Peace-Building in the Horn of Africa: the Somali Electoral System

  Focus - Allegati
  19 July 2022
  19 minutes, 34 seconds

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of the Somali electoral system, in the framework of the post-conflict political transition.

Firstly, an historical analysis is provided, in order to better understand the current situation in the country.

Secondly, the electoral law in place is assessed, underlying its peculiarity. The assessment of its uniqueness is second to an analysis of the development of the electoral system over the years.

Thirdly, an assessment of the challenges that the electoral system and the peace-building process are facing is provided. Specifically, the focus is on socio-political issues as well as insecurity, analyzing the role played by al-Shabab.

Authors:

Giulia Tessadri - Head Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Politics

Simone Mezzabotta - Junior Researcher, Mondo Internazionale G.E.O. Politics

I History

Somalia became independent in 1960, incorporating both the Italian controlled territories - under a United Nations trusteeship and the British protectorate. Soon after, difficulties emerged as well as dynamics related to the Cold War.

A coalition between the southern-based Somali Youth League (SYL) and the northern-based Somali National League (SNL) formed the first government since independence. The topic of the unification was crucial both internally and externally, thus addressing the status of the Ogaden, French Somaliland and northern Kenya. The government strongly backed the Somali communities in Kenya in their attempt to obtain self-determination. Moreover, in 1963 a confrontation with Ethiopia took place. Somalia became close to the Soviet Union, since the United States is supporting Ethiopia.

In 1967 a new government led by Cigaal was established, yet in 1969 a coup led by General Siad Barre established a military regime. The origins of the conflict are to be found in clan crashes that define the base of the Somali society. A failed coup in 1978 led to the creation of two opposition clan groups: the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) - supported by the Majeerteen clan- and the Somali National Movement (SNM) - by the Isaaq clan (Britannica). Throughout the year there was an increase in the number of opposition groups. In 1991 the United Somali Congress led an uprising that caused the eventual fall of Barre, followed by the outbreak of the civil war. In the same year, the SNV declared null the federation as established in 1960, thus declaring its independence as the Republic of Somaliland. Shortly after, violent clashes occurred in the country, leading to devastation, especially in the areas that produced grain and therefore to famine. In 1992, the UN operated to restore peace in an enormous peacemaking operation. In 1993 peace and disarmament treaties were signed in Addis Ababa. However, the situation deteriorated some months later leading to the withdrawal of many peacekeeping forces in 1994 and leaving both the clan-based violence and the war unsolved. Several unsuccessful attempts to restore peace followed, yet the war continued. In 1998, the area controlled by the SSDF called Puntland declared its self-government and autonomy, in contrast to the Republic of Somaliland that aimed at its independence.

More peace talks followed, leading to the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) - a new transitional government - and a transitional Parliament was established in 2004. In the same year, Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed was elected as the new President, but the government was based in Kenya due to security reasons. In 2006 the Islamic Courts union (ICU) - a political association of Islamic courts founded in 2006 to tackle the lawlessness of the post-Siad Barre era - took control of the capital and southern areas, questioning the legitimacy of the TFG (Ibidem). In 2007 the SICC - ICU’s new name - lost control of Mogadishu. Despite this, al-Shabah was increasing its power in the country. Moreover, in the same year a second international mission authorized by the African Union took place, yet with limited results, with warfare and famine devastating the country.

In 2008 President Yusuf terminated its position amid increasing criticism. In 2009 Sheikh Ahmed - a moderate Islamist - was elected as President. It is also worth mentioning that in 2009 the transitional Parliament opted to adopt Shari’a in the country, in order to gain support from the ICU/SICC (Ibidem). In 2012 a constitution was adopted, since the transitional government was about to expire. In the same year, the elections established Hassan Sheik Mohamud as President. In 2015 Mohamud announced that elections would have not taken place in 2016 as regulated, due to security issues related to al-Shabab. This move led to an increase of international concern. Consequently, a motion of impeachment was raised against him by the Parliament. In 2017 new elections took place and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed was elected as President after winning over Mohamud.

It is possible to notice how the situation in the country has not been solved, despite many peacekeeping efforts. Despite this, Somaliland and Puntland reached a form of stability (Treccani).

In February 2021, Mohamed’s presidency came to an end and soon after, the House of the People voted to extend by two years the Parliament and President for two more years. This move was highly criticized, causing the President to drop the extension law. The elections took place on May 15, 2022 amid deep security concerns. The main candidates were President Mohamed and former President Mohamud, with the latter winning the elections.



II Somalia electoral system

Countries that have become independent recently and are recovering from an internal conflict should define an efficient electoral system. This step is important in order to limit threats that could potentially affect stability. It is also worth mentioning that Somalia was the first country in Africa to introduce direct universal suffrage (Waal, 2022). However, it did not last long as it terminated in 1969.

In 1959 - a year before independence - Somalia elected 90 deputies on a base of 30 political districts located in the Trust territory in a closed list according to a system of proportional representation. In 1960 Somaliland adopted the first past the post voting model - voters express their vote for a candidate and the one that receives the most votes wins - electing 33 deputies. Shortly after, the unification of the two parliaments took place, thus forming the new born Somali Republic. Later on - until 1969 - Somalia adopted a closed list proportional representation, raising the number of political districts. Moreover, between 1964 and 1967 multiparty elections took place, eventually shifting towards a winner-take-all system (Elmi, 2021). Moreover, in 1968 a law intended to decrease the smaller political parties though a threshold was introduced.

Between 1969 and 1976 in Somalia there was a military regime and until 1991 a one-party dictatorship. Until the establishment of the new Republic in 2000, the system was based on a clan power sharing system. The main four clans received equal shares of seats, while other clans received almost half. This system is often referred to as the 4.5 clan based power sharing formula. Moreover, a democratic state was introduced, thus not securing any extension of the mandates (Ibidem, 2021).

The Transitional Federal Government, that followed the Transitional National Government (200-2004), became the second interim administration. Its goal was to build the institutions of the country. The TFG lasted until 2012. While the mandate was about to expire, the State was still designing the new foundations. In the same year, a constitution based on a federal system was adopted in order to solve all the issues. In the lower house - the House of the People - 275 members are elected every four years by delegates representing the different clans in the country (Kavak, 2022).

The goal to hold direct elections in 2016 proved to be too challenging, therefore opting for indirect elections that took place in 2017. The architecture of the new system consisted in the creation of 275 electoral colleges with 51 delegates each, appointed by the elders of Somalia’s clans (Britannica). Every electoral college voted for one of the 275 members of the House of People. The 54 members of the upper house were appointed by State councils and the President was to be appointed by the members of the Parliament. Specifically, more than 20 people were candidates and the system foresaw the top voted candidates advancing to the next round.

The 2017 elections proved to be extremely complicated and controversial, due to human rights violations and widespread violence. In particular, thirteen clan elders and two electoral delegates were killed (Waal, 2022). In addition, strong evidence of electoral malpractice were denounced as well as a strong degree of political corruption, which negatively affected the integrity and legitimacy of the electoral process. However, a debate on the choice of electoral system formally started in the summer of 2017.

An agreement on a new electoral system proved to be extremely difficult to reach. The goal of the following elections - set for 2020 - was to hold direct elections of the Parliament members and the President and to assure the one-person-one-vote principle. Both goals failed to be implemented, partially due to security issues. In addition, despite the expansion of citizens involved, participation was still limited due to a too high price of the registration fee - doubled - for candidates (Wall, 2022). Running in the elections is thus very limited to those who can afford to pay such a price, in a country shattered by famine, war and natural disasters. Moreover, the goal was also to grant a 30% of representation to women, who have been playing a marginal role in the Somali governments.

Proposals to establish a proportion representation in order to increase smaller groups representation arose. Despite this, a first-past-the-post voting model with the country divided into 275 clan constituencies was adopted (Elmi, 2021).

It is clear that steps have to be taken in order to guarantee a proper functioning electoral system. In order to guarantee universal suffrage, it is fundamental to build stable political institutions. Moreover, Somalis do not trust government institutions. In addition, the issue of corruption has to be addressed too, since the country ranked 179 out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index in 2020 (Waal, 2022). Therefore, it is necessary to contrast these problems in order to set up efficient government institutions.




III Challenges to the Implementation of the Current Electoral Law

In the peacebuilding process, the electoral system choice is paramount, as it can “determine the means by which votes are translated into seats” (David Farrell, 2018). Nevertheless, “a given electoral system will not necessarily work in the same way in different countries”. Despite some common experiences in different regions of the world, “the effects of a particular type of electoral system depend to a great extent on the socio-political context in which it is used” (Reynolds and al., 2005).

In Somalia, it is important to underline that socio-political analyses need to consider the humanitarian crisis that is gripping the country. Recent estimates put the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance at 7.7 million, with 1.4 million children projected to be acutely malnourished and 4.8 million Somalis experiencing acute food insecurity (Reliefweb, 2022). These figures arguably show that the crisis per se may act as the catalyst of social unrest across the country, de facto amplifying the effects of domestic political instability. More specifically, there are several challenges to the implementation of the current electoral law, which may be divided in two broad categories: socio-political issues and (in)security.

Socio-Political issues

According to the most recent electoral law enacted in February 2020, geographical districts are the recipients of the lower-house seats of the Somali Parliament, with 275 clan-based political districts and another 54 created after the eighteen administrative regions left behind by the military government. Clannish dispersion across Somalia and criticism over the military government’s creation of districts and regions represent a serious political threat to the correct implementation of the current electoral law.

Notwithstanding the chronic exclusion of some people from recent Somali politics, three groups are particularly affected by the latest electoral law. Firstly, women’s political representation may be significantly reduced as a consequence of the Somali patriarchal tribal culture that is the cornerstone of the electoral system. It is important to underline that, as part of the democratisation process, the gender quota (30%) established by the Parliament is far from attained, with 19.71% of current Somali MPs that are women (Ipu Parline).

Secondly, the new electoral law seems to be silent on the Somali diaspora – or Qurbajoogta. This term refers to Somali citizens that fled the country either during the military government or right after its fall and, from abroad, significantly contribute to every sector of society. In 2015, the UN estimated that almost two million people from Somalia were living outside the country’s borders (UNDESA, 2015) and, according to the World Bank, the total amount of personal remittances received by those that are still living in the country was roughly a fourth of Somali GDP in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

Finally, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) appear to be, by design, ignored by the geography-based electoral law, which, in turn, affects the IDPs’ participation in the election process and their political representation. As of the end of February 2022, almost three million Somalis were internally displaced, two-thirds of which were located in the South Central part.

(In)security

Regardless of the electoral law in place, security is key for the smooth functioning of the system. In Somalia, higher levels of insecurity among the population seems to be positively correlated with the rise of Al-Shabaab (‘the youth’ or ‘the boys’ in Arabic), a militant Islamist group founded and based in the country. The group was initially part of the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which, in 2006, gained power in Mogadishu. Soon after, the then Ethiopian PM Meles Zenawi started to see them as a threat for Ethiopia and, thus, decided to deploy his forces to Somalia to eradicate them. Whereas the ICU leadership went into exile, the fighters affiliated to the group fought for three years by means of guerrilla tactics and a violent public campaign that labeled international actors as “crusaders” or “invaders”.

Since the Ethiopians withdrew in 2009, they have shown to be an organised militia force that is capable of conducting terror attacks both within Somalia and in the broader region, with Kenya and Uganda as frequent targets. One of their long-term strategic objectives seems to be the realisation of their vision of Greater Somalia, which includes the North Eastern Province in Kenya and the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. At its peak in 2011, Al-Shabaab seized parts of Mogadishu and the port of Kismayo, which is the commercial capital of the Jubaland region, in the southern part of Somalia . Kenyan troops, operating as part of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), fought to push the group out of most of its strongholds. Al-Shabaab regards the Salafi-Jihadi ideology as the best means to achieve their objectives, and, hence, the merger with Al Quaeda in 2012 is seen as the symbol of the international terror recognition that the militia group had gained, with recruits from all around the world.

Arguably, Al-Shabaab represents a challenge in the implementation of the current electoral law in two direct ways. Firstly, the law is silent on how Somalis living in areas controlled by the group can participate in the elections. Throughout the years, the militia group managed to seize and administer territories in southern and central Somalia that allowed them to devise operational plans, train their fighters, and generate resources to finance their operations. In these areas, their mode of governance consists in imposing their version of Sharia Law, with the creation of an ad hoc administration that is tasked with overseeing its implementation. For the population living under their rule, security concerns may affect the opportunity cost of going to the ballots, should the universal suffrage be introduced, or being elected to represent the people.

Secondly, the group has also conducted several attacks on civilians in Somalia, which may contribute to the overall, widespread sense of insecurity. In light of the current first-past-the-post electoral system based on the 4.5 clan-based power-sharing model, insecurity may fuel corruption of MPs, who may be willing to negotiate their own safety with Al-Shabaab in exchange for money or political favours. Although their attacks are mostly concentrated in Somalia, it is also important to underline that the group has stricken cities abroad. For instance, the Ugandan capital of Kampala and the Kenyan capital of Nairobi were both targeted multiple times, in retaliation for their involvement in Somalia. For the same reason, they also targeted the Garissa University in eastern Kenya in 2015, which left almost 150 people dead and 79 injured, mostly students.

IV Conclusion: A Provisional Analysis

The victory of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in May came after a political hiatus of more than thirteen months. In several interviews prior to the elections the Somali President set various goals for his mandate, including addressing climate change, reforming the economy, and reconciliation. Nonetheless, security is likely to remain Somalis’ top priority in the short-to-medium term. Arguably, President Hassan Sheikh’s popularity is somewhat dependent on his capability to counter Al-Shabaab, deemed as the biggest threat by the population. Overall, the militia group seems to thrive in areas where conflict perdures among local actors or between local authorities and the federal government.

Hence, a strong security sector and local stabilisation may be particularly effective in the fight against Al-Shabaab. With an eye to the former, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), in collaboration Together with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), has established the Integrated Security Sector Reform (I-SSR) Section. Its role is to advise and technically support the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States-led security sector reforms. Among the I-SSR Section’s focus areas, Security Sector Governance may be key to counter the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. The goal of the Joint Security Sector Governance Programme (JSSGP) is capacity building so that it delivers increased civilian oversight of security sector reforms.

President Biden’s recent order authorising the military to re-deploy hundreds of Special Operation Forces inside Somalia came as part of a US strategy to contain Al Shabaab by suppressing its ability to devise and execute difficult operations. Whereas the US also plans to guarantee security to Somalis, their re-deployment may be counter-productive in the long run unless they coordinate with the I-SSR Section and empower local security officers. In fact, Al-Shabaab may exploit the US presence in a propagandistic manner to attract new recruits and motivate its fighters, as Al-Qaeda did in many other conflict-prone zones in the Middle East. According to Sarah Harrison, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, “[s]ending in more U.S. troops and honing in on a small number of senior Al-Shabab leadership […] cannot end the broader military fight absent more concerted and effective diplomatic and political efforts by the United States and others''. (Savage, Schmitt, 2022)

Finally, the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis is likely to make President Hassan Sheik turn towards the international community for food and financial assistance. Access to both government-controlled areas and areas under the rule of Al-Shabaab is key for the bonne réussite of any humanitarian operation. Given the experience of international actors operating in Somalia in ensuring that all Somalis get access to humanitarian aid, it is not implausible to assume that the President might turn to these NGOs to advance local stabilisation while helping the population out of the crisis. Arguably, the Somali road to democracy and universal suffrage has been marred with security threats and humanitarian disasters, which President Hassan Sheikh, at least on paper, seems determined to contain.


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