1970s, the official documents of strategic cooperation between the two states were not signed until 1976, when Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited North Korea. Since then, Pakistan and Korea have been jointly engaged in the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology.
As a matter of fact, during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, North Korea and Pakistan started working together in order to support Iran both through the exchange of oil and arms and by deepening bilateral technological trade, especially concerning the design of ballistic missiles and the purchase of equipment to enrich uranium. Moreover, according to some scholars, Pakistani know-how on nuclear fusion and fission mechanisms is likely to have been furnished to Pyongyang in exchange for North Korean missile technology (Laufer, 2005).
To sum up, the 1980s marked a turning point for North Korea in the development of its nuclear program, as its main political and military allies left it alone. In other words, the USSR and China started orienting towards a new phase of political opening of détente with the USA. The need to defend against the United States and South Korea, which was supported by Washington, became then the main justification to the increasingly systematic commitment of nuclear power development and its employment in the military sector.
North Korea’s nuclear and military capabilities.
North Korea has ranked 1st in military spending as percentage of GDP in the period 2007-2017 as reported by the State Department’s World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2019 report. The report estimated that North Korea spent between 21.9% and 24.4% of GDP each year between 2007 and 2017. This trend was confirmed also in the following years thus making defence spending a priority for the regime.
Indeed, at his 8th Party Congress in January 2021, Kim Jong-Un stressed that the two main goals of North Korea in 2022 are internal economic stability and nuclear development.
These two goals have been simultaneously pursued by the regime for decades as part of the so-called byungin principle, a dual policy re-emphasized by Kim Jong-Un in 2013 at a meeting of the Korean Workers Party.
While with Kim Jong-il nuclear development was prioritised, in 2018, Kim Jong-un stated that the dual goals had been achieved and that the focus would be on economic development from then on (Jo, 2020). However, this was not the case with government spending on defence not being reduced despite the 2018’s “Socialist Economic Construction Plan” and the “National Economic Development Strategy ''. Moreover, “Kim’s December 2019 declaration on strategic weapons development suggests that for the near term at least, nuclear weapons development will be a priority again for defence expenditure and the state” (Jo, 2020).
“Taken together, his remarks at the January 2021 Party Congress and December 2021 Party Plenum suggest that North Korea will be inward focused this year, prioritising internal stability and advanced nuclear weapons development” (Kim, 2022) and this means that in 2022 too, despite the global recession caused by the pandemic and the consequences of the international sanctions imposed on the country, Kim Jong Un re-stated strategic weapons development as the country’s priority alongside economic recovery.
The commitment toward the manufacturing and development of new weapons has also been demonstrated by the numerous weapons tests performed by the country with 9 ballistic missiles having been launched since the beginning of 2022.
In light of the impressive military spending by the country, what are North Korea’s military capabilities?
Nuclear capabilities
North Korea has conducted 6 nuclear tests since 2006 with the most recent having taken place in 2017 and with each of the tests producing increasingly higher blasts. The very first test was conducted in 2006 but did not produce a high yield which appeared to be less than 1 kiloton (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2018).
On November 2009, after several failed negotiations over North Korea’s denuclearization, the second nuclear test was performed and estimates showed that the blast caused a 4.7 magnitude earthquake while the yield of the explosion ranged between 2 about 7 kilotons, about 5 times stronger than the previous test (Fedchecnko, 2009).
The following year North Korea also announced the construction of a 30 MWe light-water reactor, a thermal-neutron reactor that uses normal water instead of heavy water as coolant and neutron moderator (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2018). On Feb 2013, North Korea conducted its 3rd nuclear test and claimed to have tested a miniaturized atomic bomb which allowed nuclear weapons to be loaded onto long-range missiles and posed a bigger threat to North Korea’s neighbors as well as countries all over the world. According to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, the test caused a 4.9 magnitude earthquake and produced a yield of two to six kilotons, twice as much as the 2009 test (Davenport, 2013). In 2016 the fourth test was conducted and experts found that the yield was similar to that of 2013 while North Korea claimed to have used a hydrogen bomb. However, experts believed it was more likely that the country tested a boosted fission device demonstrating North Korea’s increased efficiency (Philipp, 2016).
In September 2016, the fifth test was carried out and produced a 5.1 magnitude earthquake with a yield that was larger than all the previous tests ranging between 10 and 20 kilotons (Davenport, 2016). So large was the yield that also China, North Korea’s only ally condemned the act.
In 2017 the last nuclear test to date was performed at Punggye-ri, delivering the highest explosive yield by then with 140-250 kilotons. The test was of thermonuclear warhead, according to North Korea’s claims and “a yield of 100 kilotons would make the test six times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945” (BBC, 2022).
According to a RAND Corporation report from 2021, North Korea could have around two hundred nuclear weapons and the “regime possesses the know-how to produce nuclear bombs with weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, the primary elements required for making fissile material” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
North Korean nuclear research started in the 1950s and it built different nuclear facilities since then in Yongbyon, Punggye-ri, Pyongsan, Pankcon, Sinpo, Taechon with core facilities believed to be located at Yongbyon. This nuclear reactor began operating in 1986 and had an electrical power rating of 5 MWe and it also featured a reprocessing plant able to separate plutonium from the reactor’s spent fuel (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2021)
It is in Yongbyon that North Korea decided to restart its nuclear activities in 2021, at least, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has been relying on satellite images for its reports since 2009, when it was expelled by the regime. The fact that “the reactor has been discharging cooling water since July” (Bicker, 2021) suggests its activity and this was the first sign of its operational activity since 2018 when the denuclearization negotiations between Trump and Kim Jong-un failed. More recent images captured signs of reconstruction of facilities at the Punggye-ri site which was shot and some parts were blown up in 2018, when Kim Jong-un pledged to stop all nuclear tests and activities. Yet, analysts interpreted these signs of new activity as “preliminary” and that it would take several months before the site can be used to conduct nuclear tests.
Ballistic Missiles
North Korea has manufactured and tested short-, medium, intermediate- and intercontinental-range missiles and has established a nuclear-armed ballistic missile force, the Strategic Force.
It has short-range ballistic missiles such as Scud B/C, Scud ER, and unmanned SRMB variants able to reach a maximum range of 1000 km and hit South Korea or Japan. The No Dong and the Pukguksong-2 , on the contrary, have a medium range and can reach Japan.
As for the intermediate-range ballistic missiles, North Korea possesses the Hwasong-10, able to reach up to 3000 km and the Hwasong-12 with a range of 4,500 km, able to reach US military bases on the Pacific Islands.
Apart from road-mobile deployment mode missiles, the country has manufactured and tested submarine-launched ballistic missiles such as the Pukguksong-1,3,4 and 5.
The Hwasong-14 and 15 belong to the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with a maximum range of 12.000 km as well as the Unmanned ICBM and Unmanned larger ICBM, both with an intercontinental range (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2021), putting the entire US within its range and capable of dropping a nuclear weapon anywhere in the US. After testing the Hwasong-15 back in 2017, Kim Jong-un stated that North Korea had completed its nuclear development and proposed to halt the testing of intercontinental missiles.
Not only North Korea does possess a rich inventory of ballistic missiles but it is also one of the greatest exporters of components of ballistic missiles and “although initially dependent on foreign assistance, notably from the former Soviet Union and China, the program has become almost completely indigenous in materials and expertise” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2021).
Biological and chemical weapons
Apart from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, North Korea has invested in and manufactured both biological and chemical weapons. However, the international community has overlooked this type of weapons of mass destruction because of the repeated nuclear and ballistic missiles tests that the country carried out. Indeed, while the country has declared publicly its intention to become a nuclear power several times, it has never mentioned its will to produce biological and chemical weapons which, if used on a large scale can cause thousands of deaths and have other remarkable socio-economic consequences. Moreover, identifying and monitoring the production of biological or chemical weapons is quite hard because “while nuclear programs can be monitored by the number of nuclear tests and the success of missile tests, weaponizing and cultivating pathogens can stay invisible behind closed doors” (Philipp, Kim, Chung, 2017). The low amount of information available when it comes to possible biological or chemical weapons results in a “low threat perception that may undermine preparation and response efforts” (Philipp, Kim, Chung, 2017).
According to South Korean sources, the outbreaks of cholera, typhus, typhoid, and smallpox during the Korean War, encouraged North Korea to pursue a BW program and began weaponizing biological agents in the 1980s. It is difficult to assess North Korea’s Biological Weapons Capability, however, different reports and sources show that North Korea is in possession of several pathogens such as anthrax, smallpox, botulism, cholera, Korean Hemorrhagic fever, plague, Typhoid fever, Yellow fever, Dysentery, brucellosis, staph, typhus fever, alimentary toxic aleukia (Philipp, Kim, Chung, 2017).
It is also believed that North Korea possesses the facilities to weaponize such agents albeit it is difficult to draw such conclusions because of the dual-use nature of facilities used for producing BWs. Indeed, the pictures of Kim Jong-un posing at Pyongyang’s bio-technical institute with military personnel have been interpreted as a message to the international community that the country had an active bioweapons program and pointed at the laboratory’s dual-use. Moreover, despite the fact that the country is a signatory of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention and became part of the Geneva Protocol in 1988, U.S intelligence sources believe that North Korea is capable of producing biological weapons.
On the contrary, North Korea is not party to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention which not only prohibits the use of chemical weapons during wartime but also prohibits the production and stockpiling. North Korea’s chemical weapons program dates back to 1954 and Pyongyang has acquired mustard, phosgene, sarin and V-type chemical agents (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2021). While the country keeps denying the possession of chemical weapons, it is believed that North Korea, due to its CW stockpiles, is among the world largest possessors of chemical weapons. Indeed, according to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, North Korea possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of CW, it has 11 facilities where chemical weapons are produced and 13 research and development centers (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2021). Moreover, North Korea is thought to be able to use these CW agents through ballistic missiles such as the Scud, the Nodong and long-range missiles and this poses a significant threat to countries all over the world.
Conclusion
The development of the North Korean nuclear programme is the result of a long-term project launched several decades ago. At the heart of the North Korean political culture, which started developing at the dawn of the Korean War, are the principles established by the Great Leader Kim Il-Sung, notably the survival and liberation of the homeland. In order to achieve these goals, the enemy to defeat was identified with imperialism and embodied in US power. An integral part of the process to achieve the survival and liberation of North Korea was found in proactive aggressive military action, which would later lead to the occupation of much of the Korean peninsula, until the arrival of the United States and the subsequent division of the territory. With a view to defend its motherland, North Korean leadership introduced a strategic weapons development programme based on four pillars: the missile program, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and nuclear weapons. The same concept of constant modernization in relation to the development of military programs was also imparted by Kim Il-Sung. Even after several decades, his successor Kim Jong-Un, being a descendent of the Kim dynasty, continued pursuing the same goals by making military spending the centre of his political programme. Although current relations between the two Koreas oscillate between moments of dialogue and hardening of diplomatic relations, the political motivations behind the military investments of the Kim dynasty - and therefore the development of nuclear power - remain the cornerstone of North Korean decisions. For instance, North Korea’s sporadic overtures such as de-nuclearization, despite being wrongly perceived as a success of occidental diplomatic efforts, might have hidden aims such as extracting international economic concessions due to its significant domestic challenges. At the foundation of North Korean political strategy, however, seems to be the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to be used as the main tool to achieve strategic autonomy while obtaining a deterrent against the perceived threat of South Korea, and - by extension - of the United States.
After a period of negotiations with the United States and South Korea in which North Korea pledged to halt nuclear development, the recent missile tests along with the reported re-starting of some nuclear facilities suggests that North Korea is committed to nuclear development. This was also confirmed by the share of GDP spent on defence in the years 2018-2020 and by Kim Jong-un public statements. Kim Jong-un's regime has so tested increasingly dangerous nuclear weapons and has tested missiles with a range that can reach its regional rivals such as South Korea and Japan but also the United States. However, while focusing on North Korea's nuclear programme, the international community should not neglect the fact that North Korea is also the main exporter of ballistic missiles components and should keep track of North Korea's relations with other key state and non-state actors.
The development of nuclear weapons in North Korea is not only a long-term project which benefited from too many investments over time to simply be shelved after international directives, but it is also the pillar on which the very existence of the modern North Korean state is based. For these reasons Pyongyang, by virtue of the centrality of its nuclear programmes, will continue to pose a threat to peace in the region.
Moreover, while the international community has been focused on North Korea's nuclear programme as demonstrated by the numerous denuclearization talks and initiatives, the country's biological and chemical weapons capabilities should not be overlooked. The spread of Covid-19 has shown the social, political and economic effects of a pandemic and this may encourage North Korea to further invest on this type of weapons while appearing to be only focused on nuclear development.
Contenuto dell’Informazione | ||
1 | Confermata | Confermato da altre fonti indipendenti; logico in sé; coerente con altre informazioni sull’argomento |
2 | Presumibilmente Vera | Non confermato; logico in sé; consistente con altre informazioni sull’argomento. |
3 | Forse Vera | Non confermato; ragionevolmente logico in sé; concorda con alcune altre informazioni sull’argomento |
4 | Incerta | Non confermato; possibile ma non logico in sé; non ci sono altre informazioni sull’argomento |
5 | Improbabile | Non confermato; non logico in sé; contraddetto da altre informazioni sul soggetto. |
6 | Non giudicabile | Non esiste alcuna base per valutare la validità dell’informazione. |
Affidabilità della fonte | ||
A | Affidabile | Nessun dubbio di autenticità, affidabilità o competenza; ha una storia di completa affidabilità. |
B | Normalmente Affidabile | Piccoli dubbi di autenticità, affidabilità, o competenza, tuttavia ha una storia di informazioni valide nella maggior parte dei casi. |
C | Abbastanza Affidabile | Dubbio di autenticità, affidabilità o competenza; tuttavia, in passato ha fornito informazioni valide. |
D | Normalmente non Affidabile | Dubbio significativo sull'autenticità, affidabilità o competenza, tuttavia in passato ha fornito informazioni valide. |
E | Inaffidabile | Mancanza di autenticità, affidabilità e competenza; storia di informazioni non valide. |
F | Non giudicabile | Non esiste alcuna base per valutare l’affidabilità della fonte. |
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